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Domestic and foreign observers as well as most Indonesians 
nowadays upheld the notion that Sundanese Muslims are more 
observant than the Javanese which suggests that Sundanese society 
is also more Islamic than its Javanese counterpart. This notion may 
be interpreted in various ways. If we look at the historical 
development of the West Javanese religious setting, this perception is 
not entirely off the mark. In the past, the Sundanese have observed 
their religion piously,1 but if we adopt strict Islam as the measure to 
look at this development and we remove from Islam all non-Islamic 
elements, we may be forced to conclude that many people in West 
Java have only just recently turned ‘real’ Islamic. Before that they 
were Muslims but not quite as observant of ‘pure’ Islam as often 
perceived. Some of them indeed observed the performance of the five 
pillars of Islam but at the same time they observed adat practices not 
rooted in the Quran and the hadith. 
This perception is interesting but more interesting is why it is 
important that the Sundanese need to be considered as being 
Islamic? Or why the Sundanese were, and are perceived as Islamic? 
In this book I attempt to show that the question can only be 
answered by understanding the intimate relationships between 
Islam and Sunda2 in the way the Sundanese observe their religion. 
We shall see how Islam and Sunda as different cultural categories 
negotiate their places among Sundanese society. By doing so we may 
discover the elements that unite Islam and Sunda (adat) and what 
reasons - for instance fear of Communism, changing government 
                                                          
1  Th. van den End, Sumber-Sumber Zending tentang Sejarah Gereja di Jawa 
Barat 1858-1963 (translated from History of Dutch missions of Christian 
Churches in Jawa Barat Province 1858-1963) (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 
2006), p. 159. 
2  The term ‘Sunda’ is used in this book in this context to denote Sundanese 
adat, culture and religious pre-Islamic beliefs. 
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policies and increased Islamisation - may be responsible for the 
disintegration of this unity. 
This study aims to show how Islamisation took place and how 
it was contested and negotiated. I will do so by discussing religions, 
Sundanese culture, adat and politics as important variants. This 
study also discusses how dramatic political changes caused religious 
changes and how these caused cultural, political and social changes. 
This means that readers will be presented with the dialectics 
between Islamisation and other faiths in which political contexts 
played important roles. 
 
Hypotheses  
This study not only analyses the negotiations and the relations 
between Sunda and Islam, but also intends to examine the conflicts 
between Islam and other faiths, especially Aliran Kebatinan (AK), as a 
unified religious system, and Christianity. This study departs from 
the working hypothesis that there is always a coherent dialectics 
between cultural categories in society on the one hand, and 
negotiations between the state and these cultural categories, on the 
other. There is a continuous and intimate negotiation process 
between Islamisation and the indigenous Aliran Kebatinan, Islam and 
Christianity, and Islam and Christianity in tandem against the Aliran 
Kebatinan. In this book I demonstrate when the unified religious 
system in West Java was threatened. I pay attention to Islam and 
Aliran Kebatinan as important parts of the religious and cultural 
setting of Sundanese society because the Sundanese used to think in 
terms of Islam, culture and adat. Contrarily, some Muslim Sundanese, 
especially Modernists, Revivalists, and Islamists, now think that 
when they violate Islamic norms, local norms should be replaced by 
Islamic ones. This put pressure on the adherents of adat and changed 
their perception to thinking that Islam, imported from Arabia, was 
something harmful to their identity. The findings of this research 
suggest that shifting political contexts cause social and cultural 
changes in society. These changes are the results of negotiations and 
adjustments necessary for the formation of a new political agenda 
distinct from that of the previous political set-up. In both, the state 
and religious leaders play a crucial role. I am convinced that a clear 
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picture of the political, social, and religious processes that instigate 
and sustain these changes is vital for understanding how these 
changes may lead to social integration, disintegration and conflict. 
 
Organisation of this Book 
Chapter One provides the historical background of the negotiation 
and dialectical relationships between Islam and other faiths and how 
these relationships influenced each other. This chapter seeks to 
demonstrate the significance of religious practices and how adat, 
mysticism and myths were well preserved within these practices 
ultimately shaping a distinct Sundanese religious identity. It also 
analyses the history of the integration, interaction and contest of 
Islam and other beliefs in Sundanese society. In discussing the origins 
of Christianity in the area, for example, I observed the formation of 
the Christian communities and how they flourished across West Java. 
Chapter Two observes what reasons factored behind the rise of 
anti-Islamic sentiments and analyses how these sentiments 
challenged religious visions. Readers should keep in mind that anti-
Islamic sentiments were not caused by fear of Islam as a faith. Rather, 
this negative sentiment seemed to be the consequence of reinforcing 
Islam as an ideology and a totalitarian way of life. Persatuan Islam 
(PERSIS, Islamic Union) leaders insisted on the importance of a 
purified tradition and thus called upon Muslims to strictly and 
exclusively abide to the Quran and the Prophetic tradition (Sunnah). 
In this tradition adat no longer had any place and thus was excluded 
from it. This social setting sparked signs of antagonism toward Islam 
especially opposition led by Aliran Kebatinan leaders. They 
condemned Muslims’ intolerance that harmed the existing tradition. 
Despite this opposition, Islamisation continued. 
Chapter Three questions how the New Order regime sought 
total control over society through the politics it adopted, on the one 
hand, and facilitated Dakwahism and missionarism on the other in 
the end causing religious and social changes. While the authoritarian 
regime successfully imposed a political straightjacket on society, 
Dakwahists addressed the religious and spiritual needs in society and 
channelled its political aspirations through social and cultural 
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projects. This injected a sense of urgency into both Islamisation and 
Christianisation, which in turn saw the increased presence of Islamic 
activists and Christian evangelists. What I am concerned with is how 
the rise of religious activism, producing Islamism and evangelism, 
brought about rivalry and conflict between Muslims and Christians. 
From the Muslim perspective, I observed the way the cultural 
dimension of religion increasingly became significant when the 
political aspects of religion dwindled. In this context I demonstrate 
the way politics caused religious changes and how religious changes 
caused social and political changes. 
Chapter Four is to answer questions about the role educated 
Muslims played in changing society; that is how Muslim students of 
the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) Islamised their fellow 
secular students and by so doing promoted a dramatic shift in the 
campus’s sosio-religious environment. The Salman mosque was 
selected as a case study to explore how its dakwah project initiatives 
gained significance and ultimately succeeded in not only changing 
the student’s world view but also that of society at large. 
As Chapter Four deals largely with a more urban phenomenon, 
Chapter Five discusses the dialectics and contest of Islam with the 
Aliran Kebatinan in rural Lembang. It examines the process of 
Islamisation and answers the question of how Islam entered rural 
areas and built its institutions. This chapter goes back briefly to the 
development of Islamic institutions from the 1950s in three different 
villages across rural Lembang and discusses the effects of dakwah 
institutions and organisations on deeper Islamisation. 
Chapter Six observes Christianity’s upsurge and Muslim 
activists’ response to it. What I emphasise in this part is that non-
Sundanese and non-Muslim ethnic and religious attitudes (Chinese, 
Batak and Christianity) turned into reasons for tension and conflict 
between Muslims and Christians. It seems obvious that Muslims 
voiced their protests against what they called Christianisation, which 
involved Chinese and Batak Christians in Bekasi. I address the issue 
whether this conflict is primarily ethnic or religiously inspired or 








This study focuses on three important variants: Islam, Aliran 
Kebatinan and Christianity. Please bear in mind that you will 
continue to encounter these three categories in all the chapters of 
this book because they are at the centre of this dissertation. This 
study covers only a particular period of time, that is from the early 
twentieth century to the present, with an emphasis on the period 
after 1965. The book presents historical reviews in Chapters One and 
Two to demonstrate the continuity of and changes in the Islamisation 
processes. Since Muslim society consists of various different groups, I 
included local-level case studies which were strategically selected. 
Thus, to mention some examples here, I studied Aliran Kebatinan in 
Lembang, Sumedang, Subang and Kuningan. Student’s increased 
involvement in Islam was studied in Bandung at the ITB campus. 
Conflicts between Islam and Christianity were observed in Bekasi. 
The integration of Christianity in Sundanese society was studied in 
Cianjur while conflicts between Islam and Aliran Kebatinan were 
studied in Sumedang and Subang. 
 
Literature 
The historical part of this study as presented in Chapters One and 
Two refers primarily to the works of the following leading scholars: 
Ricklefs, Van Bruinessen, Steenbrink, Hefner, Van Dijk, Wessing, 
Rinkes, Pijper, Lombard, Van den End, Lubis, Ekadjati and many 
others. Their observations on the issues in this book are important to 
understand Islamisation and its dialectical relations with Aliran 
Kebatinan and Christianity as they developed from the past into 
recent times. From these sources I learned how they understood the 
way Islam spread across West Java and how it was either accepted, 
confronted or opposed. 
Numerous materials have been used to understand how 
PERSIS embraced Islam as an ideology by challenging nationalism, 
Christianity and adat to achieve “the ultimate goal of religious life 
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according to Islamic doctrine”3 They include Federspiel’s Islam and 
Ideology (2001),4 Pijper’s Fragmenta Islamica (1985), Noer’s Gerakan 
Modern Islam (1990),5 Hassan’s Islam & Kebangsaan (1984)6 and so 
on. PERSIS’s claim of Islam as the only true ideology, which implies 
the annihilation of other world visions including Sundanese syncretic 
adat, provoked anti-Islamic sentiments among Sundanese Penghayat, 
the “abangan” of the Sundanese. In understanding social polarisation, 
Ricklefs’ Polarising Javanese Society (2007) is a must read book. He 
argues that the antagonistic relationship between abangan and 
putihan or Javanist and santri dates back only to the nineteenth 
century (1830-1930) after the Revivalists challenged the ‘mystic 
synthesis’ most Javanese commonly accepted.7 Ricklefs’ latest 
publication Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java (2012) sheds an 
even brighter light in understanding the political, social, cultural and 
religious history of Java from 1930 to the present.8 
As this study examines the conflictual and oppositional 
relationship in Sundanese society, particularly between Penghayat 
and Muslims, I had to observe the function of religion in society and 
what the reasons are why religious communities polarise and why at 
certain times and under particular circumstances. Particularly 
relevant here is why the Panghayat opposed the increasing Islamic 
presence. Geertz’ article on “Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese 
Example” (1957) helps in analysing religion in rural Javanese society, 
                                                          
3  G.F. Pijper, Fragmenta Islamica: Beberapa Studi tentang Sejarah Islam di 
Indonesia 1900-1950, translated by Tudjimah and Yessy Augusdin from 
Studiën over de geschiedenis van de Islam in Indonesia 1900-1950 
(Jakarta: UI Press, 1985), p. 127. 
4  Howard M. Federspiel, Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian 
State: The Persatuan Islam (Persis), 1923-1957 (Leiden-Boston-Köln: 
Brill, 2001). 
5  Deliar Noer, Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Jakarta: 
LP3ES, 1990). 
6  A. Hassan, Islam & Kebangsaan (Bangil: Lajnah Penerbitan Pesantren 
Persis, 1984). 
7  M.C. Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions c. 
1830-1930 (Singapore: Singapore University Press; Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press; Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007). 
8  M.C. Ricklefs, Islamisation and its Opponent in Java: A Political, Social, 




“as simple uniformity of religious belief and practice characteristic of 
an earlier period,9” enabling a comparison with the changes as they 
took place in Sundanese society. In this article he discusses why 
belief and ritual that used to function to reinforce “the traditional 
social ties between individuals, through a manner in which the social 
structure of a group is strengthened and perpetuated through the 
ritualistic or mythic symbolization of the underlying social values 
upon which it rests” are disrupted. Geertz argues that this is because 
of what he observed as “an incongruity between the cultural 
framework of meaning and the patterning of social interaction, an 
incongruity due to the persistence in an urban environment of a 
religious symbol system adjusted to peasant social structure.”10 
Hefner studied Islamisation in mountainous Pasuruan, East 
Java in ‘Islamizing Java?: Religion and Politics in Rural East Java’ 
(1987). He analysed how the Javanists, the strongest opponents to 
Islam, turned away from Javanism and embraced Islam after the 
Javanist tradition declined everywhere under the New Order.11 This 
decline was the result of, among others, an increase in dakwah 
activities which progressively became “especially strong in the 
altered political climate under Soeharto, official support from the 
government to Islamisation and the sweeping social changes in rural 
society that caused Islam’s appeal increasingly became relevant for 
                                                          
9  Clifford Geertz, ‘Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example’, American 
Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 59. No. 1 (Feb., 1957), p. 36. 
10  Idem, p. 53. Geertz exemplified his thesis by presenting the story of a 
conflict which is illustrative. The conflict arose during a funeral 
ceremony between Karman, a member of Indonesian Marhaen 
Associaton (Persatuan Marhaen Indonesia; PERMAI), the Penghayat 
political party, and a Modin, a Muslim official authorised to conduct the 
funeral ceremony for Karman’s relative, Paidjan. The funeral was 
disrupted because the Modin who was a member of the Masyumi party, 
refused to lead the rites just after he learned that Paidjan was a PERMAI 
member and thus not considered to be a Muslim. After negotiation, the 
Modin eventually agreed to lead the funeral rite according to Islamic 
law after Karman agreed to produce an official letter that the deceased 
was a Muslim. 
11  Robert W. Hefner, ‘Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East 




its moral depth.”12 This study intends to provide an understanding of 
Islamisation in rural West Java. 
 
Fieldwork 
A leading expert on the study of Islam, H.A.R. Gibb (1895-1971), 
posited that: “...it is not the masses but to the leaders that we must 
look if we are to judge the present tendencies in religious thought.”13 
Based on this I decided no to refer to literature only, but to go into 
the field and I conducted interviews with all sorts of people who 
were witnesses or even key players in the whole process which I am 
describing. By doing so I was able to talk with the respondents face-
to-face. This technique is invaluable especially when one works on a 
specific case study for which primary and secondary sources are rare 
or even unavailable. It is often the case that respondents provided me 
with documents and archives not available in any library. The 
informants were moreover so kind as to advise me what relevant 
persons to interview on certain issues. I conducted interviews in 
Jakarta, Bekasi, Bandung, Lembang, Subang, Sumedang, Kuningan, 
and Ciparay between July 2008 and March 2011. I first went to these 
places in July and November 2008, and again in April and August to 
October following year. In 2010 I did my fieldworks from May to July 
and from October to November. I went to West Java again in January 
and March 2011 to conduct some more interviews. In addition to 
conducting interviews, I also attended anniversaries held by the 
Penghayat in Bandung and made personal visits to their residences 
to exchange thoughts. 
I hope that this study gives its readers the following 
contributions: First, understanding the intimate relationships 
between Islam and Sunda (adat) and the pattern of integrations and 
conflicts between Islam and Aliran Kebatinan. Second, understanding 
the patterns of integrations and conflicts between Islam and 
Christianity in West Java. Third, discovering the importance of the 
dramatic political changes that occurred at the national level for the 
                                                          
12  Idem, p. 549. 
13  Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, VKI Vol. 59. (The 




creation of the political setting for religious adjustments at local 
levels. By focusing on the local, this study seeks to make a scholarly 
contribution towards both local and national policy development, 
particularly in today’s politically decentralised Indonesia. Fourth, this 
study confirms the Islamisation of West Java, namely as “a process of 
deepening commitment to standards of normative Islamic belief, 
practice and religious identity.”14 Moreover, this study discovers the 
important roles played by educated Muslims, both Modernists and 
Traditionalists, and reveals how Islamisation took place and how it 
was contested and negotiated. Fifth, from this study I learned that in 
Sunda, the dynamics of religious resurgence and of social changes 
from below are largely determined by the regime’s political 
programme made to sustain the rulers and to control society. In the 
absence of strong policies on religions, tension and conflict between 
people of different religions will continue to erupt, thus West 
Javanese society will most likely be polarised along religious, and 
maybe, ethnic sentiments unless the state adopts policies designed to 
maintain social harmony in the multicultural society of West Java. 
                                                          












































ISLAMISATION AND OTHER FAITHS IN WEST JAVA 
 
 
In its wonderful natural and cultural setting, West Java has a large diversity 
of religious beliefs and practices. It is predominantly the home of the 
Sundanese ethnic group next to the Javanese and Betawi, most of whom are 
Muslims while the area is also the home of Christian Batak and Chinese 
groups,1 as well as other minority communities such as the Ahmadiyah, 
Shia and plenty of adherents of native beliefs. This religious diversity 
ensures a remarkable plurality among West Javanese society which has 
been its characteristic especially since the 18th century. Most observers of 
Islam in West Java would think that the Sundanese are and have always 
been more religiously observant than the Javanese. Although some among 
these observers such as, for instance, Julian Millie, argue that this 
generalisation “obscures the dramatic variety of understandings and 
conventions visible in West Java’s Islamic currents,”2 this perception is 
understandable because it is derived from the generally accepted social 
identification of the Sundanese with Islam.3 A Dutch missionary, P.N. 
Gijsman, once related that when he first encountered the Sundanese in 
1872 in Sukabumi, he had the impression that for the Sundanese, Islam was 
nothing but a piece of clothing. This means that, at that time, Islam was 
only an outward matter. After a while when he got along with them better, 
he became increasingly convinced that the Sundanese were really 
observant Muslims after all.4 
The Islamisation of West Java is the outcome of at least three 
                                                          
1  Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, Indonesia’s 
Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003). 
2  Julian Millie, Splashed by the saint: Ritual reading and Islamic sanctity in West 
Java (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009), p. 13. 
3  Van den End, Sumber-Sumber Zending, p. 159. 
4  Idem, p. 159. 
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processes. The first is the transformation from the Sundanese Hindu 
Vaisnava realm to an Islamic polity.5 This shift thus enabled the transition 
of political power away from the Hindu Pajajaran Kingdom to the Islamic 
Sultanates of Cirebon and Banten in the sixteenth century.6 That they took 
Islam seriously is, for instance, evident from the fact that from the sixteenth 
until the eighteenth century, Banten enforced shari’ah ruling on apostasy 
and imposed the death penalty on Muslims who abandoned Islam.7 The 
second was that the Islamisation of West Java took place not without 
resistance from Sundanese society but this resistance was not all that 
significant. This is in contradistinction with, for instance, the Islamisation 
of East and Central Java that had faced tremendous challenges from its 
many opponents.8 The third was the relatively easy way in which the 
Sundanese were able to adapt Islamic doctrines and norms to their own, 
age-old worldview and customs.9 
From the start, Sufi orders played an important role in this 
Islamisation process.10 In the nineteenth to twentieth centuries especially 
the Qadiriyah wa Naqshabandiyah Sufi Order (tarekat) expanded rapidly in 
West Java.11 Pesantrens (Islamic boarding schools) along with other Islamic 
propagation (dakwah) institutions played a central role in Islamising West 
                                                          
5  Robert Wessing, ‘A Change in the Forest: Myth and History in West Java’, 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 24, 1 (March 1993), p. 3. 
6  For more general information about this process, see M.C. Ricklefs, A History of 
Modern Indonesia since c. 1200 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, fourth edition, 
2008), pp. 39ff. 
7  The earliest recorded instance of the implementation of the shari’ah involved 
Sangka, an indigenous woman of royal descent who was baptised Helena van 
Bantam, probably in the late seventeenth century, in order to marry a Dutch 
Christian. Her conversion, however, was regarded as riddah (apostasy) in 
Islamic law, for which she was sentenced to death in 1704. See Mufti Ali, 
Misionarisme di Banten (Banten: Laboratorium Bantenologi, IAIN Sultan 
Maulana Hasanuddin, 2009), pp. 45-46. 
8  Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society, pp. 176-213. 
9  E.S. Ekadjati (ed.), ‘Sejarah Sunda’, in Masyarakat Sunda dan Kebudayaannya 
(Jakarta: Girimukti Pusaka, 1984), p. 82; Interview, Prof. Sobana Hardjasaputra, 
Bandung, 15 April 2009. 
10  For a history of the study of Sufism in Indonesia, see Martin van Bruinessen, 
‘Studies of Sufism and the Sufi Orders in Indonesia’, in Die Welt des Islams, New 
Series, Vol. 38, Issue 2 (1998) pp. 192-219. 
11  Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat: Tradisi-Tradisi 
Islam di Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1999), p. 200. 
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Java. The importance of the Islamic school tradition in Indonesia is 
probably most clearly stated by Geertz: ‘...The Muslim educational system is 
the master institution in the perpetuation of Islamic tradition and the 
creation of Islamic society, as well as the locus of the most serious present 
efforts to modernise that tradition and that society’.12 We will come back to 
the last part of this quote furtheron in the book. 
The significance of Islam manifested itself in the Sundanese’ adoption 
of an Islamic identity. This identity was not only Islamic but also included 
aspects of the pre-Islamic Sundanese self. In all, they observed and 
practiced the five pillars (rukun) of Islam, practiced adat and indulged in 
native syncretic creeds and practices. Moreover, they believed in spiritual 
forces. Irrespective of their background the Sundanese were tolerant 
towards Islamic values. Naturally, they were especially tolerant of those 
aspects that could easily be accommodated to Sundanese culture and 
identity. 
Despite the overwhelming presence of Islam, this did not mean that 
other world religions such as Christianity never took roots in Sundanese 
society as well. We will see below that, since the second half of the 
nineteenth century, some non-Islamic Sundanese chose Christianity for a 
variety of economic, social and religious reasons. Of course, the impact of 
the presence of the Colonial power cannot be denied in this process. 
 
Muslim Sundanese and Variety of Islamic Practices 
 
Islamic Pillars, Mysticism and Myth 
Islam is central to the life of the vast majority of the Sundanese. For them, it 
is an obligation to observe religion in daily life which finds its expression in 
their maxim “agama kudu jeung darigama”: Religion (Islam) should be 
observed as a daily obligation.13 This notion materialises in society. That 
Muslims indeed practiced the five pillars of Islam (rukun Islam) is 
evidenced, for instance, in Gijsman’s letter to Dutch Missionary Association 
                                                          
12  Clifford Geertz, ‘Modernization in a Muslim Society: The Indonesian Case’, in 
Robert N. Bellah, Religion and Progress in Modern Asia (New York: The Free 
Press, 1965), pp. 93-108. 
13  A. Suhandi Suhamihardja, ‘Agama, Kepercayaan dan Sistem Pengetahuan’, in 
Edi S. Ekadjati (ed.), Masyarakat dan Kebudayaan Sunda (Bandung: Pusat Ilmiah 
dan Pembangunan Regional, Jawa Barat, 1984), p. 213. 
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(Nederlandsche Zendingsvereeniging, NZV) in the Netherlands dated 30 
December 1872. He observed that the Sundanese he encountered were 
studying Arabic, read the Quran, went to the mosque or musalla, fasted 
during Ramadan, went on the hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca); performed 
the five pillars of Islam, paid their tithe and circumcised their sons, and 
celebrated Islamic festivals with passion.14 Gijsman concluded that “all 
these and many other things show us that the whole society is structured in 
accordance with Islamic patterns.”15 In other words, in many respects the 
Sundanese were practicing Muslims. 
Most Sundanese Muslims celebrate religious ceremonies and 
festivals such as slametan, idul fitri, maulud, isra’ mi’raj, nisfu sha’ban night, 
etcetera.16 Traditionalist Sundanese have played a pivotal role in 
preserving these practices which contain many remnants of a variety of 
local customs (collectively dubbed adat). They also played a leading role in 
transmitting Islam and in preserving Islamic traditions. One of the most 
important contributions of the Traditionalists is the Sufi order or tarekat. 
Across West Java there are a number of Sufi orders that have existed since 
the seventeenth century, namely the Qadiriyah (seventeenth century), the 
Shatariyah (seventeenth century), the Naqshabandiyah (nineteenth 
century)17 and the Tijaniyah18 (twentieth century), among others. In the 
nineteenth century, Shaikh Abdul Khatib Sambas, the great Qadiriyah 
teacher (murshid), merged the Qadiriyah and Naqshabandiyah traditions 
and called it the Qadiriyah wa Naqshabandiyah (Qadiriyah and 
Naqshabandiyah or TQN).19 From the early twentieth century, the 
Qadiriyah wa Naqshabandiyah was officially embraced and popularised by 
Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya thanks to K.H. Abdullah Mubarok and his 
successor Shaikh Shahibul Wafa Tajul Arifin, widely known as Abah 
                                                          
14  Van den End, Sumber-Sumber Zending, p. 159. 
15  Idem, p. 160. 
16  Nisfu sha’ban or 15 Sha’ban night festivals is celebrated largely by 
Traditionalists seeking God’s forgiveness and rewards. See G.F. Pijper, Empat 
Penelitian tentang Agama Islam di Indonesia 1930-1950 (Jakarta: UI-Press, 
1992), pp. 5-22. See also Suhamihardja, ‘Agama, Kepercayaan dan Sistem 
Pengetahuan’, p. 213. 
17  Nina Herlina Lubis (et al.), Sejarah Perkembangan Islam di Jawa Barat (Yayasan 
Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia Cabang Jawa Barat, 2011), pp. 50-51. 
18  Pijper, Fragmenta Islamica, p. 2. 
19  Lubis (et al.), Sejarah Perkembangan Islam di Jawa Barat, p. 159. 
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Anom.20 Abah Anom died in 2010 and his confidant, Muhammad Abdul 
Gaos Saefulloh Maslul, popularly known as Abah Gaos, won Anom’s 
followers’ support to succeed him as a murshid despite some objections 
from others.21 Over time, support for Abah Gaos’ leadership strengthened 
as evidenced among others by the great turnout of a wide range of TQN 
followers to the monthly manakiban festival sheld under his direction in 
either state-owned mosques or in private residences since 2005.22 
The Tarekat Shatariyah has been present in West Java since the 
seventeenth century after having been introduced in Cirebon and Priangan 
by Shaikh Abdulmuhyi (1650-1730) who died in Tasikmalaya. His grave in 
Pamijahan has remained a pilgrimage destination to this date and people 
from in and outside Java came to visit the graveyard.23 He was succeeded 
by his son, Shaikh Haji Muhyiddin, who wrote a treatise entitled Martabat 
Kang Pitutu (al-’Awalim al-Sab’ah or the [Doctrine of] Seven Grades) said to 
contain the Sufi teachings of his father.24 
The Tarekat Tijaniyah was first introduced to Java in the 1920s by 
the Medina-born ulama, Ali bin Abdullah al-Tayyib al-Azhari. In his 
Fragmenta Islamica, the Dutch expert on Islam, G.F. Pijper, notes that Al-
Azhari lived in Tasikmalaya and had authored a book entitled Munyat al-
Murid.25 Among his other works was the Kitab Al-Tadhkirat al-Munirah li-
ahl al-Bashirah (Garut, 1344 H [1925-1926]), in which he attacked Islamic 
reformism.26 K.H. Anas bin Abdul Jamil was the first ulama to embrace and 
popularise this tarekat in his Pesantren Buntet in Cirebon. Pijper describes 
                                                          
20  The history of Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya is comprehensively described in 
Unang Sunardjo, Menelusuri perjalanan sejarah pondok pesantren Suryalaya, 
pusat pengembangan tarekat Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyyah abad kedua puluh 
(Tasikmalaya: Yayasan Serba Bakti Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya, 1995). Lubis 
(et al.), Sejarah Perkembangan Islam di Jawa Barat, p. 162. 
21  My own observation to recent development of the Tarekat Qadiriyah wa 
Naqshabandiyah Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya in 2013. 
22  Interview, ustadz Zainal Abidin, an active member of Tarekat Qadiriyah-
Naqshabandiyah [TQN] Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya, Serpong, 09 November 
2013. 
23  Lubis (et al.), Sejarah Perkembangan Islam di Jawa Barat, p. 155-156. 
24 http://www.sasak.org/2010/04/23/syeikh-abdul-muhyi-1650-1730wali-
allah-ulama-besar-di-jawa- barat-asli-sasak/. Manuscripts of these treatises are 
preserved in the Library of Leiden University and may be found under shelf 
numbers Cod. Or. 7465, Cod. Or. 7527, and Cod. Or. 7705. 
25  Pijper, Fragmenta Islamica, p. 82. 
26  Idem, p. 87. 
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that by 1928 and until 1932 the Terekat Tijaniyah was known to exist in 
various places in West Java including Cirebon, Kuningan, Ciamis, 
Tasikmalaya and various parts of Central Java, including Brebes, 
Pekalongan and Tegal.27 
Martin van Bruinessen, in his Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat, 
observes that Sufism and Sufi orders have become an integral part of 
pesantren intellectual and religious life.28 In a number of pesantrens in West 
Java, Sufi works are available and studied. Van Bruinessen encountered 
various important books on Sufism that have become works of reference in 
these Islamic boarding schools including the Ihya’ ‘Ulumuddin (Al-Ghazali), 
Bidayatul Hidayah, Minhajul ‘Abidin, Sairus Salikin and Hidayatus Salikin 
(Al-Palimbani) in which elements of the wahdat al-wujud are apparent.29 
It has to be noted that there are some other tarekats across West Java 
which cannot be discussed here because it would lead away too far from 
the central topic of this book. Thanks to the tireless efforts of Sufi gurus, the 
tarekats grew and expanded over time. Most important is that all tarekats 
contributed to promoting a style of Islam that is accommodative to 
adjustments and modifications in order to meet local customs and the 
spiritual needs of the Sundanese.30 
Wali veneration, as practiced by tarekat followers in Sundanese 
society is perhaps the best example of how Islam was accommodated to 
local practices.31 A wali is a saint or a holy man. Some Muslims are 
convinced that a wali is endowed with supernatural power enabling him to 
offer “benefit in this world and the next.”32 Tarekat followers hold that one 
can obtain material and spiritual happiness through the visitation of places 
deemed sacred such as graves or caves.33 The best examples of saint 
veneration practices are visits (ziarah) to the graves of Sunan Gunung Jati 
                                                          
27  Idem. 
28  Van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat, pp. 19-21. 
29  Idem, pp. 162-166. 
30  Lubis (et al.), Sejarah Perkembangan Islam di Jawa Barat, p. 174. 
31  Moh. Ali Fadillah, ‘Pengultusan Orang Suci Pada Masyarakat Sunda: Sebuah 
Kontinuitas Unsur Budaya Lokal dalam Ritual Keagamaan Islam’, in Ajip Rosidi, 
H. Edi S. Ekadjati and A. Chaedar Alwasilah (eds.), Prosiding Konferensi 
Internasional Budaya Sunda Jilid 1 (Bandung: Yayasan Kebudayaan Rancagé, 
2006), pp. 419-432. 
32  Millie, Splashed by the saint, p. 1. 
33  Interview, ustadz Toha, a follower of Tarekat Qadiriyah-Naqshabandiyah (TQN) 
Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya, Serpong, 17 November 2013. 
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in Cirebon and that of Shaikh Abdulmuhyi in Pamijahan in Tasikmalaya.34 If 
we look at how ziarah is observed, we find in it a substantial continuity of 
Islamic practices and pre-Islamic paganism.35 
In his Nine Saints of Java, D.A. Rinkes relates how in Pamijahan the 
grave of Shaikh Abdulmuhyi was venerated.36 Until the present, crowds of 
people with all sorts of intentions and objectives make routine visits to the 
cave and pay homage at his grave. Rinkes observed: 
 
Shaikh Abdulmuhyi is what one might call an ‘all round man’; he is 
not a holy man for particular purposes, who mainly helps on specific 
request, but he is one who gladly shows his interest in all daily needs and 
wants, and who tries to alleviate everyone’s difficulties. If a childless 
woman requests the Saint’s mediation that she might acquire motherhood, 
in her dream she might, for example, see a hen with chicks, showing that 
her wish will be granted. A young magang37 might desire promotion; he 
would go to Pamijahan and near the grave, having made his request, 
would burn menyan (incense) and recite a set of formulae, then dream of a 
person carrying a payung [umbrella], or indeed that he climbs a ladder or 
a tree. This indicates that the Saint is favourably disposed towards him. A 
merchant desiring property in commerce would consider himself 
fortunate if the Saint caused him to dream of shooting a deer while 
hunting.38 
 
Rinkes also describes how visitors to Shaikh Abdulmuhyi’s grave 
paid homage at another cave nearby. He continues: 
 
Just as a visit to Medina is customary for those making the hajj to 
Mecca, so is it necessary for a visitor to Shaikh Abdulmuhyi’s grave to go to 
the cave and to Panyalahan to pay homage to the mysterious powers 
there. The entrance to this cave is about ten minutes’ walk from 
Pamijahan. Amply provided with bamboo torches and oil lamps, one 
                                                          
34  A valuable reference on grave visititation (ziarah) is Henri Chambert-Loir and 
Claude Guillot, Ziarah dan Wali di Dunia Islam (Jakarta: Serambi, 2007). 
35  Fadillah, ‘Pengultusan Orang Suci’, p. 419. 
36  D.A. Rinkes, Nine Saints of Java (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Sociological Research 
Institute, 1996). See also Tommy Christomy, ‘Pamijahan as the Centre of the 
Shattariyah Order in 17th Century’, in Ajip Rosidi, H. Edi S. Ekadjati and A. 
Chaedar Alwasilah (eds.), Prosiding Konferensi, pp. 343-358. 
37  Magang; candidate for a post in the civil administration who volunteers in an 
office while awaiting appointment. 
37  Rinkes, Nine Saints of Java, p. 3. 
38  Idem. 
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enters a place where water drips from the rocks above. Each in turn puts 
his or her mouth under it to drink the icy water. Opinion is that this is ‘chai 
jamjam’, or water that trickles through from the Zamzam well in Mecca, 
the beneficial power of which is famous.39 
 
In his conclusion, Rinkes argues that there is a possible connection 
with and a continuity between this grave veneration and earlier non-
Islamic practices. He argues that “It is known that many places which had 
been worshipped or venerated by a former generation kept that veneration 
after the population converted to a new religion, on condition, however, 
that the places also took part in the transition.”40 The Sundanese have 
maintained this mystical phenomenon to this date and they continue to 
uphold mystical practices their predecessors had adopted regardless of 
their religions. This also shows that previous non-Islamic practices which 
are strongly adat-inspired are essential in the life of the Sundanese people. 
The tarekat tradition is not the only crucial element that helped 
Islamising the Sundanese. Islam was predominantly disseminated through 
dakwah and education in mosques, pesantren and madrasah. Ulama 
provided classes in Quranic instruction for youths and adults, the elderly 
and the under aged, both male and female. In Priangan District, Quranic 
classes were held in the pesantren for underage students under the 
guidance of Islamic teachers (ajengan). After having finished the reading of 
the entire Quran, a graduation session was held to celebrate the 
achievement of the graduates. Elderly people, both male and female, 
regularly held religious sessions and services according to their interests 
and needs.41 
Pijper witnessed the dynamics of the transmission of Islamic 
knowledge and practices in various regions in West Java in the early 
twentieth century. He witnessed women’s participation in Islamic learning-
teaching activities where the teacher’s and the ajengan’s wives and female 
pupils of higher classes acted as religious instructors.42 Interestingly, 
female pupils apparently did not often wear a tiyung or kukudung 
(headscarf).43 For most Sundanese, Islam’s successful transmission came 
                                                          
39  Rinkes, Nine Saints of Java, p. 10. 
40  Idem, p. 12. 
41  Suhamihardja, ‘Agama, Kepercayaan dan Sistem Pengetahuan’, p. 213. 
42  Pijper, Fragmenta Islamica, p. 16. 
43  Idem, p. 17. 
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about because Muslim preachers made adjustments to the fundamentals of 
the Islamic teachings to make them accord with Sundanese worldviews and 
adat.44 This ingrained Islam in the social life of the Sundanese people as 
faith, culture and identity. 
The transmission of Islam presented extraordinary challenges to 
Christian missionaries. Dutch missionary accounts from the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries reveal the frustration among the missionaries who 
were serving in various parts of West Java and the astonishing challenges 
they faced in proselytising among the Sundanese people.45 Th. van den End 
and J. Weitjens S.J. argued that the meagre success of their conversion 
efforts stemmed from the fact that Islam was already entrenched in 
Sundanese social and cultural life.46 It is probably because of this history 
that scholars of Islam in West Java have consistently argued that the region 
has become more deeply influenced by Islam than Central and East Java. In 
Indonesia, it is common knowledge that the Sundanese have been more 
observant Muslims than the Javanese. 
Although commonly considered observant Muslims, some Sundanese 
believe in material and immaterial objects and rituals somewhat alien to 
Islamic tenets. Julian Millie observes: 
 
Hasan Moestapa47 represents Sundanese adat as a body of practices 
and rituals somewhat different form Islam. These include the belief in the 
influence of the spirits of deceased ancestors; the belief that certain places, 
notably graves and places of natural beauty, and objects, especially knives 
and other steel items, are inhabited by these spirits; a ritual symbolism 
rooted in agriculture and reverence for the rice goddess Dewi Sri; a 
conviction that mantras are useful for achieving worldly goals; a 
repository of norms made up of sayings and patterned speech...48 
 
The belief in natural beauty is manifested in the Sundanese 
conviction that there are spirits (guriang) that control the mountains and 
who possess supernatural powers that bring and guarantee prosperity and 
safeguard the life of every Sundanese. The Sundanese people value the 
                                                          
44  Interview, Abah Cakra Waluya Wirapati, Bandung, 15 April 2009. 
45  Th. van den End and J. Weitjens, S.J., Ragi Carita 2: Sejarah Gereja di Indonesia 
1860an-sekarang (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 2003), p. 222. 
46  Idem, pp. 222-223. 
47  We will return to him below. 
48  Millie, Splashed by the saint, p. 14. 
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beauty and power of their natural landscape. The three important 
mountains in the land of Sunda, Mount Gede, Mount Putri and Mount 
Padang, are believed to be sacred and powerful.49 The Sundanese celebrate 
rites and ceremonies in pursuit of the blessings of the spirits of their late 
ancestors (karuhun) by offering them food and other items.50 They also 
acknowledge the existence of other spirits such as dedemit, jurig and ririwa 
and it is not uncommon among the Sundanese that children, young girls 
and pregnant women are prohibited from visiting sites like cemeteries, big 
stones and trees during specific moments in time in order to safeguard 
them from the harm caused by these malevolent spirits.51 The character 
most discussed in Sundanese mythology of the spirit world is Nyai Roro 
Kidul. This myth occupies a special place in the mystical world of the 
Javanese. She is believed to be the goddess of the Southern Sea (i.e. Indian 
Ocean) who is also said to be a Sundanese princess, namely the daughter of 
a Pajajaran ruler.52 Although other sources claim that the princess hailed 
from a kingdom in East Java, either Kediri or Koripan, Pajajaran is most 
often mentioned.53 
Robert Wessing argues that belief in supernatural forces influenced 
the religious life of the Sundanese. He points out that: 
 
A major feature of the Sundanese belief system is the conviction that 
life is influenced by various supernatural forces, both beneficent and 
deleterious. It is important therefore in conduct of daily affairs to 
determine where the positive and negative influences are located since 
these forces are not stationary. To this end the Sundanese have developed 
divination devices which are described in their Paririmbon (divining 
books). If a Sundanese wants to conduct some business in a given place he 
must ask in which direction his objective is located relative to himself. He 
then consults his Paririmbon in order to find out where the evil influence 
is located on that particular day. If the evil is located in a direction other 
than the one he must take, he may set out directly toward his goal. Should 
his goal and the evil coincide, however, it would be best not to go at all. If 
one must go then it is best to start by heading in the direction opposite to 
                                                          
49  Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 18 April 2009. 
50  Suhamiharja, ‘Agama, Kepercayaan dan Sistem Pengetahuan’, p. 215. 
51  Idem. 
52  Robert Wessing, ‘A Princess from Sunda: Some Aspects of Nyai Roro Kidul’ in 
Asian Folklore Studies, Volume 56, 1997: pp. 317-318. 
53  Idem, p. 319. 
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the one in which the evil influence is located and only later curve toward 
one’s objective.54 
 
These practices are certainly not Islamic but seem to be derived from 
Hindu-Buddhist traditions or perhaps from native beliefs. Observers claim 
that there is an intricate mix of various religious traditions of Islam, Indian 
Hinduism and Buddhism and native beliefs. As Wessing notes, these belief 
systems seem to be “like a layer cake with each influence superimposed on 
the previous one.”55 
 
Ulama and Adat 
I shall underline from the outset that by discussing ulama and adat, I do not 
mean to subscribe to the often seen statement that ‘Sunda is Islam,’ which 
seems to imply that ‘Sunda is Islamic.’ Julian Millie is correct when he 
criticised that “this statement involves a radical effacement of difference”.56 
The point I want to make here by discussing this theme is that adat is 
important, and for the ulama such as Hasan Moestapa (1852-1930), it is 
often relevant to help ‘Islamising’ the Sundanese or, the other way around, 
‘Sundanising’ Islam. 
Adat is a complex mix of customs and values which has served to 
maintain the ancestral heritage. It is central to the social, cultural, spiritual 
and ritual lives of ulama, Sundanese menak (aristocracy, priyayi in 
Javanese), and ordinary people.57 The Dutch colonial government realised 
this social capital and promoted adat over religion. Dutch Advisor on 
Native Affairs, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, even argued for the 
precedence of adat over Islam in society. Snouck Hurgronje’s ‘receptie’ 
theory posited that this precedence would mean that Islamic law could 
                                                          
54  R. Wessing, ‘Life in the Cosmic Village: Cognitive Models in Sundanese Life’ in 
Edward M. Bruner and Judith O. Becker (eds.), Art, Ritual and Society in 
Indonesia (Papers in International Studies Southeast Asia Series No. 53 (Ohio 
University Center for International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, Athens, 
Ohio, 1979), p. 104. 
55  R. Wessing, Cosmology and Social Behaviour in a West Javanese Settlement (Ohio 
University: Center for International Studies Southeast Asia Series No. 47, 1978), 
p. 14. 
56  Millie, Splashed by the saint, p. 13. 
57  Nina H. Lubis, Kehidupan Kaum Menak Priangan 1800-1942 (Bandung: Pusat 
Informasi Kebudayaan Sunda, 1998), p. 257. 
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only be observed by indigenous people after having been filtered and 
deemed compatible with local adat. For Snouck Hurgronje, adat was not to 
be subordinated to a kind of Islam as the Arabs professed it. In order to 
implement adat in West Java, Snouck Hurgronje approached the menak and 
Muslim leaders to seek political and religious support for his policy. Haji 
Hasan Moestapa was his most important ally in championing adat’s 
primacy. 
Haji Hasan Moestapa was born in Cikajang, Garut, on 3 June 1852 
into a menak family. His father was Mas Sastramanggala, a descendant of 
Tumenggung Wiratanubaya, the Regent of Parakanmuncang. His mother 
was Nyi Mas Salpah, a daughter of Mas Kartapraja, the head of the Cikajang 
sub-district and descendant of Dalem Sunan Pagerjaya of Suci Garut. His 
mother’s family members were pious Muslims and some were known as 
ulama, including Kyai Hasan Basari and Kyai Cibunut. From childhood age, 
his parents made him recite from the Quran twice a day, in the morning 
and evening, without fail. At the age of seven, he undertook religious 
studies under the supervision of Kyai Hasan Basari. At the tender age of 
eight years, he made the pilgrimage to Mecca with his father. Upon his 
return, he studied a number of Islamic subjects with various kyais, 
including Rd. H. Yahya, Kyai Abdul Halim, Kyai Muhammad, and Kyai Abdul 
Kahar.58 When he was seventeen years old, his father sent him to Mecca to 
study. After ten years in the holy land, he returned and studied Sufism 
under his grandfather, Ajengan Cibunut. He also studied with his uncle, 
Muhammad Irja’i, who had just returned from Madura after studying Islam 
with the local Kyai Khalil.59 From 1874 to 1882 he returned to Mecca to 
study with Syaikh Hasbullah and Syaikh Abdul Hamid Dagastani, as well as 
with Syaikh Muhammad, Syaikh Umar Sani, Syaikh Mustomal Apipi, Sayid 
Bakri and Sayid Abdullah Janawi. He claimed to have mastered sixteen 
religious sciences.60 Upon his return, his prominence saw him becoming 
                                                          
58  This short biography of Haji Hasan Moestapa rests on Tini Kartini and Ningrum 
Djulaeha (eds.), Biografi dan Karya Pujangga Haji Hasan Mustafa (Jakarta: Pusat 
Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Bahasa Departemen Pendidikan dan 
Kebudayaan, 1985), p. 13. For a discussion of recent publications on Haji Hasan 
Mustafa’s work see Millie 2014. 
59  Ajip Rosidi, Manusia Sunda (Bandung: Kiblat, 2009), p. 149. 
60  In 1882, Raden Haji Moehammad Moesa, the chief Penghulu of Garut, asked 
Haji Hasan Moestapa to return home to address tensions between the ulama in 
Garut. He played the role of mediator very well and became the most important 
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acquainted with Dutch orientalists like K.F. Holle. J.L.A. Brandes, Ph.S. van 
Ronkel, G.A.J. Hazeu, and D.A. Rinkes later in his life. In 1889, Snouck 
Hurgronje asked Hasan Moestapa to accompany him on his travels around 
Java and Madura.61 In 1893, upon Snouck Hugronje’s request, Hasan 
Moestapa was appointed Chief Penghulu in Kutaraja, Aceh (1893-95),62 
where he arrived on 22 February. Snouck Hurgronje praised Hasan 
Moestapa’s abilities in a letter to the Governor-General on 22 May 1894, 
stating: “It is obvious that he could easily develop relations with the 
Acehnese and has a grasp of the local situation.”63 
After having served the Dutch colonial government in Kutaraja for 
two years, Haji Hasan Moestapa was promoted to Chief Penghulu in 
Bandung (1895-1917). During his time in Bandung, he contributed much to 
the synthesis between Islam and Sundanese adat and language. He 
proselytised in Sundanese in a way that blended Islam with local values.64 
His understanding of Islam, coupled with an amazing mastery of the Arabic 
language, enabled him to translate and paraphrase Arabic in Sundanese in 
such a way that the Sundanese were able to understand it without too 
much trouble. In doing so, Hasan Moestapa made Arabic consonants sound 
familiar to the ears and minds of his Sundanese audience.65 This, his 
greatest contribution, rendered Islam more familiar to the Sundanese, and 
was extraordinarily useful in maintaining the harmonious Islam-Sunda 
synthesis. His unique expertise and leadership has attracted much 
scholarship.66 
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Haji Hasan Moestapa’s intellectual enterprise sought to maintain 
adat central to ‘Sundanese-ness.’ For him, Islam should be understood and 
observed within the framework of adat. He argued that Islamic movements 
which ignored adat could never be sustained.67 His efforts to synthesise 
Sundanese adat and Islam were incomparable. A leading expert on 
Sundanese literature and culture, Ajip Rosidi, acknowledged Moestapa’s 
contribution. In his Manusia Sunda, Ajip observes that Haji Hasan Moestapa 
was deeply concerned with making Islam compatible with local culture in a 
way that would not stifle the future growth of the adat. He cited how Haji 
Hasan Moestapa’s work on Quranic exegesis contains only 105 verses 
which were interpreted and translated into the Sundanese language. For 
Hasan Moestapa, these verses were most relevant to the Sundanese.68 The 
rest, he said, were difficult for the Sundanese to understand because they 
were revealed in an Arabic context alien to Sundanese culture. 
Hasan Moestapa paid considerable attention to the central role adat 
played in shaping society’s cultural and spiritual lives. His adoption of adat 
into religious practices meant that his ‘Islamic’ practices were sometimes at 
odds with those of the more orthodox masses. When his beloved son, Toha 
Firdaus, passed away in a car accident, his corpse was brought from their 
home to the cemetery accompanied by a keroncong orchestra,69 instead of 
tahlil,70 as traditionally-observed. This was done as a mark of respect to 
Toha, who had been a leading keroncong artist and had headed a keroncong 
orchestra ensemble.71 Due to his unusual religious practices, Moestapa was 
accused of having deviated from the Ahlu al-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah72 
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orthodoxy. The prominent mufti of Batavia, Sayyid Uthman, criticised 
Moestafa for his eccentric and controversial interpretations of Islam.73 
Hasan Moestapa’s friendship with Snouck Hurgronje, as with other 
Dutch orientalists, influenced his intellectual and political choices. Snouck 
Hurgronje was active as Advisor for Native and Islamic Affairs in Indonesia 
(1889-1906).74 Their strong bond is illustrated in their correspondence 
between 1893 and 1895. Writing to Snouck Hurgronje, Hasan Moestapa 
liked to sign off with “your friend in Allah” or “your faithful friend.”75 He 
was proud of Snouck Hurgronje and called him “my brilliant friend forever, 
who knows everything.”76 In one of his books, his Aji Wiwitan Istilah, Hasan 
Moestapa denied that this friendship stemmed from his allegiance to him 
or to the Dutch colonial government. Rather, he said, “I am a descendant of 
ulama loved by the Dutch..... all of them love me not because of my 
expertise, but because I am concerned and patient.”77 
The Dutch Government deeply trusted Hasan Moestapa because of 
his loyalty to his Dutch friends. Snouck Hurgronje’s own theories had 
probably influenced Hasan Moestapa’s devotion to the adat and was 
unhappy with Sarekat Islam’s negative views about the adat. This inspired 
him to warn the movement, in its Congress in Bandung from 17 to 24 June 
1916, to forget its purification mission as this could jeopardise the adat’s 
precedence and confuse the community.78 He maintained that a social 
movement which overlooked adat and did not care for commoners would 
certainly disintegrate.79 
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These warm ties, however, were challenged and some notables, 
among them Sayyid Uthman, considered them a treacherous conspiracy 
against Islam.80 The Modernist Sarekat Islam (SI) and PERSIS were also 
known to be critical of Hasan Moestapa. H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto opposed the 
acculturation agenda Hasan Moestapa pushed. Tjokroaminoto thought that 
Islam promoted ethical and spiritual foundations and he stated: 
 
Our culture is based on a religion whose strong ethical and spiritual 
foundations (especially Tauhid) best fulfil human needs, in a way that best 
agrees with reason. The Islamic faith on which our culture is based 
possesses a Book revealed by God, a perfect ethical guide unrivalled by 
any other book seen or possessed by man.81 
  
This quote was also intended as an attack against the Nationalist 
movement, which claimed to promote ‘authentic’ Indonesian culture. For 
Tjokroaminoto, the Nationalists sought to revive Hindu culture. While this 
was true to some extent, his critique was insufficiently discriminating and 
to some extent also implicated local culture, which Muslim communities 
had in fact generally accepted. It was ironic that he adopted such a stance 
given the fact that he was a descent of a priyayi family whose cultural life 
was mostly rooted in syncretic traditions.82 
Hasan Moestapa accused Tjokroaminoto and his SI of trying to 
articulate the puritanical Wahhabi orientation and hence he cautioned SI 
leaders that their movement might alienate their own support-base if it 
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maintained its uncompromising attitude. It was ironic too that SI adopted 
such a stance, given that their own constituency comprised mostly of the 
rural peasantry whose adat and culture were inspired by ‘animistic’ and 
Hindu traditions. In the following years, however, the SI, later known as 
PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Sarekat Party), 
changed its attitude as it realised that adat practices remained common 
among SI members. In the end this provoked criticism from PERSIS leaders, 
who accused the SI of perpetuating bid’a (innovation not based on the 
Quran or Sunnah), and of betraying its own principles.83 
Despite PERSIS’ early bitter opposition, its attitude to adat was 
ambivalent. In the late 1960s, for example, PERSIS leader, Endang 
Saefuddin Anshari, astonished many Sundanese leaders by stressing the 
need to defend the Islam-Sunda synthesis since, for him, “Islam teh Sunda, 
Sunda teh Islam” (Islam is Sunda, Sunda is Islam).84 While this synthesis 
revealed the intimate association between Islam and Sunda, many saw this 
as the outcome of mixing Islamic practices and Sundanese adat which is 
strongly animistic or Hindu.85 The proponents of the Islam-Sunda synthesis 
strived to develop a cultural and religious justification to sustain the inter-
relation between the two. Probably because of this nexus, Karel Steenbrink 
observed that among the Sundanese the differences between santri and 
abangan are not so obvious.86 While the latent tension between Islam and 
adat remained, the Modernists and Traditionalists continued to push 
Islamisation through different approaches.87 The Traditionalists sought to 
maintain tradition, while the Modernists promoted education and social 
services. 
 
Menak and Islam 
From the nineteenth until the first quarter of the twentieth century, Islam 
became increasingly rooted in Sundanese society and had become the 
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religion of the Sundanese aristocrats, the menak, as well as that of the 
commoners.88 Most members of the menak observed Islamic worship such 
as the daily prayers but they also mostly performed the hajj to the Ka’bah 
for which many travelled to Mecca. The Sundanese elite sent its children to 
pesantren (Islamic schools). It also celebrated festivals such as Idul fitri and 
its members donned Arab-style dress during official public ceremonies.89 
In 1924, the Regent of Bandung, R.A.A. Moeharam 
Wiranatakoesoema,90 made the pilgrimage to Mecca.91 A leading expert on 
Indonesian Islam, Azyumardi Azra, observed that on the ship taking him to 
Mecca, Wiranatakoesoema noted a great diversity of ordinary men and 
women, young and old, who enthusiastically expressed their impatience to 
get to Mecca. He wondered what motivated these people to leave their 
relatives and to risk their lives to embark on such a costly and exhausting 
journey. In Mecca, he saw thousands of Muslims from around the world 
who were still living under colonial rule, congregating in a desert valley for 
the sake of their God.92 Wiranatakoesoema met the Governor of the Hijaz, 
Hidayat Sharif. In recognition of his reputation as a Muslim leader, Sharif 
presented him the Istiqlal Star, an honorary award usually reserved for 
distinguished guests.93 
However, Wiranatakoesoema did not seem to have found his hajj 
experience as entirely uplifting. Contrarily, in most respects, he 
experienced awful things during his pilgrimage trip. As observed by 
Ricklefs, Wiranatakoesoema criticised “the exploitation and extortion of the 
pilgrims by local Arabs, of the threat of highwaymen and murderers and, 
when the hajis reached Mecca, of finding there, the Islam’s holiest place, 
‘people who unscrupulously sin against the holy prescriptions’.”94 But, in 
spite of those awful experiences, Wiranatakoesoema found the hajj 
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experience moving, especially it what he viewed as ‘Islam’s universal 
reach.’95 
Upon his return, Wiranatakoesoema was called Kangjeng Haji or 
Dalem Haji. His attention and devotion to Islam also increased.96 Some of 
his relatives described him as a Muslim who was inclined always to 
observe his Islamic obligations including praying, zakat, fasting in the 
month of Ramadan, giving alms and undertaking the hajj.97 As noted by the 
expert on the history of West Java, Nina H. Lubis, the Regent 
Wiranatakoesoema supported the construction of Bandung’s grand 
mosque (masjid agung) even though his Dutch superior, Assistant Resident 
Hillen, disapproved it.98 Wiranatakoesoema was strongly attached to Islam, 
an attachment which he expressed in the public sphere. He, for example, 
liked to sing Quranic verses in kidung form.99 He was known for his habit of 
opening his public speeches by singing a kidung fatihah.100 
Kangjeng Haji’s articulation of Islam in the Sundanese language and 
by using traditional poetry (tembang) was impressive as well as rare. By 
singing the kidung fatihah, which is bid’a in the eyes of many puritan 
Modernists, Kangjeng Haji sought to express Quranic meanings through a 
cultural form familiar to the Sundanese. Though it seems unpretentious, 
the singing of al-fatihah during his official speeches expressed Kangjeng 
Haji’s endeavour to lend a sense of ‘Sundaneseness’ to the articulation of 
the Quran’s opening chapter. Such an original and native articulation of 
religion was a serious experiment at the time. The expert of Sundanese 
literature and culture, Hawe Setiawan, maintained that it was one of the 
few genuine attempts to make Islam Sundanese.101 
Aria Suriaatmaja is another Sundanese menak who was a practising 
Muslim.102 Nina Lubis observes that, serving as Regent of the Priangan, he 
was known as the ‘Prince of Mecca’. His people believed that he was 
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endowed with keramat (sanctity) much like a saint. He was trusted and 
well-respected by the people in general as well as by his subordinates who 
used to rush to visit him during Idul fitri, in the hope of receiving blessings 
through him. Lubis explains that Raden Haji Muhammad Musa was yet 
another menak who paid attention to Islam, especially to the shari’ah and 
he warned the Regent of Lebak to maintain observing his daily prayers in 
order to remain a true and proper Regent. Another Regent of Bandung, 
R.A.A. Martanagara, liked to visit pesantrens. Meanwhile, the Regent of 
Tasikmalaya established good relationships with kyais and thereby 
allowing himself to be a patron of the Al-Imtisal magazine Martanagara and 
the kyais published together.103 
The widespread interest in Islam encouraged the menak to sustain 
good relationships with Muslim leaders such as the ulama and the 
penghulu, which no doubt strengthened their socio-cultural position. From 
a political perspective, such relationships were also useful in maintaining 
stability, especially since the menak were in fact Dutch government 
officials. Wiranatakoesoema, for example, was a close friend of Haji Hasan 
Moestapa, the Hoofdpenghulu of Bandung and both entertained warm 
relations with the Dutch Advisor on Native and Arabic Affairs, C. Snouck 
Hurgronje. They were also devoted promoters of the Islam-Sunda 
synthesis.104 These acquaintances played an extraordinary role in the 
cultural and socio-political aspects of their society, especially between the 
1890s to the 1920s. 
 
Penghayat and Native-Syncretic Creeds 
The Sundanese people constituted a remarkable diversity of believers. 
Besides Muslims who display a notable diversity of religious observances 
and interpretations, some Sundanese have a rich religious vision that 
includes the belief in one or another native-syncretic creed, which 
promotes values and practices different from any world religion. The 
native-syncretic creeds and practices are variously termed ‘indigenous 
syncretism’, and ‘peasant religious syncretism’.105 The particular 
syncretism to be addressed below may be designated as Aliran Kebatinan, 
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which originates from the Javanese weltanschauung postulating “the 
essential unity of all Existence.”106 The leading expert on Javanese religion, 
Niels Mulder, calls it ‘Javanism’107 and argues that this worldview is “more 
encompassing than religion and it views human existence within its 
cosmological context, making life itself a religious experience.”108 This 
worldview sees life as a unity between all forms of existence and thus 
denies the “separation between religious and non-religious elements.”109 In 
West Java, Aliran Kebatinan followers are called Penghayat, some sort of 
Sundanese abangan, to borrow part of Clifford Geerz’s typology of the 
Javanese society.110 
In what follows I will discuss the contribution of two Sundanese 
Penghayat leaders who were most outspoken in inspiring the religious way 
of life and the religious outlook of the Sundanese. The first is Kyai Madrais 
(the popular designation of Kyai Muhammad Rais), from Cigugur, 
Kuningan, West Java. The second is Mei Kartawinata from Cimerta, Subang, 
West Java. Both argued for the significance of self-identity and authenticity 
over Islam. Kyai Madrais is the founder and was the leader of Agama Djawa 
Sunda (ADS) or Madraism while Mei Kartawinata led the establishment and 
promulgation of Aliran Kebatinan Perjalanan (AKP), especially across West 
Java. Even under intensified Islamisation, both leaders remained unwilling 
to accept Islam and remained loyal to what they claimed was an authentic 
Sundanese syncretic creed, which they deemed superior to Islam and other 
religions. 
 
Kyai Madrais and the Significance of Self: Agama Djawa Soenda (ADS) 
Kiai Madrais Sadewa Alibassa Kusumah Wijaya Ningrat (1835-1939) was 
born to Raden Kestawil and Pangeran Alibassa Kusumawijayaningrat, 
known as Pangeran Surya Nata. Pangeran Alibassa was the son of Pangeran 
Sutawijaya, who was dismissed as pangeran of Gebang on the Dutch charge 
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that he exploited his subjects.111 As a consequence, his territories were 
confiscated and divided between the Residencies of Cirebon and Priangan. 
This had severe consequences for Pangeran Alibassa, who was 
marginalised and forced to live in Gebang Udik. Alibassa died in this rural 
area before Madrais was born and the orphan was brought up by Ki 
Sastrawardana, who was asked to accept the baby as his son.112 
Madrais was trained in pesantrens in Cirebon and neighbouring 
areas, such as Leuweungbata, Brebes, Ciawigebang led by Kyai Ishak, 
Heubeul Isuk and Ciwedus.113 Various well-known Muslim leaders of his 
generation had graduated from these pesantrens. They include the founder 
of Persatuan Umat Islam (Islamic Community Union, PUI), K.H. Abdul 
Halim, Haji Muhammad Thohir, who was Mardais’ bitter opponent, and a 
mystic progenitor, Sastrosudibyo.114 Because mysticism was widely 
practiced at that time, this tradition had very much attracted Madrais’ 
attention.115 When he was fifteen years old, he claimed to have received a 
wangsit (divine/spiritual inspiration).116 Not long after, he began to 
promulgate doctrines that are largely unheard of in popular authoritative 
Islamic texts. Alexander Matheus Basuki Nursena Ningrat, one of Madrais 
loyal followers who married Madrais’ granddaughter, said that the number 
of Madrais’ following increased rapidly in the late nineteenth century.117 In 
1925, the Dutch administration officially recognised the movement they 
named ADS (Agama Djawa Soenda, Sundanese-Javanese Religion).118 
The fundamental doctrine of Madraism is a call to the awareness of 
what is conceptualised as ‘self’, which obliges man to reflect on his origin 
and identity. Fundamental to the Madrais community is the question ’who’ 
the ‘self’ is, in other words, humanism is central to Madrais’ spiritual 
teachings.119 In addition to the importance of the ‘self’ as involving 
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spirituality and identity, Madraism puts much emphasis on the concept of 
‘land.’120 Land may be interpreted as one’s home country, culture or norms 
or even ancestral wisdom. Ira Indrawardana understands the creed of the 
ADS as meaning to “choose and select life’s spirit and pay respect to the 
place of gathering (tanah pakumpulan) and to reach the ultimate human 
spirit.”121 Based on this, the followers of Madraism are obliged to love and 
respect their homeland, which is a strong element of their identity, in order 
to achieve the ultimate perfection as human beings.122 The proper 
combination of respect for self and land constitute the fundamentals 
through which ultimately human perfection can be achieved in this world.  
Madraism’s notion of the importance of ‘self’ was the most salient 
factor in inspiring the philosophy of the movement. Madraism entails “the 
obligation to achieve the ultimate perfection of the self rather than 
drowning in the theological debates that occurred in many Indonesian 
‘formalised’ religions such as Islam and Christianity.”123 Didin Nurul 
Rosidin observes:  
 
The ultimate perfection of human beings is seen as the ultimate goal 
of human life in this world, though such quality of life will only be met at 
the time when man dies and returns back to the origin, that is God, who 
had caused his existence in this crowded life. All doctrines of Madraism 
seem to be devoted towards guiding its members or other interested 
people to reach the ultimate goal of life, sampurnaning hirup, sajaning pati 
(to achieve perfection in life, then to attain the genuine death).124 
 
From the doctrinal perspective, Madraism resembles the Aliran 
Kebatinan movement, which is similarly rooted in Javanism. Aliran 
Kebatinan maintains the harmonious unity of all beings.125 Its worldview 
projects a harmonious balance between human beings, religious doctrine, 
and the universe/nature. Madraism sanctifies the value of human life as 
integrated in the universe. Humanity and the universe coexist in a 
cosmology which demands that humans respect and protect the earth and 
                                                          
120  Idem. 
121  Idem. 
122  Idem. 
123  Rosidin, Kebatinan, Islam and the State, p. 61. 
124  Idem. 
125  Mulder, ‘Aliran Kebatinan’, p. 105. 
-34- 
 
each other. These elements cannot destroy one another.126 The confluence 
in this movement of nativism, spiritualism and local identity put it in a 
diametrically opposed position to Muslim Modernism which sought to 
assert the superiority of Islam over all other worldviews unless they could 
be reconciled with Islam’s fundamental doctrines. 
Notwithstanding its Sundanese essence, Madraism seems to have 
been influenced by Islamic doctrine. This is exemplified by the pikukuh tilu 
(three principles). These are ngaji badan (literally means ‘reading the 
body’), mituhu kana tanah (literally denotes belief in one’s land), and 
ngandep or ngiblating ka ratu raja (faithful to king/queen).127 The first 
principle refers to its specific and cosmic conception of ‘self’ called ‘ngaji 
badan’. Steenbrink traced the origins of this principle back to Islamic 
mystical teachings. He claims that this doctrine “must be understood in the 
context of the famous mystic hadith qudsi: man ‘arafa nafsahu faqad ‘arafa 
rabbahu (whomsoever knows himself, knows his Lord).128 As God’s 
creation, the body is believed to contain symbolic messages that are 
decipherable on contemplation.129 
Together with this cosmic understanding of the human body, 
Madraism believes in the one and only God, Ka Gusti Sikang Sawiji Wiji130 
where the spirits of God and human beings unite (manunggal).131 Like 
energy, God is omnipresent. Madrais also believed in God’s unicity, 
commonly declared as laysa kamithlihi shai’un (there is nothing 
comparable to Him), an Islamic precept adopted by the ADS community.132 
Because God is the absolute One and without equivalent, Madrais decided 
that differences between religions are superficial. This being so he realised 
that this superficiality did not really exclude the possibility that all religions 
might arrive at a common ground and at mutual recognition. Nonetheless, 
                                                          
126  Interview, Ira Indrawardana, Bandung, 14 August 2009. 
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128  Steenbrink, ‘A Catholic Sadrach’, p. 292. 
129  Rosidin, Kebatinan, Islam and the State, p. 61. 
130  ‘Custom of Sundanese Ancestors: Explanation of Spiritual Culture’ (Cigugur-
Kuningan: National Foundation Study of Indonesian Culture, 2000), p. 9. 
131  Interview, Pangeran Jatikusuma (Chairman of Paguyuban Adat Cara Karuhun 
Urang, Adat Association for Ancestors’ PACKU), Cigugur, Kuningan, 5 August 
2009. 
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religion should not become a barrier in human beings’ efforts in creating 
what Jatikusuma called “one understanding” namely that all of them are the 
community (ummat) of God, the One and Only.133 Jatikusuma argued that 
this shared understanding should evolve into becoming “one belief” which 
should then serve as the foundation for the various communities of 
believers to unite upon. 
Aside from Madrais’ mystical dimensions, it also had nationalist 
inclinations as mituhu kana tanah.134 Mituhu kana tanah had two 
connotations with regards to tanah (land); the first is tanah amparan which 
means home land, and the second, tanah adegan, which means land as the 
location in which the human psyche and man’s ego or self are 
manifested.135 Mituhu kana tanah is described as follows: 
 
A human being, as a part of a nation or community, must value and 
love his nation. Therefore he must be able to maintain, observe and 
perpetuate his nation’s identity/attributes. Man must respect and value 
other nations. The existence of different national identities constitutes the 
will of God.136 
 
These beliefs came together in a loosely-created and rather vague 
construct of mysticism and identity. This vagueness has remained due to 
the fact that no religious text was ever produced and transmitted across 
generations. Most of the Madrais’ discourse has been transmitted in the 
form of oral traditions vulnerable to varying interpretations. 
As a consequence of ADS’s commitment to its own culture and nation, 
like other native-syncretic movements, it saw Islam as an opponent that 
endangered its existence. The ADS was critical of Islam not on doctrinal 
grounds, but because it saw Islam as imported culture. ADS leaders 
denounced Islam’s medium of the Arabic language and argued that Islam is 
the religion of the Arabs. Over time, their hostility towards Islam appeared 
to have increased. Sartono Kartodirdjo observes that Madrais had tried to 
spread the ADS for some forty years before his native-syncretic movement 
achieved official recognition in 1925. It was clear that Madrais was 
adamant to propagate this movement as he engaged many envoys (badals) 
                                                          
133  Idem. 
134  Rosidin, Kebatinan, Islam and the State, p. 61. 
135  Pemaparan Singkat Jejak Sejarah Komunitas ADS (Agama Djawa Sunda), p. 8. 
136  Idem. 
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to assist him in spreading his movement across the region. The major 
targets of propagation were people in rural areas and those in the 
mountains and hills. Sartono was astonished to learn that Madrais’ 
manifesto did not seem to be “messianic in character” although it was not 
free from “expressed millenarian expectations.”137 Nevertheless, he argues, 
this characteristic was largely articulated in terms of “a rather extreme 
nativism.”138 Sartono observes: 
 
An apparently conscious effort was made to revive selected elements 
of Javanese and Sundanese culture. Much emphasis was put on one’s duty 
to the fatherland. Ancient native magical and animistic rituals were re-
introduced in the celebration of feasts or in religious performances. The 
movement even went so far as to argue that Islam was the religion of the 
Arabs and was not intended for the Javanese.139 
 
The argument that Islam was the religion of the Arabs and thus not 
intended for the Javanese and the Sundanese people was common among 
the followers of this native-syncretic creed. The argument about the 
universality of world religions, such as Islam and Christianity, was not 
relevant as they saw elements of locality, nativity and also ethnicity in each 
religion. This anti-Islam mentality gave rise to uneasy relationships with 
Muslims.140 
Although in 1922-23 the movement’s reputation suffered due to the 
fraudulent behaviour of some of Madrais’ envoys, the Dutch officially 
recognised the movement’s statute in 1925. The statute posited that the 
movement was nativist in vision, with religious mission as its goal, arguing 
that God bestowed upon the Sundanese and Javanese people their own 
faith based on their own culture of origin. For our purpose, the most 
important point made in the statue was its declaration that the movement 
had abandoned Islam. As noted by Rosidin in his study, the statute was 
formulated by Madrais’ son, Tedjabuana, his son-in-law, Raden Satria 
                                                          
137  Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian 
Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (Singapore, Kuala 
Lumpur, Jakarta: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 128-129. 
138  Idem, p. 129. 
139  Idem. 
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-37- 
 
Kusuma, and allegedly by a mysterious Dutchman, Mr. J.L. Jacobs.141 The 
report did not specify Madrais’ role in the drafting of this statue, so his 
endorsement of this declaration remains in question. 
As Rosidin noted, it seems that in 1922 the Dutch attempted to 
confront Madraism and Muslims. Rosidin said that: 
 
In 1922, Fazar Asia reported that an anonymous Dutch agitator had 
incited an official of the Cirebon branch of the Sarekat Islam (SI) to take 
steps to halt the development of Madraism because of its anti-Islam 
proclivities. He claimed that Madraism would establish a new religion of 
the Galuh (Sundanese), which was not in accordance with Islam. 
Surprisingly, in a reply the SI official did not give any expected response 
to this incitement because, as the SI official stated, he had never heard this 
issue before. He suggested the Dutchman report this movement to the 
authorities, if the latter considered that Madrais had broken the law.142 
 
The incident described above raises questions about the involvement 
of the Dutch Jacobs in developing ADS’s statute, especially with regards to 
the declaration that the movement had abandoned Islam; I suspect that 
there was a divide et impera logic at work. It is also important to be critical 
of the Dutch role in organising this local syncretic community and naming 
it ‘ADS’. Ira Indrawardana, a young ADS leader, argues that Kyai Madrais 
never intended to turn his mystical and spiritual community into an 
organised religion.143 The explicit mention of the ‘abandonment’ of Islam 
was in fact peculiar because Madrais’ followers had never embraced Islam 
or any other world religion in the first place. So, how could they turn away 
from Islam? As stated above, Steenbrink suggests that certain doctrinal 
aspects of Madraism originated from the Islamic mystical tradition. There 
was thus a connection, so while Madraism and Sufism were two traditions 
that shared certain elements in some respects, they also had sufficient 
differences which potentially could lead to conflict. However, both 
traditions had a common enemy in the Modernism (at the time called 
Wahhabism) which came up in the 1920s. 
 
 
                                                          
141  Rosidin, Kebatinan, Islam and the State, pp. 43-46. I have been unable to identify 
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Mei Kartawinata and His Doctrine: Aliran Kebatinan Perjalanan (AKP) 
Mei Kartawinata was born in Kebon Jati, Bandung on 1 May 1897 to Raden 
Kartowidjojo and Raden Siti Mariah from Citereup, Bogor. He grew up in 
the Kanoman Palace of the Sultan of Cirebon.144 His father, Kartowidjojo, is 
said to be descended from King Brawijaya of the East Javanese kingdom 
Majapahit. His mother is a daughter of Pangeran Sageri, the grandson of 
Panembahan Rakean Sake who is claimed to be descended from the 
Pajajaran Kingdom of Bogor. Thus, Mei Kartawinata is heir to two 
prominent kingdoms: East-Javanese Majapahit and Sundanese Pajajaran.145 
Unlike other members of the kaum menak who attended traditional Islamic 
schools, Mei did not. On the contrary, he went to the private Hollandsch 
Indische Zending School and took various courses to become a junior-level 
officer.146 Because of this education, Mei was familiar with the 
fundamentals of Christian theology and acquainted with Dutch values.147 
In 1914, after having finished his formal training he sought a job and 
was hired by a printing company in Bandung. By 1922, he had joined the 
Indische Drukkerij Bond (IDB) labour union. It was probably during this 
time that Mei became involved in the Nationalist Movement that was 
flourishing in the region, in which Soekarno played a leading role. In 1925, 
when he was 28, Mei married Sukinah in Cirebon who was the daughter of 
Perwatadisastra from Kuningan, Cirebon. Upon his marriage he worked at 
a British-owned printing house in Atelir, Subang.148 
On 17 September 1927, Mei claimed that he had received a wangsit 
(divine guidance) while at the bank of the Celeuleuy River in Cimerta, 
Subang, West Java in the company of his best friends, M. Rashid and 
Sumitra.149 The wangsit contained ten messages which came to constitute 
the fundamental doctrine of the AKP. They are: (1 and 2) commands to 
stand upright and never to let anybody affront you since that would also 
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Abdul Rozak, Teologi Kebatinan Sunda: Kajian Antropologi Agama tentang 
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145  Interview, Asep Setia, Bandung, 08 June 2008. 
146  Pangeling-ngeling Ajaran Mei Kartawinata (Bandung: 2007). 
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mean disrespect toward your parents and your nation’s ancestors; (3) 
there is no power superior to the power of God, the most beneficent and 
compassionate, and this recognition must be reflected in one’s personal 
attitude; (4) to take pride in one’s self as each individual’s perfection is a 
divine gift; (5) to recognise God’s omnipresence; (6) that momentous 
change in the status quo will come, which in the end will bring freedom to 
the nation; (7) that abuse of knowledge and power for the fulfilment of 
one’s own hawa nafsu (desires) will result in resentment, resistance and 
retaliation. Conversely, putting them to use for those in need will bring 
affection and induce a sense of brotherhood; (8) to love one’s fellow beings 
regardless of appearances; (9) that one’s achievements depend on one’s 
efforts; (10) to rise for the good of the oppressed Indonesian people.150 
These ‘Ten Commandments’ provided Mei with the doctrinal system 
which earlier was lacking and which cohered around three main themes: 
divinity, humanity and patriotic fraternity.151 First, God is the most 
powerful, beneficent, compassionate and present; divine compassion must 
illuminate one’s attitude. Second, help those in need and love all mankind 
regardless of racial and social background. Third, protect one’s dignity, help 
those under oppression and be part of future efforts to challenge it.152 
The way Mei’s doctrines developed owes much to his society’s 
natural and cultural circumstances. His humanism, for example, was 
inspired by the natural environment at the Cileuleuy riverside. Mei once sat 
at the riverside and reflected on the origin of the water and the benefit it 
provides to creation. He stated that "the river actually starts with some 
drops of mountain water which swells to create an enormous volume of 
water flowing down to the ocean.”153 He maintained that the water of the 
river should have run out before it could reach the ocean. This was, 
however, not the case. He wondered how this could happen. After some 
time, he speculated that the water volume must have increased due to the 
advantage it dispersed to creation. He came to the conclusion that the 
water kept flowing because of its generosity to those in need. Mei 
Kartawinata then said by himself, “If the river water can benefit others, 
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what about myself, a creature of God’s, endowed with sound body and 
mind?” Upon his personal reflection, Mei disseminated his thoughts to the 
people. At that time he was convinced that abiding to the wangsit’s 
messages of divinity, humanity and patriotic fraternity would bring back 
the nation’s past glory, wisdom and noble character.154 
In 1930, Mei lived in Ciateul Street in Bandung where he had the 
opportunity to share his thoughts with Soekarno, Indonesia’s founding 
father.155 Mei’s encounter with Soekarno was probably made possible 
through his political activism. The IDB, which he served, struggled to obtain 
equal rights for the indigenous people. Mei’s reputation as a pro-nationalist 
meant he was very much under surveillance by the Dutch Colonial 
Administration.156 Because of his political activities, he was arrested 
several times by the Dutch as well as by the Japanese occupation forces. He 
was first arrested in 1937 in Bandung. In 1943, the Japanese occupation 
forces arrested him because of his political activism. He was detained yet 
again in Cirebon in 1947 and once more arrested and jailed in Glodok, 
Jakarta, two years later.157 
Mei believed that the wangsit contained values that were compatible 
with the nation’s cultural heritage and which might revive that heritage 
through political activism. He demonstrated his commitment to reinventing 
these values and to implement them into Sundanese society through his 
political activities. Mei’s involvement in the Nationalist movement was 
probably linked to and influenced by his native-syncretic thoughts. 
Like Kyai Madrais from Cigugur, Kuningan, Mei Kartawinata of 
Cimerta, Subang held nativist-mystical thoughts which cohered around the 
notion of the authentic Sundanese self. They soon resonated with the 
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nationalist discourse on sovereignty that demanded political freedom from 
colonial power and sought cultural supremacy and legitimacy over other 
religious and cultural visions. Their search for cultural supremacy and 
legitimacy challenged efforts to Islamise Sundanese culture. This kind of 
opposition to Islam shows how Islamisation and Islam as a religion were 
continuously contested while it confirms that a religious vision other than 
Islam existed and also demonstrates the confidence of various Sundanese 
leaders to promote and defend what they believed as the true and genuine 
religion of their society. 
 
The Christian Sundanese Community 
This section examines the origins and the expansion of Christianity in West 
Java. It analyses how Christian Sundanese leaders tried to neutralise the 
increasing influence of Islam through the tireless promotion of Christian 
missions across West Java from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. 
During that period, Christianisation had successfully garnered a tiny 
minority of the Sundanese in Cikuya, Banten; Cikembar, Sukabumi; 
Ciranjang, Cianjur; Pondok Melati and Kampung Sawah, Bekasi, among 
other localities. That success owed much to the mission’s leadership, who 
appreciated indigenous culture and adopted a low profile approach. In 
particular Frederik Lodewijk Anthing (1820-83) who had made missionary 
work his life, made great contributions towards this end.158 I selected a 
well-known Muslim-majority area, the Ciranjang district in Cianjur for my 
case study to present the history of the arrival of Christianity in the area 
and how the Christians established an exclusive settlement in a Muslim 
neighbourhood. Although the converts constituted only a tiny minority, it is 
important to learn how these reputedly strict Muslim people of Sundanese 
origin came to embrace Christianity. They claimed they descended from 
Raden Karadinata of the Sultanate of Cirebon, who was nota bene a Muslim 
with a pesantren background. The Christian leaders claimed that the first 
generation of Karadinata’s descendants had migrated to Banten in the early 
nineteenth century and had converted to Christianity mid-century. Church 
leaders in Ciranjang admit that Islam is the religion of the vast majority of 
the Sundanese but refuse to deprive adherents of other faiths of their 
                                                          
158  Gerald H. Anderson (ed.), Biographical Dictionary of Christian Missions (Wm.B. 
Eerdmans, 1999), pp. 24-25. 
-42- 
 
‘Sundanese-ness’.159 When questioned about their choice of Christianity 
amidst the Muslim majority, they wondered what might be wrong being 
Christians in Sundanese society.160 
Batavia was an important hub for the Christian mission in West Java 
as a strategic international port city. In his Visible Cities, Leonard Blussé 
argues that in the eighteenth century, along with Canton in China and 
Nagasaki in Japan, Batavia was one of the most important port cities in 
Asia. They were often written about and “fired the imaginations of sailors 
and writers alike because of their extraordinary appearance and exotic 
attractions.”161 As an international port, Batavia became a centre for trade, 
culture and socio-religious activities. From 1620 to 1844, Batavia evolved 
into the centre of Christian activity in Java, in addition to the Moluccas and 
the lesser Sunda Islands.162 Denys Lombard observed that Batavia had been 
a city of Christian pastors long before other Javanese port cities such as 
Semarang and Surabaya became attractive to them.163 In 1714, he says, a 
member of the Indies Council, Cornelis Chastelein, contributed to forming a 
Christian community in Depok.164 Particularly after the 1830s, Batavia 
became the central post for European missionaries before they obtained 
permission to carry out their missionary activities in other regions in the 
country.165 It was in Batavia that the Zending Consulate Office was situated. 
From 1822 to 1842, W.H. Medhurst from England stayed in Batavia and did 
what he could to win the sympathy of the Batavian Chinese. He propagated 
Christianity through the dissemination of Christian books which were 
printed by a small printing house in Prapatan, South Jakarta. This 
endeavour was subsequently continued by Anthing.166 
Although the Christian mission had been present since the eighteenth 
century, systematic attempts at conversion in Batavia only began in the 
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1850s after which it expanded to other regions. S. Coolsma, a Dutch 
missionary and historian of the Christian mission in Indonesia, called the 
nineteenth century the “Century of Mission” (Zendingseeuw).167 Karel 
Steenbrink explains the motive behind the waves of Christian missionarism 
as follows: “Frustration caused by failure at home, idealism, a sense of 
adventure, and a longing to perform great and heroic deeds all contributed 
in different ways to the motivations and attitudes of many of the Dutch 
citizens who decided to go overseas.”168 
The rise of the Christian missionary age in the East Indies was due to 
the Christian leaders’ initiative to reverse the Christian mission’s inward-
looking orientation. The mission expanded its previous focus on Batavia to 
include a larger area across West Java. This shift was initiated in 1851 by 
Christian leaders including F.L. Anthing, J. Esser, and E.W. King. They 
founded an association called the Genootschap voor In- en Uitwendige 
Zending te Batavia (Organisation for Inward and Outward Missionary 
Activities in Batavia) aiming to disseminate the Gospel outside Batavia, 
particularly among the Sundanese.169 A Christian of Chinese origin, Gan 
Kwee, supported this initiative. He contributed by building the first 
Christian mission network across Cirebon, Sukabumi and Bandung in West 
Java and Purworejo and Purbolinggo in East Java.170 Lombard observes that 
during the twentieth century, a wave of Chinese, most of whom were rich 
and generous, were ushered into Christianity.171 The Chinese integration 
into Christianity continued after independence and was deepened during 
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the New Order and Reform eras. 
 
The Jemaat Cikuya: The Origin of Christian Sundanese  
Before the arrival of the Nederlandsche Zendingsvereeniging, Adolf 
Mühlnickel had started his mission activities in this region on a voluntary 
basis. He was based in Cikuya, Banten and carried out missionary work for 
the Dutch Zending Tukang (ZT).172 ZT sought evangelists who wanted to 
work (as a Tukang ‘worker’) to serve the mission (Zending) and this seems 
to have been the first initiative to the voluntary mission project in West 
Java. As we will see in the following pages, Mühlnickel established the first 
Sundanese parish in Cikuya, Banten, known as the Cikuya parish (Jemaat 
Cikuya), and inspired the growth and development of missionarism in 
Banten and West Java in the following decades. 
Mühlnickel’s contribution towards the conversion of the Sundanese 
to Christianity was telling.173 ZT sent missionaries across the country with 
little financial support. This forced the volunteers to work hard in order to 
support both themselves and their missionary activities. Mühlnickel had to 
work first before he could set out on his missionary trips. He sought and 
was offered work on a plantation in Cikuya owned by a European named 
Reesink. Mühlnickel was prepared to accept Reesink’s offer on the 
condition that he be provided with a church and with a school to 
proselytise. Reesink agreed. 174 
In 1854, Mühlnickel opened a school in Cikuya and built a church in 
the same place two years later. He worked on the plantation during 
working hours and served the mission after that. While working on the 
plantation, Mühlnickel met Minggu, who later worked for him as a house 
maid.175 After some time, he met a young man named Sarma. Under 
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Mühlnickel’s influence, Minggu and Sarma converted and were officially 
baptised in the Willemskerk (Williams Church) near the Gambir railway 
station in Central Batavia in 1855.176 With this baptism, the pair were 
among the first indigenous Sundanese Muslims in Banten who had 
converted to Christianity after Helena van Bantam (d. 1704). After having 
been baptised, they returned to Cikuya to offer Christian services. With 
Mühlnickel’s support, Minggu and Sarma established a Christian parish in 
Cikuya, Banten.177 In the following years, Sarma’s children, Sondjat and 
Esther, played central roles in propagating Christianity in Cikuya. 
After some years, the Cikuya parish came to Anthing’s attention. The 
association of Anthing with the Cikuya congregation energised missionary 
activities there in terms of finance, target and approach. With Anthing’s 
support, the mission began to aim at converting the Baduy.178 This mission 
did not work out well, however, as only one family converted while the rest 
of the Baduy rejected Christianity and since the Baduy continued to refuse 
to convert, the mission among them was halted in the end. This termination 
was also due to the financial constraints Anthing and his missionaries 
faced. 
In their mission to convert the Baduy, the indigenous missionaries 
used ngelmu,179 mystical sciences commonly believed to empower its 
                                                                                                                                              
of the West Javanese population were Muslims. Interview with pastor Koernia 
Atje Soejana, Jakarta, 7 July 2009. 
176  Idem. 
177  The Nederlandsche Zendingsvereeniging (NZV), the most important evangelist 
organisation in West Java, realised that there were only few documents 
furnishing information on the Cikuya parish. See Van den End, Sumber-Sumber 
Zending, p. 429. 
178  “Baduy is a popular designation for the land/area and people of Kanekes given 
by outsiders. The naming of Baduy links to two matters. Firstly, it points to a 
location named Baduy, a Mountain called Baduy and a River called Cibaduy, 
which all three are close to each another. For the Kanekes people themselves, 
only those who settled in Baduy are properly called Baduy. It is possible that 
the identification originated from visitors to the place. Second, it was possible 
that the designation was linked to a group of desert Arabs considered 
uncivilised. They were desert nomads." See Rosidi and. Ekadjati (eds.), 
Ensiklopedi Sunda, pp. 81-82.  Also Ali, Misionarisme di Banten, p. 98. 
179  Eringa translates elmu as ‘wetenschap, kennis, leer; geheime (esoterische) 
wetenschap; kunsten (in ongunstige zin)’ (knowledge; secret (esoteric) 
knowledge; arts (in a negative sense). See F.S. Eringa, Soendaas-Nederlands 
Woordenboek , p. 201. 
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practitioners in order to influence people. At the time, ngelmu was popular 
in Banten, Batavia and other parts of West Java. People living in this region 
continued to believe in it and remained reluctant to abandon it even after 
conversion to Islam or Christianity. Sarma from Rangkas, for example, was 
a ngelmu seeker and although he had embraced Christianity180 he 
continued to use it to convert locals, who were fascinated by these 
practices.181 The most prominent evangelist, Anthing, also practiced ngelmu 
and used it in his proselytisation efforts with the help of Ibrahim Tunggul 
Wulung, a Javanese disciple. Although some Christian missionaries 
condemned his ‘mantrasising’ of Biblical verses was, Anthing’s ‘mystical’ 
approach afforded Christianity a veneer of familiarity which made it more 
attractive to the Sundanese.182 This approach was also useful in promoting 
mutual respect and understanding between the missionaries and their 
audience. Perhaps one very good example in this regard was demonstrated 
by Conrad Laurens Coolen in mid-nineteenth century interior East Java.183 
                                                          
180  Van den End, Sumber-Sumber Zending, pp. 251-252. 
181  Interview, pastor Koernia Atje Soejana, Bekasi, 11 May 2010. 
182  Interview, pastor Mintarya Sondjat, Cianjur, 12 August 2009. 
183  As told by Ricklefs, Coolen was born in Semarang to a Russian father and a 
Javanese mother said to be descended from an aristocratic family from 
Surakarta, c. 1773. He married a European wife who bore him five children and 
a Javanese Muslim woman who gave him six. Coolen began spreading his 
mission on land leased in Ngara South of Majaagung in 1830. He built a church 
at the centre of the plot, using the rest for agriculture. His estate was well 
organised and eventually piqued Javanese interest. By 1844 many Javanese 
wanted to move to Coolen’s estate situated on the low lands of Mt. Kelud. It is 
also probable that the Javanese interest in Coolen’s mission was due to his 
charismatic personality and syncretic religious doctrines and practices, a 
combination of essential Christian tenets and Islamic symbolism wrapped in 
Javanese culture. No baptism was required for his converts. Coolen translated 
Christian doctrines into Javanese in both the linguistic and cultural senses and 
created a prayer for his parish that mixed Javanese tradition and the Islamic 
profession of faith. In Ricklefs’ words: “Coolen translated basic doctrines into 
Javanese, not only in a linguistic but also in a cultural sense. He took over the 
Javanese custom of a leader ritually ploughing the soil while singing an 
invocation in Javanese verse of the rice-goddess Dewi Sri and her brother 
Sedana, whose union promised fertility. A prayer by Coolen has been preserved 
that shows how he Christianised this Javanese tradition, employing the Islamic 
profession that there is no God but God (La ilaha illa ‘llah) and presenting the 
Christian idea of the Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit in a way that would, 




Anthing and his followers realised the importance of indigenous 
culture in their mission. Sondjat, a talented singer (penembang), for 
example, often sang tembang and sometimes he used allegories and 
metaphors to attract his audience to the Gospels.184 In Cikuya, Sondjat built 
a church using modest building materials like bamboo for its walls and 
palm leaves and grass for its roof. After serving his parish with patience, he 
managed to attract others to the Cikuya parish and it is clear that his belief 
in Christianity was profound and manifested itself through a remarkable 
dedication towards his newly adopted faith. Sondjat was a poor man but he 
consistently served the Cikuya parish and continued to teach the Bible 
around the village and in rural areas.185 Sondjat continued his father’s 
efforts in the development of the Jemaat Cikuya parish with Anthing’s 
support. Later he became the first apostle of the apostolic church.186 During 
his wanderings in Banten, Sondjat met Anthing, who eventually appointed 
him as his assistant in the Cikuya parish. 
In the 1880s, the NZV set up a plan to expand its mission across 
Banten to include Serang, Pandeglang, Caringin, Leuwidamar, and Lebak. 
The Governor-General, however, rejected this ambitious plan. He 
disappointed the NZV by allowing the establishment of only one mission 
post in Leuwidamar, Lebak. The well-known missionary, A.A. Pennings, 
                                                                                                                                              
 Mount Semeru we sing of, 
 the sign of the land of Java: 
 may my farming endure 
 in the pleasure of Sri and Sedana, 
 who take the form of rice. 
 Who gives me leave is Allah the Most Pure. 
 Yea, there is no God but God (la ilaha ilelah) and Jesus Christ is the Spirit of    
 God. 
 
Through this syncretic approach, Coolen converted hundreds of Javanese who 
felt at home with a ‘Christianity’ which was not mutually-exclusive with regards 
to Javanism. See Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society, pp. 109-113. 
184  Van den End, Sumber-Sumber Zending, pp. 282-283 and 429. 
185  Idem. 
186  Interview, pastor Mintarya Sondjat, Cianjur, 12 August 2009. In 1855, Sondjat 
was 15 years old when his father Sarma was officially baptised. Before 
assuming his religious responsibilities, Sondjat liked to travel across Java. Once 
he visited Banten and was so impressed with the tradition of the orang Baduy 
that he decided to settle in the area for several years. 
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was appointed to serve there and he began his mission in 1894.187 To 
support his mission, Pennings established a clinic and a church and he built 
a house nearby. Pennings’ mission in Leuwidamar did not produce the 
fruitful results he had expected; only one family converted after several 
years of missionary activity. This failure was in part due to Muslims’ 
resistance to missionary activities. In 1902, Pennings was found dead after 
having been poisoned, although the official NZV account concealed this, 
claiming that Pennings had died of cholera.188 Pennings’ death froze the 
Christian missionary activities in this location. Towards independence the 
anti-Christian missionary attitude in the area had not changed much. After 
independence the situation became even worse, especially when churches 
in Leuwidamar and Cikuya were burned down.189 Because of this violent 
action, the forty-five members of the Leuwidamar and Cikuya parishes 
were forced to relocate to Sukabumi (Cikembar) and Bogor (Gunung Putri), 
where they built new churches.190 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Christian 
missionaries kept struggling to win the hearts of the people in Batavia and 
West Java despite being challenged from doing so by indigenous Muslims 
and by restrictions imposed by the Dutch Colonial Administration. The NZV 
was the first European missionary organisation to carry out extensive 
missionary work in Batavia and West Java. It was established on 2 
December 1858 and it sent three missionaries, C. Albers, D.J. van der 
Linden, and G.J. Grashuis to the Priangan in 1862.191 On 5 January 1863, 
they arrived in Batavia and after several days they continued their trip to 
Bandung, which was selected to be the hub of their missionary work in 
West Java.192 They arrived in Bandung in March 1863 but could not start 
their work immediately because the Dutch colonial administration strictly 
                                                          
187  Ali, Misionarisme di Banten, pp. 108-109. 
188  Idem, p. 117. 
189  By that time, the heads of the church were Sainim and Esther respectively. 
Interview, Mufti Ali, Singapore, 23 April 2011. 
190  Esther and Sondjat followed the caravan while Sarma remained in Cikuya and 
spent the rest of his life there. Interview, pastor Mintarya Sondjat, Cianjur, 12 
August 2009. 
191  Koernia Atje Soejana, Sejarah Komunikasi Injil di Tanah Pasundan, PhD 
Dissertation, Sekolah Tinggi Teologi Jakarta, 1997, p. 254. 
192  Idem, p. 254. See also Van den End, Sumber-Sumber Zending, pp. 3-8. 
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prohibited missionary work in the colony.193 This ban was aimed at 
maintaining rust en orde (peace and order) and to prevent instability 
among the Sundanese, the majority of whom adhered to Islam. The 
colonisers were well aware of the trouble that might ensue if they failed to 
keep control of missionary activities in the region.194 Years after the 
prohibition was lifted, the Dutch administration still adopted a cautious 
approach on the issue by banning the presence of more than one 
missionary association in the same place at the same time.195 
In 1865, a license was eventually issued by the Colonial 
Administration to allow missionary activities. Missionary C. Albers 
obtained his license to work in Cianjur in 1865. His colleague Van der 
Linden, who had already arrived in Cirebon in 1863 and who had 
subsequently moved to Indramayu in 1864, was also given permission to 
do his missionary work. Ds. Krol and G.J. Grashuis were asked to learn the 
Sundanese language and to translate the Bible into Sundanese. Grashuis 
returned to the Netherlands in 1865 to carry out this work but failing to 
accomplish it was forced to leave the NZV in 1868.196 
The evangelist missionaries eventually succeeded in paying visits to 
nearly all the important places across West Java, including Bandung 
                                                          
193  This ban caused much inconvenience to the Christian missionaries. It also 
provoked reactions in The Hague, especially from liberal politicians, who forced 
the Colonial Administration to modify its policy. This demand for change 
stemmed from the liberal atmosphere prevailing in the Netherlands in 
particular and in Europe in general during the 1880s. Corresponding with the 
winds of change, the Administration effected some changes in its policy, 
adopting a more positive attitude towards missionary associations. The NZV 
was now at liberty to expand its mission into the Priangan and other places in 
West Java including Cirebon and Indramayu on the north coast areas and to the 
environs of Batavia including Bogor, Karawang, and Tangerang. NZV named 
locales targeted by evangelists a ‘pos’, referring to a place where an evangelist 
resides. A place where an evangelist teacher lived was called a ‘cabang’ or ‘pos 
luar’. In the twentieth century the name ‘pos’ was replaced by ‘resor’. Prior to 
the twentieth century, the number of ‘pos’ in West Java was not well-recorded. 
Nonetheless, in 1926 a report revealed that there were 9 ‘resor’ in the area. In 
1944, however, the number had dropped to five: Bandung, Batavia, Cirebon, 
Garut and Jatikebon. Van den End, Sejarah Gereja di Jawa Barat, pp. 10-11. 
194  Van den End and Weitjens, Ragi Carita 2, p. 221. 
195  Jan S. Aritonang, Sejarah Perjumpaan Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia (Jakarta: 
BPK Gunung Mulia, 2005), p. 79. 
196  Soejana, Sejarah Komunikasi Injil, pp. 254-255. See also Van den End and 
Weitjens, Ragi Carita 2, p. 221. 
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(1870), Sukabumi and Sumedang (1872), Jatinegara (1884), Tangerang 
(1889), Lebak (1894) and Tasikmalaya (1898). Initially, the NZV mainly 
targeted the Sundanese for its missionary activities but in later years it also 
tried to include the Chinese. This was because the NZV found that some 
Chinese on the north coast had already embraced Christianity.197 The NZV 
found a Christian parish on the north coast that had a large number of 
Chinese members. This reality forced the missionaries no longer only to 
focus their attention on the indigenous Sundanese (who spoke three 
languages: Sundanese, Javanese and Malay) but also on the Chinese 
community. It appeared somewhat easier to convert the Chinese than to 
convert the Sundanese.198 There is no report, however, that mentions 
which missionary organisations had arrived on the north coast of West Java 
and the manner in which they attracted the Chinese to Christianity.  
Changes in the Netherlands had also caused changes in the emphasis, 
content, and direction of NZV’s mission in West Java. It shifted its emphasis 
from religion to social empowerment and capacity-building. This shift 
aimed to support the colonial administration’s program for the promotion 
of the people’s wellbeing by advancing education, health, agriculture and 
transportation. Inspired by the spirit of the “Ethische Politiek” (Ethical 
Politics) after 1901, the colonial administration and the evangelist 
organisations cooperated in running the government’s social programs 
particularly in education and health services aimed at improving the 
quality of life of the people in the Netherlands East Indies.199 In the early 
years of their presence in West Java, NZV missionaries also became 
increasingly involved in, and worked for, government schools. In 
collaboration with NZV missionaries as their agents of development, the 
Administration managed to organise its programs efficiently.200 
                                                          
197  Van den End, Sejarah Gereja di Jawa Barat, p. 9. 
198  Once, all the students in a class in Cirebon converted to Christianity. Massive 
conversion was unheard of in the Priangan, while there were few who 
converted to Christianity. Interview, Koernia Atje Soejana. Bekasi, 7 July 2009. 
Little has changed about Christian missionarism in recent times. Interview, 
Fabianus who served in the Liturgy Commission of the Konferensi Waligereja 
Indonesia (KWI), in the Keuskupan Bogor and currently acts as Dean of the 
Faculty of Philosophy of Parahyangan University, Bandung, 15 June 2009. 
199  Van den End and Weitjens, Ragi Carita 2, p. 221. 
200  Idem, p. 6. Despite the challenge of missionary work in an overwhelmingly 
Muslim environment, the NZV expended much effort to win over the 
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It is a truism in Sundanese society that abandoning Islam is regarded 
as a betrayal of religion, ethnicity and culture. This may be related to the 
fact that Islam had been the religion of the Sundanese majority for a long 
time although the quality and the level of acceptance and observance of 
Islam varied.201 The social stigma attached to the grave sin of apostasy thus 
served as another bulwark against conversion attempts. Apostates were 
labelled ‘murtad’ and this dishonour alone served as a social and cultural 
barrier to conversion. Abandonment of their faith entailed the alienation 
from their families and communities. The new converts thus left their 
homes and sought others like themselves, amongst whom they would be 
accepted. 
This cultural impediment meant that missionary efforts in the 
Priangan yielded little success even after thirty years. By 1898, the NZV had 
established 24 parish groups in West Java with 2,260 listed Christians. The 
number of churches increased, although not significantly. There was a 
Christian church in Pangharepan, Sukabumi with 308 members, one third 
of whom originated from the Chinese following of the late Anthing.202 Only 
the conversion of indigenous people could be credited to NZV efforts. The 
Priangan prospects for the Christian mission remained rather bleak 




                                                                                                                                              
Sundanese, as illustrated by the following initiatives. The first expert on 
agriculture the NZV sent to Indonesia was M. Ottow. He arrived in 1918. He was 
followed the next year (1919) by doctor W.J.L. Dake. The NZV also appointed 
various new indigenous converts to help the mission in managing its activities 
in religious affairs, and to further support their educational programs. In the 
following years, the NZV received more support from the Netherlands with the 
arrival of various agricultural and medical experts. From only seventeen 
Protestant ministers, twenty-seven missionaries and nine Roman Catholic 
priests in 1850, these numbers increased to seventy-seven, seventy-three and 
forty-nine respectively in 1900, and continued to increase after that. See Van 
den End, Sejarah Gereja di Jawa Barat, pp. 11-24; Soejana, Benih Yang Tumbuh 
II, pp. 39-41; Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism, p. 98. 
201  Almost all pastors in charge in the churches in Ciranjang, Cianjur expressed 
similar opinions. Interview with Dody S. Truna, Bandung, 3 April 2009. 
202  Van den End and Weitjens, Ragi Carita 2, p. 222. Sadi’in (Petrus) joined the 
Pangharepan parish after Anthing’s death in 1883 following his brother Sariun 
who had already joined the parish much earlier. 
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The Christian Community in Pangharepan, Sukabumi 
In 1872, P.N. Gijsman was sent from Cianjur to Sukabumi and, ten years 
later, he had managed to convert twenty-five people.203 In 1883, the NZV 
appointed Simon van Eendenburg as missionary in Sukabumi to replace 
Gijsman. Eendenburg purchased plantation land in Pangharepan, Cikembar 
only 18 km from Sukabumi in the direction of Pelabuhan Ratu, which was 
also used to build residences and a village for the new Christian converts 
who were alienated from their people. The converts would be assigned to 
work on the plantation, for which they were paid. At the same time they 
could dedicate themselves to church services. 
In 1886, the Pangharepan settlement was ready for habitation. The 
Christians relocated there and began a new life. Among the migrants were 
Sariun and Sadi’in, two brothers who had been born into the Marchasan 
family who originated from Leuwidahu in Banten and who were formerly 
loyal followers of Anthing’s. As noted by Koernia Atje, Sariun had been in 
Sukabumi since 1877 after having been instructed by Anthing to help NZV 
missionary, Gijsman. That year, Djimun, a follower from Batavia, 
introduced Sadi’in to Anthing, who warmly welcomed him. He offered to 
put Sadi’in, baptised as Petrus, up at his residence, during which he would 
undergo intensive training before being sent on missionary activities. 
Petrus was assigned to carry out his mission in Cikuya, Banten, 
where he married Nyai Bani from Cigelam, Serang. There is no account of 
Petrus’ missionary activities in Cikuya.204 Soon after Anthing’s death in 
1883, however, Petrus left Cikuya for Batavia to seek employment before 
he finally joined his brother Sariun in Pangharepan, Sukabumi.205 Simon 
van Eendenburg was in charge in Sukabumi before he took up residence on 
the settlement in 1888. By that time, the Pangharepan Christian population 
numbered 272, the largest Christian community in West Java.206 Van 
Eendenburg served the Pangharepan parish for twelve years. By 1900, 
Hendri Muller was appointed to replace him. Muller served the NZV until 
1905 but failed to keep the parish united as we will see below.207 
                                                          
203  Soejana, Benih Yang Tumbuh II, p. 34. 
204  Interview, pastor Mintarya Sondjat, Cianjur, 12 August 2009. 
205  Soejana, ‘Gereja Kerasulan Rawaselang: Mengenal Gereja Kerasulan Tertua di 
Jawa Barat.’ unpublished paper (Jakarta, June 2006), pp. 18-19. 
206  Idem, p. 17. 
207  Interview, pastor Mintarya Sondjat, Cianjur, 12 August 2009. 
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Koernia Atje states that Petrus or Sadi’in is said to have attended a 
pesantren before embracing Christianity. Petrus was the grandson of a 
Muslim nobleman from Cirebon named Raden Karadinata, who had left 
Cirebon in the first half of the nineteenth century to go to Serang, Banten, 
because of a quarrel he had had with his stepmother. There are no details 
about Karadinata’s ancestry but his marriage to the daughter of the 
penghulu of Banten, who bore him six daughters, suggests his linkage to the 
Cirebon aristocracy. One daughter, Dewi Sai, married the son of the 
penghulu of Serang, whose name is unfortunately unknown. Her first son 
was Mukayam, whose children were Marchasan, Ibu Maat, Sadi’in, Sariun 
and Ibu Karsiah.208 Thus Mukayam, the grandson of Raden Karadinata, was 
the direct ancestor of the first generation of Christian Bantenese. Not only 
did they convert to Christianity, they also played an instrumental role in 
leading their fellow Bantenese to adopt the faith through their involvement 
in the mission work carried out by Anthing and the NZV across Banten, 
Sukabumi and Cianjur. Mukayam’s sons, Sadi’in and Sariun, converted to 
Christianity in the second half of the nineteenth century. The reason for 
their conversion is unknown but Martan Marchasan, a third-generation 
descendant of Karadinata, put it down to God’s call.209 Martan also 
suggested that their decision might also have been influenced by the close 
relationship they maintained with Chinese and Dutch individuals.210 
The brothers later became the leaders of NZV’s Pangharepan Parish 
in Sukabumi. After having joined the parish, Petrus, Sariun and their 
friends, however, could not really appreciate the Christian canon as 
promoted by the NZV. Instead, they endlessly tried to revive Anthing’s 
doctrine whom they very much appreciated for his humility, generosity and 
his respect for their identity and culture. This was most clearly manifested 
in his preference for tailoring the Christian precepts to match the 
indigenous context. Although he was Dutch, he interacted with his 
followers with full respect for indigenous tradition and values. It seemed 
that Anthing’s legacy remained firmly rooted. It was therefore his 
indigenous - if not quite his nationalist - sentiment that factored in the 
separation between the indigenous Christians and their Dutch landlord-
                                                          
208  Soejana, Gereja Kerasulan Rawaselang, pp. 17-19. 
209  Interview, pastor Nupelus Marchasan, Ruchman Marchasan and Martan 
Marchasan, Cianjur, 12 August 2009.  
210  Idem.  
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cum-Pastor, Hendri Muller.211 Under Petrus’ and Sariun’s leadership, the 
entire congregation of fifty-seven Christians left the Pangharepan parish 
and migrated to Ciranjang in the early twentieth century. On arriving there, 
they established a settlement with the assistance of an irrigation worker 
named Armin, who at that time was in the service of the Dutch 
administration. Armin converted to Christianity after having been born into 
a Muslim family.212 
Anthing’s followers consisted mostly of people who were related to 
one another through shared familial linkages, namely through Mukayam 
and Raden Karadinata. Therefore, filial sentiments and interest seem to 
have been an important element in their bond and unity.213 Until recently, 
various individuals who claimed to be descendants from Karadinata and 
Mukayam played leadership roles in several churches. I found their 
influence in at least two large churches; namely the Kerasulan Baru Church 
and the Kerasulan Pusaka Church, both located in Rawaselang, Cianjur.214 
 
The Christian Community in Gunung Halu, Cianjur 
In the late nineteenth century, the Christians began to consolidate their 
identity with the establishment of a village whose inhabitants comprised 
Sundanese converts. Over time, their number increased slowly but surely, 
thanks to NZV’s tireless missionary work. By the 1880s, the first Christian 
community was formed in Pangharepan, Sukabumi, West Java. Years later, 
two more Christian communities came into existence in Palalangon and 
Rawaselang in Gunung Halu, Ciranjang, Cianjur.215 
From the start, the NZV considered Cianjur an important target. 
                                                          
211  Soejana, Gereja Kerasulan Rawaselang, p. 23. 
212  Interview, pastor Nupelus Marchasan, Ruchman Marchasan and Martan 
Marchasan, Cianjur, 12 August 2009.  
213  Idem. Almost all of them came from Banten. Petrus (Sadi’in) of Leuwidahu, 
probably with support from his brother Sariun and other close friends was 
upset with the leadership of the ‘zendeling’ Hendri Muller. Soejana, Gereja 
Kerasulan Rawaselang, p. 20. 
214  Interview, Martan Marchasan, Cianjur, 12 August 2009. 
215  Gunung Halu is now divided into four villages: Sindangjaya, Kertajaya, 
Sindangsari, and Gunungsari. These villages are situated in Ciranjang, Cianjur. 
Among these villages, Sindangjaya and Kertajaya are inhabited by a majority of 
Christians. There is also a significant number of Christians in the other two 
villages even if they do not outnumber those in Kertajaya and Sindangjaya.  
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Therefore, in 1863, it sent C.J. Albers to head the mission there. The mission 
work obtained permission to operate only in 1865, but a report shows that 
in December 1863, a Sundanese couple named Ismail and Murti had 
already embraced Christianity.216 Although the mission failed to result in 
massive conversion, NZV missionaries declined to give up their efforts but 
patiently persisted. In the early twentieth century, there were seventy 
Christians. Although insignificant in terms of numbers, through this 
achievement the NZV had actually planted the seed for the further growth 
of Christianity in West Java. Forty years after NZV’s arrival in Cianjur, the 
Christian community had grown. The increase was not only due to 
proselytisation, but also to immigration from other places in West Java, 
especially from Bandung and Pangharepan, Sukabumi. 
It seemed obvious that Cianjur would become a training laboratory 
for missionaries. P.N. Gijsman and S. Coolsma were appointed to work first 
in Cianjur before their appointments in Sukabumi and Bogor respectively. 
S. Coolsma was sent to Bogor in 1869 and after fourteen years, six persons 
had embraced Christianity. Coolsma wrote a grammar and a dictionary of 
the Sundanese language.217 These efforts aimed to improve the 
understanding of the Sundanese language and its culture among the 
missionaries. Coolsma’s important contribution was that he translated the 
Bible into the Sundanese language.218 
In 1903, Muller could not prevent the exodus of parishioners from 
Pangharepan. This group of Anthing’s followers migrated to Kampung 
Rawaselang, which is close to the NZV’s Kampung Palalangon. Under 
Petrus’ leadership, they started a new religious life away from the influence 
of Muller’s Dutch NZV tradition. Since Anthing was no longer there, Petrus 
and his followers enjoyed great autonomy in the organisation and in the 
management of their religious institution and they continued to act upon 
their own tradition. The reaction to the NZV appeared to have strongly 
informed the religious tradition they constructed. Soon after their arrival 
they established a denomination named the Gereja Kerasulan Baru (New 
Apostolic Church).  
In 1902, a year before the arrival of the Christians from the 
Pangharepan settlement, NZV followers under Bouke Minnes Alkema’s 
                                                          
216  Soejana, Benih Yang Tumbuh II, p. 27. 
217  Van den End and Weitjens, Ragi Carita 2, p. 222. 
218  Idem. 
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leadership had already arrived in Cianjur and had settled in Palalangon 
village. Alkema erected his first church in Palalangon, Kertajaya village, 
Ciranjang sub-district and called it the Pasundan Christian Church (GKP) 
Palalangon. The NZV church, with only 30 parishioners, was the first to 
bring Christianity to Cianjur in 1902.219 Economic hardship had compelled 
them to migrate from Bandung. Lacking agricultural land to sustain them 
economically, the situation in Cianjur was not much better for the migrants. 
Alkema, who chaired the NZV Bandung ‘pos’ (1893-1903), along with other 
pastors responsible for Cianjur, was aware of the situation and sought to 
establish an agricultural settlement for the community. 
In support of his efforts, the Dutch administration granted the NZV 
130 bau (1 bau is 0,71 ha) of land in Cianjur. In 1901, Alkema, accompanied 
by Wedana Sabri and seven indigenous Christians, travelled around in 
search of suitable land. They went all the way along the Citarum River and 
eventually arrived at what they felt was a good location. They erected 
emergency shelters and opened up space in the tropical forest, which 
process lasted nearly one year. By May 1902, the work was finished and 
subsequently nine households comprising of 21 people from Cianjur moved 
in to inhabit the new settlement under the leadership of Pastor Elipas.220 
Right from the outset, Alkema had the concrete plan to establish a 
Christian village using traditional designs and concepts. This involved a 
town square with residences for common use: church, schools, office 
buildings for the village administration, clinic, and residence for the 
Pastors. The people’s residences were to be built around this square.221 
The village was named Palalangon, which means ‘lookout post’.222 In 
                                                          
219  Interview, pastor Mintarya Sondjat, Cianjur, 12 August 2009.  
220  There is no account offering the exact number of the first generation of 
immigrants to the Palalangon village. According to Pastor Putu Suwintana, the 
first group to come to Palalangon consisted of seven persons. Interview with 
pastor Putu Suwintana, Cianjur, 11 May 2010; Koernia Atje Soejana nonetheless 
talked about nine persons. Soejana, Sejarah Komunikasi Injil, p. 286.  
221  Interview, pastor Putu Suwintana, Cianjur, 11 May 2010; See also Soejana, 
Sejarah Komunikasi Injil, p. 285. When I visited Palalangon in 2009 and 2010, 
the village landscape indeed appears to have been shaped according to 
Alkema’s initial conception - the town square is situated in the centre with 
public buildings including church, school, office and minister residence. The 
residences of the parishioners are situated surrounding the public buildings. 




the following years, the parish gradually grew through marriage and birth 
as well as by the arrival of Christian families from places in West Java such 
as Pasirkaliki in Karawang, Cikembar in Sukabumi, and Gunung Putri in 
Bogor. As we will briefly discuss below, some Christians from Gunung Putri 
in Bogor maintained good relations with their relatives in Kampung Melati 
in Bekasi. This caused an inflow of adherents and enabled the expansion of 
the Christian mission in Bekasi in the late-nineteenth century from Bogor.  
 
The Christian Community in Kampung Sawah, Bekasi 
The Christianisation of Bekasi223 started in the nineteenth century 
(c.1870s) and was the result of the expansion of the mission into various 
parts of West Java like Bandung, Cianjur, Sukabumi and Bogor. Like in 
many parts of this region, the expansion of the Christian mission into 
Bekasi seems to have been a continuation of the Christian mission’s earlier 
presence and its settlement in Bogor. The initial stages of Christianisation 
in the area owe much to Anthing and his disciples. Prior to their arrival in 
Pondok Melati and Kampung Sawah in Bekasi, Anthing’s disciples held 
services in Gunung Putri, Bogor. 
Koernia Atje Soejana maintains that before Christianity was started 
to be propagated in Pondok Melati and Kampung Sawah, the majority of the 
villagers, who are of Betawi origin, adhered to Islam.224 Aside from 
practicing Islam, Betawi Muslims also observed animistic practices like 
making food offerings and they believed that spirits guard mountains, 
empty lands and houses, big rocks, et cetera. They used to perform rituals 
which consisted of charitable offerings (sedekahan) in order toobtain 
permission to enter those places.225 They also have wisit, supernatural 
objects they believe can bring fortune.226 The majority of the villagers in 
                                                          
223  The District of Bekasi was established by Law Number 14/1950 with Jatinegara 
as its center. After some years the center moved to Ir. H. Juanda Street and 
subsequently to Jend. A. Yani street in downtown Bekasi. Bekasi has 13 sub-
districts, one of which is named Bekasi. 
224  Koernia Atje Soejana, Berakar, Tumbuh, Berkembang dan Berbuah: Mengupas 
Kisah Perjalanan Injil di GKP Jemaat Kampung Sawah (Bekasi: Majelis Jemaat 
GKP Kampung Sawah, 2008), p. 5. 
225  Sedekahan literally means giving something of value to others. 
226  Wisit is a Sundanese word which means “milik teu pahili-hili, bagja teu paala-
ala teu paliili milik jelema sabab unggal jelema geus pada boga milik sorangan” 
(No person’s luck and happiness can be changed because each individual’s fate 
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these places were rice farmers. From the nineteenth to the twentieth 
centuries they held a slametan in each stage of the rice growing cycle up to 
harvest. These ceremonies are testament to their belief in a variety of 
deities including Dewi Sri, the Goddes of fertility and the Goddess of rice.227 
The first indigenous person in Pondok Melati who converted to 
Christianity was Semain Empi, a ngelmu seeker, who conceded the 
superiority of the evangelists’ ngelmu sejati228 over his ngelmu. He was of 
Betawi origin and he was most likely a nominal Muslim who sought ngelmu 
to demonstrate his supernatural powers in order to win the respect and the 
following of the people in his surroundings. The pursuit of ngelmu and its 
practice was a common phenomenon in Batavia and all across Java. The 
missionaries, especially those who served under Anthing, were aware of 
these mystical practices and they tried to find out how to counter the 
influence of ngelmu practitioners.  
Having acquired a small following in Pondok Melati, the evangelists 
pursued the Christianisation of Kampung Sawah, two kilometres to the 
east. This effort was highly successful with the help of Anthing’s disciple, 
Paul Rikin,and his son, Loekas. Loekas underwent evangelist training in 
Sumedang under the supervision of S.A. Schilstra. After finishing his 
training he went west to serve Albers’ mission in Cianjur.229 
 
Culture-based Christianisation 
The Christianisation of Pondok Melati and Kampung Sawah owes much to 
Anthing’s cultural approach towards the indigenous people and the 
capitalizing on their social connections for the recruitment of new converts. 
Anthing and his disciples used the social bond between the Christians in 
Gunung Putri and Cigelam in Bogor and their relatives and friends in 
Pondok Melati. This approach was effective in attracting the indigenous 
Betawi to Christianity. In 1885, there were 80 Christian converts in Gunung 
Putri and after some twenty years their number had increased to more 
                                                                                                                                              
has been decided in advance). See R.A. Danadibrata, Kamus Basa Sunda (Panitia 
Penerbitan Kamus Basa Sunda, second edition, 2009), p. 441. 
227  Soejana, Berakar, Tumbuh, Berkembang dan Berbuah, p. 6. 
228  Ngelmu sejati is true mystical sciences, which Christian missionaries claimed 
could be derived from the Bible. 
229  Soejana, Berakar, Tumbuh, Berkembang dan Berbuah, pp. 30-31. 
-59- 
 
than 100.230 The initial Christianisation of Bekasi owes much to the 
Christians in Gunung Putri, Bogor. The Christianisation in this part of 
Bekasi was also due to Anthing’s missionaries’ tireless efforts in building 
relations with the indigenous people in this place, eventually winning them 
over.231 There are at least three reasons for Anthing’s success. The first is 
that he used the right approach in communicating with the people. He 
studied their culture and communicated with them in their language. 
Second, Anthing empathised with and respected them. Third, Anthing tried 
to understand the spiritual life of these people and attempted to learn 
about their magic and superstition practices. He equipped his missionaries 
with the proper knowledge about ngelmu sejati using mantras born out of 
the Bible to counter ngelmu practices employed by local leaders.232 
However, according to the leading Dutch missionary, Hendrik Kraemer 
(1888-1965), the missionaries did not seem to have properly understood 
the social, cultural and religious aspects of the Sundanese. To him, these 
missionaries did not intimately interact with the Sundanese people. Rather, 
they created parishes in places that isolated them and their church from 
Sundanese society.233 
 
The Christian Javanese  
It is believed that the Christian Javanese, migrants from Mt. Muria in Jepara, 
Central Java and Mojowarno, East Java, were the first generation of 
Christians to settle in Kampung Sawah, possibly by the late nineteenth 
century before the arrival of the people from Batavia. Their presence 
benefited from the help of Ibrahim Tunggul Wulung and Sadrach who went 
to Batavia in 1865. They were brilliant disciples of Anthing’s, who met in 
the early nineteenth century in Semarang where Anthing served the Dutch. 
They became two well-known Javanese proselytisers. Tunggul Wulung 
took Sadrach, known as Radin Abas, to Batavia in 1865, and both helped 
Anthing in his proselytising activities there and in surrounding areas. After 
a couple of years of working with Anthing, however, Tunggul Wulung and 
Sadrach returned to Java. 
The Javanese presence in Kampung Sawah is also evident in 
                                                          
230  Ali, Misionarisme di Banten, p. 63. 
231  Soejana, Berakar, Tumbuh, Berkembang dan Berbuah, pp. 25-29. 
232  Idem, pp. 28-30. 
233  Van den End and Weitjens, Ragi Carita 2, p. 223. 
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Anthing’s Trinity formulae, one of which reads in Javanese as follows: 
 
Bapa Allah, Putra Allah, Roh Suci Allah, telu-telune dadi siji, upas racun 
dadi tawa, lemah sangar kayu angker dadi tawa, isti Gusti, Tuhan Yesus 
Kristus juru slamet kami slami-lamine.234 
 
(Allah the Father, Allah the Son, Allah the Holy Ghost, three become 
one, poison becomes cure, enchanted places and woods no longer harm 
and lose their power by the will of Allah, Jesus Christ is the eternal 
saviour). 
 
The use of Javanese shows Anthing’s appreciation of the significance 
of language and culture in missionary work. As described above, Anthing’s 
mission mainly targeted the Javanese before he started his service in 
Batavia and West Java. Anthing’s missionary contribution in Batavia, Depok 
and other parts in West Java and Banten was profound. He contributed to 
the establishment of a seminary in Depok - a training centre that churned 
out missionaries from the late nineteenth to the first quarter of the 
twentieth century. One of the mission’s founding fathers, Hendrik Kraemer, 
praised Anthing for his dedication to the faith. Anthing was also generous. 
He lent his property in Kramat for the mission’s use as a training centre for 
the induction of indigenous missionaries.235 Anthing died in 1883, leaving 





This chapter shows how Islam and other religions in West Java developed 
and describes how their followers created a plural, dynamic society. It 
shows the importance of Islam as a faith, a set of practices and an identity 
for the vast majority of the Sundanese people since the nineteenth century. 
Their observance of Islamic practices (rukun Islam) and their adoption of 
an Islamic identity, however, did not stop some of them from practicing 
adat, engaging in native mystical practices and believing in spiritual forces. 
                                                          
234  Letter from C. Albers to NZV (10 April 1899) as cited in Soejana, Berakar, 
Tumbuh, Berkembang dan Berbuah, p. 18. 
235  Ali, Misionarisme di Banten, p. 62 
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Sundanese religious identity rests upon intimate and dialectical relations 
between Islam and adat which also enabled Islamic co-existence with the 
tiny Christian minority. 
Members of the Sundanese elite, such as Moeharam 
Wiranatakoesoema and Haji Hasan Moestapa, were aware of this social 
capital and they continued to maintain adat blended in Islamic practices. 
This relationship between Islam and adat was sustained with the 
intellectual and political support from the Dutch expert on Islam and native 
affairs, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje. These three men represent the special 
proponents of the Islam-adat ‘synthesis.’ Their religious, intellectual and 
cultural contributions were instrumental in keeping the Islam-Sunda 
relation intimate and for sustaining the blending of Islamic practices into 
local adat. 
Although there was a certain degree of resistance towards 
Islamisation, it failed to polarise Sundanese society along cultural and 
religious lines. During 1920s-1960s, for example, opposition to Islam 
emerged from Aliran Kebatinan followers who embraced native-mystical 
practices that underpinned a belief in a native value system and in 
supernatural forces other than the ones embraced by world religions. AK 
leaders and followers sought the supremacy of local values over those 
promoted by world religions, especially Islam. They saw Islam as a threat 
to their supremacy, legitimacy and legacy. They held nativist-mystical 
ideas, which cohered around the notion of an authentic Sundanese identity 
which resonated with the Nationalist movement that sought sovereignty 
for Indonesia as an independent state. Islam, particularly in its Modernist 
guise, was contested for its continuous efforts to gain cultural supremacy 
they deemed threatening to their authentic Sundanese identity. Although 
this kind of opposition was insufficient to temper the Islamisation of 
Sundanese society, it nevertheless shows that some Sundanese leaders 
were in favour of ‘a true Sundanese religion’ other than Islam. This 
polarisation, however, did not exist until the twentieth century. Resistance 
to Islam reached its apogee when some of the Sundanese leaders together 
with thousands of followers embraced Christianity in 1964, as will be 
discussed below in Chapter Two. Although this opposition seems to have 
separated practicing Muslims from non-practicing ones, it failed to produce 
social categories such as santri and abangan, as Geertz had observed in 
East Java. As evidence, these terms (santri and abangan) or the like are 
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unknown in Sundanese society. 
The conversion to Christianity by many Sundanese was in part the 
result of tireless efforts by Christian missionaries to promote Christianity. 
Above I discussed how the Christian mission and its institutions played 
instrumental roles in the conversion of Muslim Sundanese to Christianity 
since the second half of the nineteenth century. The conversion in the early 
years of missionary work in West Java was heavily driven by socio-political 
and economic motives through which converts recast their relationship 
with the Dutch. Most of the converts were the needy who embraced 
Christianity to secure their livelihoods and future prospects.236 Socio-
economic motives aside, conversions also depended highly on the 
missionaries’ ability to promote the adjustment of Christian practices to 
local culture and identity in promoting a ‘Sunda Kristen’ identity to smooth 
relations between Dutch missionaries and their converts. Anthing and his 
well-trained indigenous missionaries were especially skilled in this regard. 
Although the missionaries failed to convert on a mass scale, over time 
interest in Christianity increased. 
                                                          








ISLAMIC MODERNISM AND ANTI-ISLAMIC SENTIMENT 
(1920s-1980s) 
 
Since the early twentieth century Modernists emerged in Java and their 
presence contributed to enhancing Islam as an ideology and identity. In 
West Java, Muslim activists from Sumatra established Persatuan Islam 
(PERSIS, Islamic Union) in 1923. In Java, Sarekat Islam (SI) and 
Muhammadiyah were established in 1912. The Modernists’ rise posed a 
challenge to Sundanese society’s socio-political and religious setting. 
PERSIS promoted Islamic Modernism and questioned the Islamic 
practices combined with adat local leaders and Traditionalists 
commonly upheld. PERSIS sought to achieve social change through the 
work of its cadres rather than through the development of a popular 
following. PERSIS failed to change the religious visions and practices of 
the Sundanese which were rich, plural and mystical. In what follows, we 
shall see how the Modernist’s rise contributed to promoting Islam as a 
political identification and helped pose a challenge to the established 
religious and cultural visions of the Sundanese. 
 
Embracing Islam as an Ideology 
Persatuan Islam (PERSIS) 
PERSIS emerged, and its vision and political orientation were shaped 
within a socio-political context of intense competition in a society where 
groups promoted divergent visions regarding the right and proper 
foundations for the nation.1 PERSIS’ outlook was largely shaped by 
fundamental notions of Islamic doctrine and ideology. It was led entirely 
by intellectuals of the Modernist persuasion. These included Haji 
                                                          
1  Federspiel, Islam and Ideology, p. 182. 
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Zamzam and Haji Muhammad Junus, both of whom hailed from Padang.2 
It is worth noting that Padang had had encounters with the Modernist 
movement in the Middle East since early 20th century. The first Islamic 
Modernist journal Al-Munir was published in Padang in 1911 by several 
hajis upon their return from Mecca.3 The movement flourished and some 
of its followers left Padang and went to West Java including Haji 
Zamzam and Haji Muhammad Junus. Zamzam studied religion in Mecca 
for three years, which of course influenced his way of thinking. He also 
had connections with the Modernist Muslim network across Sumatra, 
Batavia, Surabaya and Bandung. In Bandung, Zamzam and Muhammad 
Junus held religious gatherings and organised discussions, which later 
extended to conceiving cogent arguments for selecting the valid bases 
from which to formulate fundamental Islamic principles and to form 
PERSIS.4 
The stated goal of PERSIS in its statute was “to achieve the 
ultimate goal of religious life according to Islamic doctrine.”5 PERSIS 
propagated a school of thought based on the Quran and the Sunnah. Its 
major concern was the reconstruction of religious thought in the 
Indonesian context and it did not actively seek to increase its following. 
As such, PERSIS did not encourage the opening of new chapters unless 
there was a real need.6 Genuine need was measured against PERSIS’ 
mission, as posited in the 1950s by its chairman M. Isa Anshary, which 
was to carry out Ishlah al-Aqidah (theological reform) and Ishlahal-
‘ibada (worship reform).7 Aside from this internal mission, PERSIS was 
committed to challenging any movement hostile to Islam.8 Like other 
Modernist movements, it embraced a rationalist theology which 
                                                          
2  Deliar Noer, Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Jakarta: LP3ES, 
1990), p. 96. 
3  Taufik Abdullah, Indonesia Towards Democracy (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), p. 12. 
4  Federspiel, Islam and Ideology, pp. 182-188. 
5  G.F. Pijper, Beberapa Studi tentang Sejarah Islam di Indonesia 1900-1950, 
translated by Tudjimah and Yessy Augusdin from Studiën over de 
geschiedenis van de Islam in Indonesia 1900-1950 (Jakarta: UI Press, 1985), p. 
127. 
6  Dadan Wildan, Sejarah Perjuangan Persis 1923-1983 (Bandung: Puslitbang 
PP Pemuda Persis and Gema Syahida, 1995), pp. 30-31. 
7  M. Isa Anshary, Manifes Perdjuangan Persatuan Islam (Bandung: PP 
Persatuan Islam, 1958), pp. 24-25. 
8  Wildan, Sejarah Perjuangan Persis, p. 31. 
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underpinned its understanding of Islam according to the Quran and 
Sunnah and its implementation accordingly. As such, it condemned 
superstition, mysticism and the cults that were common across Java at 
the time. PERSIS’ doctrine was founded on a scripturalist interpretation 
of Islam stressing the absolute unity of God, strict observance of the 
shari’ah, commitment to purify Islam from any unlawful innovations 
(bid’a) and the responsibility of defending Islam from its antagonists.9 
It would be wrong to think that PERSIS’ leaders did not know how 
to mould their ideology into a practical organisation. They thought that 
their religious ideology should be maintained through the application of 
certain recruitment criteria and by following specific procedures. To 
ensure the quality of its members, PERSIS used stringent membership 
recruitment criteria and procedures. To be admitted, one had to meet 
the following requirements: He/she should be at least 18 years old and 
live in the East Indies; by ‘Muslim’ the statute implied the observance of 
Islamic obligations including daily prayers, fasting, and alms giving, and 
at the same time of adhering to prohibitions such as gambling, 
consuming alcohol, adultery and bid’a.10 
From a socio-political perspective, to achieve its goal, PERSIS 
sought a sound Islamic ideology, particularly in responding to 
Nationalists’ charges that Muslim leaders failed to offer an ideal model 
for an independent Indonesia. PERSIS endeavoured to neutralise the 
Dutch-trained Nationalists’ proposals for a secular nation state. As noted 
by Howard M. Federspiel, Nationalist leaders contended that “the best 
way to achieve independence and build a strong Indonesian state was to 
follow the secular trend of the West and confine religion to the areas of 
individual belief and worship.”11 PERSIS’ role in promoting dakwah as 
well as its search for a sound Islamic ideology was probably 
incomparable. Similarly, its leadership, especially under Ahmad Hassan 
and Mohammad Natsir, excelled over other Muslim leaders in 
challenging the Nationalists’ promotion of a secular nation-state and 
Christian missionarism.12 Concluding the third chapter of his book on 
PERSIS, Federspiel discusses the formative period of PERSIS’ doctrine 
during which Hassan, along with Natsir and Sabirin, played central 
                                                          
9  Federspiel, Islam and Ideology, p. 122. 
10  Pijper, Beberapa Studi, p. 129. 
11  Federspiel, Islam and Ideology, p. 45. 
12  Idem, pp. 45-51 and pp. 154-157. 
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roles.13 Hassan’s thoughts, in particular, considerably shaped the 
organisation’s character and attitude. 
Hassan was born in Singapore in 1887 to a Tamil father, who was 
a scholar, and a Javanese mother.14 Hassan received his religious 
training in Singapore. In 1921 he moved to Surabaya where he met Kyai 
Haji Abdul Wahab, who later inspired him to study Islam further.15 In 
1924, he moved to Bandung where he met Zamzam and Muhammad 
Junus who also were very enthusiastic about spreading Islam. They 
formed a group and subsequently Hassan acted as the most important 
religious leader in the newly established organisation.16 
A talented propagandist, Hassan wrote extensively. His works 
cover many subjects including theology, law, jurisprudence, Quranic 
exegesis, history, language, governance and politics. Among the major 
works he published during the 1930s-40s are Al-Boerhan (The Evidence 
[1933]), Pengadjaran Sholat (Prayer Instruction [1935-1937]), At-
Tauhid (The Unity of God [1937]), Annubuwwah (The Prophecy [1941]), 
Ketoehanan Jesoes menoeroet Bijbel [Jesus’ Divinity according to the 
Bible [1940]), and Islam dan Kebangsaan (Islam and Nationalism 
[1941]). Hassan translated into Indonesian the Bulughul Maram of Ibnu 
Hajar al-Asqalani, a standard work on fiqh widely used in pesantrens.17 
Through these publications, Hassan not only demonstrated that he was 
PERSIS’ most prolific author but also its ideological architect. Aside 
Hasan’s works, PERSIS also regularly published the magazines Pembela 
Islam (Defender of Islam), Al-Lisan (The Tongue), Sual Jawab (Questions 
and Answers), Al-Fatwa (The Legal Opinion), and Al-Taqwa (Piety).18 
These publications helped tremendously in circulating PERSIS’ 
messages across the country, particularly among Muhammadiyah and 
Al-Irsyad members.  
Mohammad Natsir was perhaps the most important PERSIS 
leader. He was born to Idris Sutan Saripado and Khalida on the 17th of 
July 1908, in the small town of Alahan Panjang in West Sumatra, home to 
                                                          
13  Idem, pp. 121-195. 
14  See a must read political biography of Mohammad Natsir authored by 
Audrey R. Kahin, Islam, Nationalism and Democracy: A Political Biography of 
Mohammad Natsir (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), p. 10. 
15  Pijper, Beberapa Studi, p. 127. 
16  Idem, p. 127. 
17  Federspiel, Islam and Ideology, pp. 347-348. 
18  Noer, Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia, pp. 103-104. 
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the Minangkabau people.19 Because of economic constrains, Natsir’s 
father could not afford to send him to the Hollandsch Inlandsche School 
(HIS, the Dutch Native School), the seven-year primary school that used 
Dutch as language of instruction.20 However, Natsir was lucky to be able 
to attend the school because the head teacher of the local HIS allowed it 
provided that he hide himself whenever a school inspector showed up.21 
Natsir used this opportunity to demonstrate to the people that by 
becoming the best student in his class he showed that he was not just 
anybody and in 1923 he won a scholarship to continue his study to the 
MULO (Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs), the advanced elementary 
school in Padang where he sat in the same class with the Dutch 
children22 and after a few years Natsir graduated satisfactorily. Being 
aware that Natsir was quite smart, his father encouraged him to 
continue his studies at the next level. Natsir did not want to disappoint 
his father, so he applied for a place at the General Secondary School 
(AMS, Algemene Middelbare School) in Bandung and he was admitted 
there in July 1927 when he turned nineteenth. 
Natsir’s intellectual, religious and political activism began here. As 
observed by Audrey R. Kahin, in the late 1920s Bandung was attractive 
to educated young people from all over the Netherlands East Indies 
because the city was turning into the centre of excellent higher 
education where ‘most of the advanced Western-education schools in 
the archipelago were concentrated.’23 Bandung’s position as a learning 
centre had political consequences. Kahin noted: 
 
As the result, Bandung became the center of anti-colonial 
discussion and activity embracing all forms of the new Indonesian 
nationalism. In the same month Natsir arrived there, July 1927, the 
foremost leader of the Indonesian Nationalist movement, Soekarno, 
founded the party “that came to dominate nationalist politics not only 
in the city but throughout Java and beyond.”24 Initially known as the 
Indonesian National Association, it was soon renamed the Indonesian 
Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI). Under Dutch 
                                                          
19  Kahin, Islam, Nationalism and Democracy, pp. 1-2. 
20  Idem, p. 3. 
21  Idem. 
22  Idem, pp. 4-5. 
23  Idem, p. 9. 
24  Rudolf Mrazek, Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Southeast 
Asian Program, 1994), p. 49.  
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pressure the PNI was dissolved in 1931, but it exerted an enduring 
influence over all subsequent political parties working for Indonesian 
independence.25 
 
This political atmosphere certainly influenced Natsir. He 
frequently attended talks delivered by prominent Indonesian leaders of 
various political orientations ranging from the Nationalist Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoema to the Islamist Haji Agoes Salim.26 During this critical 
time Natsir met Ahmad Hassan, the most important figure of PERSIS, 
whom he much admired as the most influential among his early 
teachers.27 It seemed obvious that Natsir’s admiration for Hassan after 
their frequent encounters and discussions caused him to join PERSIS 
and bound both him and Hassan in ‘the strictest and most 
uncompromising Muslim group of the time.’28 
Like Hassan, Natsir wrote a lot, while he was also actively involved 
in educational matters. He wrote for Pembela Islam under the pen-name, 
A. Muchlis. In the 1930s, he championed initiatives to promote Islamic 
education by establishing Islamic schools ranging from kindergarten 
(1930), HIS (1930), Mulo (1931), teacher-training colleges (1932) and 
pesantren (1936).29 This initiative was in response to the reluctance of 
many private schools in Bandung to include Islamic instruction in their 
curricula.30 The absence of religious subjects in some schools caused 
PERSIS leaders to build their own schools to serve the interests of the 
ummat. Natsir’s long service to PERSIS and his connection to Hassan 
provided him with considerable dakwah experience which came in very 
useful, especially when much later he established the Indonesian Islamic 
Propagation Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII,) in 
1967. 
In the 1930s PERSIS emerged as one of the most prolific 
publishing houses. Media thus also became an effective tool for both 
Hassan and Natsir to communicate their religious thoughts and political 
ideologies. Hassan and Natsir regularly wrote in journals. Soekarno was 
proud of Natsir and expressed this in a letter he sent to Hassan from his 
                                                          
25  Kahin, Islam, Nationalism and Democracy, p. 9. 
26  Idem, pp. 9-10. 
27  Idem, p. 10. 
28  Idem. 
29  Noer, Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia, pp. 101-102. 
30  Idem, p. 101. 
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place of exile in Ende, Flores.31 
PERSIS’ most striking features were its persistence in promoting 
its ideology and in challenging its opponents. PERSIS held debates with 
many organisations on many issues. Among the organisations were 
Ahmadiyah Qadian (1930), Seventh Day Adventists, Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU) in Cirebon, Al-Ittihadul Islamiyah in Sukabumi and Majlis Ahli 
Sunnah in Bandung. Pijper observed that the debate sessions were 
organised to discuss sensitive religious issues. Sometimes they were 
held in response to particularly heated public topics. For example, in 
April 1933, a series of debate sessions in Bandung and in September 
1933 in Jakarta were held in response to Hassan’s 1932 article entitled 
Risalah Ahmadiyah: Membantah beberapa I’tikad Ahmadiyah (All about 
Ahmadiyah: Denying the Ahmadiyah Creed).32 
Unhappy with the article, Ahmadiyah spokesman, Rahmat Ali, 
challenged PERSIS’ leader to a public debate on the issue.33 During the 
debate, both spokesmen exchanged questions, answers, agreements and 
criticism, which showed their understanding of Islam despite their 
disagreement on some points. Pijper once attended a debate session and 
was impressed by how the debaters carried themselves despite the fact 
that the atmosphere was highly charged, especially when both 
spokesmen exchanged challenges and critical comments.34 The content 
of the debates was then published in Pembela Islam.35 Through 
promoting education, prolific publication and engaging in religious 
debates, PERSIS demonstrated its authority as defender of Islam36 
despite the insignificant growth in its membership. Pijper states that 





                                                          
31  Idem, pp. 97-100. 
32  Pijper, Beberapa Studi, p. 129. 
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36  Noer, Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia, p. 103. 
37  Pijper, Beberapa Studi, p. 129. 
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Confronting Nationalism  
We should note that PERSIS was formed in a socio-political context 
where most Indonesian leaders were seeking independence from Dutch 
rule for which the question of the nation’s ideology was discussed 
extensively. From 1912 to the 1920s, members of the Indonesian elite 
championed competing visions in terms of the social, cultural and 
political foundations of the future independent Indonesia. The contest to 
envision the best cultural foundations for the nation involved a range of 
actors of different backgrounds.  
Hassan and Natsir paid much attention to this development and 
they participated in the debates on nationalism in their writings. Both 
Hassan and Natsir considered the secular ideology as promoted by 
Nationalist proponents such as Soekarno and Soetomo dangerous for 
religion in general and Islam in particular.38 For Hassan, nationalism 
boiled down to the socio-political system in pre-Islamic Arabia called 
‘asabiyah.39 Hassan used the Prophet’s warning to Muslims not to wage 
war for the sake of ‘asabiyah, for such motives were illegitimate.40 
Hassan also argued that nationalism had alienated Indonesian Muslims 
from their brothers overseas, despite the fact that all Muslims are 
brethren as insisted by the Quran.41 Hassan also made the controversial 
ruling that joining the nationalist party is sinful because it would never 
enforce Islamic law. As he understood it, this ruling was justified by the 
Islamic precept that Muslims who do not judge by Islamic law are 
considered fasiq (morally corrupt).42 On this issue, PERSIS periodical, 
Pembela Islam, argued that: 
 
Nationhood in Islam is broad; it is not based on ethnicity, on 
origin, nor on shared dialects. Nationhood that is limited by ethnicity, 
origin, dialect, fate, is not only too narrow, but also gives rise to 
conceit, envy and seeking the downfall of members of other nations. 
Nationhood understood as such encourages arrogance towards those 
who have less Islamic nationhood and is far removed from 
encouraging its followers to be proud of their descent, ethnicity, 
dialect or origin. On the contrary, it is Islam that is able to tie all skin 
                                                          
38  Hassan, Islam & Kebangsaan, p. V. 
39  ‘Asabiyah is an Arabic term which means tribalism. 
40  Hassan, Islam & Kebangsaan, p. VI. 
41  Idem. 
42  Idem, p. VII. 
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colours, dialects and lands of origin in a bind of fellow-feeling, of 
certainty, of worship, of laws, which realises genuine brotherhood 
which in turn brings genuine harmony and equality. In Islamic politics, 
this is the basis which equates Dutch Muslims with Indonesian 
Muslims, French Muslims with Negro Muslims, and so on.43 
 
PERSIS’ argument is a classic one and commonly cited by 
Islamists, Revivalists and to some extent Modernists. It has to be noted 
that around this time, the Muslim world was influenced by notions of 
Islamic nationhood or Pan-Islamism as embraced by Muslim scholars 
such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Sayyid Qutb, and Muhammad Abduh. 
This view of human brotherhood is rooted in the Quran, although it does 
not specifically refer to Muslims as a political entity or as a nation. 
 
Opposing Christian Missionary 
Like many other Modernist organisations, PERSIS was bitterly opposed 
to Christian missionarism. Federspiel observes: 
 
The tone of the Persis commentary on Christianity is intense, 
defensive and retaliatory, and it is apparent in the articles, fatawa and 
major writings that activists saw Christian missionary activity as a 
serious threat to the existence of Islam in Indonesia. We have already 
seen in the Islamic Defender some very trenchant comments in regard 
to Christian missionaries and their endeavours in Indonesia. Persis 
activists stayed alert to Christian propaganda and outreach activity 
and made responses in the name of the Indonesian Muslim 
                                                          
43  Pembela Islam, No. 61, p. 3. n.d.: Kebangsaan dalam agama Islam itoe loeas; 
boekan karena persamaan koelit, boekan karena sepoelaoe setanah air, 
boekan poela karena selagam bahasa jang dipakai. Kebangsaan jang berbatas 
oleh persamaan koelit, oleh sepoelau setanah air, oleh selagam bahasa jang 
dipakai, oleh senasib sepertoentoengan, boekan sedja terlaloe sempit, tapi 
joega mendjadikan terbitnya rasa banggakan diri, rasa dengki dan 
meroegikan manoesia lain tanah. Kebangsaan tjara begini mengadjarkan 
sifat sombong terhadap golongan manoesia lain jang lebih sedikit .... 
Kebangsaan Islam itoe djauh daripada mendjadikan pemeloeknya rasa 
bangga karena toeroenan darah, karena warna koelit, karena selagam 
bahasa, karena tanah air. Bahkan Islamlah jang dapat mengikat segala 
warna koelit, segala lagam bahasa, segala tanah air dengan persatoean 
perasaan, persatoean kejakinan, persatoean tjara ibadat, persatuan oendang-
oendang, jang membawa kepada persaudaraan sedjati jang beroejoed 
perdamaian sedjati dan persamaan sedjati. Dalam politik tjara Islam, inilah 
jang jadi asas sampai tidak ada kelebihan Moeslim Belanda dari Moeslim 





Christianity was considered the religion of the Dutch, the kafir 
colonialists. Opposition to Christianisation began since the late 
nineteenth century and galvanised around Muslim institutions since the 
early twentieth. In West Java, PERSIS along with Sarekat Islam (SI) and 
the Muhammadiyah challenged the spread of Christianity. PERSIS was a 
healthy organisation with a sound leadership, ran Islamic schools, 
promoted dakwah and published prolifically. Ever since, through 
religious and educational programs the Modernists posed a tremendous 
challenge to Christian evangelism which had gained ground in terms of 
institution-building and massive conversions across the country.45 
Modernist leaders such as Natsir’s fear of Christianity was because of 
the point of view commonly upheld by Islamic scholars that ‘the Dutch 
were using Western education to draw Indonesians away from Islam 
and into the purview of Christianity’.46 However, this stance does not 
necessarily mean that Natsir was anti-Christian inclined. He held the 
view that Indonesia should become a tolerant nation in which religious 
freedom is protected and all believers’ rights to follow their own faiths is 
guaranteed.47 
 
Criticising Traditionalist Practices  
As observed previously, interestingly, Geertz’s Javanese santri-abangan 
social dichotomy does not exist in Sundanese society;48 it is also true 
that initially in West Java the dialectical relations between Modernists 
and Traditionalists were not as bad as those in East and Central Java but 
                                                          
44  Federspiel, Islam and Ideology, p. 154. 
45  NZV claimed monopoly in West Java since the nineteenth century but this 
did not last long as from the early nineteenth century the Episcopal 
Methodist Church also sought followers in West Java. The Apostolic, 
Adventist, Pentecostal, and Roman Catholic Churches also provided services 
in West Java and did not recognise NZV’s monopoly. See Van den End, 
Sumber-Sumber Zending, p. 9. 
46  Kahin, Islam, Nationalism and Democracy, po. 11, 25. 
47  Idem, p. 186. 
48  Steenbrink states that in his study of the Sundanese, R.A. Kern mentioned 




as we will see, later on they were.49 The Modernist-Traditionalist 
dichotomy was already latently present in the early decades of the 
twentieth century, although it had not yet crystallised. The dichotomy 
became more pronounced due to the intensification of the Modernist 
campaign against those aspects of the religion the Traditionalists very 
much embraced, as the Modernists were against local values and the 
cultural identity of the local people. However, in what follows we will 
discuss how PERSIS challenged the traditional practices upheld by the 
Traditionalists. 
PERSIS is famous for its stand against unlawful innovations 
(bid’a), including the seeking of saintly intercession and saint worship. 
For PERSIS, worship must be based solely on the Quran and the Sunnah. 
There are, however, many interpretive disagreements about the 
reliability of the references to specific religious practices. Muslim 
leaders hold different views on the reliability of these references and 
also employ different methodologies in arriving at legal conclusions. 
Likewise, their understanding and reasoning about aspects of religion 
differ. This in part contributed to sustained disagreement among them. 
One example is the disagreement on reciting prayers known as tahlil in 
the house of the deceased, which is usually followed by a meal provided 
by the family or friends of the deceased. Practiced on the burial day and 
on several succeeding days, this is observed by many Indonesian 
Muslims, especially among the Traditionalists.50 For them, the prayers 
recited in the house of mourning by those present generates religious 
merit (pahala), which accrues to the deceased.51 To the Traditionalists, 
such practices help to improve the religiosity of the people. PERSIS saw 
this celebration as bid’a, but argued against it on financial rather than 
religious grounds.52 In a fatwa entitled “Ritual meal for Pregnancy,” as 
discussed in his Sual Jawab, Hassan argued that “This particular type of 
innovation sometimes ruins people who are not well-to-do, for they 
even sell or pawn their belongings, or borrow money to hold a feast, and 
consequently fall into debt and poverty.”53 
PERSIS is also known for its critical stand against any celebrations 
                                                          
49  Steenbrink, ‘A Catholic Sadrach’, p. 288. 
50  Federspiel, Islam and Ideology, pp. 140-141. 
51  Idem. 
52  Idem, p. 140. 
53  Idem. See also Sual-Djawab V, p. 37. 
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of the Prophet’s birthday (maulud), commonly held by the majority of 
the Muslim community. The maulud festival, celebrated largely by 
Hadramis of Ba’alawi descent and Traditionalists, involves a religio-
cultural event where the celebrants recite prayers and narrate poetry 
about the Prophet’s life and his virtues.54 At one point, members of the 
congregation are required to rise out of respect for the Prophet who is 
believed to be invisibly present at such gatherings. For the Modernists, 
this practice is irrational and unlawful. Despite opposition from 
organisations like PERSIS, Muslims continued to celebrate the maulud. 
Over time, it was celebrated in even grander fashion. Pijper reports that 
in 1936, Bandung Muslims celebrated maulud with a procession of 2000 
Islamic school students. The procession ended in the Regency Hall of 
Bandung where Islamic leaders and local authorities had been waiting 
and a religious ceremony was undertaken. As part of the celebrations, 
the Regent of Bandung and the Head Penghulu delivered speeches. 
Similarly, representatives of various Muslim organisations delivered 
speeches as well.55 For PERSIS, however, this celebration had no base in 
Islam and was therefore religiously prohibited.56 For this reason, PERSIS 
did not join the event.  
While attacking such practices in order to purify Islam from 
unlawful innovations in worship, PERSIS condemned intercession 
(tawassul) and saint worship in order to safeguard Muslims’ belief from 
polytheism. PERSIS’ basic argument was that prayers must be addressed 
directly to God without the intercession of the Prophet or holy men by 
using such formulae as “with the blessing of the Prophet/Abdul Qadir 
Jailani.”57 Hassan argued that intercession had been possible during the 
Prophet’s life when he prayed on behalf of his Companions upon their 
request, but the Companions “did not ever ask his spirit, or at his 
                                                          
54  A comprehensive study on the maulud in Muslim history is presented in 
N.J.G. Kaptein, Muhammad’s Birthday Festival: Early History in the Central 
Muslim Lands and Development in the Muslim West until the 10th/16th 
Century (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993). See also Nico Kaptein, ‘The Berdiri Mawlid 
issue among Indonesian muslims in the period from circa 1875 to 1930,’ 
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 149 (1993) pp. 124-153. 
55  Pijper, Beberapa Studi, pp. 136-137. 
56  Idem, p. 126. 
57  Federspiel, Islam and Ideology, p. 145. 
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grave....”58 and thus never sought his intercession after he had died or 
went to his grave to seek his help. Federspiel noted that PERSIS’ writers 
pointed to two groups, Muslim mystics and Ba’alawi Arabs whom they 
regarded as particularly guilty of perpetuating the belief in intercession, 
leading to the worship at the tombs of “holy men.”59 
As PERSIS sought to abolish established Traditionalist practices, it 
brought about polarisation. In Bandung, for example, PERSIS leaders 
pushed their reform mission and tried to create a break from 
established culture and customs. Its commitment to break with the past 
meant PERSIS leaders refused to participate in public religious events 
organised by various Muslim organisations in celebration of particular 
Islamic festivals. PERSIS’ refusal to join the Prophet’s Birthday 
procession in Bandung in 1936, for example, was a stark deviation from 
the religious order of the day. As a consequence, this alienated PERSIS’ 
leaders and members from other Muslim organisations.60 Due to its 
campaign inciting divisions and tension within society, various 
organisations and individuals opposed PERSIS. What was astonishing 
was the degree of tension it engendered. In a village in Bandung, two 
brothers severed ties with each other when one of them joined PERSIS. 
As Pijper related: 
 
In a village in Bandung district, there were two brothers living next 
to each other. One of them became a member of PERSIS. Ever since, 
they have been at odds with each other as one did not want to be 
associated with the other (the member of PERSIS). He then went to 
partition their shared front yard with a fence. It was said that he even 
went to saw their shared rice stamping block (lisung) into two parts.61 
 
The Modernist campaign invited similar sentiments across Java. In 
1926, Traditionalist leaders, under the leadership of K.H. Hasyim Asyari, 
founded the Muslim organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in East Java. 
This initiative was in response to the Modernists’ critical stand against 
religious discourses and practices embraced in the Traditionalist 
cultural milieu and environment. The Modernist aim “to return to the 
                                                          
58  Idem, p. 145. See also A. Hassan, At-Tauhid (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, 1937), 
p. 50. 
59  Federspiel, Islam and Ideology, p. 147. 
60  Pijper, Beberapa Studi, p. 137. 
61  Idem. 
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fundamental truths of Islamic texts and tradition, the Quran and 
Sunnah,”62 challenged established culture and the long-held authority 
and practices of the Traditionalists. PERSIS in Bandung, as noted above, 
waged war against religious practices commonly observed by the 
majority of Muslims such as holding tahlilan, tawassul, and ritual meals 
and celebrating maulud. Opposing traditions which were very much 
respected by the Traditionalists created a rift within Muslim society. 
In West Java, PERSIS’ campaign against the Traditionalist offended 
believers in the nativist-syncretic practices commonly held by the 
followers of Aliran Kebatinan, and thus incited anti-Islam sentiments 
among them. ADS leader, Pangeran Jatikusuma, told me that his father, 
Tejabuana, Madrais’ son (see Chapter One), was an ardent critic of 
PERSIS.63 For ADS leaders, any religious practice rooted in nativist 
traditions and values is legitimate. Conversely, all religious practices 
that do not share nativist spiritual visions are illegitimate.64 
 
Turning Islam into a Political Identity 
Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah 
In addition to PERSIS seeking to build and promote an Islamic ideology 
through the interpretation of a complex set of Islamic doctrines it also 
endeavoured to make them relevant in Indonesian politics and culture 
in general. Sarekat Islam (SI) and the Muhammadiyah had emerged in 
the preceding years with explicit Islamic agendas that marked the rise of 
Islam as a form of political and ‘ethnic identification’ which amplified the 
distinction between the Indonesian and Dutch camps.65 Soon upon its 
establishment in 1912, the Modernist movement spread and moved 
towards politics as Islamic identity consolidated, as was the case 
especially with SI.66 M.C. Ricklefs noted: 
 
...while at the beginning the “Islam” of its title was mainly a form 
of ethnic identification – it proclaimed itself thereby Indonesian and 
                                                          
62  James L. Peacock, Purifying the Faith: The Mouhammadijah Movement in 
Indonesian Islam (California: The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing company, 
1978), p. 24. 
63  Interview, Pangeran Jatikusuma, Cigugur, Kuningan, 5 August 2009. 
64  Idem. 
65  Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society, p. 226. 
66  Idem. 
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not Dutch, Chinese or regionalist as were many other associations – its 
spread often stimulated increased religious observance and over time 
it became more self-consciously religious in aspiration. SI thus became 
the political vehicle of Javanese putihan. In many branches, for 
example, its leadership was in the hands of local hajis, many of whom 
were also traders.67 
 
With such Islamic identification with firm support from the 
grassroots population, SI inspired people to seek change aimed at 
advancing their socio-economic welfare and political interests. The 
organisation also used its influence to politically counter the activities of 
the Christian missionaries which increasingly worried Muslims. With 
the presence of these organisations, Muslims embraced a new pattern of 
response toward their socio-political issues, from one resting heavily on 
the efforts of disorganised collections of individuals to that of an 
organised movement. By doing so, the Muslim leaders and their 
followers united and cooperated to seek improved conditions for their 
religion and for their nation.  
The SI was founded by the charismatic Javanese leader, H.O.S 
Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934), believed by some Javanese peasants to be 
a Ratu Adil.68 The peasants believed Tjokroaminoto to be a King who had 
come to them with the truth and who would lead them to an imagined 
era of justice.69 Crowds of people, especially those from the villages, 
demonstrated their extraordinary respect for him. They gathered to 
listen to the speeches he would deliver from the podium and it is said 
that they also liked to touch his clothes and even kiss his feet.70 This is 
surprising because SI followers imagined that social change would be 
effected in the framework of a millenarian movement.71 Sartono 
Kartodirdjo argues that “Although the Sarekat Islam movement was 
designed to participate in modern political activity, it was bound to have 
strong millenarian overtones.” He maintains that “It is not surprising 
that the hopes that the peasants came to place in Sarekat Islam should 
find expression in traditional millenarian thinking.”72 
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SI is known for its critical stand against the Chinese. Because of 
this attitude it was seen as a threat by many Dutch officials and 
businessmen as well as by the Javanese priyayi because of the 
intermediate position of the Chinese community in the colonial setting. 
Ricklefs observes that the 1913-14 anti-Chinese riots across Java were 
linked to this movement.73 He also maintains that the Javanese priyayi 
could not accept the SI’s rejection of various established practices such 
as bowing to the priyayi as commonly observed by commoners. For 
members of the Javanese elite, such criticism of established priyayi 
culture could be a threat to “their authority and status.”74 SI’s opposition 
to this recognised adat had upset the priyayi community.  
In this regard, SI shared the Muhammadiyah’s vision of a return to 
the Quran and the Sunnah, to pursue ijtihad and to reject syncretic 
practices.75 The Muhammadiyah was founded in 1912 to seek socio-
religious reform and to serve in reforming education and culture.76 The 
movement’s initial objective was to implement organised tactical 
measures to challenge the spread of the Dutch-supported Christian 
mission across Java.77 In his account, G.F. Pijper describes how the 
Muhammadiyah was established in Yogyakarta by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan, 
the son of the Imam of the Grand Mosque of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta 
named Kyai Haji Abubakar bin Kyai Suleiman.78 Already as a child, 
Ahmad Dahlan received religious education from his parents. As an 
adult, he went to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage and to stay there for 
some years to study Islam.79 He returned home but after several years of 
living in the Dutch East Indies, Ahmad Dahlan made his second trip to 
Mecca to perform another pilgrimage and to continue studying Islam.  
Ahmad Dahlan was a friend of Ahmad Surkati from Sudan, the 
founder of Al-Irsyad, another reform organisation founded in 1915, and 
they had made each other’s acquaintance some years before the 
emergence of Islamic Modernism or Reformism in Java. In his interview 
with Pijper, Surkati said that Ahmad Dahlan had a very good character, 
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and was a sincere and humble man.80 He read works by leading Muslim 
scholars like Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-
1350) and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). He knew of the reform 
movement in Egypt but, as Haji Agus Salim told Pijper, he did not devote 
himself to learning more about it. Rather, Ahmad Dahlan discussed the 
foundation of the Muhammadiyah with Surkati. The Muhammadiyah’s 
rise, as Pijper himself noted, was actually closely linked to 
“contemporary Dutch politics that attempted to Christianise the 
Indonesians.”81 It was a reaction to the missionary activities promoted 
by the Protestant NZV and the Roman Catholics, he stressed. This 
concern featured profoundly in the early stages of the development of 
the Muhammadiyah. Only after some years had elapsed did it slowly and 
organically evolve, a process that accelerated after Kyai Haji Ahmad 
Dahlan’s death in 1923. 
Within the socio-religious atmosphere of Islamic Modernism and 
anti-colonial agitation, SI grew fast and spread across and outside Java. 
In Bandung, the SI was established in 1913 by Suwardi Suryadiningrat, 
A. Widiadisastra and Abdul Muis.82 Suwardi was a journalist who 
worked for the Bandung-based publication De Express. He was unable to 
keep his job for a long time because of his critical attitiude towards the 
Dutch. One day he wrote an article entitled “If I were Dutch” criticising 
the colonial administration, for which De Express was dissolved and 
Suwardi was exiled to the Netherlands.83 As Robert van Niel states, A. 
Widiadisastra and Abdul Muis were also journalists who wrote for Kaum 
Muda, established in 1912 in collaboration with Mohammad Junus, an 
Arab from Palembang who supported the publication financially. 
Widiadisastra inspired the establishment of this publishing company. 
His marriage to one of the daughters of the penghulu in Bandung seemed 
to have religiously inspired him. He played an active role in SI until 
1919.84 
Like Suwardi and Widiadisastra, Abdul Muis had much experience 
in journalism. For his concern for the welfare of the people, he was 
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promoted to the SI’s Central Board.85 Like the leaders of the 
Muhammadiyah, Abdul Muis was critical of the NZV. In the Volksraad, he 
criticised the Dutch Colonial Government’s subsidising of zending 
organisations.86 For him, it was outrageous that the subsidy which was 
generated largely from Muslims through their income taxes (belasting) 
was not utilised for the benefit of Muslims but, on the contrary, used to 
support Christian missionary organisations.87 The SI most strongly 
criticised missionarism when A.W.F. Idenburg was Governor-General in 
Batavia (1909-16). The issue of Christian missionarism, previously the 
problem of Muslim commoners, soon became the concern of SI leaders. 
As soon as SI mobilised its members as a community against the Dutch, 
society polarised along Muslim and Christian lines. The identification of 
the Dutch with Christianity introduced an association between the 
Dutch and Indonesian Christians. So, from cultural and socio-political 
perspectives, while the emergence of Islamic Modernism stepped up 
pressure on the colonial government in introducing a political 
distinction between Indonesians and the Dutch, it also caused 
polarisation along ethnic and religious lines. 
In this atmosphere the SI continued to grow. In 1916, an SI 
Congress was held in Bandung. Many prominent Muslims attended and 
addressed the congress. Among them were Rd. H.O.S Tjokroaminoto 
(President), Rd. Hasan Jayadiningrat (Banten), Rd. Wignyodarmoyo 
(Surabaya), Daeng Kanduruan Ardiwinata (Volkslectuur Editor), 
Wignyadisastra (SI President, Bandung Chapter), Abdul Muis (SI Vice 
President, Bandung Chapter), Abdul Manap (Aceh), and Habib Ali bin 
Abdulrahman Al-Habshi (Arab leader from Batavia).88 SI struggled in the 
face of politics and the ideological competition between Nationalism, 
Islamism and Communism, to which in the end it succumbed.89 In 
reaction to this division, the Perserikatan Komoenis di Hindia (later 
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named Partai Komunis Indonesia) was formed in 1921.90 The division 
had a negative impact at the grassroots level. Some Muslim leaders and 
activists in Bandung questioned the support lent by the Bandung SI 
chapter to the leftists during the SI Congress. To counter this socio-
political fragmentation inside the SI, which might have important 
negative impact on the Islamic community, various Modernist leaders in 
Bandung started to promote Islam as a purified identity and as a 
political ideology. 
 
The Rise of Anti-Islamic Sentiment 
Anti-Islamic Opposition: Seeking an ‘Authentic’ Faith 
The Modernist intensive campaign to promote Islam as a purified 
religious identity and a political ideology destabilised Sundanese social-
religious and political life. In religious life, the leaders of sufi orders were 
alert to the spreading of a what seemed to them to be a Wahhabi-
inspired movement in the country.91 This puritanical religious 
movement had swept over West Java during the 1920s. Pijper suggests 
that the movement was met with formidable opposition by the 
established sufi orders.92 From the early to the late-1920s friction 
between sufi orders saw various orders labelling the others as ‘Wahabi’. 
In short, the Wahabis became the number one enemies of Islamic 
mystical as well as of nativist syncretic movements. Against this 
backdrop, I presume that the locally and native-inspired syncretic 
movements such as AKP and ADS came to exist as attempts to reduce 
the influence of or even to displace such puritanical religious 
orientations deemed extraneous to local spiritual needs. 
It is possible that the need to counter Modernist religious 
orientations contributed to inspiring the Dutch administration to 
respond amicably to native-syncretic movements such as the one that 
arose in Kuningan, West Java. In 1925, the Dutch Administration 
officially recognised one native-syncretic movement it termed Agama 
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Djawa Sunda (ADS), as mentioned in the first chapter.93 ADS was led by 
Madrais, who led his movement from Kuningan, Cirebon. Mei 
Kartawinata, the leader of Aliran Kebatinan Perjalanan (AKP) was 
inspired by Madrais’ religious movement. According to Madrais’ 
grandson, Pangeran Jatikusuma from Kuningan, Mei met Madrais 
several times and they discussed various issues especially regarding the 
social movement needed for the nation’s independence.94 
The AKP came up in 1927 and flourished in the 1950s and 
1960s.95 During this time the AKP following grew to comprise thousands 
of people. The enthusiasm among the West Javanese to join this native-
syncretic belief was probably due to the interests they shared with the 
Javanese. As described by Mulder, “They participate because they may 
look for inner tranquillity, for escape from oppressive social ties, for 
consolation in disappointment, for magical powers, for mystical 
expression, for an esoteric milieu of initiated friends, but nowadays they 
probably join most often for reasons of dissatisfaction with organised 
religion and in search for a valid emotional form of personal cultural 
expression.”96 This is a real example of an experiment initiated by local 
leaders’ initiatives to promote native religion as relevant to indigenous 
identity and culture in contradistinction to the Modernists’ intensive 
campaign for purification. 
AKP and ADS’s emergence saw its leaders put in efforts to express 
their vision to their followers.The defenders of the AKP and ADS were of 
the opinion that Islam’s fundamental doctrines contradict Aliran 
Kebatinan principles. Muslims believe in one God and the Prophet 
Muhammad as His last Messenger. Muhammad represents the Seal of 
Prophethood, which absolutely denies any further claim to 
Prophethood. The Aliran Kebatinan proponents perceived Islamic 
norms, as mediated through Arabic culture, as contradictory to their 
Sundanese culture and identity, especially in matters pertaining to adat. 
The Classical Arabic language, which is the language of the Quran and 
hadith and used by Muslims in rituals but rarely in communication, is 
alien.97 The AKP leader, Mei Kartawinata, stated that “Islam is the 
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religion of the Arabs and (the Arabs) came to colonise the Sundanese.”98 
For Mei, there was nothing sacred about the Quran, and to symbolise 
this he once publicly stuffed a copy into his pants, exclaiming to 
observers: “Look, it is simply paper!”99 By doing so, Mei tried to de-
sacralise the Muslims’ authoritative text and sought to reveal as baseless 
the Sundanese people’s respect for it. Not all Aliran Kebatinan 
proponents, however, would go to such extremes. Especially in the era 
of reform after 1998, the leaders of the AKP do not seem to have 
displayed such an extreme anti-Islamic stand. 
Mei’s doctrine urged followers to seek authentic faith, as rooted in 
Sundanese history and to respect Sundanese dignity. The Sundanese had 
inherited this and transmitted it from one generation to the other. The 
followers of the AKP believe that everybody must respect their origin in 
terms of their place of birth, ethnicity, languages, race and nation.100 An 
Aliran Kebatinan active member, Asep Setia, stated that “As a Sundanese, 
I have been bestowed with my own tradition, language, custom and 
land; I therefore owe God gratitude and show belief in Him in my own 
manner.” He added: “I wonder why nowadays many Sundanese people 
would prefer the use of Arabic greetings such as assalamu ‘alaikum 
(peace be upon you) or alhamdulillah (Praise be to Allah) instead of 
sampurasun, rahayu or puji Gusti (Praise be to Gusti).”101The ‘doctrine’ of 
the supremacy of local symbols and values is central to the AKP 
movement and for AKP’s followers this reactive attitude toward Islam 
has almost become ‘theological’. By considering Islam, Arabic, and the 
Quran foreign, Mei and his followers identified Islam as ‘the other’ 
distinct from established local Sundanese society and culture.  
 
Anti-Islam Sentiment’s Slowdown  
The anti-Islamic tone propagated by the defenders of Aliran Kebatinan 
weakened during the 1940s due to the changing political context. In 
1943, Japanese forces occupied Java and forced the Dutch Colonial 
Government to relinquish its authority. Under the Japanese occupation 
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national politics changed in favour of Muslims.102 Some Muslim leaders 
used this shifting political constellation to pressurise the native-
syncretic movements.103 During this time opposition to AKP and ADS 
from the Muslim community increased. As Steenbrink noted, Muslims 
accused the ADS leadership of supporting the Dutch Colonial 
Government which, in return, granted them recognition independent 
from Muslim authority.104 In 1944, the ADS was banned and, moreover, 
before this date there was a Japanese attempt at returning the ADS 
community to the Islamic tradition by telling Tedjabuana to promote 
circumcision among his followers. Unwilling to bow to Japanese rule he 
temporarily dissolved the movement and moved to Bandung.105 In the 
meantime, AKP was suppressed after its leader, Mei Kartawinata, was 
arrested in 1943 for his political activism.106 As a consequence, AKP 
followers kept a low profile or went underground.  
As the political context was in favour of Muslims, the Japanese 
occupation galvanised the Muslim community by recognising them as an 
important political force. W.F. Wertheim maintained that “the 
recognition of Moslems as an important political factor was a bold 
deviation from the former colonial practice, which denied Islam any 
latitude as a political creed.”107 During the Japanese occupation, PERSIS, 
NU, Muhammadiyah and PERTI joined in MIAI (Majelis Islam A'laa 
Indonesia/Madlisul Islamil A'la Indonesia, Indonesian High Islamic 
Council). The Modernists and Traditionalists had never before united as 
a socio-political force.108 In 1943, MIAI transformed itself into an Islamic 
party named Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian 
Muslim Consultative Council). As Wertheim has noted, Soekarno 
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recognised Islam as an official religion but rejected to give it a dominant 
position within the state structure.109 
After independence, the Aliran Kebatinan regained its feet, 
capitalising on the new dynamics resulting from the changing political 
context. The 1945 Constitution (article 29) officially recognised the right 
of each citizen to believe in their ‘agama’ and ‘kepercayaan’ (religion and 
belief).110 According to Aliran Kebatinan followers, the term 
‘kepercayaan’ referred to their faith. Contrarily, Muslims contended that 
the term is synonymous with ‘religion’.111 Each group in society 
continued to make claims about the meaning of the word according to 
their interpretation of that article. This polarising debate divides them 
to the present day. The changing political context, however, offered a 
chance for the ADS to revive and prosper. ADS’ leader Tedjabuana, for 
example, returned to Cigugur in 1946 and revived the ADS with the 
construction the Paseban Tri Panca Tunggal, ‘Madrais Grand 
Mansion’.112 
Anti-Islam sentiment continued and culminated in 1950s and 
1960s. I presume that in West Java it was most likely induced by 
national post-independence political developments and the outcome of 
the Madiun affair in East Java113 that pitted abangan against santri in 
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retaliatory bloodshed.114 As Hefner has noted, the polarisation between 
Javanists and orthodox Muslims later became the basis for political 
organisation in rural Java.115 This political division and ideological 
rivalry very much intensified following the development of local 
religious tension between Javanists and orthodox Muslims.116 This 
fostered an anti-Islamic mentality among the followers of Javanism or 
Aliran Kebatinan. 
I would like to remind readers that there is no evidence to show 
how this development in East Java reached West Java. However, I 
believe that this political tension and the division it caused had a 
negative impact on other areas and spread outside East Java to the west. 
In West Java, tensions occurred in various places including Ciparay, 
Lembang, Subang, Sumedang and Cianjur. In Ciparay, for example, in 
1954, Darul Islam rebels117 attacked AKP followers and killed twenty 
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four persons.118 At the time of the attack, the victims were busy making 
preparations for an arts performance to celebrate their Saka Year. In the 
Lembang region, tension between Muslims and Aliran Kebatinan 
followers occurred from the late 1950s until the 1970s. Muslim dakwah 
was often mocked by Aliran Kebatinan followers; the Muslim call to 
prayer was met with derisive comments such as, “Listen, that is dog’s 
barking.”119 This situation, however, illustrates the degree of hostility 
between people of different faiths born out of a complex mix of 
ideological and cultural conflicts. 
Let me return to the MIAI transformation into Masyumi, which 
initially seemed to be a significant step towards consolidating a single 
Islamic party but proved false after only a few years. The unity between 
the Traditionalists and the Modernists ended in 1952 after the NU 
Conference in Palembang yielded a separation from Masyumi. 
Nevertheless, Masyumi remained in existence with major support from 
PERSIS and the Muhammadiyah. The leading Muslim politician, M. 
Natsir, was appointed the chairman of Masyumi. In the 1955 election, 
the party won West Java, leaving other big parties in their wake. 
Masyumi gained 26.46 per cent of the votes, slightly more than its 
Jakarta branch (26.13 per cent). The Indonesian Nationalist Party 
(Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) came in second with 23.63 per cent, 
before the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, 
PKI) with 10.84 per cent.120 The other Islamic parties including 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (PERTI) and Partai 
Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) shared 15.73 per cent. In total, the 1955 
election gave 41.49 per cent to all Islamic parties in West Java.121 The 
Non-Islamic parties including PNI, PKI, IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung 
Kemerdekaan Indonesia, the Association of Indonesian Independence 
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Supporters), Partai Katolik (Catholic Party), Parkindo (Partai Kristen 
Indonesia, the Indonesian Christian Party) and Murba (Musyawarah 
Rakyat Banyak, Many People Deliberation) gained 42.83 per cent of the 
total vote. Total participation in the election was 88.65 per cent.122 
These figures also show that in terms of political participation, the 
Sundanese aspirations were divided into Islamic and non-Islamic ones. 
The considerable gain in the 1955 election demonstrates the 
social and political influence of Islamic parties. Although they failed to 
achieve a dominant majority, Islam remained significant. The majority of 
the Sundanese embraced Islam even if they did not vote for an Islamic 
party. One’s belief in Islam does not automatically ‘Islamise’ one’s 
political orientation. Wertheim – writing in the early 1970s - argued that 
Islam as a faith does not necessarily resemble Islam as politics.123 He 
contends that “although Islam is the religion of a large majority of the 
Indonesian people, the attitudes of those who confess Islam as their faith 
and as an ideology often resemble those of a minority group.”124 This 
echos Dutch colonial policy, which confined Islam to personal 
observance for fear of it becoming a “rallying symbol for anti-colonial 
resistance.”125 
 
PERMAI: A Political Resistance against Islam  
During the 1950s, the Aliran Kebatinan organisations were considered 
religious sects. They achieved resurgence due to social and political 
contexts favourable to them. Aritonang observes that: “Notwithstanding 
protest by Muslim clerics, especially during Japanese rule, ADS was able 
to develop and even claim some 100,000 adherents in the early 
1950s.”126 By 1953, for instance, there were 360 organisations, a 
massive increase from 29 in 1952, according to a Department of 
Religious Affairs report.127 By 1954, the increasing presence of the 
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Aliran Kebatinan as well as of other sects and groups forced the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs to establish a Coordinating Body for the Surveillance 
of Currents of Belief in Society (Badan Koordinasi Pengawasan Aliran 
dan Kepercayaan Masyarakat, BAKOR PAKEM) to monitor their 
development and activities. BAKOR PAKEM was tasked with keeping 
these religious movements in check and ensuring that charismatic 
leaders would not mobilise the movements against the state or cause 
social unrest.128 The rapid spread of the religious sects was an important 
phenomenon across West Java at that time.  
Prior to the 1955 General Election, Aliran Kebatinan elites 
attempted to consolidate and unite themselves in a national body named 
All-Indonesia Kebatinan Congress Body (Badan Kongres Kebatinan 
Seluruh Indonesia, BKKI), resulting from the first Aliran Kebatinan 
Congress in Semarang in 1955. For his own political gain, President 
Soekarno backed the attempt and endorsed the BKKI’s establishment. 
He even attended the third BKKI Congress in 1957, in which he 
delivered a speech and praised the movement for its commitment to 
Pancasila.129 Wongsonegoro requested Soekarno to recognise the Aliran 
Kebatinan as an official religion.130 
Under this socio-political setting, the Aliran Kebatinan grew into a 
socio-religious and political force. In Lembang, for example, the 
significance of the Aliran Kebatinan tradition overshadowed Islam at the 
time. Throughout the course of the 1950s to the 1970s, for example, 
Islamic practices such as salat, puasa, haji, zakat and tahlilan and so on 
were not widely-observed in Lembang.131 Only a few mosques were 
available throughout Lembang. And it was not easy during the 1950s to 
the 1970s to find Islamic institutions such as Islamic religious study 
groups (majlis taklim), Islamic schools (madrasah) and Islamic boarding 
schools (pesantren) or Quranic Kindergarten (Taman Pengajian Anak, 
TPA), and so forth.132 Haji Otong from Tasikmalaya, who arrived in 
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Nyalindung, Lembang, in the late 1950s established a mosque and an 
Islamic school in this village to neutralise the influence of Aliran 
Kebatinan and anti-Islam sentiments there.133 
During the 1950s and early 1960s, tension between Aliran 
Kebatinan movements and Muslims came up because many of them 
opposed Islamic parties.134 The Aliran Kebatinan’s struggle against Islam 
was politically manifested in the establishment of a party, named 
Indonesian Marhaen Associaton (Persatuan Marhaen Indonesia, 
PERMAI). In 1955, Mei and his friends, including J.B. Asa and Iwa 
Kusumasumantri, declared the establishment of the PERMAI party prior 
to the general election.135 PERMAI was a nation-wide party even if it did 
not play a prominent role at the national level. The party, however, 
failed to make the electoral threshold in the 1955 election, having won 
only two seats in the Konstituante.136 This result forced the Party’s 
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dissolution, marking Mei’s failure to consolidate his political position in 
the Konstituante through which he had hoped to politically promote the 
Pancasila and the native-syncretic creeds. Mei returned to the 
grassroots and re-united with former PERMAI members, officially 
reorganising his movement under the banner of AKP. 
 
Turning Away from Islam 
Pressure against Aliran Kebatinan 
Since independence, Muslim leaders paid much attention to their 
missionary (dakwah) activities aiming to promote Islamisation and to 
challenge anti-Islam tendencies among Aliran Kebatinan followers. 
Social mobilisation for economic, social and political reasons brought 
about social change. Migration from areas such as Tasikmalaya and 
Garut, where Islamic culture was strong, to other places where Islamic 
influence was less pronounced, such as Lembang, gradually caused 
socio-religious and cultural changes that forced the decline of anti-
Islamic sentiment and the decline of native-syncretic culture commonly 
embraced by Aliran Kebatinan followers. These changes pressurised the 
Aliran and caused tension. 
As said above, during the 1950s and early 1960s the Aliran 
Kebatinan movement reached its culmination. AKP had a considerable 
growth and was well-institutionalised. AKP and ADS movements were 
two of the most prominent religious movements in the region. This 
golden era ended in the mid-1960s. The AKP failed to keep the pace of 
its considerable growth due to leadership crises and socio-political 
pressure. In the meantime, in 1964, the Kuningan Court, supported by 
the army and the national government, banned the ADS. Popular 
accounts claimed that the ADS was not banned; rather, Tedjabuana 
dissolved it.137 The ADS and AKP leaders failed to understand why the 
government refused to recognise their beliefs amidst its support for the 
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Disappointment and Dissolution  
ADS undoing began with the discrimination ADS followers faced.139 One 
day in March 1964, Sakim, a male nurse who was an ADS follower, failed 
to get a health subsidy for his wife’s stay in a government hospital in 
Kuningan after she had given birth. Sakim was a government civil 
servant eligible to receive subsidy for stays at government hospitals. The 
hospital, however, refused to give Sakim a subsidy because he failed to 
show his marriage certificate to prove that the woman giving birth was 
his wife. According to contemporary Indonesian law, a marriage was 
recognised if it was registered either with the Civil Registry Office for 
non-Muslims or with the Office of Religious Affairs for Muslims. Sakim’s 
marriage, however, was conducted according to ADS custom, which was 
recognised by neither office.140 This case soon came to the attention of 
BAKOR PAKEM, the Coordinating Body for the Surveillance of Currents 
of Belief in Society. Tedjabuana tried to help Sakim with the assistance 
of A. Hidayat Sasmita, a parish priest from Cirebon, and Sie Tjie Djiem, 
the President of the Cirebon chapter of the Catholic Party, at the 
Kuningan Court. The ADS leader, however, failed. On 9 July 1964, the 
Kuningan Court prosecutor through BAKOR PAKEM decided that since 
the ADS marriage was unrecognised according to law, Sakim’s marriage 
was considered unlawful.141 His application for medical subsidisation for 
his wife was therefore rejected. For ADS leaders, this rejection was a 
symbolic denial to recognise the ADS’s existence, its vision and its 
mission.142 
There was also, of course, a political complication because inter-
marriage between ADS followers and Muslims was rampant and 
provoked tension in society. In many respects, Muslims, as well as the 
authorities, wanted to conduct marriages according to Law number 
22/1946, which obliged every citizen to marry “under the auspices of 
government religious officials in order to obtain a formal 
                                                          
139  The following account rests largely on interview with Jatikusuma, Cigugur, 5 
August 2009; Interview with Ira Indrawardana, Bandung, 14 August 2009, 
and Interview with Romo Abu Kasman, chief pastor of the Cigugur Church, 
Cigugur, Kuningan, 6 August 2009. 
140  Steenbrink, ‘A Catholic Sadrach’, p. 294. 
141  Idem. 
142  Interview,  Pangeran Jatikusuma, Cigugur, Kuningan, 5 August 2009. 
-93- 
 
acknowledgement from the government.”143 ADS followers defied this 
law and this defiance often provoked animosity. It was not rare that to 
get their way, ADS leaders and followers converted to Islam for the sake 
of marriage and afterwards abandoned the religion. Tedjabuana, for 
example, converted to Islam in February 1951 to be able to be the legal 
guardian in the marriage of his son, Siti Jenar, but soon after renounced 
the religion.144 
Muslim leaders tended to be extraordinarily sensitive whenever 
they were challenged with this kind of problems. They sometimes blew 
issues out of proportion in a way that suggested they took personal 
affront.145 In 1964, the following case was brought before the court and 
the perpetrator was jailed for several months. One day in 1964, Kamid, a 
citrus farmer of Cigugur, Kuningan, wanted to express his thanks to God 
after having had a successful harvest by giving some of his citrus to his 
neighbours. Unfortunately, a Muslim family fell ill after having eaten the 
citrus and Kamid was accused of having intended to harm them by 
poisoning them. Kamid denied the charge. To prove his innocence, 
Kamid swore that he did not poison his neighbours, and for unknown 
reasons, he then went on to step on the Quran. This action outraged 
Muslims and they demanded justice from the public prosecutor for 
Kamid’s offense of the Muslim Holy Book. Kamid was punished with a 
jail sentence.146 
Such sustained tension had great impact. Muslim activists and 
organisations were outraged and demanded the suspension of ADS.147 In 
1964, ADS leaders were accused of breach of trust in the construction of 
the ADS Tri Mulya School in downtown Cigugur, Kuningan. They were 
accused of having raised funds by coercion and using them 
irresponsibly. Muslim demands to suspend the ADS provoked the court 
to take action. By 1964 hundreds of ADS members were arrested and 
imprisoned. The ADS leaders, Tedjabuana, and his son, Jatikusuma, were 
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also detained.148 Tedjabuana recognised that this situation put the lives 
of the members of his community at risk and that he had to take 
concrete action. Tedjabuana finally dissolved the ADS in 1964 after 
having been suffering for decades.  
 
Embracing Roman Catholicism 
Frustrated at having been denied recognition for decades, along with 
exposure to discrimination and other social and political pressures, in 
the end Tedjabuana embraced Roman Catholicism. Many considered this 
an act of apostasy although Tedjabuana had never been a real Muslim. 
His conversion was witnessed by Pastor A. Hidayat Sasmita and soon 
afterwards thousands of his followers joined him in embracing 
Catholicism. Only a few of them embraced Protestantism or Islam. 
Tedjabuana saw many similarities between Catholicism and ADS, 
especially in their doctrine of love. Neither faith required circumcision, 
which the ADS saw as a violation of the human body. The palace-
sanctuary of Paseban Tri Panca Tunggal, which was previously used to 
carry out ADS ceremonies, was soon used as a Catholic Church. The 
‘conversion’ of ADS members to Catholicism also facilitated the 
permeation of Catholic influence in the villages where ADS followers 
lived, such as in Cisantana in Cigugur, Ciawi in Tasikmalaya, Pasir in 
Garut and the village of Manggahang near Bandung.149 After some years, 
the Catholics built churches in Cisantana and Pasir.150 On 5 March 1978, 
Tedjabuana died as a Catholic at the age of 82. Since then, his son 
Jatikusuma took over full leadership of his community. 
Jatikusuma had in fact begun to exercise more authority since 
1974. He followed his father in embracing Catholicism.151 He lived in the 
Grand Mansion of Cigugur and allowed the use of the residence’s hall for 
the Catholic mass.152 Later, the Catholic community erected a church, 
parish houses, clinic and school just uphill near the mansion. While 
church activities, properties and membership significantly increased, 
                                                          
148  Interview, Pangeran Jatikusuma, Cigugur, Kuningan, 5 August 2009. See also 
Rosidin, Kebatinan, Islam and the State, p. 53. 
149  Steenbrink, ‘A Catholic Sadrach’, p. 295. 
150  Idem. 
151  This following account rests largely on my interview with Pangeran 
Jatikusuma, Cigugur, Kuningan, 5 August 2010. 
152  Steenbrink, ‘A Catholic Sadrach’, p. 296. 
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the mansion and its residents, including the Pangeran, were not really 
saved from economic insecurity. The conversion of the ADS members to 
Catholicism had also redirected regular and irregular donations away 
from ADS’ coffers to the church treasury. It seems that the ADS leaders 
did not anticipate the economic consequences of this conversion. 
Steenbrink argues that “some events and developments in 1964-1981 
show that the expectations of Jatikusuma and the Catholic clergy about 
the conversion to Catholicism were quite different.”153 
There were several consequences the ADS leaders had not 
foreseen. First, Jatikusuma, as well as his father, Tedjabuana, lost their 
privileged positions as Pangeran (Lord). Social activities were organised 
with due respect to the Pangeran but the religious hierarchy saw 
Jatikusuma complain that after having become a Catholic, his position 
turned into one of a sheep in a flock from previously having been a 
Lord.154 This represented the unexpected ‘desacralisation’ of the ADS 
leaders. Second, as said above, economic and social resources which 
were previously channelled to the leaders of the ADS were now 
allocated to the church. The radical shift in the socio-religious and 
cultural life of the ADS community had tremendous economic 
consequences, especially for the ADS leadership. Third, this radical 
change also seriously eroded ADS authority. With the adoption of church 
leadership and organisation, the old ADS authority was challenged and a 
new pattern of allegiance emerged. The allegiance of the former ADS 
followers had split in two. Some of them continued being loyal to 
Pangeran Jatikusuma rather than to the church; but the majority of 
followers found the church to be the true spiritual place to which they 
surrendered their allegiance. 
Jatikusuma was unhappy that in church he was just a member of 
the congregation and to assert his influence, he boycotted discussions 
with church leaders. In this situation, there was clearly tension between 
Jatikusuma and the church leaders, most of whom were former ADS 
followers. This illustrates the dynamics and the impact of the radical 
shift in the religious and organisational orientation of the ADS 
community, from a native-syncretic current to that of the world religion 
of Roman Catholicism. 
                                                          
153  Idem, p. 9. 
154  Interview, Pangeran Jatikusuma, Cigugur, Kuningan, 5 August 2009.  
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Some of the factors cited above constituted the reasons behind 
Jatikusuma’s disillusionment that caused him to turn away from 
Catholicism and to return to the teachings of his grandfather. While his 
sense of disappointment was latent for some time, the trigger came later 
on, in Bandung in the late 1970s, during the Sundanese Christmas Mass 
in a church in Kebon Kelapa.155 Prior to the celebration, Jatikusuma 
demanded that the attendants of the Sundanese mass celebration should 
wear Sundanese attire and that the liturgy should be conducted in 
Sundanese. For some church leaders, this demand was too much. Pastor 
Abu Kasman said that “In the Catholic Church, hierarchy and authority 
are strong and exercised carefully; the liturgy must be in Latin like 
Muslims use Arabic in their prayers. All churches will always maintain 
uniformity in performing worship. If one church allows the adoption of 
local culture, the others will come with similar demands.”156 The church, 
however, did approve of Jatikusuma’s dress proposal for the pelayan 
misa (mass assistants) but not for the Pastor. Jatikusuma was upset with 
the inflexibility of the Church and decided to leave the Sunda Mass. 
Abu Kasman argues that the Catholic Church had in fact made 
many adjustments in order to accommodate local culture, especially the 
use of Sundanese music and art such as angklung (bamboo musical 
instrument) and degung (small gong) in the church, in addition to 
wearing a keris (kris) and a blankon (Sundanese headdress, especially 
for the mass assistants). For the pastor, this kind of adaptation has not 
yet been allowed by the Catholic Church.157 Due to this restriction, the 
relationship between the church leaders and ex-ADS leaders became 
strained. Misunderstandings continued to occur and polarised the 
Church and the devoted proponents of Sundanese culture, the ADS 
followers.158 
                                                          
155  Idem. 
156  Interview, Romo Abu Kasman, chief pastor of Cigugur Church, Cigugur, 
Kuningan, 6 August 2009. 
157  Idem. 
158  In 1977, Jatikusuma declared his breaking with the church and he began to 
revive the old ADS tradition under a new banner, PACKU (Paguyuban Adat 
Cara Karuhun Urang; Adat Association for Ancestors’ Way of Life) in 1980. 
Under Muslim pressure, the West Java court banned PACKU in 1982, 
accusing this new organisation of being a reincarnation of ADS. Despite this 
challenge, Jatikusuma continued his struggle by establishing another 




Islamic Modernists sought a crucial shift in the Islamisation trend. They 
argued for the superiority of Islam over all other cultural heritages 
which upset the existing socio-religious setting and the political order 
among Sundanese society. With their ‘purification’ agenda, the 
Modernist leaders questioned the amalgamation of Islamic practices and 
adat and condemned belief in spiritual forces and native-syncretic 
practices. They believed that adat is Hindu and that Christianity is the 
religion of the Dutch and therefore both are Muslims’ opponents. In this 
context, the pressure put upon the Aliran Kebatinan continued. As 
pressure mounted, the Aliran Kebatinan leaders saw that the Islamic 
vision did not share their worldviews and that these visions could not be 
reconciled. As a consequence, anti-Islam sentiments emerged. After 
being disappointed because the state did not recognise them as 
members of a full-fledged religious organisation and after it failed to 
meet the civil rights of Aliran Kebatinan followers, they turned away 










































THE WANE OF ALIRAN KEBATINAN AND RELIGIOUS 
RESURGENCE: THE NEW ORDER’S POLITICS ON RELIGION, 
ISLAMISATION AND CHRISTIAN REVIVAL (1965-1990) 
 
 
This chapter discusses a crucial stage in the development of Islam in 
Indonesia in the shifting political context in the aftermath of the 30 
September 1965 coup attempt, which produced unprecedented political 
turmoil and seriously damaged President Soekarno’s legitimacy. In this 
context Soeharto came officially to power in 1968 to lead the New Order 
Regime.1 Soeharto was acutely aware of complex mixture of fear of 
Communism and of Islamism as represented by the PKI and DI/TII 
ideologies fighting for Communism and the investment of the Islamic 
State. Soeharto and his regime made this fear work for them through the 
promotion of remarkable socio-political changes in order to gain control 
over the grassroots and by so doing causing strict control of social and 
political life. One such change was the promotion of what Boland called 
‘religious freedom’ even if this came with restrictions.2 In his words: 
 
.... and religion was in favour as never before. Freedom of religion 
has also often been stressed since 1965, but with this restriction: that 
such freedom does not include the freedom to be non-religious, let 
                                                          
1  Boland, The Struggle of Islam, pp. 149-151. 
2  With loyal support from all his aides in the military and the civil forces, 
Soeharto sought to exercise total control over politics and society. 
Communists, actual and alleged, were exterminated while the leaders of the 
left-wing Nationalists were eliminated. Since then the Army played a crucial 
role, soon becoming the dominant political force. The New Order kept 
control of the economy by regulating foreign investment. See Herbert Feith, 
‘Political Control, Class Formation and Legitimacy in Soeharto’s Indonesia’, 
in Indonesian Politics: A Reader, Christine Doran (ed.) (Centre for South-east 
Asian Politics: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1987), p. 222. 
See also Boland, The Struggle of Islam, p. 149 and Harold Crouch, The Army 
and Politics in Indonesia, Revised Edition (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), p. 135. 
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alone anti-religious. ...So it came about that after Soekarno’s fall his 
slogan of 1964 once more became topical: the Indonesian people as 
well as the Indonesian state ”must have a God and a religion” (harus 
ber-Tuhan dan harus beragama). It is undeniable that many religious 
leaders considered this development a reason for new hope.3 
 
It would seem like a paradox that the promotion of religious 
freedom boiled down to efforts to obliterate the (religious) native 
syncretic creed across Java. However, with reference to its first principle 
of the belief in One God, the regime provided the Pancasila with deep 
religious meaning and by so doing it silently warned the Aliran 
Kebatinan followers in West Java not to take side with the leftists or 
their sympathizers as they had done in the past.4 The anti-Communist 
mentality of the regime provided the setting for policy making that more 
or less outlawed the existence of all syncretic movements and, as a 
consequence, negated their growth and influence in society. 
In a similar way, the regime ‘abolished’ political Islam but 
promoted cultural Islam and by doing so provided the ground for the 
unprecedented increase in Islamic institutions and expressions of 
Islamic cultural identity.5 As a consequence, Muslim leaders and 
particularly the Modernists used this context for the promotion of 
dakwah, after their leaders’ pursuit for the rehabilitation of the 
suspended Masyumi party (of course) was rejected. This dakwah 
campaign, particularly at the grassroots level, had a tremendous impact 
on the social structures in the decades to come. 
Christian leaders also greatly benefited from these remarkable 
changes. This was so despite the disagreement and the tension they had 
with Muslim leaders and activists across the country on various matters 
pertaining to the ethics of propagation, the construction of houses of 
worship, the receipt of foreign aid, and so on.6 As a result of their efforts, 
Christians won large numbers of converts and they used Soeharto’s 
political change as a solid basis for demanding the unequivocal 
implementation of article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
                                                          
3  Boland, The Struggle of Islam, p. 149. 
4  Van Bruinessen, ‘Saints, Politics and Sufi Bureaucrates’, p. 98. 
5  Idem. 
6  The study on these issues refers to Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened: 
Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New Order (Leiden/Amsterdam: 
ISIM/Amsterdam University Press, 2006), pp. 21-104. 
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Rights (UDHR), which guarantees the freedom of religion, including the 
freedom to convert.7 Coincidentally, it was in this context that Christians 
capitalised on their considerable advance in terms of human capital 
because they were better schooled and consequently had gained better 
access to higher positions in society. The people in parts of West Java 
were aware of this, and also realised that Christian social institutions 
like hospitals and schools were of a higher quality than others in the 
area. This made conversion to Christianity for them even more 
interesting.8 
Soeharto’s political change tremendously influenced the 
Indonesian political context in entire regions, including West Java. 
Readers should keep in mind that at the time, all political expression in 
West Java was in fact a direct reflection of the political dynamics in 
Jakarta which demanded compliance from all provinces and which 
influenced the political atmosphere in these provinces. 
 
Soeharto’s Politics on Religions and Pressures Against 
Aliran Kebatinan 
 
Soeharto’s Regime’s Claim of Pancasila and Anti-Communist 
Mentality 
Soeharto’s politics on Aliran Kebatinan and religion were drawn on the 
following premises: First, Soeharto officially recognised the Aliran 
Kebatinan as ‘kepercayaan’ (belief) distinctive from ‘agama’ (religion). 
This constitutional recognition should have ensured the state’s 
protection of this native syncretic creed. This was not the case, however, 
as Soeharto declared on one occasion that a kepercayaan is not a religion 
but that all religions are kepercayaan. The New Order regime slowly 
marginalised the Aliran Kebatinan across West Java and pressured its 
followers to embrace an official religion. In 1967, the regime tasked the 
Coordinating Body for the Surveillance of Currents of Belief in Society 
(BAKOR PAKEM), established in the 1950s, to keep a close eye on Aliran 
Kebatinan groups which were suspected of sympathising with the 
Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI). This 
                                                          
7  Idem, p. 50.  
8  Interview with Romo Abu Kasman, chief pastor of the Cigugur Church, 
Cigugur, Kuningan, 6 August 2009. 
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suspicion fed the social stigma that descended on them, especially from 
among believers, both Muslims and Christians.9 From 1967 onward, the 
government also required some hours of religious instruction in state 
schools that promoted orthodox religions associated with modern 
schools, literacy and modernity.10 Under this political pressure and 
within this shifting social context, the Aliran Kebatinan groups and their 
followers, the Penghayat, suffered and failed to prosper. 
Second, the regime officially recognised five religions and each 
citizen was required to embrace one of them. Religious elites were given 
strong support to conduct dakwah or missionary activities. Freedom of 
religion was promoted from 1965 onwards and atheism was prohibited. 
Indeed, in a speech before the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), 
Soeharto proclaimed that every citizen must embrace one formal 
religion; otherwise they would be considered atheist. The adage was 
that if one is an atheist, one is a communist. Islam and Christianity were 
supported in their capacities as counter-ideologies to Communism 
rather than as moral and spiritual teachings. 
Third, religion was useful; radical political Islam or Islamism was 
not.11 While Soeharto sanctioned the use of the United Development 
Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), a fusion of Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU), Indonesian Muslim Party (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, 
PARMUSI) and others, as a conduit for Muslim political sentiment, any 
attempt to use religion as a political ideology was not to be tolerated. 
Nonetheless, the regime viewed the Party as a potential threat and 
hence kept controlling it. Here, while it is unclear exactly what kind of 
relation between religion and politics Soeharto approved of, it was 
obvious that he wanted a separation of religion and ideology. Soeharto, 
therefore, crushed any initiative that might lead to the ‘ideologisation’ of 
religion. 
Fourth, although hostile towards the use of Islam as a political 
ideology, Soeharto sought to strengthen his relationship with Muslims. 
To this end, he lent considerable support to Muslims, especially on 
matters pertaining to their social and cultural interests, often at the 
expense of Christian aspirations.12 By satisfying the Muslims, Soeharto 
                                                          
9  Interview, Andre Hernandi, Bandung, 7 July 2010. 
10  Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java, p. 155. 
11  Feith, ‘Political Control’, p. 222. 
12  Perhaps the best examples to note are Decree No. 1/1969 on Religious 
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hoped to avoid political instability. At the same time, he sought to firm 
up an electoral constituency which would help maintain the political 
status quo and his share in it. 
Fifth, at first blush, this political stance seems to have favoured 
Muslims over Christians. In fact, this was not the case. Rather, the New 
Order regime treated Christians as important allies, many of whom were 
well-educated technocrats appointed to ministerial and other high-
ranking offices. But in essence such policy did not mean to favour the 
Christians. Rather it was created in the best interests of the regime itself. 
It was hoped that Christians would contribute to the regime’s 
development campaign and lend a hand in negotiations with Western 
donors. The New Order regime thus paid attention to the social and 
religious interests of Christians living in Christian-majority regions, such 
as Papua, Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) and North Sulawesi. 
 
Aliran Kebatinan’s Continued Decline 
Within these political parameters, Aliran Kebatinan, once the worldview 
of the overwhelming majority of Sundanese and Javanese, suddenly 
found itself on the back foot. At the expense of Aliran Kebatinan, 
Soeharto’s political succession facilitated Islamisation on the one hand 
and Christianisation on the other. The revitalisation of Islam saw 
significant social transformation after the 1980s, resulting from 
Dakwahism, while that of Christianity was reflected in the growth and 
numbers of its adherents and institutions. This coincidence of growth 
contributed to a sense of competitiveness which ultimately resulted in 
tension between Muslims and Christians, built up around a number of 
issues including the ethics of proselytisation, the construction of houses 
of worship, accusations of forced conversion, the need for pluralism, 
etcetera. This chapter will discuss the context that gave rise to the 
                                                                                                                                        
Propagation decreed jointly by the Minister of Home Affairs and the 
Minister of Religious Affairs, and Law No. 1/1974 on Marriage. It seems 
obvious that the latter represents Muslim voices rather than Christian 
aspirations. Article 2 (1) of the law states that “marriage is valid only if it 
is conducted in accordance with the religious laws and beliefs of the 
parties.” This article has produced the common view that inter-religious 
marriage is forbidden in Indonesia. A good reference to this issue is 
Ratno Lukito’s ‘The enigma of legal pluralism in Indonesian Islam: the 
case of interfaith marriage’, Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, Vol. 10, 
No. 2, 2008, pp. 176–187. 
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dialectical dynamic in which these faiths were engaged. Before that, we 
will explore how the heavy pressure on the Aliran Kebatinan has 
institutionally weakened their creeds and socially marginalised their 
followers. Especially across West Java, the New Order politics on Aliran 
Kebatinan and religion had several repercussions. 
The first was that the growth in number of Islamic institutions 
such as mosques, pesantrens and madrasahs in rural areas undermined 
village traditions and led to stronger marginalising of Aliran Kebatinan 
followers contributing to tensions between them and Muslims.13 As we 
will see below in the Subang case, Muslim-supported state organs 
launched assaults against Aliran Kebatinan rituals and historical sites at 
the Cileuleuy riverside in Cimerta. Aliran Kebatinan followers were also 
forced to embrace Islam.14 In Lembang, the rise of Islam as a social force 
replaced village syncretic traditions with Islamic ones which 
contributed to the gradual Islamisation of the region since the 1960s. 
Secondly, Soeharto’s support of religion prejudiced state neutrality 
with severe consequences at the community level. In Sumedang, for 
example, civil and military officers pressured Aliran Kebatinan 
adherents to embrace Islam. The latter were persuaded that, by 
becoming Muslim, they would be considered Pancasilaists. The political 
identification of Islam with Pancasila explains how the ruling 
bureaucrats used the New Order regime’s promotion of religion for its 
political interests, prejudicing the state’s neutrality and autonomy. 
Third, Soeharto’s support of religion encouraged Aliran Kebatinan 
followers and former Communist sympathisers to embrace recognised 
religions independent of actual religious motives. The state’s promotion 
of religion as well as the expansion of grassroots Islamisation initiatives 
in both rural and urban areas weakened the socio-cultural basis of 
Aliran Kebatinan and negated the influence of Communism. In this socio-
political atmosphere, the PKI was obliterated while Aliran Kebatinan 
also experienced a considerable setback. In what follows I will present a 
few brief case-studies illustrating the social and political repercussions 
the New Order policy on Aliran Kebatinan and religion had in Subang 
and Sumedang, West Java. 
                                                          
13  Ibnu Hijar Apandi, ‘Sekilas Perkembangan Islam di Desa Wangunharja 
Kecamatan Lembang Kabupaten Bandung Barat’, unpublished document, 
Lembang, 26 March 2011. pp. 1-6. 




The Weakening of Aliran Kebatinan in Subang 
Subang is made up of highlands in the south and plains and coastal-
lands in its northern littoral. The southern parts include Sagalaherang, 
Jalan Cagak, Cisalak, Kasomalang, Bunihayu to Tanjungsiang. Islamic 
influence is rather strong across these areas. Islam probably came to 
Subang through Cikalama, Sumedang, as suggested by the fact that many 
Muslim figures, for example the Subang head of the Indonesian Islamic 
Scholars’ Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI),15 trace their lineage 
back to Kyai Oo Muhyidin of Pesantren Pagelaran 2 in Sumedang.16 In 
terms of intellectual tradition, the influence of Traditionalist Islam as 
represented by the NU, is strong. The people in this region easily 
accepted the Ahlu al-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah tradition by virtue of its 
relative compatibility with local syncretic cultures. Other Muslim 
organisations such as the Muhammadiyah, PERSIS, and Islam Jamaah 
are also active there but their influence is minor. In the general elections 
held from 1971 to 1987, the United Development Party (PPP) won a 
significant proportion of the votes across southern Subang.17 
While this socio-religious culture characterises the southern part, 
the northern littoral that encompasses Subang to Pagaden, Pamanukan, 
Ciasem and Patokbeusi was less influenced by Islam. On contrast with 
the rest, Ciasem and Pamanukan are relatively more religious, probably 
                                                          
15  Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) is the Indonesian Islamic Scholars’ Council, 
founded on 24th of May 1975 by President Soeharto. As observed by 
Mohammad Atho Mudzhar, Soeharto encouraged the MUI’s establishment 
for two reasons. First, Soeharto thought that the Muslim community needed 
a nationwide body of ulama to talk on its behalf in the inter-religious body. 
He also emphasised that such a body would be required to encourage 
Muslims’ participation in solving national problems. In practice, MUI’s main 
role is to give legal opinions (fatwa) on Islamic affairs. A very good study on 
MUI’s legal opinions is the one by Mohammad Atho Mudzhar, Fatwa-Fatwa 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Sebuah Studi tentang Pemikiran Hukum Islam di 
Indonesia 1975-1988 (edisi dwibahasa) (Jakarta: INIS, 1993), p. 46. A good 
article about the MUI is Moch Nur Ichwan’s ‘Ulama, State and Politics: 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia After Suharto’, Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 15, no. 
1, 2005, pp. 45-72. 
16  Pesantren Pagelaran 1 is located in Cikalama, Sumedang. The following 
account on Subang rests largely on interviews with Hawe Setiawan, lecturer 
at Pasundan University, Bandung, 14 July 2010. 
17  Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 14 July 2010. 
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owing to their proximity to deeply religious Islamic Cirebon. Large parts 
to the south of Pamanukan, across Pagaden and Patokbeusi to Subang 
have green plantations and scenery attractive to Europeans on their 
breaks during the colonial days. There is a railway station in Pagaden 
that enables people to travel to and from the area. In the coastal regions, 
local traditional arts and performances are vibrantly alive and the area 
has apparently become a hub for arts and performances.18 
Economically, Subang is relatively resource-rich with many 
plantations in its territory. Subang was home to a famous plantation 
company named P&T (Pamanukan and Tjiasem, 1886) which later 
changed its name to NV. Maatschappij ter Exploitatie der Pamanukan en 
Tjiasem Landen. The P&T Company was led by Peter Willem Hofland. 
His prominence was later commemorated by a statue which was erected 
in Subang. P&T owned expansive tea plantations across Bunihayu, Jalan 
Cagak, and Subang. There are also significant rubber plantations across 
Kalijati, Pamanukan and Ciasem. Agriculture is thus of great importance 
in the life of the Subangese. During the 1950s and 1960s, these regions 
became the bases of the PKI, which engaged peasants in its labour 
movement. Aliran Kebatinan was also based in these regions, but its 
followers were not necessarily PKI members. Probably due to this 
background, the New Order regime, from its advent, saw Subang as a 
communist enclave in need to be cleaned up. 
After the New Order Regime came to power, it decided that its rule 
over Subang had to be different from that applied under Soekarno’s Old 
Order. The New Order adhered to the Pancasila as an important mark of 
distinction, and designated Subang as a Pancasila Bastion, while 
launching a radio station called BENPAS (Benteng Pancasila) to spread 
its propaganda.19 The Aliran Kebatinan elite tried to dance to the New 
Order’s tune. The AKP, an important Aliran Kebatinan organisation in 
West Java, demonstrated its loyalty to the Pancasila with its adherents 
claiming it to be their paramount ideology.20 The AKP even adopted the 
name ‘Agama Yakin Pancasila’ which literally means ‘Religion Convinced 
                                                          
18  Idem. 
19  Idem. 
20  AKP is Aliran Kebatinan Perjalanan, a Kebatinan association that emerged 
since 1927 and grew well in the 1950s, especially in some parts of West 
Java. Budidaya is an Aliran Kebatinan group in West Java born out of a 
division within the AKP organisation in 1981. 
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of Pancasila’. As we will discuss later, the Subangese authorities, 
together with members of the Traditionalist Muslim youth organisation, 
Ansor, were hostile towards the Aliran Kebatinan community and 
demolished the Pancasila Memorial (Tugu Pancasila) on bank of the 
Cileuleuy River in 1973. Aliran Kebatinan’s strategic appropriation of the 
Pancasila only appears to have gained relevance after Soeharto’s 
downfall followed by the rise of Islamism. 
Besides having been home to PKI bases in the past, Subang was 
and still is also known as an Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) 
stronghold. Recently, politicians from the Indonesian Democratic Party-
Struggle (PDI-P) have dominated Subang’s administrative and legislative 
bodies. Eep Hidayat, the PDI-P Regent of Subang (2008-2011) 
introduced an interesting socio-cultural program that required all civil 
servants once a week to dress in black and to sport a head band (ikat 
kepala) and to wear slippers, a dress code similar to that of the Baduy 
people of Kanekes, in the Banten’s southern littoral.21 This promotion of 
Kanekes culture appears to have been a symbolic reaction seeking to 
reassert Sundanese ethnic identity amidst the deepening influence of 
other cultures and identities among the Sundanese and Bantenese. The 
Islamic identity of Banten continues to strengthen. 
Given the area’s history, the New Order applied a strategy of 
containment, placing it under surveillance and deliberately facilitating 
Islamisation. This initiative, aimed at the grassroots, was supplemented 
by the promulgation of legislation aiming to marginalise the AKP. On 23 
May 1967, the BAKOR PAKEM, the Coordinating Body for the 
Surveillance of Currents of Belief in Society, issued decree number SK-
23/PAKEM/1967 that banned the AKP and its activities across West 
Java. AKP leaders, never having received a copy of the decree, did not 
know how to respond to the suspension.22 After this, the state enhanced 
its promotion of religion by making it a compulsory subject in state 
schools and universities. Some years after the issuance of the decree, the 
BAKOR PAKEM of Subang issued another decree number: Kep. 
01/1.2.SK.1.312/4/1974 which dissolved the AKP in Subang. By May 
1974, AKP followers were forced to declare that they would cease their 
                                                          
21  The Baduy people are believed to be the original Sundanese people and their 
culture is considered authentic Sundanese. 
22  Interview, Adang Amung, General Secretary of AKP, Bandung, 7 July 2010. 
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involvement in the organisation.23 They were also driven to embrace 
Islam.24 
This ban was enforced following tensions between Muslims and 
Aliran Kebatinan followers, especially of the AKP, about the Tugu 
Pancasila and sumur wangi (fragrant well) in Cileuleuy.25 The Tugu was 
constructed by AKP leader Mei Kartawinata as the sacred focal point of 
pilgrimage, while at the same time symbolising the importance of the 
Pancasila for the movement and its followers. AKP followers also 
deemed sacred the well located a hundred meters from the memorial. 
They believed that its water cured a number of diseases and increased 
the fecundity of agricultural lands. Some of them stated that, “because 
the water from the fragrant well had healing powers, why not consider it 
to be similar to the zam zam well in Mecca, and the Pancasila Memorial 
as our Ka’bah.”26 
This equation offended Muslims. The AKP claim to the Pancasila 
did not sit well with the New Order regime. To deprive them of the bases 
of such claims, and capitalising on anti-Aliran Kebatinan sentiments 
among Muslims, the sacred sites were demolished. One day in 1973, a 
crowd of people from the village administration office together with 
Ansor members converged on the sites, demolished the Tugu and filled 
the well with rubbish.27 
 
AKP Suspension  
The demolition of the Pancasila Memorial and the AKP suspension 
across Subang and Sumedang illustrates the sustained hostility in these 
regions on the part of both the State and Muslim organisations towards 
the AKP in particular and Aliran Kebatinan in general. Denied the 
freedom to practice their belief, the movement went underground. Most 
AKP adherents claimed Islam as their religion, especially when having to 
                                                          
23  ‘Keluar dari Islam (Lalu masuk lagi)’, Tempo, 4/VI August 1976. 
24  Idem. 
25  Interview, Mimin Sukandar and Agus, Subang, 14 July 2010. 
26  Interview, Engkus Ruswana, Bandung, 27 July 2010. Zamzam water comes 
from a well in Mecca and Muslims believe it to possess miraculous 
properties. The Ka’bah is the holy centre of Islam to which all Muslims face 
when performing prayers.  
27  Interview, Mimin Sukandar and Agus, Subang, 14 July 2010. 
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make declarations for official purposes, as on identity cards.28 While 
regretting the inability to take pride in their true identity, the tactic was 
necessary for their own safety.29 It was also not unusual during the New 
Order regime for village administration officials to write ‘Islam’ on the 
identity cards of the Aliran Kebatinan followers without their prior 
permission.30 
From the 1970s to the 1980s, AKP’s underground bases in Subang 
were spread out across rural areas including Patimban, Randu and 
Gantar. The most important leaders at the time were Ahmad Zaini and 
Jinul. Under Zaini’s leadership, the AKP grew in strength despite the 
consistent pressure from regime organs in the villages. As in other 
places, the AKP proliferated mainly through family ties.31 There were 
also, however, many members who embraced the AKP individually after 
having gained more knowledge and understanding about it. Yayanda 
Sapin, a respondent in Pusakajaya in Subang, admitted that he embraced 
the AKP only in 1988, earning him government surveillance as a 
consequence. Once, he was summoned and interrogated about his 
religious affiliation by people working in the village office. Learning that 
he was an Aliran Kebatinan follower, they condemned him by saying 
“How is it that you do not have a religion? You are just like a pig; Damn 
you PKI!” Holding on to Aliran Kebatinan as their true faith in such 
daunting circumstances, most AKP loyalists resorted to keeping a low 
profile and to operating underground. 
 
State and Islamisation in Sumedang 
The New Order’s policies on Aliran Kebatinan followers represent the 
administration’s efforts to contain its growth and to funnel its members 
into an official religion. In this unfavourable climate, Aliran Kebatinan 
followers capitulated to State pressure and converted mostly to Islam or 
Christianity. With little resistance, many embraced a formal religion and 
abandoned their native-syncretic currents.32 Those unwilling to 
                                                          
28  Interview, Adang Amung, Bandung, 7 July 2010. 
29  Interview, Yayanda Sapin, Subang, 14 July 2010. 
30  Interview, Narka, Subang, 14 July 2010. 
31  Interview, Narka and Darga, Subang, 14 July 2010. 
32  In Marpu’s case in Cimanggung, Sumedang in 1976, the state’s apparatus 
along with proponents of the ruling Golkar Party encouraged him to 
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concede, like Yayanda above, were placed under surveillance and were 
accused by the regime of being PKI sympathisers, a label that carried a 
heavy social stigma. 
 
The Politics on Marriage and Coercive Conversion  
Aliran Kebatinan followers were denied any rights to marry according to 
their adat. According to Law 1/1974 on Marriages, marriage must be 
conducted according to one’s religion and belief. Muslim marriages are 
registered with the Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama, 
KUA) situated in all districts across the country. Non-Muslim marriages 
are registered with the Municipal Registry Office. This office, while not 
explicitly being prohibited to do so, had not been authorised to register 
the marriage of Aliran Kebatinan adherents. This means that Aliran 
Kebatinan members, who were considered to be Muslims, did not want 
to register their marriages at the KUA but also could not register at the 
Municipal Registry Office. After the issuance of Law 1/1974 on 
Marriages, various government organs from ministry levels down to 
provincial levels issued a number of decrees and regulations on adat 
marriage and its registration.33 For Muslims, the enactment of the 
Marriage Law was a reminder to live according to Islam. For Aliran 
Kebatinan followers, the law limited their lives with regards to their 
adat and syncretic culture. 
The objective behind the requirement that Aliran Kebatinan 
followers register their marriages at the KUA and the Municipal Registry 
Office was to encourage them to embrace one of the formal religions, 
since registration presupposed subscription to a recognised faith.34 The 
strategy produced ambivalent results. It was not uncommon for 
followers of Aliran Kebatinan to identify themselves as Muslim, as they 
did on their identity cards.35 For the state, this identification entailed 
that their marriages should be conducted according to Islamic law as per 
                                                                                                                                        
embrace Islam and to make his fellow Penghayat (Aliran Perjalanan) to do 
the same. Interview, Marpu, Sumedang, 28 May 2010. 
33  See all degrees and regulations compiled in Himpunan Peraturan 
Perundang-Undangan yang Berkaitan dengan Kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan 
Yang Maha Esa (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Nilai Budaya Seni dan Film, 
Direktorat Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, 2006). 
34  Interview, Andri Hernandi, the Chairman of AKP, Bandung, 15 August 2009. 
35  Idem. 
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Law 1/1974. Aliran Kebatinan adherents, however, could not accept this 
scenario. Their refusal stemmed from their view that their identification 
as Muslim should not necessarily do away with their right to marry 
according to the adat. For many of them, registering themselves as 
Muslim was purely a pragmatic move and politically motivated. The 
regime had forced this action upon them. 
The issue of adat marriages dates back to the 1950s and continued 
to trouble Aliran Kebatinan adherents until 2006 when the relevant laws 
were changed. In 1953 the AKP of West Java requested that the Regent 
of the Priangan allow them to marry not in accordance with Islamic law. 
The Regent, Ipik Gandamana, accepted their request.36 In the New Order 
era (1967-1998), the marriage issue was more complicated because it 
was politicised. AKP followers attempted to address this at all levels 
from the Central Government down to that of the local authorities but 
never met with a satisfactory resolution.37 
 
‘Declaration of Apostasy’, Opposing the Politics on Marriage 
In July 1976, Marpu, AKP’s leader in the Cimanggung highlands in 
Sumedang and his 262 followers declared that they were abandoning 
Islam and thereby rejecting Islamic jurisdiction in matters pertaining to 
their civil rights, such as marriage, burial, and other social and cultural 
affairs. The national weekly, Tempo, reported this development in 
August 1976. Emus, a member of the AKP in Cimanggung, who was also 
a friend of Marpu’s, had a problem in arranging his daughter’s marriage 
and its registration. Neither the Cimanggung Office of Religious Affairs 
(KUA) nor the Sumedang Registry Office was willing to register it. While 
not surprised by the KUA rejection, Emus and Marpu could not accept 
the Registry’s refusal. Emus and Marpu thus consulted Pak Uu, the AKP 
leader of the Sumedang branch. Pak Uu approached the Registry Office. 
Surprisingly, with Pak Uu’s declaration that Emus was not a Muslim, the 
Registry Office permitted the registration of Emus daughter’s marriage 
on condition that Emus himself provided a written declaration that he 
was not a Muslim. 
Marpu, Emus, and their friends interpreted this success as a 
recognition of their identity and the occasion deserved to be celebrated 
                                                          
36  ‘Keluar dari Islam (Lalu masuk lagi)’, Tempo, 4/VI August 1976. 
37  Interview, Marpu, Sumedang, 28 May 2010. 
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by declaring that they were leaving Islam, despite the fact that they had 
never been Muslim.38 This declaration symbolised their having gained 
recognition of their rights to marry and to be registered according to 
existing law.39 It was also an expression of their liberation from Islam, 
which had become a barrier against them exercising their rights. For 
them, this marked the end of the state’s discrimination against them, a 
happy occasion after years of frustration with the state’s reluctance to 
protect their right to observe the adat they believed in and wanted to 
live by. This imprudently dramatic gesture, however, provoked a 
reaction from the Sumedang Court and police and military officers. They 
soon summoned Marpu and his friends and they were forced to revert to 
Islam. As will be discussed and analysed later in this chapter, this issue 
should inspire caution among observers of Islam in this region, 
sweepingly characterising West Java as entirely Islamic. In the following 
discussion we will see the results of my investigation into this case and 
the impact it had on the future development in Cimanggung. 
 
Successful Islamisation under State Sponsorship 
This case as reported by Tempo surprised me and made me curious so 
that I decided to do my own investigation. However, I wondered 
whether Marpu was still alive, and also whether he and his community 
had remained Muslim after their coerced ‘return’ to Islam. I wanted to 
get some idea of the consequences of state-sponsored Islamisation. On 
27 May 2010, I went to Cimanggung, Sumedang, to find Marpu. On my 
arrival I met the village head, Edi Kusnaidi, whom I interviewed. He 
informed me that Marpu was still around. The next day, I tried to find 
him in the Sumedang highlands. On my way to his house I met Dede, the 
head of a sub-village territory, who accompanied me there. On arriving 
at our destination, Dede approached Marpu’s family and told them about 
me and why I had come. While Dede talked with Marpu’s elder son, 
Yana, some villagers eyed me with suspicion. It was a while before I was 
invited to enter Marpu’s house. Dede informed me that “the people here 
still remember and fear a return of the 1976 case, so they are always 
cautious of outsiders like you.”40 
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40  Interview, Dede, Sumedang, 28 May 2010. 
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Decades had passed since Marpu had led the mass ‘apostasy’, so it 
was indeed my good fortune to have been able to meet him. Although he 
was 89 years old and could not hear very well, he still spoke eloquently. 
Marpu recounted that after the declaration, Emus and himself along 
with some other friends were summoned and interrogated at the 
Sumedang Court. The interrogation was led by prosecutor Kuffal who 
was accompanied by police and military personnel. Marpu told me that 
they were asked to ‘return’ to Islam. This request was strange for them 
because they had never been properly Muslim. He could still remember 
how one interrogator tried to persuade and proselytise him. The 
interrogator stated: 
 
Kamu harus kasihan sama saya. Negara kita negara Pancasila. 
Kalau kamu tidak kembali masuk Islam, berarti kamu tidak ber-
Pancasila dan tidak kasihan sama saya!41 (you have to take pity on me. 
Our state is a Pancasila state. If you refuse to return to Islam, that 
would mean that you are not a Pancasilaist [loyal to the Pancasila]; and 
also that you have no pity for me). 
 
It is worth noting how Kuffal equated Islam with Pancasila and 
how he enticed Marpu and friends to convert to Islam so as to be 
categorised as Pancasilaists. The association also connoted that loyalties 
to Aliran Kebatinan and Pancasila are mutually exclusive. In the end, 
Marpu and friends converted to Islam, out of fear of being stigmatised as 
being other than Pancasilaists. Under this pressure, Marpu and his 
friends were ‘forced’ to recite the Islamic profession of the faith 
(shahadat) under Kuffal’s direction which was not without some 
difficulty given the strangeness of the formula to them. Marpu and 
friends had been given a ‘new faith’ by the government to replace the 
one they had had. 
Although they had ’returned’ to Islam, many Muslims remained 
sceptical. Marpu remembered that among them were members of 
PERSIS, the Muslim organisation that enjoyed strong support in West 
Java.42 In response to continuing pressure, Marpu thought that he should 
convince the people that he was intent on becoming a practicing Muslim. 
He realised that this required a mosque, which would boost their 
credibility in the eyes of the Muslims and reduce the likelihood of harm 
                                                          
41  Interview, Marpu, Sumedang, 28 May 2010. 
42  Idem. 
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from the more fanatical amongst them. The fact that they had been 
under public surveillance after their ‘return’ also factored in Marpu’s 
request for the local authority to build a mosque for the former AKP 
followers. The Sumedang administration approved Marpu’s request, 
reflecting the government’s line on religion. By the early 1980s, the 
Sumedang Department of Religious Affairs provided a grant of IDR 
500,000 for the construction of a mosque. With the support of the 
people in the village, Marpu constructed the mosque on his own land 
right behind his house. After its construction was finished, Sumedang’s 
Regent and his subordinates in the civil and military organs came to 
inaugurate the new mosque. Marpu described the inauguration session 
as joyous and the inauguration encouraged the subsequent ‘conversion’ 
of AKP’s followers to Islam, marking the Islamisation of the entire 
village.43 
Since then, the mosque became the centre of Islamisation. It 
functions as a venue for prayer and for other regular religious sessions. 
Over time, the holding of the congregational Friday prayers there 
attracted more and more people. As an important figure, Marpu began to 
change his lifestyle to more reflect his new faith and identity. He 
observed the teachings of the shari’ah, performed daily prayers, fasted 
during Ramadan, celebrated the Idul Fitri and Idul Adha festivals, 
attended tahlilan, and mauludan, and so on. He began to manage his 
mosque and to play an active role in the Mosque Prosperity Council 
(Dewan Kesejahteraan Masjid, DKM) activities in Sumedang. He 
demonstrated his ability in managing mosque affairs, at the same time 
increasing his knowledge about Islam. He studied Islam with Kyai 
Ajengan Abu from Sumedang. After some years he became a khatib 
delivering sermons in his mosque.44 All this is evidence of the existence 
of an intimate connection in the Islamisation project between state 
organs, local officers and Islamic organisations and leaders. 
In the last session of my interview I posed my closing question to 
Marpu who was sitting next to his wife and eldest son. The question 
aimed to determine his level of happiness in Islam. I asked him whether 
he was happier as a Muslim or with Aliran Kebatinan. He said “Well I am 
happy with Islam, but I think being Muslim is like eating a banana with 
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the skin; what you really taste is only its skin, you don’t taste the real 
banana.”45 On 11 August 2010, three months after my interview with 
him, I was informed by Dede that Marpu had died. Marpu’s son, Yana, 
told me that in the last days of his life, Marpu was still obsessed with 
matters of the mosque, advising his son to renovate it.46 
The Islamisation of Cimanggung was a success due to the support 
of Muslim institutions such as pesantren and the MUI. The most 
important figure contributing to dakwah in Cimanggung was Kyai 
Ajengan Abu from Cikalama in Sumedang. Edi Kusnaidi, the current head 
of Cimanggung village, informed me that more than 50 mosques and 
mushalla have been constructed in his territory since the 1980s. Edi 
proudly related that the Village Office involved itself in the promotion of 
Islam in Cimanggung by holding routine travelling propagation tours 
(dakwah keliling).47 The vast majority of Cimanggung’s population of 
10,000 people is Muslim. There are only five people who declare 
themselves as AKP adherents.48 The attempt by local authorities to 
Islamise AKP followers was a manifestation at the grassroots of the 
state’s backing of religion and its suspicion of Aliran Kebatinan. 
Cimanggung is a village in the Cikeruh District, a ten kilometres’ 
drive from Bandung on the Padalarang highway. In geographical terms, 
it is easier to get to Cimanggung from Bandung than from Sumedang. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, before the Padalarang highway was constructed, 
people preferred going to the village via Cicalengka, approximately four 
kilometres up to the hills, rather than via Sumedang.49 Cimanggung itself 
is directly north of Bandung. 
In the west, the AKP gained considerable following in the 
mountainous Lembang area down to Cimahi.50 There are several 
important AKP enclaves to the east of Cimanggung including Ciparay, 
Majalaya, and Cicalengka. Thus, the AKP created a half-ring stronghold 
from Ciparay in the east, through Cimanggung in the north and down to 
Lembang and Cimahi in the west. Bandung has been known as an AKP 
                                                          
45  Idem. 
46  Interview, Yana, Sumedang, 15 October 2010. 
47  Interview, Edi Kusnaidi, Sumedang, 27 May 2010. 
48  Idem. 
49  ‘Keluar dari Islam (Lalu masuk lagi)’, Tempo, 4/VI August 1976. 
50  Interview, Mimin Sukandar, Cimahi, 20 July 2010. 
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base since the 1950s.51 
Ciparay is the most important AKP home ground to date. Its 
significance is attested to by the large Pasewakan building that was 
erected in the early 1980s as a place where AKP activities are planned 
and organised. The Pasewakan also functions as a convention hall, 
hosting art performances and annual festival celebrations. The 
construction of the Pasewakan was initiated by AKP followers. When the 
building was under construction, one government officer offered 
financial assistance to the head of the Construction Committee, Iyus 
Jusuf. Iyus, however, was asked to offer him a bribe so he refused to 
accept the funds on principle.52 The construction of the Pasewakan was 
eventually completed with the sole financial support of AKP followers. 
Because of the unfavourable social-political environment under 
Soeharto’s regime, the AKP kept a low profile. In the early 1980s, there 
were 150,000 AKP members but in the following years their numbers 
had dropped dramatically to 19,406.53 The 1990s saw no improvement 
and the 2000 census saw their number further decreased to 14,535 
across West Java.54 Only a couple of years after Soeharto’s fall, the AKP 
followers tried to reclaim their golden past, attempting a revival in 
various places across West Java including Subang, Sumedang, Ciparay 
and Lembang. This will be discussed later on. 
In addition to the aforementioned causes, it is worth noting that 
some more factors at the national level were essential in providing the 
context for such a change. Hefner’s study of the Islamisation in the 
Pasuruan highlands in East Java55 sheds light to a better understanding 
of this situation. First, there was the shift in the social and cultural bases 
of Soekarno’s political reign in the aftermath of his downfall. Hefner 
observes that Soekarno’s fall caused a dramatic political change that 
created a socio-cultural setting that increasingly shifted away from the 
social and cultural bases of Soekarno’s political reign. Soekarno had 
been supported by the Nationalists and the Communists and he had 
followers primarily among the peasant and lower middle classes, most 
                                                          
51  Interview, Andri Hernandi, Bandung, 15 August 2009. 
52  Interview, Iyus Jusuf, Ciparay, Bandung, 20 July 2010. 
53  Interview, Andri Hernandi, Bandung, 15 August 2009. 
54  Population of Indonesia: Results of the 2000 Population Census, Series: 1.2.2., 
Table 06.1 and 06.8 (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2000), pp. 31 and 38. 
55  Hefner, ‘Islamizing Java?’, pp.553-551. 
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of who hailed from rural Java where religious syncretism was prevalent. 
With the extermination of the PKI and the weakening of the left-wing 
Nationalists, this political base was weakened.  
Second was that the implementation of the floating mass strategy 
by the regime had significantly implicated the dramatic change in the 
rural political setting.56 Hefner observes that Soeharto cleaned up rural 
political activism via his ‘floating mass’ policy, which further eradicated 
the influence of the Communists and the Nationalists across the rural 
areas.57 The ‘floating mass’ strategy, although meant to serve New Order 
politics, in fact favoured Muslim groups. In his conclusion to his study of 
the Islamisation in the highlands of Pasuruan Regency, East Java, Hefner 
observes: 
 
Moreover, in a curious way— and this is an irony that may not be 
apparent to some Indonesian Muslim leaders— New Order restrictions 
on rural political activity may in fact have worked in favour of more 
broadly conceived Muslim interests. With the field cleared of most of 
the Old Order anti-Islamic organisations and with strong government 
pressure on all Indonesians to profess a recognised religion, many 
former opponents to Islamic parties have come to view Islam in less 
politicised terms.58 
 
The view of Islam “in less politicised terms,” corresponded with 
the weakening of Islamic parties, especially in rural areas, along with the 
continuous transformation of Islam on the ground as a religious and 
spiritual entity. Islam actively expressed itself in society through the 
agency of dakwah. It was politically expedient that Soeharto encouraged 
dakwah activities. Modernist elements played a crucial role in boosting 
Islamic dakwah in urban and rural areas. Dakwah was promoted chiefly 
to prevent people from becoming atheists or sympathisers of the 
Marxist ideology. Hence, religious education and the construction of 
houses of worship were promoted by the government’s development 
program. This support for official religion and its institutions weakened 
the Aliran Kebatinan across Java. Hefner notes that: 
 
                                                          
56  The ‘floating mass policy’ prohibited parties to have offices below the 
district administrative level or to campaign or indulge in political activities 
in this level, except during times leading up to elections. 
57  Hefner, ‘Islamizing Java?’, p. 549. 
58  Idem, p. 551. 
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Developments under the New Order appear to have only 
enhanced the overwhelming institutional advantage of the orthodox 
Muslim community. Javanist initiatives aimed at creating a mass-base 
and explicitly non-Islamic “Javanese” religion have all but ceased. 
Despite some regional successes, Hindu and Buddhist organisations 
still claim only a small percentage/proportion/number of Java’s rural 
population.....Meanwhile, the social forces undermining village 
tradition have grown stronger, encouraging villagers, particularly the 
young, to look elsewhere for more encompassing moral guides to 
modernity. The Pasuruan example awaits ethnographic comparison 
with other areas of rural Java. If similar developments are occurring in 
even a few other sectors of the Javanist community, the New Order 
may provide the setting for a profound adjustment in the balance of 
cultural power between Islam and Javanism. Whatever the short-term 
setbacks of Muslim political parties, the social forces unleashed under 
the New Order may contribute to the partial realisation of one of the 
Muslim community’s primary religious goals, the Islamisation of 
Java.59 
 
I believe that Hefner’s observation that the New Order politics on 
religions may have contributed to the partial success of the Islamisation 
of East and Central Java also applies to other part of Java. 
 
Political Change and Christian Revival 
Christian religious leaders in the post-Soeharto era, like leaders of other 
religions, could hardly have foreseen that the State would one day offer 
them again the strong support the New Order had provided rather than 
merely tolerate them.60 As Boland noted, the Soeharto regime had been 
in favour of religions and had realised the importance of religious 
freedom as we have seen above.61 Soeharto, who was a devoted 
subscriber to Javanese values and worldviews, was surprisingly 
accommodating to the religious hopes and ambitions of Dakwahists and 
missionaries alike. Moreover, he invited the leaders of religious 
communities to offer him their ideas with respect to his development 
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60  In what follows the general position of Christianity in Indonesia and West 
Java will alternate because one is incomprehensible to the topic of this book 
without the other. The reader will find in Chapter Six that particular 
attention is paid to the situation in some areas in West Java such as Bekasi. 
61  Boland, The Struggle of Islam, p. 148. 
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agenda especially on issues such as family planning, education, 
economic empowerment, and so on. Soeharto’s politics on religion were 
primarily intended to control society but also provided the harmonious 
setting for people adhering to different faiths. At the initial stage, 
Soeharto’s political recruitment and cultural preference seemed to 
favour Christians and Aliran Kebatinan members over Muslims. 
However, in the following years changing circumstances had forced him 
to make adjustments to prevent an upsurge of Muslim opposition. 
Christians were seen as important allies to the New Order Regime, 
with a number of Christian intellectuals and technocrats serving as 
cabinet ministers and occupying high-ranking posts in Soeharto’s 
cabinet. Examples are General T.B. Simatupang, General M. Panggabean, 
Admiral Sudomo (before his conversion to Islam in 1997), Minister 
Radius Prawiro, Minister B.J. Sumarlin, Indonesian Central Bank 
Governor Adrianus Moy, General T.B. Silalahi, General Benny Moerdani, 
to name but some. As ambassadors to the West they were invaluable to 
Soeharto. This picture could not have been more different from that of 
the Aliran Kebatinan members, who increasingly lost political clout after 
Soekarno’s fall and thus gained nothing whereas Christians celebrated 
the new political context favourable to them and almost immediately 
reaped the benefits of this considerable transformation. 
The Christians enjoyed at least two boons in the wake of 
Soekarno’s departure in the mid-1960s. The first was the surprisingly 
large-scale conversion of abangan Muslims to Christianity. Ricklefs 
argues that one of the most important motives behind this conversion in 
Java was “animosity towards Islam among abangan who had previously 
supported or been sympathetic to PKI,” and that this conversion 
constituted a “major and on-going transformation of Javanese society.”62 
Returning to West Java, there is no reason to assume that the situation 
there would have been dramatically different from that in Java despite 
the fact that abangan do not exist in the area.63 
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63  A more general picture of the situation in Indonesia may be glanced from 
the following. A survey held by a Catholic organisation claims an increase of 
7.45 per cent in the Catholic population in Indonesia in general from 1966 to 
1967.63 The leading Christian figure of the Indonesian Christian Church 
Council (DGI), T.B. Simatupang, reports “an increase of roughly 825,000 in 
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Secondly, the New Order regime’s support to missionary 
organisations from overseas, particularly from the United States and 
Europe, benefited Christians as these organisations did everything in 
their power to help their Christian counterparts in financing church 
programs and in matters like building mission networks, organisations 
and management. With this in mind, Christians benefited from the 
avalanche of foreign aid in the form of financial and human resources 
(missionaries)64 which helped to accelerate the growth of churches and 
other Christian social institutions across the country. Christians 
overseas were excited by this state of affairs, which they called a 
“revival” that was to be sustained.65 As they considered Asian countries 
and Indonesia especially as new promising places for renewed 
missionary activities after the 1960s, they thought that Indonesia might 
want to host the World Council of Churches (WCC) conference in 1975.66 
Simatupang accepted the suggestion to have Jakarta host the conference 
during the WCC executive committee meeting in Sofia in 1971. Although 
President Soeharto and the Chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 
Idham Chalid, largely endorsed his plan, the majority of Muslims, 
particularly the Modernists, were opposed to the initiative.67 
As devoted critics of Christianisation, the Modernists were 
suspicious of Christian activities. In responding to the WCC to plan their 
conference in Jakarta, for example, one leading Modernist, H.M. Rasjidi 
wrote a book entitled Sidang Raya DGD di Jakarta 1975: Artinya bagi 
Dunia Islam (WCC Assembly in Jakarta 1975: Its Implication to the 
Islamic World) and accused the conference of being a forum for the 
planning of the expansion of Western colonialism through Christian 
missionaries and through Christianising the Indonesian people.68 The 
                                                                                                                                        
claims that there was a “considerable growth” in church membership 
outside the DGI.63 One Christian account claims that the conversion to 
Christianity reached two million. See Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents 
in Java, p. 138. 
64  Rifyal Ka’bah, The Christian Presence in Indonesia: View of Christian-Muslim 
Relations (London: The Islamic Foundation, 1995), pp. 47-52. 
65  Avery T. Willis, Jr. Indonesian Revival: Why Two Million Came to Christ 
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66  Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened, pp. 63-64. 
67  Idem, p. 63. 
68  Aritonang, Sejarah Perjumpaan Islam, p. 415. See also, H.M. Rasjidi, Sidang 




Soeharto regime did not want to risk an outbreak of social and political 
instability and therefore in response to the Modernists’ latent fear it 
took the pragmatic option to call off the WWC conference in Jakarta. The 
conference was held in Nairobi instead. 
A series of disagreements, tension and conflicts in the preceding 
years between Muslim and Christian leaders all over the country 
including West Java over many religious issues such as a propagation 
code, foreign aid, and the construction of houses of worship, illustrate 
the continuous distrust between Muslims, Modernists especially, and 
Christians.69 Under this distrustful relationship, Muslims and Christians 
fiercely competed to secure their interests in order to prevail as will be 
illustrated in West Java with the Pentecostal experiences. I chose the 
Pentecostal church because they have been subjected to violent attacks 
by radical Islamists because of their spectacular growth in the area. 
 
The Revival of the Pentecostals in West Java 
The conversion of significant numbers of lay Muslims and the revival of 
Christianity produced a kind of excitement for the leaders of and people 
active in different Christian denominations, who had been operating in 
the country for decades, including those of the Pentecostal churches. 
Like many members and organisations of other churches, the 
Pentecostals used the remarkable change in religious politics to 
strengthen their presence in terms of intense member recruitment and 
the building of places of worship. After some years this effort provided 
the setting for the upsurge of Pentecostalism across the country, 
particularly across West Java.70 
A brief history of the Pentecostal church in Indonesia in general 
provides the following picture. In the second half of the nineteenth 
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century, Indonesian Pentecostalism was rooted in the Holiness 
movement of the Methodist Church in America. This movement insisted 
on a return to old Methodist religious traditions as prevalent during the 
time of John Wesley (1703-91) which stressed modesty and passion in 
worship and service.71 This movement aimed at a revival of Christians’ 
spiritual life and a return to a free worship style that celebrates 
sensation and unrestrained emotion.72 To this end, the leading figure of 
the Pentecostal Church, CH. F. Parham established a Holiness Movement 
independent from the Methodist Church. It was in 1900 that Parham 
began to promote Pentecostalism with its three major tenets, namely, an 
emphasis on eschatology, baptism by the Holy Spirit, and ‘speaking in 
tongues’ as proof of one’s having been baptised by the Holy Spirit.73 
As Aritonang and Steenbrink observed, Pentecostalism sprouted 
from Bali to East, Central and West Java and continued to expand across 
other islands. From its inception in the early twentieth century, the 
Pentecostal mission was centred in Surabaya, Cepu, Temanggung and 
Bandung.74 From Bandung, the evangelicals propagated their mission 
and erected churches in Cimahi, Jakarta, Bogor, Sukabumi, Cirebon and 
Depok, all in West Java.75 
Missionaries from the Netherlands had attempted to spread 
Pentecostalism across the Netherlands East Indies since 1911. Gerrit L. 
Polman was one of the early leaders of Dutch Pentecostalism. He liked to 
send the Dutch Pentecostal bulletin, Spade Regen, to the Netherlands 
East Indies, which later influenced the Dutch in Temanggung, Central 
Java.76 As a result, various Dutch Christians including Horstman, Weirs 
and Van Abode, began to conduct Pentecostal prayer services in 1911. 
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From September 1920 to 1923, after the arrival of the first generation of 
Dutch Pentecostal missionaries in West Java, the Pentecostal mission 
was to see the arrival of more missionaries. Among them missionaries 
were Willem Bernard Blekkink and his wife Marie (Polman’s sister) and 
Mina Hansen, all of whom settled and worked with Horstman in 
Temanggung, and Johann Thiessen, who settled in Bandung.77 
In the following years the mission flourished further as many 
Indonesians converted to Pentecostalism. 1923 saw a Vereeniging De 
Pinkstergemeente in Nederlandsch-Indië (Pentecostal Organisation in the 
Netherlands East Indies) established in Cepu and officially recognised by 
the Dutch as a kerkgenootschap (church body) through Besluit No. 33, 
Staatsblad no. 364. This development was due to Weenink van Loon’s 
efforts in concert with other leaders. Most of the converts from 1920 to 
1941 were non-Christians, mainly Chinese Buddhists-Confucianists, 
Indo-Europeans or of ethnic Javanese religious backgrounds, as well as 
Protestants and Catholics of Dutch origin.78 
 
Considerable Pentecostal Growth in West Java 
The Pentecostal church enjoyed considerable growth after Indonesia’s 
Independence and continued to thrive from the 1970s to 1990s under 
the leadership of the prominent and leading Evangelist, Ho Lukas 
Senduk, popularly known as Oom Ho. Barbara Watson Andaya reports 
that Senduk was born as Ho Liong Seng in Ternate in 1917 to a middle-
class Indonesian-Chinese family. His father was a wealthy Singaporean 
and his mother was an Indonesian of Chinese descent said to have ties to 
Ternate’s ruling family.79 For a period of time they lived in Ternate 
before moving to Manado, where later he led the Chinese community. 
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Senduk studied at a Dutch school in Manado and worked for a Dutch oil 
company in Ambon, the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij (BPM), 
where he joined the Pentecostal church (De Pinkstergemeente in 
Nederlandsch-Indië) in 1935. During the Japanese Occupation, the 
Pentecostal Church changed its name to the Pentecostal Church in 
Indonesia (Gereja-gereja Pentakosta di Indonesia, GPdI), where Senduk 
was appointed secretary of the Central Board. During 1945-1946 
Senduk served a Pentecostal denomination in West Java in 
Tasikmalaya.80 
In the mid-1960s, Indonesia went through a period of political 
turmoil following the failed coup attempt in 1965, which caused a 
remarkable change in Indonesian politics and society. Senduk used the 
changing political context to strengthen the Pentecostal mission. In 
1967, he established cooperation with one of the world’s best-known 
Pentecostal Churches, the Church of God (CoG), based in the U.S. In the 
following years, the Church of God helped with the promotion of 
education and the missionary activities of Senduk’s Indonesian Bethel 
Church (Gereja Bethel Indonesia, GBI), established in Sukabumi West 
Java in 1970. The major concern of this cooperation was the provision of 
teacher training programs aimed at providing teachers for elementary 
schools and for the Bethel Academy of Theology (Akademi Theologia 
Bethel, ATB).81 This program continued to expand throughout the 1970s 
and flourished during the 1980s-1990s with the opening of the Faculty 
of Missiology. In cooperation with the Church of God in Cleveland, 
Tennessee, the faculty offered post-graduate studies and offered 
programs for certificates of Master of Arts in Church Ministry (MACM), 
Master of Divinity (M.Div) and Master of Theology (M.Th).82 GBI is 
perhaps one of the most successful Pentecostal denominations and it 
has become the largest Pentecostal community in Indonesia with 2.5 
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million members and 5,200 congregations.83 Senduk died in 2008 
leaving the ambition to build 10,000 Bethel churches across Indonesia 
for the next generation.84 
The Pentecostal growth demonstrates the recurring pattern of 
new churches brought into existence by virtue of fragmentation. 
Aritonang and Steenbrink observed that one of the major characteristics 
of the Pentecostals was their propensity for engaging in schisms.85 One 
group that was born out of Pentecostalism was the Charismatic Church 
whose followers reject associations with any particular denomination. It 
emerged in the second half of the 1960s and became popular in the 
1980s.86 Its popularity was the result of its capacity in meeting 
Christians’ need for a new spirituality, certainty and security caused by 
the failure of the established churches in fulfilling such needs.87 Wiyono 
observes: “When Charismatic conventions offered ‘casual’ and 
‘therapeutic’ services, warm fellowship, plus comfortable environments 
(held mostly in ballrooms of expensive hotels), many churchgoers, 
primarily those from the middle class, intellectual society and 
mainstream churches, came and joined them.”88 
One important leader of the Pentecostal-Charismatic movement in 
the 1970s and 1980s was Jeremia Rim who was a Javanese from Madiun 
and who steered the movement from Surabaya. His ability and 
popularity saw him receive frequent invitations to visit the U.S. where 
he met prominent Charismatic leader, Moris Cerurou, who blessed 
him.89 He also received numerous invitations to lead prayers from 
Charismatic congregations across Java, Jakarta and West Java. His 
movement reached its peak in the mid-1980s. In 1985, he organised a 
massive congregation and healing session called Kasih Melanda Jakarta 
(Love Sweeps over Jakarta) in the Senayan Sports Centre. This 
successful service attracted tens of thousands of people and inspired 
Jeremia to hold another session in the following year called Kasih 
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Melanda Indonesia (Love Sweeps over Indonesia).90 The Charismatic 
boom during the 1980s encouraged the establishment of bukit-bukit doa, 
prayer sites located on hills across Java, but also in Jakarta and Bogor. 
Encouraged by the successful congregation in Jakarta, Jeremia 
established a New Covenant Christian Church in West Java in Bandung 
with the help of his supporter Bambang Wijaya whom he trusted and 
who later became his successor after his death in December 1993. 
Currently, Bambang is the chairman of Jaringan Persekutuan Doa 
(Prayer Alliance Network) throughout the Asia Pacific.91 
The Pentecostal-Charismatic movement gained ground in various 
parts of West Java. In 1978, Nani Susanti, a businesswoman well-
respected by Cirebon’s Chinese business community, established the 
Ecclesia Foundation in Cirebon to promote Pentecostal-Charismaticism 
in the city. The foundation invited prominent Charismatic leaders from 
other parts of West Java and from abroad to lead the congregations. The 
foundation held regular prayer congregations and organised social 
services.92 This movement inspired the presence of the Charismatic 
movement in other places including Bekasi and Karawang in the West 
Javanese surroundings east of Jakarta in the following years. As will be 
discussed below, in November 1999 a foundation named Mahanaim was 
founded in Bekasi with the task to reach out to thousands of 
underprivileged children and adults.93 The foundation claims to “help 
the future of Indonesia’s young generation and to equip them to become 
future world leaders able to meet any challenges in life.”94 The 
foundation sought to solve the problem of poverty and to improve the 
education of the needy to prevent them from “turning into a generation 
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without hope trapped in the never-ending cycle of poverty.”95 Since then 
until the Reform Era, the upsurge of Pentecostalism was apparent across 
West Java and showed a new strength in terms of church attendance, 
church numbers and organised social services, which created tensions 
between the church and Muslim hard liners.96 
 
Muslims’ Search for Mission Restriction 
Of course the Modernists all over Indonesia were very unhappy with the 
Pentacostal success and with Christianisation in general and therefore 
they initiated a counter-Christianisation discourse and took anti-
Christianisation action, also in West Java. However, they lacked 
confidence in competing with their Christian counterparts and looked 
for protection from the State. Modernist leaders did everything in their 
power to mitigate the Christian mission’s dominance by demanding 
stringent regulations on missionary funding. In a 1967 parliamentary 
question session, for example, Lukman Harun, a Muhammadiyah leader, 
demanded that the government regulate and control the inflow of 
foreign aid into non-Muslim religious organisations.97 
All steps undertaken by the Modernists sought to secure the 
Muslims from being targeted by missionaries. In a panel on Inter-
religious Consultation held in November 1967, Mohammad Natsir 
strongly appealed to the Christian elites not to make efforts to convert 
believers in other faiths, including Muslims. He argued: 
 
……what we really hope from you, our Christian brothers, is that 
you should witness and acknowledge that we are Muslims. Please 
understand that we are not heathens or animists. We all have 
embraced a religion, namely Islam. We all have shibghah (faith), with 
our own identity. So please do not go against our identity. Please do not 
make us a target for Christianisation (leading to apostasy).98 
 
Natsir’s appeal represented Muslim hopes in relation to religious 
propagation. The idea was that missionaries regardless of their religion 
should not try to proselytise believers in other faiths, that is, people who 
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have already embraced a recognised religion. Muslims sought consensus 
with their Christian counterparts on this point but they failed despite 
the government decrees’ favouring their interest.99 Christians 
considered this as running against their religious principles and 
therefore rejected the proposal. Christians instead argued for more 
freedom, particularly in the construction of houses of worship. The New 
Order’s voice was careful but clear. In his opening address of the Inter-
religious Consultation in 1967, President Soeharto said: 
 
The government wants to assert and guarantee that it will not 
hamper any efforts of religious propagation. It is the sublime task for a 
religion to ensure that those who do not embrace a religion in 
Indonesia become devoted believers. By doing so the Belief in One God 
adopted by the Pancasila has been adopted. It is, however, the 
government’s concern, if religious propagation is simply done for the 
sake of increasing the number of followers, let alone that the 
propagation method used would create the impression that it aimed to 
attract those who already have embraced a religion.100 
 
Soeharto’s stance soon materialised in a concrete public policy. On 
13 September 1969, Minister of Home Affairs, Amir Machmud, and 
Minister of Religious Affairs, Mohammad Dachlan, issued joint decree 
number 1/1969, regulating religious propagation and the construction 
of houses of worship. In principle, the decree accommodated both sides. 
It guaranteed the freedom to proselytise and worship for all believers 
but made this conditional on the maintenance of security and social 
order as reflected in article one. 101 Article two of the decree charged the 
Kepala Daerah (local authority) at the district and provincial levels with 
the responsibility of keeping an eye on religious propagation so as to: 
(a) prevent it from causing division or polarisation among people of 
different faiths; (b) keep it free of intimidation, deception, and coercion; 
(c) ensure its keeping within the law, security and social order. 
Point (c) is more or less a repetition of the first article, which 
betrays the nature of the decree as being in reality more of an 
instrument towards maintaining social order rather than a guarantee for 
the freedom of religion. Consistent with the New Order strategy, the 
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decree seemed to favour Muslim interests more than those of Christians. 
The Indonesian Church Council (Dewan Gereja-gereja Indonesia, DGI) 
and the Supreme Council of Indonesian Bishops (Majelis Agung 
Waligereja Indonesia, MAWI) objected to the absence of detailed 
guidelines on the construction of churches and voiced their concerns 
over the possibility of government officials facing a conflict of interests 
because of their own religious affiliation.102 
The Christian desire to liberalise regulations on proselytisation 
and Muslim anxieties concerning the potential consequence of 
liberalisation kept both communities locked in competition, which 
eroded their relationship. Since the advent of the New Order, relations 
between the two Abrahamic religions have been largely characterised 
by latent misunderstanding, competitive tension and hostility. Muslims 
were suspicious of Christianisation and similarly, the Christians were 
unhappy with the deepening Islamisation as promoted by Dakwahists. 
Their relationship remains delicate to date, despite each community 
claiming to have received their religion from the same God, Allah. 
Muslim suspicion of their Christian counterparts was rooted in the 
colonial era. During that time, the Modernists were ardent critics of the 
Dutch whom they accused of taking a biased position toward Islam. In 
the 1930s-1940s in PERSIS’ central office in Bandung, West Java, M. 
Natsir devoted himself to monitoring of and reacting to affronts against 
Islam commonly committed by Christian missionaries. PERSIS’ popular 
magazine, Pembela Islam, was used very well to voice and to 
communicate displeasure at the ‘blasphemy’ frequently perpetrated 
during that time.103 
Colonial precedents fed a post-colonial fear of Christianity. This 
fear manifested itself in Muslim suspicion of the New Order State, which 
they saw as favouring Christians. Many could not accept the significant 
representation of the Christians in the higher bureaucracy and the army, 
especially in the earlier half of the regime. This state of affairs created 
prejudice among Muslims. Probably due to this prejudice, Muslim 
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activists were tempted to link any state policy and intimidation against 
them to a State-Christian conspiracy. As a result, these activists 
expressed themselves as a strong political protest movement. They were 
very influential at the grassroots where they had a large following.  
In many respects, most Dakwahists felt inferior to their 
counterparts, given the Christian superiority in terms of financial, 
educational and institutional resources. Rifyal Ka’bah, a Modernist 
activist in the 1970s, reported on the huge financial aid obtained by 
Indonesian churches from 1967-1976, most of which was used to fund 
personnel and to promote service and development projects.104 As 
Mujiburrahman has noted, American Christians paid considerable 
attention to the situation in Indonesia and provided huge grants to 
support the Christian mission.105 M. Natsir once analogised the 
superiority of the Christian mission over Islamic dakwah by saying: 
“How could a cart win a race against an express train?”106 
Mujiburrahman observes: 
 
For the development programmes in 1973 – again with reference 
to Sinar Harapan, 25 May 1973 – Natsir said that the International 
Christian Aid had provided $150,000 and the WCC gave $200,000. 
Natsir argued that it would be very naïve not to think of the 
development programmes as a means to convert people. After the 
Inter-religious Consultation in 1967, he said, there had been a ‘free 
fight for all’ and ‘survival of the fittest’ in the field of religious 
propagation in Indonesia. In this regard, how could Muslims compete 
with the Christians, “how could a cart compete with an express train?” 
he said. 
 
Muslims observed Christian empowerment with unease. The 
Modernists were especially disappointed and frustrated in their 
expectations of playing a greater role in development and politics.107 
Boland recalls a tashakkuran (thanksgiving) day held by Modernists on 
14 August 1966 around the Kebayoran Baru Al-Azhar Mosque. The 
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gathering was attended by an enthusiastic crowd of about 50,000. It 
seems that their gratitude also resulted from the release from prison of 
various Masyumi leaders including HAMKA, Isa Anshary and 
Burhanuddin Harahap. Other Masyumi leaders were also present among 
the crowd including Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Asaat, Prawoto 
Mangkusasmito, Mohamad Roem, Kasman Singadimejo and M. Natsir. 
Boland relates that the leaders went on stage to present their concerns. 
A near-unanimous concern was the “rehabilitation of Islam.”108 Prawoto 
demanded ‘rehabilitasi multikompleks’, something of a total 
rehabilitation that included the Masyumi’s restoration. This demand, 
however, was not met and, likewise after September 1965, 
developments in general “held disappointment for the Islamic 
community.” 109 
Ricklefs captures the psychological state of Muslims at the time 
well in the following quote:  
 
The religious environment was made more volatile by the 
changing perception of the senior generation of Modernist Islamic 
leaders. They had lost some of the self-confidence of the early years of 
the twentieth century. Rather than awaiting others’ recognition of 
what they regarded as their natural right to lead the nation, they 
became bitterly accustomed to the role of political outsiders. They 
now saw leadership as something to be won rather than assumed. 
Their belief that anyone who was shown the true Islam would 
naturally embrace it had meanwhile been shaken by the limited (albeit 
very significant) progress of the Modernist interpretation of Islam and 
the hostile reaction it sometimes produced.110 
 
The Modernist perception of having lost out under the new 
arrangement forced them to re-shape their future trajectory. They 
reformed their strategy to “bring their religious ideals into engagement 
with the rapid social transformations of the period and the new course 
of national development” through promoting dakwah activities in the 
country.111 Another major drive that forced Muslims to re-shape their 
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future trajectory was that they were convinced that the New Order was 
replicating the colonial policy on Islam. The ban on wearing the jilbab 
for Muslim female students at state schools, for example, was seen as a 
reflection of a secular policy, demonstrating the New Order’s 
commitment to keep Islam in the private sphere in order to prevent it 
from becoming dominant in the public sphere. Such policy was aimed at 
containing and mitigating the potential influence of the imported 
ideology of radical Islamism.112 
The overall political atmosphere during the 1970s was deeply 
influenced by the New Order’s continuous attempt to portray radical 
Islam as the nation’s enemy. From 1976 up to 1988, the regime, as 
pointed out by Ricklefs, was ‘less inclined’ to “identify Communism as 
the greatest threat to the nation’s security but rather spoke of ‘imported 
ideology’, by which radical Islam was meant.”113 Given this scenario, the 
early 1970s saw the regime turn to reactivate the Darul Islam (DI) 
movement since it was strategically expedient to conjure up a radical 
political other, in opposition to which Indonesians would identify with 
the regime. In fact, this threat was also created to deny momentum to 
the only Muslim party, the ascendant United Development Party (PPP), 
in the build-up to the 1977 elections.114 However, the regime’s serious 
miscalculation became evident from the PPP’s garnering a significant 
29.3 per cent of the votes in the elections, the biggest share it achieved 
throughout the New Order.115 This intelligence game had involved 
General Ali Moertopo as general in charge, BAKIN the intelligence 
agency as operator, and former Darul Islam fighters, who had been 
incorporated into the Indonesian Army, as mediators.116 The ICG 
presented the scenario as follows: 
 
The argument provided by BAKIN was that, with the fall of South 
Vietnam in 1975, Indonesia was in danger of Communist infiltration 
across the Indonesian-Malaysian border in Borneo, and that only the 
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reactivation of Darul Islam could protect Indonesia. Whether through 
coercion or money or a combination of both, a number of DI leaders 
rose to the bait, and by mid-1977, the government had arrested 185 
people whom they accused of belonging to a hitherto unknown 
organisation called Komando Jihad, committed to following the ideas 
of Kartosuwirjo and establishing the Islamic state of Indonesia (NII). In 
reality, the Komando Jihad was Ali Moertopo’s creation.117 
 
As a consequence, mutual mistrust between the regime and the 
Muslims kept relations tense. With Ali Moertopo masterminding policy, 
Muslims kept protesting state policies against them while 
simultaneously working at the grassroots to counter the Christian 
mission. 
The culmination of this mistrust of the New Order regime was the 
Muslim protests against Soeharto’s campaign to impose Pancasila as the 
sole ideology of the state and of all mass organisations. It seems that 
through the Pancasila Soeharto wanted to pre-empt Modernist attempts 
at formulating Islam as an ideology and to thwart their ambition of 
making Indonesia an Islamic state. On 16 August 1982, Soeharto posited 
the Pancasila as asas tunggal (the sole foundation) in his annual address 
to the People’s Representative Assembly (DPR), urging all social and 
political forces to consider adopting the Pancasila as their only 
ideological basis.118 This irked some radical Muslim activists, who then 
agitated against its acceptance during Friday prayers or other religious 
occasions. 
The Tanjung Priok tragedy in 1984 that claimed tens of Muslim 
lives in the impoverished North Jakarta neighbourhood perhaps best 
exemplifies how these factors played out. In the tragedy’s aftermath, 
Muslim activists accused General Benny Moerdani, a national Army 
Commander, who was a Catholic, of targeting Muslim activists. The state 
was perceived as an agent of Christian interests only because its 
representative, who happened to be Christian, was responsible for a 
particular policy and specific action. This kind of logic fed identity 
politics which contributed to sustaining a mutual negativity between 
Christians and Muslims. 
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While Modernist protests continued, the Traditionalists also 
responded. In 1984, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) declared its return to its 
initial guidelines (khittah) in its congress in Situbondo,119 meaning that 
it thereby withdrew from the PPP and that NU members were no longer 
expected to support the PPP. The NU elite granted their followers the 
freedom to support whatever party they liked.120 
The regime’s desire to depoliticise Islam culminated in 1985 with 
law number 3/1985, obliging all socio-religious and student 
organisations to adopt the Pancasila as their sole ideology.121 
Paradoxically, Islam gained greatest influence at a time when its political 
significance appeared to have dwindled under Soeharto’s New Order. It 
is undeniable that this regime succeeded in weakening Muslim political 
parties, but it failed to moderate growing devotion among Muslims and 
the increased presence of Islamic symbols in public life, both of which 
factored in the rise of what Hefner called ”civil Islam” that marked a 
deepening process of Islamisation.122 
 
Engaging Dakwahism, Engaging Politics 
Two major orientations surfaced as Islamist/Muslim politics failed. The 
first was Dakwahism and the second was the renewal of Islamic thought. 
By seeking to promote adherence to Islamic norms and values through 
dakwah, the Modernists tactically circumvented engagement in 
mainstream politics while planting the seeds for their future 
constituency. It is reminiscent of Natsir’s popular statement: “Before we 
promote da’wah through politics, we engage in politics through 
da’wah.”123 In order to realise this idea, in May 1967, the Modernists 
founded the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) or Indonesian 
Islamic Propagation Council, with Natsir as its chairman, to implement a 
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Given that Soeharto’s interest to contain communist ideology 
required him to encourage dakwah and missions in both urban and rural 
areas, the Department of Religious Affairs was assigned to oversee 
religious instruction in state schools, designing a curriculum, manuals 
and textbooks. To sustain the initiative, the Department organised the 
training of the religious teachers it appointed. The government made 
religious instruction compulsory, stipulating two hours per week for all 
state primary schools beginning at form four, continued at secondary 
schools and for two years at the universities.124 
At the same time, the government promoted religious education 
and supported the construction of Islamic schools (madrasah) at all 
levels. In the following years, Soeharto sponsored the establishment of 
the Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila (Pancasila Muslim Good Deeds 
Foundation) that helped the construction of mosques all across the 
country. A huge budget was also allocated through the Department of 
Religious Affairs to boost Muslim devotion through social development 
programs. In the late 1960s Soeharto approved the establishment of the 
National Alms Collection Body (Badan Amil Zakat Nasional, BAZNAS) to 
help needy Muslims and he declared himself an ‘amil’.125 The 1970s and 
1980s saw the increasing presence of Islamic institutions in urban and 
especially rural areas. It was a gradual but consistent development that 
energised dakwah activities. This in part contributed to the decline of 
the Aliran Kebatinan across Java although its practices could still be 
observed in certain rural areas. By contrast, the Christian mission 
upsurged everywhere which in turn created anti Christian sentiments as 
said above. 
Initially, such negative sentiments were latent, particularly among 
the Modernists from PERSIS, the Muhammadiyah and DDII but they 
became increasingly real especially after the massive conversion to 
Christianity across Java in the aftermath of Soekarno’s downfall.126 In 
West Java these negative sentiments became a matter of serious concern 
especially after the unprecendented conversion of ADS members in 
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Kuningan to Catholicism in 1964.127 Over time this facilitated the 
permeation of Catholic influence in various villages in West Java, such as 
Cisantana in Cigugur, Ciawi in Tasikmalaya, Pasir in Garut and 
Manggahang near Bandung as we have seen in the Chapter Two.128  
Under these circumstances, Muslims felt they were under 
pressure in such a way that they even believing unverivied reports, 
rumours and leaflets causing even more unrest. In 1970, for instance, 
DDII functionaries were alarmed by a leaflet that went around and 
which stated that Central Java would have been Chritianised after 10 
years.129 Muslim leaders, including Natsir were worried about this 
development in Christianisation efforts and the unrest it brought and as 
a result their reaction was that they would not allow the region to be 
Christianised any further.130  
Kahin is critical about Natsir’s position towards Christianisation, 
as she considers it not in line with his support for democracy and his 
admiration of Western culture.131 Kahin said: 
 
Natsir’s struggles in trying to work out the relationship between 
Islam and democracy and between Islam and nationalism are in line 
with his ambivalence regarding the influence of Western powers and 
Western thought. As with many of reformist Muslim thinkers who 
influenced him, and especially Haji Agus Salim who had worked so 
closely with leading members of the Dutch colonial administration, 
Natsir was torn between an admiration and embrace of the “positive 
sides of Western culture” and a strong opposition to Western 
imperialism and what he saw in the Netherlands East Indies as its 
effort to Christianize the people it governed.132 
It seemed a paradox that while Natsir admired Western culture 
his outlook towards Christianity was unfavourable. He never objected to 
non-Muslims assuming high positions as cabinet ministers even if he 
believed that the Indonesian President should be a Muslim.133 It seems 
possible that this paradox was the result of his involvement in the 
Islamic mission organisation called the Muslim World League of which 
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he was appointed vice Pesident in 1969.134 
Since 1980, Natsir focused on Dakwahism especially after his 
relationship with the Soeharto regime had increasingly become worse 
because of his association with the opposition group Petisi 50. He was 
banned from making trips overseas. Because of this, he turned his 
dakwah attention inwards and he made Bandung one of his homebases 
for his dakwah activities alongside Jakarta. He capitalised on his 
relationship with Saudi and other Middle Eastern countries to get 
financial aid. From Bandung he continued his strategy to place the 
Dakwahism on the shoulders of young Muslims who studied at tertiary 
educational instutions in Bandung, Bogor, Jakarta and elsewhere in part 
through Bina Masjid Kampus as will be discussed in the next chapter.135 
 
Dakwahism and Secularism 
As stated above, the two major orientations of the Muslim community in 
responding to their political circumstances, especially among 
Modernists, was to promote Dakwahism and to renew Islamic thought. 
While Dakwahism was promoted by senior Modernist leaders, in the 
early 1970s, young Modernist intellectuals led by Nurcholish Madjid 
(1939-2005) began to turn away from their seniors. Madjid’s bold call to 
reform Islamic thought clearly contradicted the struggle of Natsir and 
his supporters to re-create a Muslim ummat and an Islamic state in 
which the shari’ah would be enforced. With his popular slogan ‘Islam 
Yes, Partai Islam No’, Nurcholish set the rationale for his reform and his 
quest for the relevance of Islam and the political discourse of modernity, 
strictly emphasising the unity of God and promoting liberal and 
progressive ideas.136 Nurcholish deliberately challenged his fellow 
Modernists’ obsession with an Islamic state and tried to delegitimise 
their claims to an ‘Islamic’ politics while questioning their ability to 
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properly address the challenges Muslims faced.137 The reform 
challenged DDII’s politicisation of Islam, known initially as political 
Islam and subsequently as Islamism. 
Nurcholish’s reforms tended to be less critical of NU Traditionalist 
Muslims. The senior generation of Modernists, who were very much 
anti-Traditionalist, were thus faced with challenges posed by their own 
younger generation as personified by Nurcholish, but also by the state 
and by thriving Christianity. This partly explains why these Modernists 
sought support from, and alliance with, Muslim forces overseas, 
especially from Saudi Arabia. This effort brought financial aid, but also 
the transmission of an “Arab-Islamic” political and religious discourse,138 
reflecting the failure of the senior Modernists to independently produce 
a discourse on Islam and politics relevant to the context of modern 
Indonesia’s pluralistic society. 
Since Independence, Modernist exertions towards gaining political 
prominence, whether through Dakwahism or the renewal of Islamic 
thought, have only met with frustration. They had first hoped that they 
were in a position to win the nation’s leadership, but this did not 
eventuate. They also attended the Konstituante sessions (1955-57) with 
the genuine expectation that they could defeat their Nationalist and 
Communist rivals, however this was unsuccessful. Soon after the 
destruction of the Old Order and the PKI at the hands of Soeharto’s 
military forces and supporting Islamic organisations in October 1965, 
Modernists thought that their time had finally come. Once again, there 
was only more frustration. Although Modernist Muslims supported the 
New Order’s rise to power, after only a few years they found themselves 
marginalised by the elites of the same New Order, which 
overwhelmingly consisted of military personnel and of only small 
groups of civilians. 
The Dakwahists feared that Christianity’s growing influence might 
herald a deepening process of Westernisation and by implication of 
Secularisation and hence they actively tried to defeat Christianity. This 
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explains why, in the early 1970s, Nurcholish Madjid’s renewal 
movement was challenged when he opined the need to reform Islamic 
thought through recourse to concepts enunciated from Western ideas 
and notions, such as secularisation, liberalism, de-sacralisation, et 
cetera.139 Madjid points out that: 
 
The term secularisation actually means all forms of liberating 
development which function to liberate the ummat from their own 
historical process of growth which is no longer capable of 
distinguishing which values are Islamic and transcendental from those 
that are non-Islamic. 
 
Because of his ‘secularisation’ ideas, Nurcholish, who was 
previously considered Natsir’s potential successor and therefore known 
as ‘Natsir muda’ (Natsir junior) disappointed his seniors and added to 
their frustrations. DDII members understood that, if not downright 
against them, Nurcholish’s movement in any event did not support their 
interests. Against this backdrop, the DDII began to develop a connection 
with campus dakwah activists in order to provide a shelter for devout 
Muslim students at secular universities against the dangerous influence 
of Nurcholish’s reform movement and the threat of secularisation which 
in essence it considered part and parcel of Westernisation and 
Christianisation.140 This connection can be traced to Muslim activist 
training sessions Natsir and his colleagues organised in the Indonesian 
Hajj Committee (Panitia Haji Indonesia, PHI) in Kwitang, Jakarta in 1968, 
and subsequently in Pesantren Darul Falah in Bogor, West Java.141  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter relates the social transformation born out of the intricate 
dialectics of New Order politics, religious development and social 
change, which resulted in the rise of religions as identities and 
significant social forces, on the one hand, and in the decline of local 
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syncretic creeds such as Aliran Kebatinan, on the other. Soeharto’s 
promotion of ‘religious freedom’ for official religions, with restriction, 
favoured Islam, Christianity and other faiths weakening local syncretic 
currents. While it is unclear exactly what kind of relation between 
religion and politics Soeharto approved of, it was obvious that he 
wanted a separation between religion and ideology. He, therefore, 
crushed any initiatives that might lead to the ‘ideologisation’ of religion. 
These politics transformed religious ideology to mere 
dakwah/missionary activities. 
Under this shifting context, the significance of the official religions 
had considerably increased, producing Dakwahism and mission 
activities. The immediate implication of this situation was that Islam and 
Christianity, in particular, increasingly became important as aspects of 
social identity. The dynamics of religious life at the grassroots, which 
promoted Islamisation and Christianisation, depended on how religious 
leaders responded to various social factors (e.g., migration, education, 
economic situation, institutions, et cetera). The process of Islamisation 
(and Christianisation) was very much related to the regime’s search for 
strategic allies in order to neutralise the influence of Communism and in 
order to impose its hegemonic control over society. Against this motive, 
the promotion of religion was not built on a solid vision of religious 
freedom and tolerance. The Christian leaders sought a liberal policy in 
spreading religions whereas Muslims, on the contrary, demanded 
restrictions. Meanwhile, the regime saw order and stability as its 
priority and warned all parties in society not to violate this (despite its 
support of religious mission). The absence of a solid vision of religious 
freedom and tolerance sparked tension between communities of 
different religions, especially between Muslims and Christians. 
Soeharto’s increased interest in Islam also contributed to 
Islamisation and social change in Indonesia. As a Javanese, Soeharto 
actually was personally inclined towards Aliran Kebatinan. However, he 
did not sustain this devotion for a mix of political, social and religious 
reasons. Meanwhile, in the end, his own spiritual needs compelled him 
to seek a form of personal piety.142 This quest saw Soeharto develop 
greater interest in learning about Islam since the early 1980s although 
he did not completely abandon his devotion to ‘mystical power’ or Aliran 
                                                          




Seeing Christianity as their greatest opponent, the Modernist 
leaders sought for a gigantic leap in organising and leading the dakwah 
agenda. They realised that they would not be able to win the religious 
race with the Christians unless they were equipped with qualified 
human capital and the proper resources in order to promote the birth of 
dakwah activists from among intellectual circles (the middle class). 
Therefore, Natsir turned his eyes to campuses and began to cultivate his 
mission on these secular training centres. After some years, this strategy 
proved fruitful, as will be discussed in the following chapter. 
This rather long discussion of the situation in Indonesia in general 
is necessary to provide the background for what was about to transpire 
in West Java. Many new developments were initiated in this context of 
which the Salman dakwah movement on the ITB campus in Bandung in 
West Java was one of the most important as will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter Four. We will see there that the nation’s general attitudes 
towards religion in the entire country caused a movement that was 



















                                                          


















THE EMERGENCE OF MUSLIM STUDENTS AS DAKWAH 




In the preceding Chapter we have discussed case studies of Islamisation 
in the rural areas of Subang and Sumedang which were in part the 
result of the Soeharto regime’s policies on religion, which provided the 
setting for this kind of social change. This chapter discusses the 
Islamisation at the Bandung Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi 
Bandung, ITB) where practicing Muslim students played a prominent 
role. Through the promotion of dakwah, they tirelessly sought to turn 
Islam into their moral foundation, to adopt it as their identity in their 
personal and social life and to entice other ITB students to observe 
Islam as their cultural reference.1 They used this prominent state 
campus as their new centre for the promotion of a variety of Islamic 
discourses and activities. This initiative knitted Muslim students from 
various backgrounds into solid dakwah networks, which inspired the 
flourishing of Dakwahism at the ITB and promoted deepening 
Islamisation among the educated class in Muslim society at secular 
campuses and beyond. Robert W. Hefner describes this transformation 
as an effort to turn away from the old-fashioned “scholastic arguments 
of the Traditionalist scholars (ulama) and the harshly exclusive styles of 
the Modernist elite.”2 This transformation also marks an important 
development in dakwah leadership and organisation and mirrors the 
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The Coalesce of ‘Santris’ on Secular Campuses and their Search for 
Piety 
As Hefner observed, after Indonesia’s independence (1945), middle 
class3 practicing Muslim students began to coalesce in large cities4 and 
they started to pursue tertiary education at universities. They 
originated particularly from the Modernist group.5 Despite their 
differences in religious orientation, once they entered university they 
were unified by their desire to attend classes that would not interfere 
with their performance of the five daily prayers. They wanted to be 
pious Muslim students. However, in the 1950s devout Muslim students 
could not easily perform their religious duties at the ITB. By 1960, 
when the number of these students had increased, they started to fight 
for their right to practice their religion through the establishment of the 
Salman Mosque. As we will see, the ITB community was polarised by 
the conflict between secular education and religion that crystallised 
around the issue of the Friday prayers which must be performed in 
congregation.6 Due to the Salman Mosque’s instrumental role in the 
resurgence of dakwah on campuses since the early 1970s, the 
phenomenon came to be known as the ‘Salman Movement.’7 
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Much like earlier modern Muslim movements, the Salman 
Movement aspired to imbue social life with Islam.8 There are, however, 
obvious differences between the Salman Movement and its 
predecessors. Muslim movements that emerged in the early part of the 
twentieth century (e.g. Modernism) generally aimed at the purification 
of the faith, with some movements employing Islam as an ideological 
means for political identification towards this end.9 By contrast, 
although there was a certain degree of political motives, the Salman 
Movement was primarily concerned with cultural-intellectual issues 
and focused mainly on faith and piety, education, leadership, and aimed 
to turn ITB students from less devoted Muslims into practicing 
Muslims.10 
This quest for piety was rooted in the simple demand to be able 
to perform obligatory prayers. Students and academic staff members 
who came from practicing Muslim families began to face problems in 
performing their daily prayers because there was no place designated 
for them to pray. This was problematic particularly on Friday, since 
Muslim students who attended the Friday noon prayers had to forego 
classes to do so.11 Thus, the desire for a mosque to pray was essentially 
a demand for the reconciliation between the students’ freedom of 
religion and their right to education, which conflicted due to the status 
quo.12 For students like Imaduddin Abdulrahim, popularly known as 
Bang Imad, the issue was not that simple, however. For him the main 
question was why classes were held on Fridays at all when everybody 
knew that Muslims had to attend congregational prayers on Fridays.13 
This question related to the dominant culture and ideology of the vast 
majority of the ITB community. 
Professor Van Roemont, an expert on Islamic architecture who 
taught at the ITB in the 1950s, saw that his student, Ahmad Noe’man, a 
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practicing Muslim of Muhammadiyah background from Garut, West 
Java, regularly performed his prayers in places around the campus 
grounds. The lack of a designated prayer space became progressively 
more problematic due to the increasing admission into ITB of students 
from Islamic backgrounds. The problem crystallised when classes 
continued without the attendance of the students who had to leave for 
Friday prayers. Van Roemont eventually sympathised with Noe’man 
and he discussed the situation with him. Van Roemont realised the 
needs of the Muslim students and he had no objections allowing them 
to leave class to go to the mosque in Cipaganti or the Grand Mosque at 
the town square in Bandung.14 At the time, roadside mosques were hard 
to find. Larger mosques were located miles away from the ITB campus 
in villages, meaning that students had to miss classes travelling to and 
from the mosque. This was compounded by derisive ‘secular’ students 
deriding them by asking them to ‘convey their regards’ to God.15 
It was against this backdrop that some Muslim students proposed 
the building of a campus mosque but failed to obtain support from the 
ITB Rector, Professor Otong Kosasih.16 The rector argued that allowing 
its construction discriminated against students of other faiths, who 
would likely seek similar concessions. The disappointed students, 
reading between the lines, suspected that the rector was reluctant to 
allow religion to intrude on the secular ITB environment. Meanwhile, 
the political climate was also not in favour of Islam thanks to the Darul 
Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) rebellion in West Java and 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) action 
in West Sumatra. The alleged involvement of the leaders of the 
Modernist party, Masyumi, in the PRRI revolt had caused friction 
between them and Soekarno.17 Thus, the combination of a strongly 
secular culture and an unfavourable national political atmosphere 
contributed to the sustained marginalisation of practicing Muslims 
within the campus student body. 
Despite these circumstances, the students persisted in their 
ambition to build a mosque. A mosque committee was formed on 17 
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April 1960, with T.B. Soelaiman18 appointed as its chairman and Bang 
Imad as his deputy.19 On 27 May, 13 students held their first Friday 
prayers on campus using part of the grand auditorium which, up till 
then, ‘secular’ students had used for social but non-religious gatherings. 
The Muslim student congregation eventually grew to fill the whole 
auditorium. ‘Secular students’ respected this venue’s use for prayers 
and decided not to desacralise it by organising their parties in the same 
spot and they started to seek other venues for their entertainment. The 
interesting situation thus arose where ‘secular tolerance’ displayed by 
‘secular students’ proved to initiate the early phase of an Islamisation 
process on the campus they themselves did not desire.20 
However, this tolerance did not quite pave the way for the 
construction of a mosque, with the secular campus bureaucracy proving 
the main obstacle. Practicing Muslim students did not have much 
bargaining power in their encounters with the campus authorities, 
which were comprised mostly of members of the Sundanese educated 
class. The rector, born in Majalaya, Bandung, was himself a member of 
this class and cared little for the students’ religious needs. From a 
cultural perspective, this was no surprise since, at the time, wealthy 
educated Sundanese were generally secular people. The students from 
practicing Muslim families and others perceived this insensitivity 
towards religion as a violation of their rights, and it only strengthened 
their resolve in their struggle for the mosque’s construction. 
Surprisingly in view of his nationalist inclinations, President Soekarno 
supported the proposal for a campus mosque on 28 May 1964.21 
Because of this, the rector of the ITB and its ‘secular’ students had no 
option but to support the project.22 The endorsement Soekarno gave to 
the mosque committee opened the gate for many students from a wide 
political spectrum to support the plan, among them Purwoto Handoko, 
Chairman of the ITB Student Council; Doddy A. Tisna Amidjaja, ITB 
Rector (1969-76), and people who became important in Indonesian 
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Islam much later like Ahmad Zuhal, later the Minister for Research and 
Technology; and Muslimin Nasution, then the Chairman of the 
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan 
Muslim Indonesia, ICMI). Because of Soekarno’s endorsement, support 
even came from the wealthy Aburizal Bakrie, Erna Walnono (later 
known as Erna Witoelar) and Dedi Panigoro who were not particularly 
known as practicing Muslims. Through their fundraising activities they 
were instrumental in helping the construction of the Salman Mosque.23 
It is unclear why these secular students changed their minds but 
this was perhaps due to the fact that at that time, Soekarno’s influence 
was still formidable among the students as well as among the campus 
bureaucrats. The atmosphere of respectful tolerance on the campus was 
also a contributing factor which was showcased with the secular 
students coming to support the mosque project. A former Salman 
activist, Sakib Machmud, stated “ITB students with a secular 
background, known as the ‘dance group’, were involved in fundraising 
for the mosque; we needed their participation because they knew 
where to get funds.”24 Only three years later, the mosque project was 
realised and it was finally used for the first time in 1972.25 
While the role of students from an ‘Islamic’ background from 
rural areas in the Salman Movement is significant, they never pretended 
to promote Islamism as a political ideology.26 Initially, they wanted to 
fulfil their religious obligations (prayers).27 The presence at ITB of 
many practicing Muslim students in the 1950s and the 1960s, including 
student leaders Ahmad Sadali and Ahmad Noe’man from Garut, T.B. 
Soelaiman from Sumedang, Imaduddin Abdulrahim from Medan, Sakib 
Machmud from Java, and A.M. Lutfi from Cirebon, had a profound 
impact on campus social and cultural life in the course of championing 
the construction of the Salman mosque.28 The mosque was the second 
to be built on a secular campus in Indonesia after the Arif Rahman 
Hakim Mosque on the grounds of the University of Indonesia in 
                                                          
23  Nashir Budiman and Ziauddin Sardar, ‘Salman: Masa Lalu, Kini dan 
Mendatang’, www. Kalamsalman.org, 10 November 2008. 
24  Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009. 
25  Interview, Ahmad Noe’man, Bandung, 18 June 2009 and Sakib Machmud, 
Bandung, 21 July 2009. 
26  Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 04 June 2009. 
27  Interview, Ahmad Noe’man, Bandung, 18 June 2009. 
28  Idem. 
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Salemba in Jakarta.29 Its great symbolic significance and function as a 
centre of leadership saw it inspire Islamic dakwah and piety as well as 
intellectualism and activism on secular campuses in the following 
decades, particularly across Java. 
 
Neutralising the Dominance of Secular Students 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, practicing Muslim students were “the 
weaker of the factions in the student body” vis-a-vis secular nationalist 
student factions that were the predominant players at national 
universities around the country.30 The perception of this ‘campus 
political’ imbalance perhaps served as another impetus towards the 
emergence of the Salman Movement. Its main actors were students 
affiliated, directly or otherwise, with Muslim student organisations such 
as Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, The Association of Muslim 
Tertiary Students) and Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII, Indonesian Muslim 
Students). They had become politicised during the power transfer from 
the Soekarno regime to that of Soeharto. At the time, left-wing student 
groups had already lost their credibility because of the 30 September 
1965 ‘coup’ attempt. 
The national student political scene was reflected on the ITB 
campus with Muslim student activists being greatly outnumbered by 
‘secular’ students. It was feared that the secular students would 
dominate the Student Council and therefore practicing Muslim students 
constructed a campus mosque not only primarily for religious purposes 
but later also in part to neutralise the dominance of secular students.31 
In its construction, the motive of the practicing Muslim students, who 
only dreamed of having a mosque in which to perform their prayers,32 
became integrated with the political motivations of former HMI/PII 
activists, who wished to build a mosque-based social movement. It is 
important to note that the latter’s motivations coincided with the 
interests of senior Muslim politicians who were also former Masyumi 
activists such as Mohammad Natsir, Mohamad Roem, Zainal Abidin 
                                                          
29  Idem. 
30  Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 123. Also, Interview with Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 
21 July 2009. 
31  Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009. 
32  For instance, Ahmad Noe’man who originates from a Muhammadiyah 
family in Garut, West Java. 
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Ahmad, Rasjidi, and Osman Raliby. Although they had already been 
side-lined or had left the political arena because they were 
disappointed with Soeharto’s New Order regime, they still maintained 
ties with, and were even active in, the cadre formation of Islamic 
students in order to create a generation of young Muslims who could 
carry on their struggles.33 
The Salman Movement was in part realised because practicing 
Muslim students on campus were politically dissatisfied with the 
Soeharto regime. Notwithstanding the importance for the Movement of 
this dissatisfaction as a political impetus, its religio-cultural and 
intellectual motivations were also important. 
 
Leadership Inspiration, Intellectual and Religious Vision 
Soekarno’s Inspiration: Seeking the Fire of Islam 
Readers should note that when the Salman Movement came up in the 
end of the 1950s and continued to grow up to 1965, Indonesia 
embraced the politics of Guided Democracy in which Soekarno himself 
was the principal actor.34 Ricklefs observes that: 
 
He (Soekarno) offered Indonesia something to believe in, 
something which many hoped would give them and their nation 
dignity and pride. Other powerful forces turned to him for guidance, 
legitimacy and protection.35 
 
As we have seen above, Soekarno inspired Salman Movement’s 
activists to turn to him for support for the construction of the Mosque 
on the secular ITB campus. That they succeeded may be seen as one 
example of the validity of Ricklef’s notion as mentioned above. 
The process to obtain the President’s consent started when a 
delegation of the Salman Mosque Construction Foundation (Yayasan 
Pembina Masjid Salman, YPM), including Prof. T.M. Soelaiman, Ahmad 
Sadali and Ahmad Noe’man, met with President Soekarno in the State 
                                                          
33  Endang Saefuddin Anshari, Sakib Machmud, Hasan Sutanegara, A.M. Lutfi, 
Miftah Faridl, Rudy Syarif Sumadilaga, Yusuf Amir Feisal and others were 
also among the early Salman Mosque activists who had been fostered by 
senior politicians. Lutfi, ‘Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia’, pp. 158-159. 
34  Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, pp. 294-321. 
35  Idem, p. 294. 
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Palace in Jakarta on 28 May 1964. During the breakfast meeting, the 
President was attended by his Minister of Religious Affairs, K.H. 
Saifuddin Zuhri.36 Soekarno asked the delegation to explain their 
proposal and he was satisfied with the arguments it presented to him. 
After having inspected Ahmad Noe’man’s drawings of the mosque, 
Soekarno asked why there was neither a dome nor any pillars inside. 
Noe’man explained that a dome was merely an accessory without a 
clear function and might even be seen as an extravagance. According to 
Noe’man, the ITB Mosque had no intention to build a dome. He quoted 
verse 170 from the Chapter of The Cow (al-Baqarah) in the Quran, 
which criticises the behaviour of those who were adamant to blindly 
imitate the tradition of their ancestors. Concerning the pillars, he 
explained that they would impede the line formation (saf) during 
congregational prayers and should therefore not be included. Soekarno 
agreed and immediately signed the blueprint, naming it ‘Salman 
Mosque’ after consulting K.H. Saifuddin, who was seated next to him.37 
The name of Salman Al-Farisi, one of the close companions of the 
Prophet Muhammad and a brilliant strategist and contemporary 
technocrat, inspired Soekarno to suggest the students to use this name 
for their mosque. The complex use of strategy, Soekarno as strategist 
for independence, the students using him for their strategy and Salman 
as strategist under Muhammad gave enough impetus to use this name 
for the ITB campus mosque which was also the more fitting because 
Soekarno himself was a graduate of this same institution and Salman 
was a technocrat in his time. 
Apart from discussing the mosque’s structural aspects, the YPM 
ITB delegation also engaged in discussions with Soekarno on Islamic 
thought. They convinced Soekarno that the orientation of the mosque to 
be built on campus would resonate with his conviction that what 
needed to be taken from Islam was its ‘fire’, not its ‘ashes’.38 Soekarno’s 
idea about the ‘fire of Islam’ was greatly inspired by L. Stoddard, a 
                                                          
36  Interview, Ahmad Noe’man, Bandung, 18 June 2009. 
37  Idem. 
38  Interview, Ahmad Noe’man, Bandung, 18 June 2009. “Fire” and “ashes” are 
used to distinguish between the values of Islam, which are eternal, and its 
symbols, which are temporary and contextual. 
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Western scholar who wrote The New World of Islam and The Rising Tide 
of Colour.39 
During polemics with Muslim intellectuals such as A. Hassan and 
Mohammad Natsir, Soekarno expressed his admiration for the Turkish 
State which had implemented Kemal Attaturk’s secular, modernised 
conception of Islam.40 Soekarno desired to separate religion from the 
State while retaining the ‘fire’ of Islam as its driving force. His 
opponents in their turn, sought to formally embed religious principles 
and laws the formation of the State. The debate also involved other 
intellectual circles and split into nationalist and Islamist camps. As we 
know now, the debate was never settled to the satisfaction of either 
camp and came to a dead end in the Constitutional Assembly in 1955 
when the foundations of the state were argued. 
Soekarno thus found that the initiators of the mosque project 
appreciated the importance of the “fire of Islam”, which had been his 
obsession since the 1930s. At the same time, the mosque to be built on 
the grounds of his very own alma mater would deliver a progressive 
message as symbolised by its unconventional architectural style, and 
would be a token of an open nationalist spirit rather than that an 
exclusively Islamic one. It was against this backdrop that Soekarno 
sanctioned the plan to construct the Salman Mosque, as mentioned 
above. No huge leap of political imagination was required to guess at 
the strategy behind his approval. Over time, however, dynamics 
developed that pushed the mosque in the direction of Islamic visions a 
la Mohammad Natsir rather than those of Soekarno’s. Its construction 
was halted after Soeharto took over from Soekarno “because the New 
Order Government mistrusted Islam” at that time.41 
Although by that time unfinished, the mosque could already be 
used as a venue for activities conducted by Muslim student activists. It 
had library facilities and hosted meetings, lessons on classical music 
appreciation, martial arts and sports, Islamic training, student Quranic 
                                                          
39  Idem. L. Stoddard’s New World of Islam was translated into Indonesian 
(Dunia Baru Islam) and published in January 1966 by a committee chaired 
by Lieutenant General H.M. Muljadi Djojomartono. President Soekarno 
wrote short introductory remarks to the Indonesian edition. 
40  Federspiel, Islam and Ideology, p. 103. 
41  Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009. 
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studies and subuh religious classes (after dawn prayers).42 It was the 
first mosque to organise these subuh classes featuring specially-invited 
speakers. However, only small numbers of students regularly attended 
these classes. Seeking more participants, Salman activists intentionally 
brought in female students from the Universitas Pasundan and 
Universitas Padjadjaran campuses. This succeeded in baiting more 
students to the early morning classes because “boys usually like to 
come to places where there are many girls.”43 Towards the same end, 
the classes were pushed forward to 7 a.m. 
Natsir was extremely committed to maintaining secure 
relationships with the young Muslim intellectuals who were engaged in 
the Salman Movement. Along with other senior public Muslim figures, 
he made a point of visiting Bandung to deliver talks during the 
mosque’s morning classes. During these visits he would also attend 
dialogue sessions with student activists in A.M. Lutfi’s house, where 
they felt safe from police raids – which had happened on other 
occasions in Indonesia - and avoided being suspected of conducting 
subversive Islamic activities.44 Often, Imaduddin was asked to lead the 
congregational prayers because of his melodious voice and superb 
recitation of the Quran.45 
 
M. Natsir’s Crucial Role: Modernist Appropriation of Public Space 
Having failed in rehabilitating the Masyumi in 1966, Natsir, the main 
figure of Persatuan Islam (PERSIS), withdrew from the political stage 
and initiated activities in dakwah and education by founding the 
Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII, later to be called Dewan 
Dakwah) in May 1967.46 Within a short time, Natsir and his DDII were 
pulling the wagon of Muslim groups who were frustrated with 
Soeharto’s New Order Regime, which they perceived as having become 
increasingly detached or even hostile to Islam.47 The DDII became 
                                                          
42  Interview, Ahmad Noe’man, Bandung, 18 June 2009. 
43  Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009. 
44  Lutfi, ‘Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia’, p. 159. 
45  Idem, p. 158. 
46  Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, p. 334. 
47  Indications of the Soeharto regime’s hostility towards political Islam were: 
First, apart from rejecting the rehabilitation of the Masyumi, Masyumi 
figures were also banned from leading the Partai Muslimin Indonesia 
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increasingly influential because of the financial and other support it 
received from the Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami of which Natsir had been 
chairman.  
Natsir’s actions also inspired Muslim students in engendering 
new forms of Muslim movements, which remained aloof of practical 
political currents and rather regarded university campus environments 
as home to intellectual communities.48 Natsir and the Muslim students’ 
interests coincided because Natsir had recognised the possibility of 
appropriating the religious space of the mosque as a venue insulated 
from political interference. Therefore, through the Dewan Dakwah, 
Natsir started to actively initiate the construction of mosques in campus 
environments.49 Like Natsir, Muslim students also recognised the 
relative freedom from state intervention which mosques enjoyed and 
which made them potentially the social movements’ prime loci. 
                                                                                                                                       
(Indonesian Muslims Party, PARMUSI), ‘created’ by Soeharto to replace the 
Masyumi; Second, in October 1970, the government unilaterally announced 
its installation of PARMUSI functionary Djaelani Naro as general chairman 
of the PARMUSI, which up to then had been led by Djarnawi Hadikusumo. 
Dispute could not be avoided. In the end, Soeharto appointed M.S. 
Mintaredja (state minister) as the new general chairman. Muslim groups 
considered this a concerted effort by the Soeharto regime to control 
political Islam. See, for instance, Solihin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin 
Indonesia (Jakarta: Lembaga Pendidikan Islam, 1970), and K.E. Ward, The 
Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Ithaca NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1970); Third, Soeharto became increasingly close to the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that was dominated by Chinese-
Catholic and secular figures who, in fact, had helped to topple Soekarno’s 
regime and had paved the way for Soeharto to enter the stage of power. The 
CSIS was founded in 1971 as a New Order think tank and was led by Ali 
Murtopo and Sudjono Humardhani – both Soeharto’s private assistants. The 
institution formulated various New Order policies including the policy in 
countering the influence of Muslim groups. See, for instance, R.E. Elson, 
Soeharto: A Political Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), p. 146. 
48  This was also connected with the policy of ‘depoliticizing’ the campus 
implemented by the New Order regime through Normalisasi Kehidupan 
Kampus-Badan Koordinasi Kampus (NKK-BKK, Normalisation of Campus 
Life-Campus Coordination Body). This policy sought to free the campus 
from practical politics after the period of student political upheavals from 
1974-1978. 
49   Aay Muhammad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis 




Excepting the ITB and University of Indonesia (UI), until the 
earlier period of the New Order secular campuses lacked permanent 
mosques. Although the Salman Mosque was only established in 1972 as 
the result of efforts having been made since 1960, a temporary prayer 
facility had been available for prayers and other religious activities 
since the mid-1960s. Having taken two years to construct, the 
University of Indonesia’s Abdul Rahman Hakim (ARH) Mosque opened 
in 1968. However, the Salman Mosque issue resonated louder than that 
of the mosque at the UI in Jakarta due to the firm and courageous 
leadership of Imaduddin Abdulrahim and his friends. The University of 
Indonesia, however, became the centre for religious and political 
activism of the Tarbiyah movement’s young leaders later in the 1990s. 
 
Nurcholish Madjid’s Influence: Cultivating Monotheism 
The influence Natsir’s charismatic leadership had on the likes of 
Imaduddin, Faridl, Lutfi, Saifuddin Anshari, Sadali, Noe’man, and Sakib 
was undeniable. However, these Muslim activists were also important 
HMI figures with close ties to Nurcholish Madjid, the General Chairman 
of the Muslim Student Association (HMI) whose reformist thoughts 
provoked controversy and were challenged by many ex-Masyumi 
leaders affiliated with the DDII.50 They were the main opponents of 
Nurcholish’s call for Islamic reform in the 1970s. Strong opposition to 
Nurcholish came from H.M. Rasjidi, Abdul Qadir Jaelani, and Endang 
Saifuddin Anshari.51 Apart from these figures, others greatly 
appreciated his thoughts. Imaduddin even compiled materials for his 
Mujahid Dakwah Training (Latihan Mujahid Dakwah, LMD) by adapting 
the Nilai-nilai Dasar Perjuangan Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam 
(Fundamental Values of Struggle of the Islamic Student Association, 
NDP-HMI) formulated by Nurcholish, Saefuddin Anshari, and Sakib 
Machfud during its 1968 congress in Malang, East Java.52 
Imaduddin’s close relationship with Nurcholish began with the 
1966 Congress of the HMI when he was appointed head of Lembaga 
                                                          
50  Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009. 
51  Smith (et al.), Bang Imad, p. 34. 
52  Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009. NDP-HMI is a HMI must-
read text for students who wanted to join the Islamic Student Association. 
See Yudi Latif, Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa: Genealogi Inteligensia Muslim 
Indonesia Abad ke-20 (Bandung: Mizan 2005), p. 534. 
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Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam (LDMI, the Predication Body of Muslim 
Students) and Nurcholish elected as HMI Chairman.53 Admiring 
Nurcholish for his honest and modest character, Imaduddin even 
named his daughter ‘Nurcholishah’.54 Their relationship deteriorated 
when Nurcholish called for Islamic reforms, urging Muslim intellectuals 
to consider secularisation. Imaduddin could not appreciate that and it 
led to misunderstanding between them. Their relationship was 
restored, however, when both pursued their PhDs in America and 
occasionally met to discuss issues related to Islam and the Indonesian 
ummah.55 In addition, when Imaduddin became involved in the 
formation of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, the 
Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals), he invited Nurcholish 
to join the meetings. Nurcholish was also Imaduddin’s friend whom he 
asked for support when in need, and who provided him with 
constructive input.56 Imaduddin once even declared that he would be in 
the forefront to support him if Nurcholish ever sought the presidential 
office.57 
Regardless of their differences in Islamic thought, for both the 
oneness of God (tauhid) was at the centre of their religious belief. This 
means that even if Nurcholish was in favour of secularist and other 
modern not necessarily Muslim ideas, the notion of tauhid was never 
contested. In this particular aspect, all agreed. If was only in the issue of 
to what extent tauhid could be maintained in modern outlooks that 
ideas differed. Muslim intellectual and Nurcholish friend and colleague, 
Dawam Rahardjo, states that with his ideas about secularisation, 
Nurcholish believed in the centrality of the man-God relation in all 
aspects of life. In order to reach a situation of political secularisation, 
Nurcholish was convinced that “in order to keep the man-God 
relationship central a radical devaluation of existing social structures 
                                                          
53  Smith (et al.), Bang Imad, pp. 158-159. 
54  Interview, Ahmad Noe’man, Bandung, 18 June 2009 and Sakib Machmud, 
Bandung, 21 July 2009. 
55  Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009. See also Smith (et al.), 
Bang Imad, p. 47. 
56  Smith (et al.), Bang Imad, pp. 51-55. 
57  Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009. 
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was needed”,58 but not necessarily religious ones. Dawam also notes 
that Nurcholish’s thought about tauhid was in essence the same as that 
of Imaduddin’s because both shared the notion of tauhid uluhiyya (the 
unity of God).59 Another strong correspondence is Imaduddin’s thought 
that it is imperative for all Muslims to liberate themselves from any 
reliance upon others except Allah.60 Imaduddin agreed with Nurcholish 
who argued that in this world there is nothing sacred except Allah and 
the Quran. He said that he did not oppose Nurcholish’s reform ideas.61 
While true that he disagreed with Nurcholish’s use of Western concepts 
in his description of Islam, for Imaduddin it was simply a question of 
terminology. Therefore it is safe to claim that Imaduddin and 
Nurcholish Madjid shared the same fundamental intellectual and 
religious vision. Imaduddin’s intellectual vision became the buttress for 
the Salman dakwah movement’s intellectual diversity in the years to 
come. 
 
The Training of Muslim Students to be Dakwah Activists 
Only at the end of 1972 was the Salman mosque finally declared 
finished and ready to be used for Friday prayers for the first time. In 
1974, the Salman mosque initiated the LMD, set up by Imaduddin and 
his associates, and which proved a phenomenal success. Imaduddin had 
earlier been mentored by Mohammad Natsir in the group called Panitia 
Haji Indonesia (PHI, Indonesian Hajj Committee) and the PHI entrusted 
him with the coordination of youth training and development.62 
Imaduddin was thus a central figure in LMD training. A mentor in the 
                                                          
58  M. Dawam Rahardjo, ‘Islam Kemodernan: Catatan atas Paham Sekularisasi 
Nurcholish Madjid’, in Nurcholish Madjid, Islam Kemodernan dan 
Keindonesiaan (Bandung: Mizan, 2006), p. 26. 
59  Rahardjo, ‘Tauhid Uluhiyyah Tokoh Muslim Modernist dari Salman’, in 
Smith (et al.), Bang Imad, pp. 133-142. 
60  Imaduddin Abdulrahim, Kuliah Tauhid (Jakarta: Yayasan Pembina Sari 
Insan- YAASIN, 1990), pp. 35-52. 
61  Smith (et al.), Bang Imad, p. 34. 
62  It was called the PHI group because initially their training schedules took 
place in the PHI building on Jalan Kwitang, Central Jakarta. See, Luthfi, 
‘Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia’, in Smith (et al.), Bang Imad, p. 161. 
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early training, he also compiled training materials63 which contained 
the NDP-HMI modified tauhid doctrine mentioned previously.64 
During the LMD, participants were isolated from contacts with 
the outside world for three to five days, during which time their faith 
was further buttressed with basic Islamic teachings on theology (aqida) 
and introductions to the sources of Islam, the Quran and Sunnah.65 The 
training was intense and lasted whole days, starting one hour before 
early morning prayers. At night, the participants had to rise in order to 
perform nightly prayers and at the closing of the training session, they 
had to take their vows by uttering the shahadat in front of their trainer 
without paying allegiance to a specific doctrine, as was the tradition of 
the Ikhwanul Muslimin of Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood, hence forth 
Ikhwan).66 
From 1974 to 1989, the Salman Mosque organised 71 LMD 
training sessions, not only in Bandung but also in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, 
Medan and in other cities.67 Muslim student activism gradually 
developed a new culture among the mosque-based youth movement. 
LMD activities represented the height of this new culture. This was so 
because they involved activists from campuses all over Indonesia so 
that in a matter of just a few years a network of LMD alumni was 
created which facilitated dakwah dissemination. The success of the 
training program caused the use of the mosque to shift from that of a 
space traditionally used for ritual worship to a centre for faith, piety, 
intellectualism and activism. In the early 1980s, the Salman Mosque 
offered pre-university training and mentoring sessions which attracted 
thousands of Senior High School students from Bandung and sought to 
equip them with the intellectual and leadership skills needed at 
university. In fact, this mentoring served practically as a sort of 
recruitment mechanism for future university activists. In addition, upon 
their return, the alumni of the pre-university training and mentoring 
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64  Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 22 July 2009. 
65  Rosyad, A Quest for True Islam, p. 33. 
66  Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009. 
67  M. Imdadun Rahmat, Arus Baru Islam Radikal. See also Abdul Aziz (ed.), 




sessions became mentors at their schools and they got involved as 
activists in universities and society in following years.68 
Over time in and around Bandung, interest in Islamic piety, 
Muslim lifestyles and fashion, and publications increased following the 
increased mosque attendance. This had a profound impact on campuses 
and society across Bandung by the 1980s, laying the ground for what 
was arguably the Salman movement’s greatest contribution, enhancing 
faith and devotion, intellectualism and activism.69 The LMD quickly 
came to involve activists from other secular universities so that in a 
short time, it became an integral part for the formative training of 
Muslim student cadres attached to campus mosques all over Indonesia. 
It is important to mention here that the ITB Salman Mosque not only 
took the lead in the campus dakwah movement, but also sparked the 
construction of campus mosques all over Indonesia.70 In the course of 
the 1970s-1980s, the mosque’s activities thus established a foundation 
for the enhancement of the observation of Islamic duties among the 
educated class of Muslim society. This was in response to a call 
mounted by senior Modernist leaders for the revival of Islam in the 
fifteenth century A.H.71 
Coinciding with the growth of the DDII in supporting campus 
mosques,72 religious activism also responded to the warm reception by 
Muslim students at other secular state universities. This gave the 
impetus for the formation of pockets of students who had become 
                                                          
68  Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010. 
69  Interview, Ahmad Noe’man, Bandung, 18 June 2009. 
70  Salman Review, Yayasan Pembina Masjid Salman, edition 02/2009, p. 7. 
71  Abdulrahim, Kuliah Tauhid, pp. xiv and 12. 
72  DDII-supported campus mosques included: Masjid Arif Rahman Hakim on 
the campus of Universitas Indonesia (UI), Salemba Jakarta; Sultan Alauddin 
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Magelang; Sultan Trengganu Mosque, Semarang; Al-Furqan Mosque on the 
campus of IKIP Bandung; IKIP Mosque Malang; Campus Mosque of the 
Institut Teknologi Surabaya (ITS) Surabaya; Campus Mosque of the Al-
Ghifari Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB), See: Muhammad Furkon, Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, p. 127. 
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‘enlightened’ because of the religious studies they conducted on their 
campuses. Their consciously having taken the road of a return to Islam, 
as opposed to students who decided not to follow this kind of 
education, formed the basis of a distinguishing identity. As a result of 
campus dakwah, the headscarf (jilbab), which initially was donned on 
the successful completion of a student’s Islamic training, obtained 
greater significance symbolising the Muslim woman’s new Islamic 
identity. In the Salman Mosque, this first appeared in the mid-1970s. 
Since then, more Muslim women, especially students, have started to 
wear the jilbab. This new trend spread to other universities along with 
the dakwah model’s expansion. 
Since the mid-1980s, Muslim observance increased and came to 
be markedly more visible.73 Progress on secular campuses and schools 
expanded in subsequent years, going beyond the campus environment 
and into wider society. The increase in piety among the public was 
indicated by the rise in mosque attendance whether for regular, Friday 
or tarawih prayers, the rapid building of prayer houses and increased 
payment of the Muslim tithe.74 There was simultaneously an obvious 
heightened interest in travelling to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage 
(hajj), the fifth pillar of Islam. In the following years, the number of 
Islamic educational institutions such as madrasah and pesantren 
mushroomed all over West Java.75 Parents were no longer reluctant to 
send their children to Islamic schools. This phenomenon occurred in a 
context where Muslims sought moral support and a moral framework 
in the midst of rapid social change.76 In Bandung, numerous outlets 
opened selling Muslim dress and halal food and beverages. Stickers 
with Islamic slogans were posted on walls, cars and in student 
                                                          
73  Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 04 June 2009. 
74  Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010. This 
Islamisation became a major trend in Java. See Ricklefs, A History of Modern 
Indonesia, p. 356. 
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76  Robert W. Hefner, ‘Islam and Nation in the Post-Soeharto Era’, in Adam 
Swartz and Adam Paris (eds.), The Politics of post-Soeharto Indonesia (New 
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dormitories and so forth.77 Mizan, a prominent printing and publishing 
house in Bandung, began to publish Islamic books that were attractive, 
with elegant cover designs, different from the plain, old-fashioned 
ones.78 In short, Islam’s upsurge changed Bandung social life as more 
people abided to the rules of Islam by going to mosques, dress the 
Islamic way, attend Islamic schools and perform the hajj. 
 
Campus Activists’ Radicalisation 
As stated in Chapter Three, despite the propagation of a more Islamic 
lifestyle, especially among those considered nominal Muslims, the 
overall political atmosphere during this time was not in favour of 
political Islam. For Muslim activists, keeping a low profile was the only 
way to avoid a crackdown on their dakwah activities by intelligence 
personnel. During these years, Soeharto and the issue of corruption 
became the targets of student rallies.79 Student opposition peaked in 
1978 when they rejected Soeharto’s re-election.The political upheaval 
saw security forces seal off the ITB campus following the student’s 
rejection of Soeharto’s re-election. The army occupied the Salman 
Mosque dormitory and for several months, Salman Mosque activities 
came to a halt. Consequently the regime became the focus of heated 
opposition from a wide variety of student movements, including those 
engaged in Muslim activism on campus and outside the universities’ 
premises, and particularly within usroh circles.80 Campus mosques have 
                                                          
77  For instance, ‘I am proud to be a Muslim’; ‘Islam is my religion’; or ‘Islam is 
the religion of peace.’ Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 
October 2010. 
78  Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 04 June 2009. 
79  Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, p. 346. 
80  Usroh literally means ‘nuclear family or cell’ and is considered effective for 
the development and the formation of cadres under the repressive New 
Order circumstances. It is worth noting that during the 1970s, the concept 
of usroh was not exclusively used in campus dakwah circles. The term was 
also officially used by DI/TII groups in the early 1980s. The usroh model 
was also widespread among NII (Islamic Indonesian State) followers. Thus, 
everything that goes in the direction of radical expression using the usroh 
model was immediately suspected of plotting against the State. This was the 
more so since the police had apprehended members of the usroh group of 
Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir who were suspected of scheming 
to create an Islamic State and who considered the leader of Darul Islam, 
Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo, as their primary source of political 
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been used as bases for religio-political student movements ever since, 
which is a new phenomenon in Indonesian history.81 It has to be noted, 
however, that the Salman Movement kept focusing on the religious, 
intellectual and cultural dimensions of dakwah. It was only after the 
Soeharto regime imposed severe restrictions on campus politics in 
1978, which caused many student activists to join mosques as the only 
safe venue for their activism, that campus dakwah became “a sanctuary 
for the expression of political dissatisfaction and frustration.”82 
It is not surprising that this quickly drew public attention, and 
also came to Soeharto’s notice. The New Order regime suspected that 
the dakwah movement was a repackaging of the radical political 
aspirations which it wanted to suppress. Moreover, Salman activists did 
not hide their opposition to Soeharto’s regime out of frustration over its 
repression and the persecution of Muslim activists.83 This political 
scenario saw the Indonesian state adopt an increasingly repressive 
attitude against Islamic activism. As a result, the Salman Movement and 
all other mosque-based dakwah movements that belonged to its 
network were further politicised. Several of their key activities 
including mentoring, and the LMDs were designed with the goal of 
opposing the state in mind.84 
In January 1978, the Student Council was disbanded by the order 
of Admiral Sudomo in his capacity of Commander in Chief of the 
Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Komando Operasi 
Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, KOPKAMTIB). Daoed Joesoef was 
appointed Minister of Education and Culture (1978-1983) and he 
implemented the ‘normalisation of campus life’ policy seeking the ‘de-
politicalisation’ of the campuses. Although the policy has often been 
opposed for fear that it turns students passive and apolitical, it remains 
in force. Eventually, the character of the classes changed from being 
                                                                                                                                       
inspiration. International Crisis Group, ‘Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The 
Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia’, Indonesia Briefing, 
Jakarta/Brussels, 8 August 2002, p. 3. Also Interview with Abu Chaidar, 
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81  Latif, Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa, p. 531. 
82  Elizabeth Fuller Collins, “Islam is the Solution” Dakwah and Democracy in 
Indonesia’, in Kultur: The Indonesian Journal for Muslim Cultures, Vol. 3 no 1, 
2003, p. 158. 
83  Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009. 
84  Interview, Abu Chaidar, Bandung, 14 April 2009. 
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rather open to rather restricted by the implementation of the Semester 
Credit System (Sistem Kredit Semester, SKS), under which students 
only had 4 years (8 semesters) to finish their studies, failing which they 
would be disenrolled. The Semester Credit System policy ensured that 
students no longer had the time to engage in political activities outside 
campus giving them limited opportunities to become too much involved 
in the dakwah movement. Even though its members were still active in 
mentoring and training, they (of course) realised they were increasingly 
susceptible to state intervention.85 
In 1978, Imaduddin Abdulrahim, the foremost figure in the 
Salman Mosque, was detained by the police and incarcerated for 14 
months for criticising President Soeharto in a speech he had delivered a 
Yogyakarta.86 In his speech which he held at Gadjah Mada University in 
May 1978, Imaduddin stated “Anyone who prepares a grave before s/he 
dies resembles Pharaoh.”87 Although Imaduddin did not explicitly 
mention Soeharto, the security service inferred that the statement was 
directed at Soeharto due to the fact that the President had made 
preparations for his final resting place on the Astana Giri Bangun 
premises on Mount Lawu, near Solo. On 23 May 1978, upon his return 
to Bandung, Bang Imad was arrested in his home.88 In response to the 
situation unfavourable to Salman’s interests, the movement adopted a 
low profile. Since then LMD activities were terminated. 
Imaduddin was released in July 1979 with the help of Prof. Doddy 
Tisna Amidjaya, the ITB Rector. Prof. Tisna came to see Admiral 
Sudomo and appealed for Imaduddin’s release, proposing to send him 
overseas to pursue his PhD. Initially Sudomo rejected the appeal 
because he felt Imaduddin was too critical of the government. However, 
he finally accepted it after being persuaded to do so by Tisna.89 Tisna 
then saw Daoed Joesoef, the Minister of Education and Culture, and 
asked him for a PhD scholarship for Imaduddin. Daoed declined, saying 
that “With only a Master’s Degree he already rebelled, what might he do 
after having obtained a Doctorate?”90 In 1980, with the help of 
                                                          
85  Interview, Ahmad Noe’man, Bandung, 18 June 2009. 
86  Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009. 
87  Lutfi, Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia, p. 39. 
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Mohammad Natsir, Imaduddin, who was in the US in the 1960s, 
eventually returned to Iowa State University on a PhD scholarship from 
the King Faisal Foundation and with additional financial assistance 
from the Minister of Religious Affairs of Kuwait, with whom Natsir 
happened to be personally acquainted.91 With Bang Imad’s departure, 
the Salman dakwah movement underwent a gradual shift in its ways of 
operation and in its orientation. 
Since Bang Imad was detained and subsequently sent overseas to 
pursue his PhD, Ahmad Sadali assumed an important leadership role. In 
1979, Salman’s LMD training program resumed under the new name 
‘Studi Islam Intensif’ (SII, Intensive Islamic Study) to avoid surveillance 
while member recruitment resumed. In 1981, training and mentoring 
activities also targeted secondary and high school students as well as 
elementary students with programs such as Salman Islamic Youth 
Family (Keluarga Remaja Islam Salman, KARISMA) and Nurturing 
Salman Children (Pembinaan Anak-anak Salman, PAS). Because of these 
activities, the Salman Movement’s popularity increased among students 
and it succeeded in implanting its influence in society. KARISMA’s way 
of mentoring quickly became the frontrunner in guidance activities for 
Islamic youth in West Java in particular and in Indonesia in general.92 
These programs attracted thousands of students and continued 
throughout the decade. Even today, KARISMA still has more than 1000 
members while PAS has more than 500.93 
Ahmad Sadali’s leadership was uneventful and because of his 
calm character fitting to the unfavourable political situation. Ahmad 
Sadali and his brother Ahmad Noe’man came from Garut, West Java and 
had been admitted to the ITB in the 1950s. Sadali and Noe’man’s father 
was a Modernist member of the Muhammadiyah and a religious leader 
in their hometown. While Noe’man was admitted to the Department of 
Architecture at the ITB, Sadali was admitted at the Department of Visual 
Arts. Sadali’s intellectual and leadership visions differed from 
Imaduddin’s as the latter adopted a tough approach while Sadali 
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preferred the soft touch. His vision was built on a simple combination of 
what was termed ‘faith, reason and feeling’.94 Hence, it is no wonder 
that in the 1980s Salman’s dakwah activities had more of an intellectual 
and cultural bent, rather than a political one. Aside from religious 
classes, the 1980s saw the Salman Mosque promote social and cultural 
activities such as classical music, vocal group and life music 
performances, mountain climbing, and the like.95 The Mosque also paid 
particular attention to knowledge and competence aspects rather than 
to political activism. 
The 1980s saw interesting progress when the campus dakwah 
movement was further disseminated to other campuses across and 
outside Java. Campus mosques that stood out with regards to the 
Salman Mosque dakwah movement were: Arief Rahman Hakim Mosque 
(ARH), on the campus of the University of Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta; al-
Ghifari Mosque, on the Institut Pertanian campus in Bogor (IPB); 
Jamaah Shalahuddin, on the Gadjah Mada University campus in 
Yogyakarta; and the al-Falah Mosque in Surabaya. Because the Islamic 
study activities were conducted simultaneously by student activists 
across these locations, the campus dakwah movement spread out fast. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the dakwah effort was reinforced by the 
establishment of Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK, Campus Islamic 
Propagation League) across secular universities. Salman Mosque 
activists who had previously been involved in the LMD played a crucial 
role in this reinforcement process. Within and outside Jakarta, the LMD 
alumni reinforced the dakwah movement not only through the 
establishment of the LDK but also by means of offering religious 
activities on their respective campuses, which appealed to students. 
The introduction of the Salman Mosque dakwah movement into 
the UI and the IPB was a strategic step made by LMD activists. However, 
while it is true that former LMD activists facilitated the proliferation of 
the Salman dakwah movement, Salman did not set out to propagate a 
single solid and coherent notion of its Islamic ideology with which it 
tried to resist the New Order regime’s push towards social and political 
hegemony. 
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The Salman movement failed to notice that by not adopting a 
solid ideology of its own, it was prone to influence by other groups of 
dakwah-inspired students. These students had been trained in 
universities in the Middle East and were convinced of the ideology of 
the Ikhwanul Muslimin. Because Salman did not realise this they found 
themselves in competition with these graduates from the Middle East. 
This early ‘infiltration’, in its part, shaped the gradual and tangible shift 
in the direction and orientation of the campus dakwah movement in 
Bandung, Bogor and Jakarta, and in other parts of Java, led by graduates 
from Islamic universities in the Middle East, who leaned towards 
Ikhwanul Muslimin’s ideology and movement. 
In Jakarta, the ARH Mosque at the UI played a leading role in the 
redirection and reorientation of the campus dakwah model previously 
developed by the Salman Mosque. The ARH mosque was built in 1968 
and named after a Muslim activist who was killed during the students’ 
protest against Soekarno demanding the extermination of Indonesian 
Communist Party after the failed coup attempt in 1965.96 Aay 
Muhammad Furkon reveals that the ARH mosque was built with DDII 
support. The presence of these mosques on and around campuses was 
achieved by courtesy of the DDII and thus strengthened DDII’s dakwah 
activities.97 Since the mid-1970s, the DDII had facilitated the 
Islamisation of campuses through the promotion of strategic initiatives, 
such as aforementioned Bina Masjid Kampus,98 an integrated dakwah 
program consisting of building mosques as said above, Islamic 
predication and the training of dakwah activists. These initiatives 
continued from the 1980s onward. With its influence and religious 
resources, the DDII managed to control the Islamic discourse in the 
mosque, particularly during Friday prayers, after it was authorised to 
select preachers (da’i) for the Friday sermons.99 Although LMD alumni, 
such as Aus Hidayat Nur and Zaenal Muttaqien, kept control over the 
administration of the mosque’s activities, the DDII played a definite role 
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in the reproduction of Islamic discourse. With these LMD alumni and 
DDII mentors, the leadership of the ARH mosque pushed the dakwah by 
means of recruitment and network-building. Recruitment was carried 
out through various activities, such as group study meetings and 
discussions known as tadabbur and halaqah.100 These study clubs drew 
the attention of great numbers of students in the following years. 
From 1976 to 1980, at least six mosques were built on and 
around campuses in Jakarta, Depok, Bogor and Bandung with the 
support of the DDII.101 Over time, these became the centres for the 
expansion of the LDK. In Bandung, Bogor and Jakarta, the presence of 
mosques and the LDK on the universities’ premises caused a significant 
shift in the orientation of student activities. Students grew more 
receptive to mosque activities, which were different from those offered 
by intra-campus student organisations. As a result, dakwah activities at 
universities in these three cities produced young Muslim activists and 
intellectuals who later became public figures and politicians, including 
present-day Prosperity and Justice Party (PKS) members of parliament 
such as Mahfudz Siddik, Muzammil Yusuf, Radzikun, Fahri Hamzah, 
Mustafa Kamal, Zulkiflimansyah, Priatna, Suswono, and Rama 
Pratama.102 
In Jakarta the LDK promoted the donning of the jilbab among 
female students. In his account, Ali Said Damanik presents an 
interesting case about this expression of identity.103 Damanik cites the 
transformation of identity as experienced by female students at the 
Polytechnic Faculty at UI, as the consequence of their sustained 
participation in religious activities conducted by the faculty’s LDK. It is 
said that almost none of the female students wore headscarfs when 
they were admitted to the faculty. Shortly before they graduated, 
however, almost all of them sported the jilbab and thus had accepted a 
                                                          
100  Tadabbur is an Arabic word that means ‘to contemplate’; it is a religious 
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dress code that had been strange for them in the past.104 This 
phenomenon was not only a matter of changing the style of dress, but 
rather constitutes the expression of a new Muslim female identity. This 
illustrates the crucial transformative role of the mosque and the LDK in 
‘Islamising’ the female students of a secular university. 
The campus dakwah movement grew rapidly during the late 
1980s up to the 1990s because of the fertile spiritual Islamic ground as 
a result of the prohibition put on the students of being engaged in 
politics. R. William Liddle, termed this the ‘Islamic turn’,105 with its 
slogan ‘back to the mosque in anticipation of the fifteenth century 
Islamic revival’. In the 1980s and 1990s, this slogan had been 
popularised by mosque youth activists and grew prolifically. Large 
mosques such as the Al-Azhar, Cut Meutia, and Sunda Kelapa in Jakarta; 
Al-Istiqamah and Mujahidin in Bandung; Syuhada in Yogyakarta; and 
Al-Falah in Surabaya turned into new public venues for the guidance of 
Muslim youth through training sessions and mentoring activities 
adopted from the campus mosque movement. With the formation of the 
Indonesian Mosque Youth Communication Body (Badan Komunikasi 
Pemuda Masjid Indonesia, BKPMI, 1977), chaired by Salman Mosque 
figure, Toto Tasmara, Islamist ideas spread out even further through 
the activities of the mosque. The BKPMI also became a conduit for the 
ideas of Muslim movements from other parts of the Muslim world, 
especially that of the Ikhwan. Under Tasmara’s leadership, the BKPMI 
even officially adopted the idea of usroh as developed by the Ikhwan in 
Egypt.106 
 
The Shift in Dakwah Orientation 
The Leading Role of Middle East Graduates 
The Soeharto regime favoured the dakwah movement as it did not seem 
to have any political agenda and because it agreed with the regime’s 
politics of religion; to stop the comeback of Communism and Islamist 
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ideologies. Political developments in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
seemed to oppose the regime’s expectation. In late 1979, the 
‘normalisation of campus life’ policy radicalised students activism. The 
asas tunggal campaign in the early 1980s had a major impact on Muslim 
activism, radicalising its politics and provoking the re-emergence of 
Darul Islam/NII activists. Consequently, dakwah activism risked being 
infiltrated by jihadi cells.107 The student movement became increasingly 
weary of Soeharto and his cronies and their rampant corruption and 
they reacted by taking more radical steps. This was the more so when 
dakwah leaders like Imaduddin had become involved. This 
‘radicalisation’ of the students increased significantly in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. Because of this, the regime boosted a dakwah 
movement that was strongly devoted to religious orientations rather 
than to political activism. The Iranian revolution which started in 1979 
caused Soeharto to fear the emergence of intellectual Muslim activists 
who, inspired by the Iranian revolution, had embraced an Islamic 
universalist and fundamentalist creed to seek revolutionary social 
change in Indonesia. Liddle observes: 
 
Islamic universalism is a powerful creed on university campuses, 
especially at two major national universities in West Java, the 
Bandung Institute of Technology and the Bogor Agricultural Institute. 
Campus mosques at both institutions are well-known centres of 
Islamic study where, many believe, a new breed of religiously-devout 
cum technologically-sophisticated leaders of the umat is being 
created. The universalists have translated the writings of the Iranian 
intellectual Ali Shariati, and still follow closely the Iranian Islamic 
revolution.108 
 
This socio-political background seems to have favoured religious-
oriented movements such as the Tarbiyah to continue to exist and 
flourish and in time to replace the ‘radicalised’ campus dakwah 
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movement.109 The Tarbiyah was born out of this context and was 
established by graduates from Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt and Syria in the early 1980s.110 The leaders of the Tarbiyah 
initiated a new phase in the history of the dakwah movement in 
Indonesia and transformed the simple usroh model into a Tarbiyah 
model, thus hijacking, or say capitalising on the existing dakwah 
resources built up by Salman activists. This meant a shift away from the 
model of the campus dakwah movement that the Salman Movement 
promoted towards the pattern of the Tarbiyah inspired by the method 
(manhaj) of the Ikhwan.111 Tarbiyah activists utilised the dakwah 
network that had already been established by LMD alumni all over 
West Java and in Jakarta. Some Muslim figures who were involved as 
Tarbiyah trainers include Buya Malik Ahmad, Rahmat Abdullah, and 
Hilmi Aminuddin, as well as M. Daud Ali and Nurhay Abdurrahman who 
played important roles in activist training.112 Over time, the Tarbiyah 
began to gain ground in the ARH. This was reflected in the ‘defection’ of 
former LMD activists, among others Aus Hidayat Nur from the faculty of 
History and Literature, who became actively involved with the 
Tarbiyah.113 
In this shifting dakwah context, Salman’s pre-eminence in the 
campus dakwah movement declined in the early 1990s. Especially after 
the death of Ahmad Sadali, Salman Movement’s leadership weakened 
and failed to be consistent with the established Salman dakwah vision 
and cadre recruitment.114 This was not surprising since his successor, 
Professor Iftikar Zutalaksana, then-chairman of Salman Mosque 
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Construction Foundation (YPM), was not a well-trained Salman 
activist.115 The movement’s most important leadership training 
program, Intensive Islamic Study (Studi Islam Intensif, SII), began to 
suffer. The SII, which had been a successful cadre recruitment 
mechanism until this time, received insufficient attention from the 
Salman leadership. 
 
The Promotion of the Ikhwan Vision 
Intense cultural exchange between Indonesian and Middle Eastern 
countries paved the way for intellectual exchange, especially from the 
Middle East to Indonesia. The introduction of the thoughts of Ikhwan’s 
intellectuals, including Hasan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, to campus 
dakwah activists was one such exchange. In Bandung, the early spread 
of the Ikhwan ideology, however, was very much the result of ties 
between the Salman Mosque and the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia 
(ABIM), which had been established in 1972. Imaduddin had lived for 
two years in Malaysia and had had intellectual exchange with ABIM’s 
activists.116 His connection with international Islamic organisations, 
such as the International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations 
(IIFSO), in which he served as General Secretary (1977-78), and the 
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) enabled him to become 
acquainted with the Ikhwan ideology.117 Salman activist, Hermawan 
Dipoyono, who Imaduddin had sent to Malaysia, stated that there, he 
found books authored by Qutb, Al-Banna, and Sa’id Hawwa.118 He took 
them home with him but at that time they could not be translated and 
published due to the regime’s surveillance measures against radical 
Islam. It was in this political setting that activists began to organise 
themselves in cells, popularly known as usroh. 
The usroh concept had been imported from Malaysia by another 
Salman activist, Toto Tasmara. In Malaysia, usroh had been adopted 
earlier because many Malaysian activists had studied at Middle Eastern 
universities.119 Usroh was initially a vehicle of Islamic propagation, 
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which originated from the thought of Hasan Al-Banna, the founder of 
the Ikhwan. Usroh groups were formed based on religious class groups 
and consisted of five to eight people led by a murabbi (teacher), who 
was their more senior mentor.120 The students realised that the 
government was not in favour of any radical ideas and of some of the 
Arabic books authored by Ikhwan members and thus the students only 
dared to translate part of these books and to circulate them among 
Salman activists and usroh groups.121 However, the spread of Ikhwan 
ideas was impeded by the covert nature of the usroh networks and the 
fact that Qutb’s books could not be reproduced in full. The 
dissemination of Ikhwan discourse increased significantly only after the 
publication of the Indonesian translation of Qutb’s Ma’alim fi al-Tariq 
(Signposts along the Road or Petunjuk Jalan in Indonesian) and other 
Ikhwan writings by the DDII’s publishing house in the early 1980s. 
It was under these circumstances that dakwah activities began to 
meet transnational radical thought, although its influence was not yet 
significant.122 During this era of leadership (1992-96), there was an 
endeavour by Tarbiyah activists to subvert Salman’s dakwah vision. 
This was possible because some Salman activists at that time were 
affiliated with the Campus Islamic Propagation League (Lembaga 
Dakwah Kampus, LDK) of the UI, which they had joined when still at 
senior high school in Jakarta before moving on to study at the ITB. Since 
the 1980s, the LDK of the UI has been known to be an important centre 
for Tarbiyah cadre recruitment. In Jakarta Tarbiyah mentors were able 
to manage and control the LDK of the UI and they used it as its 
recruitment and reproduction centre for the new generation of Muslim 
activists with a vision different from that of Salman’s. Hilmi Aminuddin 
and Rahmat Abdullah are known to have been the main mentors in 
theTarbiyah recruitment training sessions in Jakarta. 
By the late 1980s, the Tarbiyah had consolidated its presence at 
the ITB. This enabled it to temporarily control Salman Movement’s 
leadership and to modify its vision and orientation between 1992 and 
1996.123 One big change was the de-emphasising of Salman’s 
intellectual and cultural commitment and a shift in emphasis to harakah 
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(political activism) and to a shari’ah mind-set. The consequence of this 
shift was that the movement acquired a more exclusive character at the 
expense of its inclusive tolerance. Gender segregation, for example, was 
strictly observed. Salman’s office hours were divided into female 
(akhwat) and male (ikhwan) ones.124 Boys and girls were still able to 
interact or communicate but could not make eye contact. Budhiana, a 
former Salman activist now heading the YPM research and 
development department, recounted that where an akhwat needed her 
ikhwan’s signature for work, this was done with their faces turned away 
from each other.125 
Tarbiyah means education or training. This movement’s vision 
and ideology are very much the same as those of the Ikhwanul 
Muslimin in Egypt, the socio-religious movement established by Hassan 
Al-Banna. In the early 1980s Tarbiyah activists returned home having 
graduated from universities in the Middle East. They joined the dakwah 
activism organised by the LDK on campuses across Java. One important 
centre of Tarbiyah activism was the LDK of the Arif Rahman Hakim 
Mosque. When the New Order regime collapsed in 1998, the Tarbiyah 
movement declared the foundation of the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan 
- PK; from 2004 onwards, Prosperity and Justice Party - PKS) which the 
LDK supported. This political manoeuvre of the Tarbiyah movement 
once again underlines its difference from Salman which from the outset 
emphasised that it was a religious, cultural and intellectual movement 
and not a political one. When its alumni who were active in the PK/PKS 
pulled out of the Salman Movement to join – or support – the Tarbiyah 
movement’s party, the Salman leadership firmly refused because it 
considered itself the property of the entire Muslim community and not 
of any specific Islamic party or Muslim group.126 The leaders of the 
Salman Mosque rejected any political alliance and firmly maintained 
their commitment to remain neutral towards all Muslim political 
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forces.127 For them, alliance to a particular party would cause Salman to 
take sides which would violate its inclusive vision. 
 
What Made the Shift Possible? 
Readers may want to know why the Tarbiyah was able to displace the 
prominent position of the Salman dakwah movement among campus 
activists. The reason is because the Salman Movement was an open-
minded institution and liberal in its orientation. The Movement did not 
insist on a single reference or orientation of the Islamic ideology of its 
members because it did not have a coherent and solid ideology of its 
own as mentioned above. As a consequence, the Movement became a 
breeding ground for diverse intellectual discourses as well as various 
ideological orientations. Its alumni, who spread out to mosques on 
campuses all over Indonesia, were free to choose or promote whatever 
intellectual or ideological orientation on their return to their respective 
universities. The Salman movement’s role as a centre of Muslim 
activism turned it into fertile soil for the reproduction of a wide range 
of discourses. It is true that from early on, the Salman Movement’s 
young intellectuals had been under the guidance of Mohammad Natsir 
who was inclined to adopt a strict Modernist understanding of Islam. 
But Natsir, as Hefner emphasised, was also a more open minded 
intellectual than his colleague, Isa Anshari. Similarly, although 
Imaduddin, the most influential of all Salman leaders, had a short fuse, 
he was nonetheless relatively intellectually open-minded as Miftah 
Faridl, his close friend stressed.128 Evidently, he displayed no hostility 
to Nurcholish’s basic argument for Islamic reform, whereas his friends 
Endang Saefuddin Anshari and Abdul Qadir Jaelani were vehemently 
opposed to Nurcholish’s thoughts. The charismatic Imaduddin showed 
his aptitude to act as mediator when tension among his friends 
mounted. When conflict arose after Nurcholish had expressed his 
reform ideas, Imaduddin took the initiative to reconcile Nurcholish and 
his opponents in his house in Bandung shortly before he left for 
Malaysiain the early 1970s.129 By so doing, Imaduddin had revealed 
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leadership and intellectualism that configured the Salman Mosque’s 
intellectual orientation. 
At times, articulations of radical Islam indeed did surface in the 
Salman Movement such as passages of Ikhwan books mentioned above, 
but, once again, there were no strong radical tendencies as there was no 
solid ideological soil in which radicalism could take root. It seems that 
the radical tendencies that did emerge came up as a means of 
opposition to the New Order regime’s brutal oppression of student 
movements. It is undeniable that the Salman Movement initiated the 
introduction of Ikhwan Islamist thought among Muslim student 
activists in Indonesia.130 LMD training sessions, for instance, clearly 
emulated the dakwah method of the Egyptian Ikhwanul Muslimin but 
its training materials were not derived from the Ikhwan but were in 
part compiled by Imaduddin and Miftah Faridl131 while part of them 
were modifications of the Basic Struggle Values of the Muslim Student 
Association (NDP-HMI) drawn up by Nurcholish Madjid and friends as 
mentioned above.132 
No single Ikhwan figure became a fixed point of reference. The 
Salman Movement not only embraced aspects (adoption of shari’ah law, 
return to the core sources of Islam, the Quran and hadith and the 
instalment of Islamic social justice and so forth) of the politically-
oriented discourse of Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, it also 
appreciated the less politicised and more religious Albani, the 
progressive Yusuf al-Qardhawi, and the rationalist Juhaili. At the same 
time, Salman Mosque’s publishing house, Pustaka, published the 
Indonesian translation of Islam, the book written by the liberal thinker 
Fazlur Rahman. Imaduddin, considered one of Salman Mosque’s most 
Islamist-oriented leaders, was in fact proud of the Pakistani-born 
intellectual, who had fled Pakistan to settle in the USA seeking to renew 
his Islamic thought.133 When he was in the USA to pursue his PhD in the 
1980s, Imaduddin became acquainted with Fazlur Rahman at Chicago 
University and he invited him to deliver a lecture at his alma mater, the 
State University of Iowa. The reason for the Salman Movement’s 
inclusive attitude is that, according to the chairman of the Salman 
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Mosque Islamic Propagation Development Board, ‘As long as it is 
possible from a rational point of view, we accept anybody.’134 Thus, 
rather than standing for radical Islamism, on the contrary, the Salman 
Movement facilitated the pluralisation of Islamic thought because 
Salman activists realised its reality. Salman activists argue that under 
this condition the “Salman Movement was no longer the undivided 
point of orientation; there were many models and we here realised that 
we were no longer the only one.”135 
Against this backdrop, signs of polarisation within the dakwah 
movement resurfaced in the 1980s, when Muslim activists and 
intellectuals failed to cope with the growing pluralisation and 
politicalisation within the movement. Apart from the Tarbiyah, 
polarisation within the dakwah movement gave birth to the Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) and the Salafis.136 
The HTI was founded in 1983 in Bogor at the Bogor Agricultural 
Institute (IPB) and it used Pesantren Alghazali in Bogor as its religious 
stronghold. The HTI’s founding fathers are the Abdullah bin Nuh, the 
head of the pesantren and lecturer in Arabic literature at the UI, Abd al-
Rahman al-Baghdadi, Hizbut Tahrir activist from Australia, and Mustafa 
Bin Nuh’s son who studied in Jordan and who was involved in the 
Hizbut Tahrir movement there.137 Al-Baghdadi later joined the teaching 
staff at LIPIA (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab/the Institute 
of the Study of Islam and Arab).138 
The HTI’s expansion also rode on campus dakwah networks that 
began to flourish in the course of the 1980s. HTI shares much with 
other campus movements in terms of its concern about leadership, 
fraternity, and intellectualism. It differs profoundly from other dakwah 
groups in its goal, which is the reestablishment of the world-wide 
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Caliphate.139 For the Hizbut Tahrir, the Islamic Caliphate is the ideal 
form of government and it considers it obligatory to fight for it. The 
struggle to reinstall the Caliphate is to be accomplished in three phases: 
first, build a cadre, second interaction with society, while the third phase 
is the takeover of power. 
Initially, HTI activists joined the Tarbiyah in its use of the campus 
dakwah network, which originated in Salman’s LMD in order to 
disseminate their ideas and to recruit members. However, competition 
eventually saw HTI part ways with the others. The Tarbiyah formed the 
Indonesian Muslim Students Action Unit (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa 
Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI), whereas the student activists of the Hizbut 
Tahrir formed the Student Movement for Liberation (Gema 
Pembebasan). In order to organise dakwah on the campuses, Tarbiyah 
cells congregated in the Campus Islamic Propagation Board Friendship 
Forum (Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus Daerah, FSLDK) 
while HTI students gathered in the Campus Islamic Propagation 
Coordination Body (Badan Koordinasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, 
BKLDK).140 
Although some alumni from the Salman Mosque joined the HTI, 
there was neither cooperation nor confrontation between the two. 
However, politically, the Hizbut Tahrir is clearly more radical than the 
Tarbiyah. Nevertheless, Hizbut Tahrir activists do not resort to force to 
intervene with the Salman Movement and therefore the Salman 
Movement is careful to maintain good relations with its alumni who are 
active in the Hizbut Tahrir even though relations are ‘limited to mere 
discussions.’141 
Apart from transnational politics, Muslim activism’s national 
political arena was extended with the return of Darul Islam 
underground cells. Sources close to Darul Islam’s old leaders claimed 
that in the 1970s, the movement “had already shown signs of 
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revival.”142 For this reason, it is possible that Gen. Ali Moertopo rebuilt 
the Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia (DI/NII) organisation only to 
crush it later, ironically, after he initially intended to use it to counter 
Communism.143 The crackdown of more than a hundred ex-Darul Islam 
followers only a few months before the 1977 elections hints at the 
proponents’ aims of the reactivation of ex-Darul Islam.144 Regardless, 
some cells went underground due to military oppression and looked for 
safe shelter in campus dakwah movements. This specific aspect has not 
yet been studied in full but probably deserves more attention than it 
has received so far. 
The picture that does emerge when we look a bit further in 
history is the following. In the 1970s, the Salman Mosque was in danger 
of being used for recruitment by DI/NII activists known under the name 
of Darul Islam (DI) Muda (Young Darul Islam).145 This group, as its 
name suggests, inherited the DI/NII ideology of Kartosoewirjo who had 
declared the founding of the NII in May 1948 in Garut, West Java. In 
1962-63, the government obliterated the group but the NII ideology did 
not die but was rather transmitted to a new generation that shared its 
dreams of an Islamic state.146 They tried but failed to infiltrate the 
Salman Mosque which, at that time, indeed tended towards radical 
action. 
Although they managed to recruit a number of Salman Mosque 
activists, they failed to prevail over the Salman Movement ideologically 
because of their militancy.147 An ex-NII activist admitted that, in the 
end, “we became disappointed with the Salman Movement and were 
more compatible with the Shiites.”148 According to one NII activist, the 
Shiite revolutionary spirit that had succeeded in toppling Shah Reza 
Pahlevi in Iran in 1979 had drawn the NII to its teachings and they had 
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started to build communications with Shiite leaders in Bandung. In fact, 
Shiite teaching attracted activists not only from NII but also from 
Salman Movement backgrounds. The Salman Mosque organised studies 
on Shiism, and pictures of Imam Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian 
revolution, started to appear on book covers and on the vehicles of 
student activists. The Salman Movement again revealed its open-
minded character by allowing Shiite admirers (and followers) to use its 
forums. It even translated and published books from authors with a 
Shiite background, such as Ali Shariati and Murtadha Muthahari along 
with those from Ikhwan and Salafi backgrounds and liberal thinkers. 
The Salafi Movement was born in the context of rising Shiite 
influence. It originated from LIPIA in Jakarta, which is a branch of the 
Muhammad Ibnu Saud University in Riyadh. This Saudi-funded college 
played the most crucial role as the agent for the ‘salafisation’ of Muslim 
activists. This group has been present in secular universities across Java 
since the early 1980s and increased its presence in the early 1990s.149 
In training activities conducted in the 1980s, graduates from 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt sometimes combined principles stemming from 
both Salafi “true Islamic” theology and the Ikhwan model of activism 
and training. This collaboration was undertaken for the promotion of 
halaqah and daurah at campuses. The orientation of their training 
program was popularly labelled “Aqidah Salafi, Manhaj Ikhwani.” (Salafi 
in belief, Ikhwan in methodology).150 This brand explicitly shows the 
influences of two of the most important trans-national Islamist 
movements, the Saudi-based Salafi and the Egyptian Ikhwan, and at the 
same time indexes the further political and social differentiation of both 
groups. According to a Salman Mosque activist who later became a 
Salafi figure, Salafi teachings started to enter West Java in the early 
1990s. The Salman Mosque itself had by that time already become 
mixed with various other movements so that the presence of the Salafis 
was not all too obvious.151 
Distinct from Tarbiyah, HTI and the NII, the Salafi Movement is ‘a-
political’ and spends all its resources to engage in the direct 
propagation of pure Islam, even by going from door to door. In contrast 
to Modernist Islamic groups who refer to the Quran and the Sunnah by 
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using their own reasoning (such as the Muhammadiyah and PERSIS), or 
Traditionalists who refer to their religious experts (ulama such as the 
NU), the Salafis claim to understand the Quran through the 
interpretation of the close companions of the Prophet. Salafis are 
Revivalists who consider the way of life during the lifetime of the 
Prophet and his close companion as ideal. Hence, Salafis supplant into 
the present what they imagine to have been the way of life during the 
Prophet’s time, for instance by dressing themselves as they think the 
close companions of the Prophet dressed and by adopting the close 
companions’ interpretation of their morals.152 
The Salafis claim to follow the example of the Prophet by 
engaging in dakwah.153 Like the Modernist Muhammadiyah and PERSIS, 
the Salafis refuse to observe religious celebrations they consider 
deceitfully innovative (bid’a) such as mauludan and tahlilan. Moreover, 
they reject music, which they consider prohibited by religion and they 
are opposed to Sufi orders. The Salafis are not a single entity. Some 
Salafi take an a-political stance and focus fully on dakwah; others take 
the radical road, such as Jafar Umar Thalib, who founded Laskar Jihad, 
which was involved in the religious conflicts in Ambon.154 
Although some Salman Mosque activists became Salafi, the 
Salman Movement has no organisational ties with them. Abu Chaidar, a 
Salman activist who was attracted to Salafi teachings, swiftly left 
Salman for the LIPIA where he immersed himself in Salafi teachings and 
subsequently became the most prominent Salafi teacher in West Java. 
He used to consider the Salman Mosque as his most ideal ‘home’, but 
nowadays, after having reached maturity, his most ideal ‘house’ is that 
of the Salafi. He was also formerly active in PERSIS’ religious activities, 
but after having studied at LIPIA he abandoned it because, he insisted, 
of the deviant aqidah PERSIS held.155 For him, PERSIS’ religious 
teachings conform largely to the interpretation of its religious teachers 
and are not based on the Prophetic traditions and the understanding of 
his pious companions. Concerning aqidah, Abu Chaidar also criticised 
the articulation of tauhid as promoted by Imaduddin in his popular 
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book Kuliah Tauhid.156 For Abu Chaidar, Imaduddin has no background 
in religious training so his teaching about tauhid has no strong 
foundation. Abu Chaidar also criticises the PKS for its use of Islam for its 
political interests. More recently, the ITB campus for the first time 
witnessed the increased presence of the Salafi community on its 




Undoubtedly, the Salman Movement is a sustained effort to promote 
Islamisation and to articulate Muslims’ religious identity and social 
interests in the big cities where the new middle class was taking shape 
and educated generations of observing Muslims began to come to towns 
in pursuit of tertiary education.158 This dakwah movement contributed 
to at least three achievements in the process of deepening Islamisation. 
The first was in influencing the Islamisation of the educated classes, 
particularly those with nominal Muslim backgrounds, at the Bandung 
Institute of Technology (ITB). The movement offered a moral 
foundation amidst rapid social change, rampant state corruption, and 
moral degeneration within society through a proper understanding of 
the values of tauhid, personal devotion, and piety. 
Second, by emphasising tauhid, the movement did not pretend to 
promote any single ideology. This stand, however, meant that the vision 
of the Salman Movement was at times diluted by intruding ideologies 
such as those of the Tarbiyah, Hizbut Tahrir, Salafis, Shiites and the NII. 
Nonetheless, it is certain that the Salman Movement stands apart and 
remains true to its identity. It remains part of the overall Muslim 
community and is not appropriated by nor allied with any specific 
Islamist group. However, by not adopting a particular Islamist ideology, 
the Salman Movement failed to keep its alumni from aligning 
themselves with the above models of dakwah activism, which were 
attractive to some but not all of them. But again, the Salman movement, 
by not aligning itself with any specific Islamist group, became home to 
Muslim communities from different backgrounds, accommodating a 
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variety of different and even opposing thoughts, and remained 
consistent with its vision as an open, non-sectarian, cultural-intellectual 
movement aloof from partisan politics. 
Thirdly, with its characteristic open-minded vision, the Salman 
Movement was instrumental in the creation of Dakwahism and was 
instrumental in providing the setting for the expansion of various 
dakwah networks spanning Islamic activities on campuses and on 
senior high schools in and around Bandung. It is worth considering 
whether the Salman movement influenced, or was independent from, 
the process of deepening Islamisation across rural West Java, such as 
Lembang and Sumedang. If the Islamisation of these rural areas 
occurred independently of the Salman movement, both can be 
understood within the wider context of social transformation and the 
further and intensified Islamisation of West Java. However, as the 
question remains, further research is recommended in order to provide 
a clearer understanding of the Islamisation process of West Java. For 
example, if the Salman movement contributed to the Islamisation of 
these areas, it is still unclear how the Salman Mosque’s dakwah 
























OBSERVING ALIRAN KEBATINAN‘S DECLINE AND ITS 
STRUGGLE TO REVIVE IN RURAL WEST JAVA (1998-2011) 
 
 
Above we have seen the impact of the New Order’s policy on religions 
on deeper Islamisation and on the steady development of Dakwahism 
after Muslim student leaders took the initiative in leading campus 
dakwah and transformed the ITB into the centre for dakwah activists. 
This development had significant consequences for society, particularly 
among Muslims in urban areas. This case study examines the process of 
Islamisation in Lembang and tries to answer the question of how Islam 
entered rural areas and how it built the institutions that increasingly 
influenced and changed the religious life of the Sundanese. This chapter 
goes back briefly to the development starting in the 1950s of Islamic 
institutions in three different villages across rural Lembang and 
discusses the effects of dakwah institutions and organisations on 
deeper Islamisation. The second major question addressed in this 
chapter is how the Aliran Kebatinan defended itself during the process 
of deepening Islamisation and what enabled it to endure and eventually 
to revive. As case studies, I have selected Aliran Kebatinan Perjalanan 
(AKP) and Budidaya, both coming from the same roots and asserting 
significant influence in Lembang, West Java. 
 
Social Change that Leads to Islamisation 
Lembang’s Geography and Socio-Demography 
Lembang is located in West Bandung, south of Subang which border is 
only a few kilometres away. Lembang and Subang are separated by the 
famous Tangkuban Perahu Volcano. Lembang is located across 
mountainous highlands, parts of which belong to Subang territory. 
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Perhaps because of this geographic nexus, the AKP native-syncretic 
movement easily penetrated to the south, that is, from Lembang in West 
Bandung down to Ciparay in the east from which it expanded in the 
eastern region towards the north, across Sumedang, Majalengka, and 
Cirebon. There was also a sprinkling of AKP followers in Ciamis and 
Tasikmalaya.159 
Since the 1920s, Lembang, like Subang and Bandung, became a 
stronghold of the nationalist movement and home to the Indonesian 
Nationalist Party (PNI).160 The territorial propinquity of three 
nationalist bases strengthened the ideological network across the area. 
This also inspired the breeding of nationalist and native-syncretic 
movements such as the AKP. While the movement was founded in 
Subang, its influence has flowed down south, where it emerged 
stronger. In Lembang, a road map of AKP influence would begin in 
Mekarwangi and continue across Langansari, Pagarwangi, Kayu Ambon, 
Cibogo, Cikole, Cikidang down to the village of Wangunharja. It thus 
formed a circle across the mountainous Lembang district throughout 
agricultural lands.161 
The Lembang district occupies 10,620 ha and consists of 16 
villages. According to data recently published by the District 
Administration Office, Lembang’s total population is 156,078162 of 
which 14,446 persons are peasants who work as labourers in the 
agricultural industry, 11,562 people till the land while 6,047 are 
livestock farmers. 3,561 Persons work in informal sectors, 775 are 
entrepreneurs and 1804 work in small-scale enterprises. More than 
5,000 people are employed by the government as civil servants, 
soldiers and members of the police force.163 The vast majority of 
Budidaya followers are peasants and many of them are low-income 
workers. The General Secretary of the West Bandung Budidaya branch, 
Asep Hari, is a peasant. Given that the livelihood of the majority of the 
people depends to a large extent on the availability and affordability of 
land for rent or purchase, land is a major issue in the region. 
Lembang is home to 148,263 Muslims, 5,200 Protestants and 
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2,502 Catholics and the remaining includes some Buddhists and Hindus. 
From the total Muslim population, 87,651 are categorised as tithe-
payers (muzakki).164 In terms of contributions to Islamic propagation 
(dakwah), state organs played a role in supporting Islamic institutions, 
but this support was not as significant compared to that provided in 
Cimanggung, Sumedang (as discussed in Chapter Three). Successful 
dakwah efforts across Lembang over the last five decades depended 
primarily on help from individuals from private and civil organisations. 
This demographic reality should provide sufficient caution 
against characterising Sunda as entirely Islamic. One Modernist leader 
argues that it is true that Islam has had an expansive presence 
throughout West Java but that it would be wrong to assume that the 
Sundanese possess an in-depth understanding or strict observance of 
Islam.165 There are some places in the region where Islamic influence 
was dominant and where Muslims were more observant than in other 
places. These include Tasikmalaya, Ciamis and Garut in the south, 
Majalengka and Sumedang in the centre, and Cianjur and Sukabumi in 
the west. Purwakarta, Subang, Indramayu, Karawang and Bandung are 
territories where Islamic influence was less significant.166 It is thus not 
surprising that since independence, Ciparay and Lembang, both in 
Bandung, became the bases of the native syncretic culture and currents.
 
The major Aliran Kebatinan organisation, the AKP, was strong in 
this region, especially in the 1940s and 1950s, but has weakened since 
the 1970s. In the 1980s it was divided, giving birth to a new 
organisation named Budidaya. While this split added to the drop in 
Aliran Kebatinan’s influence, it is interesting that Budidaya has survived 
and retains a following there to date. In the meantime, Islam permeated 
into Lembang since the 1950s, and its doctrine and institutions were 
promoted in this established native-syncretic community, which in the 
end changed society. 
 
Muslim Migration into Lembang 
Readers should notice that the socio-political contexts during the 1940s 
to the 1960s had a tremendous impact on religious development across 
                                                          
164  Data collected from Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama, KUA), 
Lembang, 27 July 2010. 
165  Interview, Dody S. Truna, Bandung, 3 April 2009. 
166  Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 14 July 2010. 
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West Java, especially in Lembang. The political context was the Darul 
Islam (DI) rebellion, which caused social and political damage, anxiety 
and bloodshed and a forced migration of observing Muslims into other 
places in the region. Kees van Dijk's, Rebellion under the Banner of 
Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia, sheds much light to understanding 
the damage the Darul Islam rebellion had on Sundanese society from its 
declaration in 1948 until its extermination in 1962. He points out that 
the rebellion had inflicted material damage and changed the lives of 
many people in West Java. He said “in the first quarter of 1952, Darul 
Islam inflicted damage to the tune of Rp. 9,981,366,- and 11,016 people 
were evacuated or fled their homes. From 1955 to 1962 the number of 
evacuees fluctuated between 209,355 in 1962 and 303,764 in 1958.”167 
As hundreds of thousands of people evacuated from the areas and 
thousands of them fled their homes, there was thus a large number of 
migrants who entered secure places across West Java. 
Hiroko Horikoshi in her study on the Darul Islam movement 
argued that the DI’s insurgents jeopardised the internal security in the 
Priangan and thus brought about the general deterioration of the social 
conditions in this area which in the end created serious social and 
economic damage.168 Horikoshi observes: 
 
In the next decade Indonesia underwent both political and 
economical decline, and in Priangan the virtual absence of internal 
security caused by the DI insurgents contributed to the general 
deterioration of social conditions. Refugees from the fertile Priangan 
hills and plains flooded the major cities, thereby increasing the urban 
population along with the number of administrative problems.  A 
sudden drop in agricultural productivity and a virtual cessation of 
commodity flows between regions, resulting from disruptions of the 
transportation system, worsened the already inflationary conditions 
in DI areas. The possibility of destroying the DI began to emerge only 
after the political climate in Jakarta changed in the early 1960s when 
Guided Democracy was put into effect.169 
 
In the Lembang case, the refugees or migrants included Muslims 
like religious teachers (ustadz) such as Haji Muhammad Ishak and Haji 
                                                          
167  Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, p. 105. 
168  Hiroko Horikoshi,  ‘The Dar ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1948-62): An 
Experience in the Historical Process’, Indonesia, Vol. 20 (Oct., 1975), p. 77. 
169  Idem. 
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Mohammad Otong from Tasikmalaya and Haji Syarif Muhidin from 
Garut. The other important migrants were Haji Junaidi from Cianjur and 
Haji Ahmad Masduki from Central Jawa.170 In their new surroundings, 
the migrants worked and lived a normal life. Those who were trained in 
Islamic schools or pesantrens brought Islamic values and practices with 
them. In a simple way, in their new social environment, the 
Traditionalists sought to maintain what they were obliged to perform 
according to the Islamic laws and doctrines they adhered to. They 
prayed, fasted, read the Quran and celebrated festivals including 
mauludan, rajaban, nisfu sha’ban and others.171 As they had to pray the 
communal Friday prayers, they struggled to build mosques for that 
purpose.172 Having inherited Islamic traditions and living the Islamic 
way, practicing Muslims played important roles in promoting Islamic 
practices and in organising dakwah activities and hence in furthering 
the Islamisation of Lembang. 
Let me take Haji Mohammad Otong by way of example, even 
though other Muslim leaders may have made greater contributions. Haji 
Mohammad Otong was born in Tasikmalaya and attended Pesantren 
Cintawana in Tasik and Pesantren Sempur in Purwakarta. In 1960 he 
moved to Lembang to escape the DI/TII rebellion. With his religious 
training, ustadz Otong served as a religious teacher while promoting 
Islamic propagation (dakwah). This helped in his proposal to marry 
Mariam, the daughter of Haji Mohammad Toyib, then a well-known 
figure in Nyelindung Cikole, Lembang, and after his marriage, he joined 
his father-in-law in strengthening dakwah in the village. He used the 
mosque established by Haji Mohammad Toyib as the centre for 
religious and educational activities. By 1968 he established an Islamic 
elementary school named Madrasah Ibtidaiyyah (MI) in the mosque’s 
compound. After a few years, many people of different social 
backgrounds came to study at the madrasah and attended religious 
activities in the mosque compound. As the religious activities increased, 
the mosque and the madrasah became centres of dakwah and 
increasingly counterbalanced Aliran Kebatinan practices and activities 
                                                          
170  Interview, Haji Tatang Haidar, Lembang, 28 July 2010 and ustadz Asep, 
Bandung, 1 September 2014. 
171  See Glossary. 
172  Interview, Haji Tatang Haidar, Lembang, 28 July 2010 and ustadz Asep, 
Bandung, 1 September 2014. 
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in the village.173 It is worth noting that Muslim individuals such as 
religious teachers who organised informal religious activities in private 
residences and in mosques had contributed substantially to introducing 
Islamic practices among the local people. And this success was 
strengthened by the increased presence of Islamic institutions such as 
mosques and madrasahs, pesantrens and others. As readers will see in 
what follows below, the growth of Islamic institutions very much 
helped the further expansion of dakwah activities among the local 
people in the rural areas of Lembang. 
 
The Growth of Islamic Institutions and the Transmission of its 
Doctrines 
As argued above, the migration of Muslims including the likes of 
religious teachers such as Haji Muhammad Ishak, Haji Otong, Haji 
Muhidin, Haji Junaidi and Haji Ahmad Masduki into Lembang, helped 
the consolidation of Dakwahism and Islamic institutions since the 
1960s, and this also factored in the Islamisation of Lembang in the 
following years.174 The growth of mosques as well as other institutions 
including Islamic schools (madrasah), Islamic boarding schools 
(pesantren), Islamic kindergarten (TPA) and Islamic religious group 
(majlis taklim) across the villages and districts was instrumental to this 
Islamisation. The mosques became centres of doctrine, worship, and of 
socio-religious activities. From the 1960s till 1970s, the most popular 
Islamic activity at mosques was learning the Quran and practicing daily 
prayers (solat). By the 1980s, the most popular Islamic activity was 
pengajian (learning the Quran and other religious subjects) at majlis 
taklim. These informal religious sessions organised in mosques or 
sometimes at private residences, attracted many people.175 In Cikole, 
Mekarwangi and Wangunharja, dakwah challenged the growth of the 
Aliran Kebatinan community.176 
Let us look at the development of Islamic institutions in 
                                                          
173  Interview, Haji Tajuddin, Lembang, 28 July 2010. 
174  Ibnu Hijar Apandi, ‘Sekilas Perkembangan Islam di Desa Wangunharja 
Kecamatan Lembang Kabupaten Bandung Barat’, unpublished document, 
Lembang, 26 March 2011. pp. 1-6. 
175  Interview, Haji Tatang Haidar, Lembang, 28 July 2010. 
176  Interview, Haji Tajuddin, Lembang, 28 July 2010. 
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Wangunharja village in Lembang as an example.177 Wangunharja is one 
of 14 villages located across the Lembang sub-district of West Bandung. 
In the 1940s to the 1960s, the majority of Wangunharja’s population 
were nominal Muslims. Mosques or dakwah efforts were rarely found. 
Folklore was a big element in popular culture and the commoners were 
devoted of mystical practices such as ruwatan, slametan, food offerings, 
et cetera.178 The Islamisation of the village took place slowly, with the 
1940s-1950s probably representing its initial stage. Muslim leaders in 
the village reported that this was when the first mosque was 
established before other Muslim institutions in subsequent decades. 
The gradual Islamisation began with the founding of the Al-Ikhlas 
Mosque in the sub-village of Cikawari. According to Masri Hidayat, the 
MUI head of Wangunharja village, the mosque was established in the 
1950s. Another Muslim leader, ustadz Soleh Abdullah, claimed that the 
mosque had been built even earlier, in the 1940s. The building of this 
mosque owed much to Muslim da’i (preacher) such as Haji Kosasih, R. 
Hidayat, Haji Mansyur and ustadz Iip Sadikin. However, the holding of 
the congregational Friday prayers attracted only a few people. In the 
1960s, the mosque augmented its dakwah activities by building an 
Islamic elementary school, named Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI) 
Cikawari.179 
In the 1960s, through the efforts of ustadz Iip Sadikin, Haji Idi 
Alisan and Ahi Syahidin two further mosques were established, al-Huda 
and al-Mukmin. This project was linked to the religious campaign held 
with the support of the early New Order Regime. Upon the failed coup 
attempt on 30 September 1965, government officials worked with local 
religious leaders to promote “operasi mental” (mental operation), 
encouraging people to embrace Islamic teachings. The government 
officials, with the help of local Islamic leaders, intensified dakwah 
across the village. They established the mosques in the hope that people 
would be blessed with divine guidance (al-huda) by which they might 
be persuaded to become believers (al-mukmin). So the names of these 
mosques refer to this dakwah objective by targeting Communist 
                                                          
177  This description largely rests on Ibnu Hijar Apandi, Sekilas Perkembangan 
Islam, pp. 1-6. 
178  Interview, Dede Atmaja, senior leader of Budidaya, Cikole, Lembang, 30 
September, 2009. 
179  Interview, MUI head of Wangunharja, Lembang, 27 July 2010. 
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sympathisers and those Sundanese who remained observing the adat 
and the legacies of their ancestors. 
From the 1970s to 2000s, six more mosques were built across the 
village including Miftahul Khoir, Nurul Arifin, Al-Hikmah, Nurul Iman, 
Al-Hidayah and Darussalam. Since dakwah activities centred in 
mosques they generally involved fewer female Muslims. However, since 
the mid-1980s, female Muslims began to hold regular congregations in 
the mosques and also they established a majlis taklim named al-
Hidayah (1984), reminiscent of the one of the same name organised by 
the New Order ruling party, Golkar.180 
In the early 1990s, the dakwah in Wangunharja village intensified 
with the establishment of Pesantren Salafiyah Ar-Rochma in 1993. The 
pesantren was established by ustadz Dedeng Abdul Hamid from Garut. 
With the help of his wife, Euis Mumih, ustadz Dedeng initially based his 
pesantren’s activities in the al-Huda mosque. This pesantren grew and 
eventually could afford the construction of its own building. In the 
following years, the pesantren introduced classes at kindergarten, 
secondary and high school levels. The development of this Islamic 
school paralleled that of the Madrasah Ibtidaiyah of Cikawari which was 
centred in the al-Ikhlas mosque. 
Due to the sustained interest in Islamic education, in 1991, Haji 
Otong from Tasikmalaya established a secondary school named 
Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs) Nurul Huda. In 1992, Haji Otong died and 
he was succeeded by his son, Haji Tajuddin who attempted to continue 
his predecessors’ dakwah albeit with some innovations. In 1994, he 
transformed Nurul Huda into an integrated boarding school named 
Pesantren Nurul Huda.181 He also established ties with the government 
to develop agro-business in the village. To this day, Muslims of Tasik 
descent still make important contributions to Lembang society. 
Amongst these is Aam Abdussalam, an important Muslim leader who 
graduated from Pesantren Sukahideng Tasikmalaya.182 Given the fact 
that Muslim leaders from Tasikmalaya come from Nahdlatul Ulama 
backgrounds, the socio-religious character of Lembang has been very 
much influenced by Muslim Traditionalism. 
In the 2000s, the Al-Mansuriyah Assa’adah foundation was 
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182  Interview, Haji Tatang Haidar, Lembang, 28 July 2010.  
-191- 
 
established with the objective of improving the educational levels of the 
people. The foundation also introduced new Islamic schools from 
kindergarten up to high school levels.183 
In 2007, Wangunharja female Muslims established another majlis 
taklim named al-Mubarak, which in Arabic means “the blessed.” Aside 
from these two majlis taklim, nearly every mosque in Wangunharja 
conducted Quranic recitation or other religious study sessions. These 
sessions were conducted by the Mosque Prosperity Council (DKM) with 
the support of the village office of the Indonesian Islamic Scholars’ 
Council (MUI). The development of dakwah in Wangunharja as visible 
in the growth of the number of mosques, madrasah and majlis taklim 
was similar to its development in other parts of Lembang.184 
From a handful of mosques in the 1950s, Lembang today has 151 
mosques, 105 langgar/mushalla. Each village has numerous mosques. 
There are 156 majlis taklim and 320 teachers of Quranic recitation 
classes across the region. There are also 88 khatibs (preachers for 
Friday prayer) and 38 muballighs (common preachers), dakwah 
institutions for children abound and include 53 Quranic Kindergartens 
(TPA), 28 Islamic Kindergartens and 5 Islamic Elementary Schools (MI). 
There are 5 Islamic Secondary Schools (MTs), 1 Islamic High School 
(MA), 1 Islamic Tertiary School and 4 pesantrens. Almost all of these 
institutions are owned privately or by organisations. In comparison, 
Lembang has 7 churches and 1 vihara.185 
The head of Cikole village, Adang Soabana, argues that 
institutional growth enabled the intensification of Islamic doctrines’ 
transmission leading to higher rates of conversion. Adang mentioned 
the RW 13 neighbourhood as an example where there is now a mosque 
with an active majlis taklim organised by adult female Muslims. During 
the 1980s and 1990s, the vast majority of the neighbourhood were 
Aliran Kebatinan adherents.186 
In Mekarwangi, the influence of Islam has very much deepened. 
                                                          
183  Ibnu Hijar Apandi, ‘Sekilas Perkembangan Islam’, p. 1. 
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185  Data collected from the Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama, 
KUA), Lembang, 27 July 2010. 
186  RW refers to Rukun Warga or an administrative unit in a village which 




During the 1960s-1980s, for example, Mekarwangi village was known 
as an important Aliran Kebatinan centre. By the mid-1980s, the number 
of Aliran Kebatinan followers reached into the thousands. Since the 
1990s, Islamisation, however, has decreased their strength. The pattern 
of Islamisation in Cikole and Mekarwangi was similar to that in 
Kampung Cibereum, Wangunharja.187 In the mid-1980s a mosque was 
established by Haji Mana and used to promote Islamic doctrines among 
adults and children with the establishment of a majlis taklim and a TPA. 
The most important doctrine the Islamic institutions addressed 
was the belief in the absolute unity of Allah, called tauhid 
(monotheism). Rejection of tauhid may lead to shirk (polytheism) or 
idolatry. Shirk means to associate or attribute anyone or anything with 
Allah and is regarded as an unforgivable act.188 My informant in 
Lembang, Haji Tatang Haidar, pointed out that the major point stressed 
in dakwah during the 1960s to the 1980s was aqidah, especially 
teaching monotheism (tauhid) and the Islamic pillars (rukun Islam).189 
This stressing point aimed to counter syncretic practices upheld by the 
people in the region which is regarded as a form of polytheism. 
Islamisation’s main focus was thus the promotion of monotheism which 
challenged the cultural syncretism especially the Penghayat upheld. 
 
Changing of Land Ownership 
The expansion of Islam over the last few decades has changed the 
structure of land-ownership through the increased demand for land by 
Muslims for dakwah usage, their own personal interests, or for a mix of 
dakwah and entrepreneurship. Haji Tajuddin, the owner of Pesantren 
Nurul Huda of Nyalindung, for example, owns a sizeable area of 
agricultural land. In the last couple of years, with the support of the 
Department of Agriculture, his pesantren was selected as a model for 
agro-business development. Haji Tajuddin said he established the 
pesantren for both economic and dakwah reasons: 
 
In the last couple of years we have sought a creative way of 
conducting dakwah by promoting agricultural initiatives rather than 
merely through preaching and teaching. To make this initiative a 
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dakwah, we included people from other faiths and cultural 
backgrounds. Many peasant members of the Penghayat community 
joined this agro-business program. We organised regular meetings 
with all peasants, often in mosques, in which the Penghayat 
participated too. When the time for prayer came, the Muslims went to 
pray while the Penghayat remained. Although they did not perform 
prayers, they joined us in this socio-economic interaction centred in 
the mosque. In order to make the business more viable, I am seeking 
more land to purchase in this area.190 
 
This shows religious expansion with an economic connection. 
Regarding land ownership, the expansion of agro-business will 
automatically require the purchase of more land in the village, which 
will increase land prices. While this project is still in the pipeline, I have 
been informed that in Wangunhardja, a village several kilometres from 
Nyalindung, land prices have gone up, ultimately causing 
unemployment in the village as poor Penghayat farmers can no longer 
afford to rent land to make a living.191 It is also true that the population 
growth in this area has become another factor in the rise of 
unemployment. 
Asep Hari was anxious about the concentration of agricultural 
land in the hands of people from outside the village or by the wealthy in 
the village. He stated that these land holders included, for instance, the 
chairman of the consultative assembly of the Prosperity and Justice 
Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), popularly called Pak Haji. Pak 
Haji is said to have purchased approximately 100,000 square metres in 
Cibereum in Wangunharja village in 2009. Some people in the village 
believe that it was the PKS that bought the land although the 
transaction was carried out in Pak Haji’s name. Wangunharja’s village 
secretary, Entar Sutarya, said that to the best of his knowledge, the land 
purchased was to be used for social needs, that is, for the construction 
of a training centre. Prior to the transaction, the land was used to grow 
hardwood trees. According to Entar, there is serious concern about this 
transaction among the villagers, some of whom protested due to the 
fact that the transaction raised land prices. Most recently, the PKS used 
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philanthropic funds from Kuwait for the construction of mosques and 
for the execution of socio-religious programs in the village. 
For poor people in the village, this price hike creates huge 
economic problems as it places the land outside their financial capacity 
to rent, let alone to purchase. Since 2010, the unemployment rate in the 
village has increased significantly and caused an unprecedented exodus 
of villagers seeking work overseas as Indonesian Workers (Tenaga 
Kerja Indonesia, TKI). The village has never before seen emigration on 
this scale. Asep Hari’s concern about this problem led him to meet with 
Pak Haji. In the meeting Pak Haji claimed that the land was taken over 
to create a community project and to promote human resource 
development and training, especially for disadvantaged locals. Until 
now, the anticipated community project has yet to be realised. Asep 
Hari’s attempt at obtaining an explanation as to why Pak Haji’s promise 
never materialised received no satisfactory answer.192 Rather, what Pak 
Haji and his allies from PKS seemed to have done was to help dakwah 
activities in the village with philanthropic funds from the Middle East. 
For the Penghayat in the village, the dakwah programs the PKS 
promoted with aid from Arab countries is unacceptable.193 A Penghayat 
in Wangunharja protested why the mosque, constructed as an Islamic 
trust (wakaf), was built in the village office compound whereas the land 
is owned by the state and therefore its use for mosque construction 
should have been prevented. 
 
Aliran Kebatinan in Decline 
The Weakening of the Syncretic Basis 
With the significant growth of Islamic institutions and considerable 
spread of Islamic doctrines and dakwah in Lembang since the mid-
1960s, Islam grew steadily in sharp contrast to Aliran Kebatinan’s 
constant decline. The introduction of Islamic institutions and the 
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practices they promoted came at the expense of Sundanese syncretic 
practices such as sesajen, ruwatan and wayang performances, which 
were observed especially in mountainous areas. This decline resulted 
from the weakening of, to borrow Geertz’ phrase, ‘the syncretic basis’194 
of the Sundanese culture on the one hand, and internal divisions within 
AKP, on the other.195 
Gauging by the increased attendance at the mosques and 
pengajian sessions conducted by religious teachers, popular adherence 
to Islam increased significantly. All the religious teachers I met 
admitted their involvement in teaching the people in the mosques and 
in their surroundings in Lembang to read and understand the Quran, 
the aqidah (Islamic theology), and the ibadat (Islamic compulsorary 
worship).196 These teachers usually came from a Traditionalist 
pesantren background in which they had been instructed by using many 
standard textbooks, commonly known as kitab kuning (yellow books). 
The teachers told me that in their teaching they went back to what they 
had learned from these books, such as, for instance, Tijan al-Durari197 
and Tuhfatul Murid198 authored by Shaikh Ibrahim al-Bajuri (d. 1860), 
and Jauharat al-Tauhid by Shaikh Ibrahim al-Laqqani (d. 1631) on 
aqidah. Textbooks on Islamic law they mentioned include the Safinat al-
Najah by Shaikh Salim bin Sumair al-Hadrami (d. 1271 A.H), Bulugul 
Maram by Ibnu Hajar al-‘Asqalani (d. 1449) and Kifayat al-Akhyar199 by 
Imam Taqiyuddin bin Muhammad al-Husaini (d. 829 A.H). Of course 
they were very well versed in the contents of one of the most significant 
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195  The leadership crisis of the AKP has split the movement into three groups. 
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tafsirs for the study of the Quran, namely Tafsir Jalalain authored by 
Jalaluddin al-Mahalli (d. 1459) and Jalaluddin al-Suyuti (d. 1505). Last 
but not least mention should be made of Ihya’ Ulumuddin, one of the 
best Islamic works in Sufism and ethics by Imam al-Ghazali (d. 1111).200 
Their socio-religious background as Traditionalists enabled them to 
approach the people in Lembang to embrace Islam without being 
confrontational but rather through friendly and appealing ways.201 
The Islamisation of Lembang was also linked to the region’s 
prevailing social and political dynamics. With deep Islamisation and 
social change during the New Order, Aliran Kebatinan followers faced 
many social constraints, particularly in matters of education, 
employment and marriage. Adang Soabana explained that proof of one’s 
official religion had to be produced when seeking admission to schools, 
in applications for work and to register marriages. Thus, he maintained 
that Aliran Kebatinan adherents faced religious discrimination when 
looking for employment.202 School admission forms require applicants 
to answer a question about their religion or the religion of their 
parents. As a result, pupils whose parents adhere to Aliran Kebatinan 
must choose one of the five official religions, namely Islam, 
Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism in order to be 
admitted to schools because each pupil has to be instructed in one of 
these religions.203  
Furthermore, all pupils must follow religious studies (pelajaran 
agama) and sit compulsory exams on the subject. This requirement 
induces them to learn about religious doctrines, particularly Islam and 
to interact with their Muslim schoolmates. This social interaction has to 
some extent increased their knowledge and interest in Islam, resulting 
in conversions from Aliran Kebatinan to Islam among the youth.204 
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Islamisation progressively undermined Aliran Kebatinan’s native-
syncretic culture and caused disruptions in, to borrow Geertz’ phrase, 
the ‘simple uniformity of religious belief’of the Penghayats in Lembang 
as well as in other parts of West Java.205 This transformation 
corresponds to the changes that took place among the Javanese in the 
mid-twentieth century in East Java as Geertz observed.206 Geertz noted 
that the syncretic basis of Javanese culture has changed since the first 
half of the twentieth century. He argued: 
 
.......in all but the most isolated parts of Java, both the simple 
territorial basis of village social integration and the syncretic basis of 
its cultural hegemony have been progressively undermined over the 
past fifty years. Population growth, urbanization, monetization, 
occupational differentiation, and the like, have combined to weaken 
the traditional ties of peasant social structure; and the winds of 
doctrines which have accompanied the appearance of these structural 
changes have disturbed the simple uniformity of religious belief and 
practice characteristic of an earlier period. The rise of nationalism, 
Marxism, and Islamic reform as ideologies, which resulted in part from 
the increasing complexity of Javanese society, has affected not only the 
large cities where these creeds first appeared and have always had 
their greatest strength, but has had heavy impact on the smaller towns 
and villages as well.207 
 
This impact was increasingly apparent following the momentous 
changes in the mid-1960s, especially after the failed 30 September 1965 
coup attempt. The attempt that killed six generals and a young daughter 
of general Nasution’s, caused serious political turmoil. Rex Mortimer 
observed the developments after the abortive action, arguing that 
“although Soekarno insisted on devising a political solution to the crisis, 
and formidable punitive action, the army moved on its own volition to 
ban PKI activities, arrest Communists and suspects, and suspend 
members of the party holding official positions.”208 Mortimer described: 
 
A ruthless campaign of extermination of Communists and alleged 
Communists was inaugurated in Central Java and quickly spread to 
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East Java and other provinces. Most accounts agree that the army 
triggered the massacres that took place in Indonesia in the following 
months, but in most places it enlisted the aid of Moslem and other 
anti-Communist youth groups, who probably accounted for the greater 
part of the death toll.209 
 
Because the PKI was strongly against any deeper penetration of 
Islam, especially in Java and also in West Java, this new social and 
political context paved the way for Islam to grow deeper and to expand. 
Ricklefs observed that the annihilation of the PKI demolished one of the 
pillars of aliran politics and thereby was undoubtedly essential in 
facilitating the Islamisation surge.”210 In Java, after the PKI was 
destructed and the political party system had changed so that the many 
nationalist local parties had merged into one PNI party no longer with 
branches in the villages,211 the Nationalists experienced what Ricklefs 
called a “complete de-institutionalisation of abangan village life.”212 
This institutional decline weakened the nationalist and abangan 
capability to “defend and promote abangan social, cultural and spiritual 
styles.”213 
In West Java, the PKI destruction allowed Muslims to strengthen 
their dakwah agenda and use this moment to support their 
institutionalisation of Islam largely through private initiatives but not 
rarely with the support of the state.214 Muslim leaders promoted 
dakwah activities in both rural and urban areas. The Traditionalists 
played a greater role in rural areas while the Modernists successfully 
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promoted and uplifted Islamic lifestyles in the cities. Their influence, 
however, sometimes overlapped. Dakwah in both areas revolved 
around mosques, pesantrens, universities, schools, communities, 
publications and fashion. I do not argue that urban Islamic activism was 
directly linked to the progress of rural dakwah activities, but rather I 
suggest that urban and rural dakwah expansion happened in sequence 
or probably in tandem. Adang Soabana said that since the 1980s, 
dakwah activity had increased significantly in Lembang and that this 
was clearly discernible by the increased number of mosques in the 
region that played an important role as agents for the dissemination of 
Islamic doctrines and cultures.215 This trend continues to date.216 This 
Islamisation pattern resembles that in other parts of the country, where 
the role of the mosques along with other Islamic institutions was 
central.217 
 
Preserving the Creed through Family Ties 
Surprisingly, the Islamisation project across Lembang had not wiped 
out the Aliran Kebatinan or caused the total extermination of its 
influence in society. Rather, the Penghayat remained on the defence and 
did their best to survive with minimal expressions of their syncretic 
culture such as celebrating the Saka New Year, organising slametan and 
sesajen gatherings and such.218 Most Penghayats, however, adopted a 
more cautious attitude toward Islam. Many of them accepted Islam as 
their religion on their identity cards but demonstrated little interest in 
observing Islamic rituals. Popularly known as ‘Islam KTP’, this group 
contributed to sustaining Aliran Kebatinan culture and later became the 
main agents of its revival in Lembang. 
Several causes led to the continued existence of the Aliran 
Kebatinan. First was the strict preservation of its culture transmitted 
through family ties.219 Second, the Islamic dakwah in some respects 
failed to reconcile aspects of Islamic doctrine with Aliran Kebatinan 
culture and values. As Niels Mulder noted, Aliran Kebatinan proponents 
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were dissatisfied with organised religion, especially given their 
commitment towards an authentic traditional belief, or in Niels 
Mulder’s words, a “valid emotional form of personal cultural 
expression.”220 Third, dakwah and its organisations failed to address the 
Penghayat’s socio-economic needs. One good example is the purchase 
by a leader of a Muslim party of sizeable plots of land, which pushed up 
land prices in the village. This taking over of these plots of land was 
against the economic interests of the local people. Penghayat, most of 
whom are peasants and labourers who very much depend on affordable 
agricultural land and low-prices basic commodities, were naturally 
upset over this inconsiderate transaction. 
Different from world religions with their books and prophets, 
history, intellectual traditions, sophisticated civilizations and 
institutions, Aliran Kebatinan only had their immediate surroundings 
and family at their disposal mainly working with simple doctrines and 
oral traditions incomparable with these world religions they had to 
face. To explain Aliran Kebatinan we need to have a look at these family 
ties in order to understand how it survived in Lembang in the 
deepening process of Islamisation and how it was contested by the 
personal convictions of its members sometimes causing them to go over 
to Islam or back.  
Aliran Kebatinan’s spread across Lembang took place from the 
1950s to the 1980s. This was due to the contribution of some 
individuals of the first generation including, Anwar Wijaya, Wira, Umar, 
Emeh, Enjum and Suratma. These are believed to have been the first 
people to introduce the AKP to Lembang. Anwar Wijaya was the most 
prominent figure among the Aliran Kebatinan followers in this region. 
He travelled to various places across West Java. 
Wira was known as the most prominent figure in the propagation 
of the Aliran Kebatinan in Cibedug in the Cikole village. In carrying out 
his mission, he was aided by his allies including Iko and Atmaja.221 
Wira’s daughter, Edah, married Atmaja’s son, Ade, currently known as a 
senior figure in the Cibedug Penghayat community. Atmaja’s nephew, 
Ayep Supriatna, is among the new generation and enjoys a leadership 
role among the youth. Ayep married Euies who was born into a Muslim 
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family. His marriage was conducted according to Islamic law but his 
wife, Euies, eventually abandoned Islam for Aliran Kebatinan. The other, 
currently a senior leader in the area, is Rahmat, the son of Iko, who is 
known to have been an important ally of Wira’s. 
Similar to Cibedug, Budidaya membership in Wangunharja has 
been sustained by demanding family members’ strict loyalty to the 
tradition. In Desa Wangunharja, almost all Budidaya members 
(approximately 50 people) belong to the family of Suratma. Suratma 
was a first-generation adherent and connected to Mei Kartawinata and 
his allies, who were involved in propagating Aliran Kebatinan in 
Lembang. Suratma’s son, Ujang Yaya, has five children, Rika, Asep, Ayi, 
Ajang and Eden. Eden married Anwar Wijaya’s grandson and is now an 
active member of the Budidaya organisation. Ayi, also an active 
member, married a Muslim woman, Nyi Wiwi. In order to avoid 
complications, Ayi married Nyi Wiwi according to Islamic law, which 
meant he had to hide his identity. One year after their wedding, Nyi 
Wiwi began to wonder why her husband never performed Islamic 
rituals such as salat (prayer), ngaji (reciting Quran), and why he never 
fasted in the month Ramadhan. She questioned her husband about this 
and was shocked to discover that her husband was a Penghayat. This 
confession created some turbulence in their one year-old marriage. Nyi 
Wiwi immediately left the house and returned to her parents. In order 
to save his marriage and family, Ayi tried to convince his wife about the 
reason why he embraced the religion, hoping that she would also 
convert. After several weeks of arguments and persuasion, Nyi Wiwi 
finally embraced her husband’s belief. The reason behind her decision 
to become a Penghayat, as she related, was that its religious precepts 
are simpler, and offer her more happiness and security than Islam as 
she understood it. She claimed to have been frightened of the threat to 
go to neraka (hell) in Islam, while for her, belief in hell is not rational 
because nobody can ever know about life after death. “It is not our 
business,” she stated.222 
Suratma’s grandson, Asep Hari, Ayi’s brother, also married a 
Muslim woman named Tin Tin Nurhayati who was born into Haji 
Mulya’s family. Like Wiwi, Nurhayati eventually abandoned Islam. In 
my interview with her, Nurhayati explained why she embraced Aliran 
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Kebatinan. She stated that she found her new belief simple and 
comfortable because of the way its followers manifested it in social 
interaction. “My husband has been a good model as a husband, father 
and member of society; he has never overstepped the traditional limits 
of mapipitu, that is, maen, maling, madon, madat, minum, mateni, 
mangani.”223 On the other hand, what Muslim preachers teach in 
mosques and during pengajian sessions has become mere empty 
teaching. Many Muslims are committing mapipitu and thus violate the 
values of their own religion. “In spite of the increasing presence of 
Muslim institutions and symbols elsewhere in the village, I have not 
seen Islam in the reality of Muslim society,” she stated.224 “There is even 
an ustadz (religious teacher) who practices polygamy while the faith I 
now hold prohibits such practice,” she asserted.225 
Its insistence on monogamy has been an important reason why 
Wiwi was interested in and continued to adhere to this syncretic 
tradition. In her eyes, in his family, her husband was a key figure in 
leading and propagating Aliran Kebatinan. His leadership is 
authoritative and his contribution crucial in the recruitment of new 
followers. He is outspoken in promoting the economic interests and 
civil rights of his fellow Penghayat. 
However, the most important reason behind Budidaya’s recent 
state of affairs is the adoption of legal reform at the national level. As 
said above, in 2006 the government issued law number 32/2006 on 
population registration, which provided the legal basis for the 
protection of the Penghayat’s civil rights. The law allows them to marry 
according to their adat and to register their marriages at the Registry 
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Office.226 In October 2009, Asep Hari, the leader of Aliran Kebatinan in 
Lembang celebrated the marriage of his daughter Neng Yeni Mulyani 
which was conducted according to adat. Neng Yeni was proposed to by 
a Muslim man named Asep Rudi Setiawan.227 Asep Rudi agreed that the 
marriage was to be undertaken in accordance with law number 
32/2006. By doing so, Asep Rudi implicitly declined to marry according 
to Islamic law, as regulated by Law No. 1/1974 on marriages. 
 
Recent Signs of Revival? 
Obtaining Political Recognition in Law No. 23/2006 
In the light of preserving their creed, the Penghayat struggled to survive 
and sought to re-emerge. Signs of its revival have been apparent since 
2000 and is evident in their persistent search for the legal recognition 
of their civil rights and culture reconstruction, such as in the case of 
adat marriages and so on.228 They won this struggle with the issuance of 
Law Number 23/2006 regarding Population Registration. Since then, its 
membership has slowly but steadily increased. It is, however, not 
simple to obtain accurate statistics on the number of Aliran Kebatinan 
followers because many of them hide their true religious affiliations, 
refusing to reveal their religious identity for social and political 
reasons.229 One respondent said that the total number of Penghayat, 
especially those associated with the Budidaya organisation, is about 
eight hundred across Lembang.230 This constitutes a small minority 
within an overwhelmingly Muslim population. 
Nursigit, of the Lembang District Office staff, confirmed this 
increase and affirmed that the Aliran Kebatinan seems to have been 
enjoying a revival in the Reform Era.231 Its adherents have galvanised 
their struggle in defence of what they claim to be the only authentic 
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Sundanese faith and culture.232 Of late, more Penghayats have gained 
the courage to express their identity. Some of them even came to the 
Lembang District Office to declare that they were not Muslims, but that 
they have their own belief.233 
This development inspired caution among Muslims. Muslim 
leaders in Cikole village pre-empted this revival with the construction 
of mosques and the promotion of dakwah activities. Moreover, in 
almost every village in Lembang one can find a Quranic Kindergarten 
(TPA). The exchange I had with Dede Atmadja, the Aliran Kebatinan 
leader in Cibedug village, epitomises how the cultural difference 
between Aliran Kebatinan followers and Muslims remains entrenched 
in the face of the intensified campaign of dakwah. His grand-daughter 
graduated from the TPA in his village. On a wall near in his living room 
hung his grand-daughter graduation picture, in which the child is 
wearing a headscarf. When asked, “How could your grand daughter join 
the Quranic class?” he replied with confidence, “Well, out there she 
might engage in Islamic training, but at home she indulges in Aliran 
Kebatinan customs.”234 
Attempts by Penghayats’ leaders to consolidate the difference 
have mostly been articulated in various forms of resistance.235 First, in 
their hostility towards Islamic symbols. Niels Mulder describes this 
resistance as manifesting “an anti-Islamic mentality.”236 This is also 
seen in their critical stance towards the collaboration of Islamic 
institutions with state organs at the grassroots. For instance, they 
denounce the growing presence of Islamic institutions and culture 
across the villages such as mosques, Islamic schools, Quranic 
kindergartens, Muslim dress and the mushrooming Islamic movements 
and organisations.237 The second important act of resistance among 
some Sundanese in Lembang was abandoning the practice of ‘Islam 
KTP’238 which they had allowed to exist in less secure times. Third, is 
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their sustained rejection of Islam despite its increasing presence and 
dominance. Penghayat strongly uphold their faith and refuse to convert 
when they marry Muslims or people of other religions. The Budidaya 
chairman in West Java claims that in case of inter-religious marriages 
with Muslims, more Muslims than Penghayats would end up converting 
to each other’s conviction. The protection of their syncretic creed was 
achieved through close ties with their families, which cements loyalty to 
their tradition. Since the group seeks to consolidate its identity, its 
concern has been in championing Sundanese symbols, institutions and 
culture over others. When I tried to attract their attention to the 
Traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama, which shares similar religious interests 
with them, particularly in honouring adat, a Penghayat leader 
contended that “all Muslims and their organisations are the same 
because they all are hostile to Aliran Kebatinan.”239 
Another front of resistance involved the struggle to obtain legal 
and political recognition, and the Penghayat passed up no opportunity 
to achieve this end. In the drafting of the Constitution (1945), 
Wongsonegoro, later the chairman of All-Indonesia Kebatinan Congress 
Body (BKKI), succeeded in inserting the word “Kepercayaan” into 
article 29 (2), which reads: 
 
The State guarantees the freedom of each citizen to embrace 
his/her religion and to perform rituals according to his/her religion 
and belief (Kepercayaan).240 
 
This provided Aliran Kebatinan with a constitutional basis. 
However, immediately on gaining power in the aftermath of 1965 coup 
attempt, Soeharto led a profound socio-political transformation across 
the country. Since then, the Soeharto regime promoted religiosity yet 
restricted the development of Aliran Kebatinan. The state preferred to 
officially recognise world religions and categorised Aliran Kebatinan as 
a cultural feature of the nation. All its followers were encouraged to 
embrace one official religion while maintaining Aliran Kebatinan as 
their tradition. Many of the Penghayat wanted to keep only Aliran 
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Kebatinan as their faith. This opposition created tension in many places 
across West Java. 
In 1974 the government issued law number 1/1974 on 
marriages. Following this law, there were many regulations from 
various levels of government, from the President and ministers, down 
to the governor. These legal products largely address the 
implementation of the law, especially regarding marriage registration 
for Penghayat. Generally, they reflect the political line, which 
encouraged all citizens to embrace a sanctioned religion and to marry 
according to their respective religions. Exceptions were the decrees 
issued by Minister of Justice Mujiono in 1982, and by Minister of Home 
Affairs Rudini in 1990.241 Mujiono’s decree acknowledged adat 
marriage outright, while Rudini’s decision was premised in legal and 
humanitarian arguments that made adat marriages conditional on 
judicial discretion (Penetapan Pengadilan).242 This policy, however, was 
abolished in 1995 by the decree of Minister of Home Affairs Yogy S. 
Memet, signed by the Director-General for General Governance Affairs 
and Regional Autonomy, Sumitro Maskun.243 
Another effort was undertaken in 2000 with the establishment of 
the Civil Registry Consortium, which sought to formulate a Civil 
Registry Bill. The draft was ready by 2004 and was then revised several 
times before it was brought before Parliament in 2006 under the name 
Administrasi Kependudukan or Population Registration as said above. 
This law includes various articles that regulate adat marriages.244 In 
order to provide the rules of the game, in 2009, the Ministers of Home 
Affairs and Culture and Tourism issued a joint decree providing 
detailed guidelines on the provision of services to Penghayat,245 who 
welcomed the law with much joy, declaring, “We have achieved 
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Sovereignty!”246 The law provided the legal foundations for the 
members of the Penghayat community to exercise their civil rights and 
liberties, including marriages according to their adat. The government 
also guaranteed the community’s right to burial in public cemeteries 
and according to adat rites.247 This has brought about great 
consequences in society, as became visible in the last couple of years. 
The quest for securing legal recognition for the Penghayat, having 
begun during the New Order, thus finally bore fruit in 2006. This 
milestone in their struggle owed much to changes across the country in 
the reform era.248 The issuance of the law represents a breakthrough 
for the revival of Aliran Kebatinan across West Java. Its implementation 
on the ground, however, remains problematic since popular 
perceptions of the Penghayat as a deviant sect remain entrenched. 
Nanang, general secretary of AKP East Bandung branch, informed us 
that in most cases, government organs, from district down to village 
levels, were not prepared for this change. Nanang added: “We have 
anticipated this legal change and tried to implement it in cooperation 
with our members as well as with the local government. In Ciparay, East 
Bandung, the government officials did not know what to do. The irony 
is that they often ask us to consult the Indonesian Islamic Scholars’ 
Council (MUI), the fierce opponent of Aliran Kebatinan, in order to be 
acknowledged as Aliran Kebatinan adherents.”249 
 
Conversions Away from Islam 
The Penghayat’s sustained rejection of Islam and their obsession with 
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Sundanese identity recently witnessed Muslims’ conversions out of 
Islam. In the last three years, conversions out of Islam have involved 
primarily two groups of people in the Lembang district. The first group 
comprised of non-practicing Muslims who, while identifying themselves 
as Muslims in fact maintained their native-syncretic creed and 
practices. The second were either observant or nominal Muslims who 
developed an interest in Aliran Kebatinan after having integrated into 
the Aliran Kebatinan family through marriage or have adopted it as an 
alternative faith. 
While the number of conversions is not yet significant, during 
2009 there were several people who embraced Aliran Kebatinan. I 
selected some of them for my case studies in seeking to understand 
their motives as well as the social and cultural contexts of their 
conversions. One convert I interviewed was Eman, a man of 35 years of 
age. He was born into a Muslim family to a father named Haji Ujug from 
Wangunharja Lembang. Growing up, Eman practiced rituals including 
the obligatory daily prayers and fasting during Ramadhan. He can recite 
the Quran, having learnt recitation since childhood. Eman fathered two 
sons who graduated from a junior high school in Lembang and for 
fifteen years now he has been working as a farmer in northern Subang. 
He rented 1,000 square meters of land on which he planted cabe merah 
(red hot chillies). From his agricultural business he earns about IDR 
1,000,000 with each harvest, every three months.250 
His conversion process, to what he called “agama Sunda” or 
Sunda religion, commenced with a conversation he had in 2009 with 
Ayah of Subang, who works on an agricultural estate there. Ayah felt 
responsible for bringing back his fellow Sundanese to what he was 
convinced was the religion of their ancestors. After getting to know him 
better, Ayah informed Eman about Aliran Kebatinan as promoted by 
Budidaya. Eman was dumbfounded at his ignorance of his ancestors’ 
religion.251 Ayah advised him to meet Asep Hari of Wangunharja for a 
better understanding about Aliran Kebatinan. 
By mid-2009, Eman returned to Wangunharja after his had 
business collapsed. For some time, he observed Islamic rituals, 
particularly Friday prayers, until one day it struck him that he had 
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never seen Asep during the congregational prayer sessions in the al-
Ikhlas Mosque near his house. Curious as to why this was the case, 
Eman tried to find him. He finally met Asep and discussed the ‘religion 
of their ancestors’ which Ayah had earlier told him about. Eman then 
decided to leave Islam. Eman confessed as follows: 
 
I had been a Muslim for 35 years and never felt fully comfortable 
with the religion. Islamic shari’ah is difficult and Muslims society is 
polarising. Recently I had the good luck of having met Ayah from 
Subang and Asep Hari from Wangunharja. They led me to the Aliran 
Kebatinan Budidaya, which maintains the simple traditional 
Sundanese worldview, uniformity and practices inherited from my 
ancestors. I do not know why I was so ignorant about this religion. 
However, I am now happy after having found this tradition, the 
religion of my ancestors, and having become a Penghayat. 252 
 
Apart from believing that Aliran Kebatinan is the legacy of his 
ancestors, Eman argued that his interest in the creed was also due to its 
adherents’ deep commitment to Aliran Kebatinan principles. He thus 
saw the community of Aliran Kebatinan as true believers. Actually, 
Eman believes that Islam promotes similar values but he could not 
accept the contradiction he witnessed between Islamic precepts and 
Muslims’ behaviour. This suggested to him that Islam is simply the 
religion on their identity cards and not a reality in their daily lives. 
Above all, he maintained that his conversion was cemented by his 
conviction that Aliran Kebatinan is the religion of the Sundanese, as 
opposed to Islam which is a foreign import, the religion of the Arabs.253 
Another convert to Aliran Kebatinan I interviewed was Ujang who 
is 50 years old and was born into a Muslim family with six brothers and 
sisters. Financial difficulties meant he was unable even to complete 
elementary school in his village. Today he works as an agricultural 
labourer and earns IDR 20,000 per day. He decided to convert only in 
mid-2009. He claims that he is able to better identify with this Sunda 
religion. He stated, “The reason for my conversion is due to my recent 
encounter with this creed. I had never heard of it before. Islamic 
teachings are good but come from the Middle East and Islam is not the 
                                                          
252  Idem. 
253  Idem. 
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religion of the nation’s ancestors.”254 His encounter with Abas, a farmer 
from Capunagara, Subang, changed his belief. Ujang’s sons, however, 
refused to follow him but he is hopeful that they will eventually change 
their minds. 
Though Eman and Ujang from Wangunharja have embraced 
Aliran Kebatinan, they are still registered in the village administrative 
office as Muslims.The deepening influence of Muslim politics from 
national to district levels and the issue of legal procedures in many 
respects prevent equal recognition of the Penghayat as a faith 
community. While this does not really imply a systematic effort to 
violate the religious freedom of the Penghayat, it is obvious that the 
administrative process caused by changing their religious belief is far 
from easy. Even the administration fee charged to those wanting to 
register their conversions is prohibitive. Both my respondents could 




This case study shows how, in rural Lembang, the political and social 
context shaped religious developments which had a tremendous impact 
and caused wide social change. As observed in this chapter, the social 
change that drove towards Islamisation in Lembang was due to several 
factors. The first was the Darul Islam (DI) rebellion from 1948-62 which 
caused much damage and loss of confidence in socio-economic security 
among the people living in the conflict areas, such as Tasikmalaya and 
Garut. It provided the setting for Muslims to escape from these places of 
origin and to make them look for a safe destination, particularly in 
Lembang. The migration of individuals into Lembang had social and 
cultural consequences because of their individual conduct and because 
they introduced Islamic doctrines and practices into their new 
environment. 
Second, the contributions of these individuals continued to have 
significant consequences as they built Islamic institutions which 
strengthened the Islamic presence at the detriment of Aliran Kebatinan 
interests. The institutionalisation of Islamic propagation caused the 
                                                          
254  Idem. 
255  Idem. 
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transformation of dakwah from being conducted as individual acts and 
as a personal obligation to institutional activities undertaken by groups 
of Muslim activists. This had a much more significant impact on society. 
The change was made possible after a vast range of Islamic institutions 
grew from the 1960s onward. The arrival and the spread of Islamic 
institutions like mosques, pesantrens, majlis taklim, madrasahs, and 
TPA in Lembang increasingly promoted Islamisation. These institutions 
functioned as dakwah centres and were important sources for the 
reproduction and the promulgation of established Islamic doctrine 
centred in tauhid. The institutions were also set up to promote Islamic 
cultures. After a few years, these institutions started to have tangible 
impacts at the grassroots level. More and more people started to visit 
mosques and madrasahs and they wanted to study the Quran and to 
seek for Islamic instruction and education. 
Third, readers should bear in mind that at the start of the 
Soeharto era in mid-1967, the Islamisation of Lembang entered a new 
stage of development as the regime’s politics on religions provided the 
setting for the religions to have more privileges. Although this shift in 
context was centred in Jakarta, its impact had reached far beyond the 
Capital and had influenced society at the grassroots in West Java. 
Scholars who understand these developments in the religious 
lives of the Sundanese people who were living under great Islamic 
influence, would have thought that this transformation would have 
brought about the end of the native-syncretic creeds. This is in fact not 
really the case. Although Penghayat were living under tremendous 
pressure inflicted by the totalitarian regime and in the shadow of 
Dakwahism, this local faith had in fact never disappeared. I found that 
from roughly 1980 to 1998, this group had been on the defence and had 
waited for the right moment to revive. 
The wind of change since 1998 provided them with the context 
and the moment for their comeback. The following factors enabled 
them to retain. The first factor is the claim that the Aliran Kebatinan is 
essentially a true Sunda religion that had been upheld by their 
Sundanese ancestors and should be considered superior and be 
defended against other religions, especially Islam which is foreign to 
Sundanese culture. Because they considered Islam as foreign, Aliran 
Kebatinan leaders sought to reclaim their place in indigenous 
Sundanese history and to legitimise their presence in recent times. This 
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claim rests on nativist and ethnic sentiments and aimed to reconstruct 
their identity. People from rural areas found it easier to entertain 
meaningful relationships with the ethnic symbols that already were 
embedded in everyday rural life. The growing appreciation of local 
symbols reflects the resurgent identification with their cultural 
heritage. One point made by my respondents about why their faith in 
the Aliran Kebatinan has not gone under amidst deepening Islamisation 
is the fact that its creed is simple compared to Islam or other religions. 
This is perhaps relevant to what Geertz called “the simple uniformity of 
religious belief and practice” as observed above.256 
The second is that in the view of the Penghayat, the 1945 
Constitution guaranteed freedom of religion to all citizens and thus 
provides Aliran Kebatinan with the right to live in co-existence and in 
harmony with other official religions, by interpreting the word 
‘kepercayaan’ as ‘religion’ to denote their native-syncretic creed. While 
they had faced no serious challenges during Soekarno’s time, his 
downfall and the extermination of the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI) signalled trouble for them. Some of them were arrested, others 
were put under surveillance. The regime allowed religions to play a 
greater role in society and promoted them as fundamental aspects of 
Indonesian culture. This policy soon caused an imbalance in what 
Hefner phrased “the cultural power” structure of society as socio-
political life increasingly favoured religions and weakened the Aliran 
Kebatinan.257 
Third, the strong ties between family members and lineages 
which were maintained with extreme care and patience resulted in the 
Aliran Kebatinan’s resilience and its ability to defend its tradition. The 
Reform era provides the setting for them to revive some cultural 
elements of their faith and they were able to struggle to obtain the right 
to conduct marriages and funerals according to their adat. Although 
these phenomena signify the dynamics of the persistent old resistance 
of the Penghayat towards Islamisation, it is too optimistic to claim that 
this attempt will be able to temper the on-going Islamisation in West 
Java. Islam’s presence in West Java is too pertinent and the forces of 
Islamisation too strong to enable Penghayat members to completely 
                                                          
256  Geertz, ‘Ritual and Social Change’, p. 36. 
257  Hefner, ‘Islamizing Java?’, p. 551. 
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withstand it. However, their resilience has shown that they can sustain 










CHRISTIANISATION IN BEKASI: 




In its report of November 2010, the Brussels-based International Crisis 
Group (ICG) reported an intense Christianisation process in West Java 
and indicated that the region had become the place where missionaries 
had gained ground fastest.   1 The district of Bekasi in West Java is one of 
the most important Christian strongholds.2 It saw a significant growth in 
its Christian population and institutions, especially due to the influx of 
migrants from Sumatera and other parts of Indonesia since the 1970s. 
Although Christianity had already gained ground in various parts of 
West Java like Sukabumi, Cianjur, Bogor and Bekasi since the nineteenth 
century, in terms of actors and institutions, the recent development of 
the Christian community in Bekasi constituted a new trend. 
In terms of actors, the recent Christian development does not 
seem to be primarily the result of the leadership of local leaders and 
activists. Readers should note that in the past, the Christianisation in 
West Java and in Bekasi in particular depended very much on local 
leaders and activists who were mostly of Sundanese, Betawi and 
Javanese origins. They shared a keen sense of identity cohesiveness 
because of their religious bonds. Nowadays, the role in Christian 
development and leadership in Bekasi is primarily played by new actors 
                                                          
1  ICG, ‘Indonesia: ‘Christianization’ and Tolerance’, Asia Briefing No. 114, 24 
Nov 2010, p. 2. 
2  Bekasi statistics show that the Christian population has seen a significant 
growth as does the number of churches. According to the 2009 statistics, 
Bekasi has currently 413 out of a total of 2135 churches in 17 districts and 
9 cities across West Java. Its appeal to the evangelist mission lies in its 
strategic position, situated right between the capital Jakarta and heavily 
industrialised West Java. 
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of Batak and Chinese origins whose social and cultural identification 
differs from those of the Sundanese majority. 
This development provides the context for the rise of anti-
Christian sentiments with heavy ethno-religious undertones. In other 
words, the anti-Christianisation reaction contains strong anti-Batak and 
anti-Chinese sentiments. These sentiments are not a surprise. The 
Christian Chinese played important roles in the Christianity’s upsurge in 
this growing city, especially in its leadership and in the building of 
Pentecostal churches. Batak Christians have lived in Bekasi for some 
decades where they earn their living while preserving their identity. 
They came, stayed, worked and built churches where and when they 
could afford it. Thus, in Bekasi, their existence contributed in making 
Christian culture and institutions increasingly apparent in the public 
sphere. 
The reaction against Christianity that contains ethno-religious 
sentiments is novel and evidences the new dynamics in Christianisation 
and Islamisation dialectics in West Java. It involves new actors, 
leadership and institutions even if it shows a consistent effort by the 
Christians to promote their religion in order to oppose and neutralise 
Islam’s hegemonic influence across the region. This chapter seeks to 
discern how these dynamics work out and tries to explain their impact 
among Bekasi grassroots society. 
 
The Development of Religions in West Java 
Throughout Indonesia’s history, the development of religions has been 
inextricably connected with the power game of the prevailing regime. 
Soeharto’s welcoming politics towards religions saw churches, mosques, 
schools and other social institutions with religious affiliations 
proliferate. This steady increase indexes a rise in religious devotion 
among Christians and Muslims on the one hand, and sustained 
competition between these two communities, on the other. This 
religious development is linked to economic and industrial development 
resulting from the national economic transformation during the New 
Order era. During the first half of the New Order liberal economy (1967-
85), the country received huge foreign loans and direct investment with 
the 1970s oil boom which boosted national economy and 
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industrialisation.3 Recession in the early to mid-1980s, however, 
changed the regime’s economic policy, with industry reoriented towards 
exports and with the promotion of trade liberalisation and 
deregulation.4 Due to this change, from 1986 to 1996, the country 
recorded more than 7 per cent growth per annum, which saw 
unprecedented industrialisation and urbanisation.5 As centres of 
industrialisation, Jakarta and West Java experienced much economic 
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3  Hal Hill, The Indonesian Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000). 
4  Idem. 
5  Idem. 
6  Profil Kependudukan Provinsi Jawa Barat Tahun 2000 (Jakarta: Badan Pusat 
Statistik, 2000), p. 7. 
7  DKI is the acronym for Daerah Khusus Ibukota (the Capital Special Region). 
8  DIY is the acronym for Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta Special 
Region). 
9  NTB is the acronym for Nusa Tenggara Barat. 
10  NTT is Nusa Tenggara Timur. 
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From a socio-cultural perspective, the influx of people of various 
social and religious backgrounds introduced new symbols, cultures and 
institutions. Likewise, from the socio-political and socio-economic 
angles, the migratory flow entailed demographic shifts with significant 
repercussions in Jakarta and West Java. Known as majority-Muslim 
regions they were now being slowly coloured with new Christian 
churches along with increased Christian activities. 
 
Trends in Christianity’s Upsurge in Bekasi 
In what follows below we shall look at the most recent trends in 
Christianisation which are a continuation of those in the past in terms of 
cause, actors and leadership. In terms of cause, the Christian population 
and the increase in numbers of Christian institutions born out of 
migration and urbanisation seem to have become the major factors that 
changed the social demography and the identity of the Bekasi 
community’s make-up. The Christian population and the number of 
Christian institutions increased significantly during the past few 
decades.11 In general in West Java, the Christian population’s annual 
growth rate exceeded 4.0 per cent per annum from 1970 to 2000, the 
highest percentage experienced by Christians in majority-Muslim areas 
across Indonesia. Christian leaders, however, rejected the speculation 
that this growth was the result of conversions from Islam. They 
acknowledged that conversions took place but claimed their number 
was insignificant and instead stated that the population growth was 
caused by migration from majority-Christian regions including North 
Sumatra, North Sulawesi, and NTT.12 From the 1970s to the 1990s, 
Christians flooded into West Java. Among them were Batak 
Protestants.13 In their new majority-Muslim community, it was difficult 
to find a church or to build one in which to conduct Sunday services and 
therefore they held services in private residences and in other venues 
such as shop-houses (ruko), malls and hotels. Eventually they sought to 
                                                          
11  Suryadinata, Nurvidya Arifin, and Ananta, Indonesia’s Population, pp. 104-
110. 
12  Interview, Fabianus, Bandung, 15 June 2009. While we do not have census 
or survey materials to gauge the reality of Muslim conversion to 
Christianity, my observation in a Christian village in Cianjur confirms that 
there was no significant conversion from Islam to Christianity. 
13  Interview, pastor Pieterson, Jakarta, 9 March 2011. 
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construct churches. Over the years the number of churches would seem 
to have multiplied in tandem with the Christian population growth and 
their increasing frequent attendance at services although the impact of 
the problem of church construction constraints needs to be studied 
before this correlation can be established with any certainty.14 
Readers should keep in mind that in the early New Order period, 
Christians entered high positions in society because they were highly 
educated and held excellent academic qualifications.15 Because later the 
national education system improved in general, also Muslims became 
better trained. Soeharto helped modernizing Islamic schools (madrasah) 
by standardizing its system.16 Nevertheless, the initial advantage of the 
Christians remains to be felt to this day. With better education and 
having more political opportunities the Christian minority thus enjoyed 
considerable political and economic advantages that, together with their 
own efforts, boosted them to “unprecedented social and political 
prominence.”17 Sidel observes: 
 
From parish schools scattered throughout the archipelago to 
seminaries to the Protestant and Catholic students’ organisations at 
the most prestigious universities in the country, some Indonesian 
Christians enjoyed a clear head start in the multitiered hierarchy of 
education that fed into the New Order bureaucratic elite, even as their 
church coffers and business connections were enhanced by growing 
numbers of wealthy Chinese Protestants and Catholics. University 
lecturers and student activists affiliated with the Partai Katolik and 
other Christian groups had joined the rallies against the PKI and 
Soekarno in the critical first months of the New Order and enjoyed 
something of a hegemonic position as the regime’s leading political 
operatives for years thereafter.18 
 
In this context, the Christians grabbed their opportunity and 
converged on civilian and military posts in the cabinet, parties, media 
and business sectors. Until the late 1980s, Protestants and Catholics 
                                                          
14  Idem. 
15  A useful analyses of this hypothesis may be found in Gavin Jones’ ‘Religion 
and Education in Indonesia’, Indonesia, 22 (Oct. 1976), pp. 19-56. 
16  Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Education, Young Islamists and Integrated Islamic Schools 
in Indonesia’, Studia Islamika, Volume 19, Number 1, 2012, pp. 84-85. 
17  John T. Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2006), p. 45. 
18  Idem, p. 48-49. 
-220- 
 
secured the Soeharto cabinet’s top economic and security portfolios.19 
The crucial role the Christian elites played for the nation’s development 
demonstrates the significance of Christian education and the importance 
of their institutions at the grassroots even if the regime withdrew its 
political support from them. 
From the 1990s, Christian representation in the civil bureaucracy 
and military ranks started to wane, much to their chagrin. This was 
caused by the vast improvement of the national and particularly Islamic 
educational system20 but also an important contributing factor was 
Soeharto’s embrace of Islam. A leading political observer, William R. 
Liddle, observes that the Catholics and Protestants “have long been wary 
of santri intentions toward them.”21 They were unhappy with a 
campaign in 1992-93 “to replace Christian members of the cabinet with 
Muslims.”22 Christians kept struggling to preserve their socio-political 
and economic interests at the level of the state while keeping up 
competition with Muslims at the grassroots. From 1997 to 2000 the 
Protestant church kept growing, despite the violence perpetrated 
against it under the political volatility of the years surrounding the New 
Order’s downfall in 1998. In this shifting political constellation, protests 
against church construction and Sunday services conducted in private 
residences in Jakarta and West Java emerged.23 The mid-1990s saw such 
protests increase and turn destructive. In 1995-96, waves of violent 
protests swept over Rengasdengklok in West Java, leaving behind the 
charred remains of several churches. Muslim hostility nonetheless failed 
to slow down the construction of churches. During the transitional years 
(1997-99) the number of churches rose significantly and this trend was 
sustained in the following years, with the rate of increase almost 
doubling from 1999 to 2005. 
Since 1998, democratisation induced fundamental social and 
political changes that provided the political setting for the 
Christianisation more than ever. In the meantime, Muslim activists of 
various persuasions, including Modernists, Islamists, Revivalists and 
                                                          
19  Liddle, ‘The Islamic Turn in Indonesia’, pp. 616-617. 
20  For a detailed and relevant discussion of this particular point, see Ricklefs 
Islamisation and its Opponents in Java, pp. 206-210. 
21  Liddle, ‘The Islamic Turn in Indonesia’, p. 617. 
22  Idem. 
23  Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad, pp. 7-74. 
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Dakwahists, were busy struggling to consolidate their political forces. 
The Christians largely continued to focus on their socio-religious and 
cultural agenda, which sustained development and kept it on track. 
During these years of transition, the Christian revival was strengthened, 
and church attendance soared. Perhaps the denomination that best 
exemplifies the reality of the Christian growth rate is the Pentecostals, to 
be discussed later in this chapter. The number of its adherents mounted 
sky-high during the time of reform.24 Recent statistics show the 
distribution of the Christians across West Java in terms of population 
and numbers of churches. The Christian/Catholic population-to-church 
ratios were thus: Catholics 4,651: 1, Protestants, 994:1.25 
 
Table 226 
Numbers of Christian and Catholic Population (by thousands) & 






























































































































































                                                          
24  Andaya, ‘Contextualizing the Global’, p. 4. 
25  The Christian population-Church ratio is as follows: 1. Protestants 844.5: 1 
(districts) and 1148: 1 (cities). The ratio in West Java in total is 999.4: 1. The 
ratio for Catholics is 2357: 1 (districts) and 9.175: 1 (cities) while being 
4654: 1 in West Java in total. 
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During the 1980s, the Christian population in Indonesia including 
East Timor which had been incorporated into the nation since 1975 
increased at an average rate of 5.2 per cent; about double the national 
population growth rate of 2.5 per cent. From 1980 to 1985, the numbers 
of followers of Protestantism, Roman Catholicism and Buddhism 
increased while those of Islam and Hinduism decreased. From 1980 to 
1987, there was significant growth in the number of churches across all 
27 provinces. East Java and Jambi saw 200 per cent growth, Central Java 
150 per cent growth and North Sumatra 90 per cent, for instance.27 The 
rise of Christianity, in terms of numbers of churches, is likewise 
reflected at the national level, from 1977 to 2004. 
 
                                                          
27  F. Ukur, ‘Pertumbuhan Gereja: Suatu Telaah Historis-Misiologis’, in Buku 
Makalah Seminar Pertumbuhan Gereja 1989 (Jakarta: Panitia Seminar 





Houses of Worship 1977 – 2004 
 
Religions 1977 2004 Growth Rate (%) 
Islam 392,044 643,834 64.22 
Protestant 18,977 43,909 131.38 
Catholics 4,934 12,473 152.79 
 
Pentecostal Revival and Chinese Leadership 
The Christian population growth rate in West Java trumps that of all 
other provinces inhabited by majority Muslims. From 1970 to 2000, it 
stood at 4.5 per cent.29 In 1980, the Christian population was 599,049.30 
This number increased to 763,363 in 2005.31 The evangelical 
Christianisation campaign, especially that of Pentecostal and 
Charismatic movements, is active in Muslim-majority provinces 
recording a pronounced Christian population growth. After Soeharto’s 
downfall in 1998, Christianity enjoyed more room to propagate its 
mission across West Java. In November 1999, one prominent 
Pentecostal leader, Rachel Indriati Tjipto Purnomo Wenas, known as Iin 
Tjipto, established the Mahanaim foundation in Bekasi with the help of 
the Ecclesia foundation. Nani Susanti from Cirebon is Iin’s aunt and 
Yusak Tjipto’s younger sister. Yusak, Nani, and Iin, together with Petrus 
Agung Purnomo, Petrus Hadi Susanto and Daniel Alexander are known 
as the ‘6 Hamba Tuhan’ (God’s 6 Servants), and claimed a divine 
mandate for their ‘prophethood’. Petrus Agung Purnomo is a successful 
businessman in Semarang.32 Petrus Hadi Susanto is an important 
charismatic leader in Temanggung. They all joined the Jemaat Kristus 
                                                          
28  See Naskah Sosialisasi Peraturan Bersama Menteri Agama dan Menteri 
Dalam Negeri No. 9 and 8 Tahun 2006 tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas 
Kepala Daerah/Wakil Kepala Daerah dalam Pemeliharaan Kerukunan Umat 
Beragama, Pemberdayaan Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, dan Pendirian 
Rumah Ibadat. 
29  Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, Aris Ananta (eds.), Indonesia’s 
Population, pp. 104-110. 
30  Penduduk Indonesia Menurut Propinsi Seri L. No. 3. Hasil Pencecahan Lengkap 
Sensus Penduduk 1980 (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1980), pp. 26-27. 
31  Penduduk Indonesia Seri S 1. Hasil Survei Penduduk Antar Sensus 2005. 
32  Andaya, ’Contextualizing the Global’, p. 19. 
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Indonesia Sangkakala in Semarang.33 The ICG report alleged the 
Mahanaim of being involved in evangelical action.34 Since the early stage 
of the Pentecostal’s presence in Indonesia, Bandung was selected as one 
of the evangelicals’ major centres, along with Temanggung and Cepu in 
Central Java. In the following decades, Pentecostal-Charismaticism 
consolidated its hold in West Java. 
There are several factors behind its growth. First, as the ICG report 
noted, was the cultural crisis mostly experienced by workers in the 
region’s industrial centres. The evangelical community was attractive to 
industrial workers who sought new cohesive communities after having 
been “uprooted from their traditional social networks.”35 Second, 
according to Juliette Koning, through Pentecostal religious activities, 
persons can conceptualise themselves as global citizens. For the Chinese, 
who constituted a significant number of adherents to this denomination, 
to be a Pentecostal means the affirmation and reaffirmation of their 
ethnic identity.36 Third, another motive that led the Chinese and other 
Christians to join the Pentecostal church was political. During 1990-
2000, the Pentecostals and their churches became the targets of attacks 
that left them in a state of crisis, psychologically, religiously, politically 
and culturally. Juliette Koning, who recently conducted research on the 
Pentecostal-Charismatic movement in Indonesia, argues that these 
evangelist Christians provide theological and spiritual experiences to 
those who cannot derive such experiences from modernisation. This 
movement is mostly concerned with supernatural experiences, a sort of 
divine communication with God or meeting Jesus ‘face to face’.37 
Aside from spiritual experiences, this religious movement is 
attractive for its simple practices. It shares Bible teachings about 
everyday life, holds religious gatherings with vibrant singing and 
testimonies, and also tries to recruit as many members as possible, 
emphasising a sense of belonging.38 In fact, evangelists “claim a divine 
                                                          
33  Interview, Jeremy Wijaya, Bandung, 22 March 2011. Petrus Hadi Susanto’s 
school in Temanggung became the target of an uprising on 8 February 2011. 
34  ICG, ‘Indonesia: “Christianization” and Tolerance’, p. 3. 
35  Idem, p. 2. 
36  Juliette Koning’s unpublished presentation in Singapore Management 
University (SMU) on Understanding the rapid rise of Charismatic 
Christianity in Southeast Asia Singapore, 2010. 
37  Idem. 
38  Idem. 
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mandate to urgently save as many souls as possible before Christ’s 
Second Coming, believed to be imminent.”39 Currently, the number of 
evangelist Christians worldwide is estimated at 647.8 million, 523.7 
million comprise of Pentecostals in addition to Revivalist Protestants 
and charismatic Catholics.40 
The Pentecostal revival is in fact an essential part of the 
Christianisation process in Indonesia. Christian activists I interviewed 
did not deny Christianisation efforts. However, they believed it to be 
simply the consequence of the more visual performance of Christian 
religious duties across the country.41 In West Java, Christian evangelical 
activists acknowledged this reality but were convinced that each 
Christian is obliged to serve God by means of converting non-Christians, 
whose salvation is thus guaranteed. One Protestant activist argued 
specifically that converting Muslims is a positive religious duty for 
Christians. He admits that converting Muslims has become almost 
intuitive especially in the course of providing social services within 
Muslim communities. This mission for salvation translated into a 
powerful call for them to salvage Muslims, in which conversion is 
logically unavoidable.42 
Under these circumstances, the Christians felt more confident to 
assert and express their identity in the public sphere. The advent of 
democracy in the late 1990s, together with its concomitant guarantee 
for the freedom of expression, has seen Christians demand their 
freedom of expression from the national state alongside other social and 
political aspirations. Christian leaders no longer shy away from the 
public spotlight, and now unabashedly declare that Indonesia is not an 
exclusively Muslim country. Muslims can no longer ignore the fact of the 
presence of Christianity in Indonesia. Obviously, Christianity has been 
part of Indonesia since colonial times, but their adoption of this high 
profile is something rather new. This confidence in expressing their 
identity and their faith is attested to, for instance, by the following 
                                                          
39  Katharina Hofer, ‘The Role of Evangelical NGOs in International 
Development: A Comparative Case Study of Kenya and Uganda’, Africa 
Spectrum, Vol. 38, No. 3 (2003), (Hamburg/Germany: Institute of African 
Affairs at GIGA), p. 376. 
40  Idem, p. 378. 
41  Interview, John Simon Timorason, Bandung, 9 July 2008. 
42  Idem. 
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statements. My Christian respondents acknowledged the revival of 
Christianity across West Java since the 1990s. Pastor Putu Suwintana of 
the Pasundan Christian Church in Cianjur, said that this revival is 
witnessed by the following phenomena: (1) increased levels of Christian 
observance and devotion as reflected by church attendance; (2) 
increased attendance caused greater identification and heightened 
engagement with church affairs – consequently Church activity has also 
risen. These interlinked phenomena spurred the growth of Christianity 
and its institutions across the region. Pastor Putu Suwintana stated that 
this revival has become apparent since the 1990s.43 
Of Chinese background, Stephen Tong, a popular Indonesian 
pastor known throughout Southeast Asia for his services and oratory 
talent provided the following testimony. Tong has 15,000 members in 
his congregation in the region which has grown in just two decades.44 
Tong is extremely confident. For Jakarta, for instance, Hannah Beech of 
Time Magazine reports: “When Tong, 69, raised a crucifix onto the 
church’s massive steeple, worshippers at a nearby mosque complained. 
Tong didn’t back down. “Jakarta has 1.2 million Christians, so a church 
for 4,000 people is nothing,” he says. We did this legally, so why can’t we 
put a cross on our church, just likes mosques have their symbol?”45 
Such confident assertions were buttressed because of increased 
Christian revival. Similarly, nowadays it is not rare to witness other 
cultural expressions of Christianisation, such as car stickers with slogans 
such as ‘Jesus inside’ or ‘We love Jesus’, reminiscent of similar 
expressions among Muslims in the 1990s. Indeed, according to the Pew 
Forum on Religion and Public Life, the number of Asian adherents to 
various Christian denominations exploded to 351 million in 2005, up 
from 101 million in 1970.46 This spiritual blossoming, in turn, influences 
Muslims’ religious conservatism. Hanna Beech observed that “a religious 
revolution is transforming Indonesia.”47 With increasing confidence in 
propagating their mission, along with demographic change and 
democracy, Christian leaders, especially the evangelicals, rose to 
prominence. With Chinese leaders playing an important role – such as 
                                                          
43  Interview, pastor Putu Suwintana, Cianjur, 11 May 2010. 
44  Hannah Beech, ‘Christianity’s surge in Indonesia’, Time, 26 April 2010. 
45  Idem. 
46  This citation is quoted from Beech, ‘Christianity’s Surge in Indonesia’. 
47  Idem. 
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Tong mentioned above – Muslims saw these developments as 
threatening and began to organise resistance to defend Islam. While 
their defensiveness is understandable it is more important to note that 
the anti-Christianisation rhetoric seems to be an expression of panic 
caused by the growth of Christianity in the region mixed with anti-
Chinese sentiment. 
Since 1970s, Chinese Christians played leadership roles and 
courageously ran activities across West Java. Due to its history, 
leadership and membership, the Pentecostal-Charismatic church may be 
considered as a largely Chinese religious movement, although in reality 
it is not exclusively so. Historically, the Chinese were associated with 
Christianity since the nineteenth century. In West Java and especially in 
Jakarta, they played a significant role in missionary work. A Chinese 
missionary known to have served the Chinese community in Batavia 
(1899-1901) was Gan Kwee from China, who had links to the most 
prominent Apostolic missionary, F.L. Anthing. 
In 1938, the Christian Chinese Classis48 of West Java established a 
Chinese Christian Church named THKTKH-KHD (Tiong Hoa Kie Tok 
Kauw Hwee Khoe Hwee Djawa). In 1958, this communion of Chinese-
Christians changed its name to GKI-Jabar, Indonesian Christian Church 
in West Java. The Chinese-Christians were led by John Sung, their most 
prominent pastor and spiritual leader.49 Pastor Sung was renowned for 
his extraordinary oratorical talent. Many Chinese-Christians very much 
enjoyed his sermons, which they commonly described as ‘spiritualising.’ 
His talent and charisma increased the church membership from 1,681 
persons in 1941 to 6,000 in 1951. The number of its members mounted 
to 45,000 in 1994 and in 1988, GKI became a member of the 
Communion of Indonesian Churches (Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja 
Indonesia, PGI).50 
The GKI church has thus largely been the home for Chinese-
Christians. They kept a low profile during the New Order for political 
reasons. During that time, there were no reports about their active 
involvement in proselytising missions. In what follows, however, we will 
see how the vision and the stance of the Chinese-Christians towards 
                                                          
48  Classis is a group of local churches centered in a district and directed by a 
church body. 
49  Van den End and Weitjens, Ragi Carita 2, p. 225. 
50  Idem, p. 225. 
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missionary work have changed. Although no accurate numbers are 
available, more and more have joined the Pentecostal-Charismatic 
Church since the New Order. Of late, not only have they become active 
members but some of them also play significant roles in its missionary 
activities. 
While this leadership role is not a relatively new phenomenon, the 
association between the Chinese and the evangelist Christian 
denomination is ‘heavily freighted.’51 A scholar on Pentecostals in 
Malaysia and Indonesia, Barbara Watson Andaya, observes that “not 
only does Christianity carry the baggage of European colonialism, but 
resentment towards Chinese economic dominance has at times resulted 
in violence.”52 The ICG report observes: 
 
In fact, evangelical Protestantism has seen significant growth in 
recent years. According to the 2000 census, Indonesian Christians 
officially constitute about 8.8 per cent of the population, of whom 5.8 
per cent are Protestant and 3 per cent Catholic. Muslims are 88.2 per 
cent, Hindu (mostly on Bali) 1.8 per cent, and Buddhists, Confucians 
and others make up the rest. Many Protestant evangelists believe the 
true percentage of Christians is closer to 12 to 15 per cent, and some 
put the figure even higher, although this is dismissed as wishful 
thinking by many objective sources. Some said the converts to 
Christianity are often afraid or unwilling to change the religious 
designation on their identity card, so they are counted as Muslims in 
the census. One pastor said the fastest growing segment of converts on 
Java was the thirteen to eighteen year old age group, young people 
travelling into the cities for work or school and becoming exposed to 
Christian proselytisation.53 
 
While in demographic terms urban teens represent the group 
most likely to be successfully proselytised in Java, the report has 
identified West Java as the home of the fastest growing evangelism, with 
Banten next in line. While the extent of evangelist success, especially in 
attracting Muslim converts, remains unclear, the report suggests that 
the ‘conquest’ of West Java and Banten would serve as an important 
foothold towards the further Christianisation of the capital, Jakarta. As 
claimed by the report: 
 
                                                          
51  Andaya, ‘Contextualizing the Global’, p. 2. 
52  Idem. 
53  ICG, ‘Indonesia: “Christianization” and Tolerance’, p. 2. 
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The Sundanese people have been identified as having among 
them “the least followers of Christ,” and so the evangelists have geared 
up projects, like the Joshua Project and Lampstand, to the challenge of 
converting them. These projects are overseas initiatives launched with 
the help of locally-based foundations. Towards this end, the Joshua 
Project set up a database of unreached people while Lampstand 
focuses on planting churches and proselytising to the Sundanese 
people.54 
 
The ICG report observes that another active evangelical 
organisation is Partners International based in Washington, USA. This 
foundation emphasises the importance of local culture in realising its 
mission so its leaders work with local partners in promoting community 
development projects in support of ‘Vision Indonesia 1:1:1’.55 The latter 
is a missionary initiative which encourages missionaries to build “one 
church in one village in one generation.”56 To achieve this ambitious 
goal, the foundation established the Evangelical Theological Seminary of 
Indonesia (ESTI) with some 30 branches across Indonesia and it 
launched an initiative called the Sundanese Christian Fellowship, which 
has a dozen groups active around West Java.57 
As the report above notes, ethnic Chinese have for a long time 
been playing clear leadership roles. Some figures involved, with names 
indicating ethnic Chinese origin,58 include Pastor Rachel Indriati Tjipto 
Purnomo Wenas, the head of Mahanaim foundation; Wong Christopher 
Cahyadi,59 allegedly responsible for the ‘human cross’ in front of Al-
Barakah mosque in downtown Bekasi on 2 May 2010; and Hendry 
Leonardi Sutanto, whose house in the elite Bekasi Kemang Pratama 
Regency complex was allegedly used for a mass baptism on 23 June 
                                                          
54  Idem. 
55  Idem, p. 3. 
56  Idem. 
57  Idem. 
58  For Indonesians, these Javanese sounding names clearly indicate Chinese 
origins because they may sound Javanese but no Javanese would be named 
like this. 
59  See ‘Christofer Jadi Tersangka Formasi Pedang-Salib di Masjid Agung Bekasi’, 
Voice of Al-Islam, Monday 14 June 2010, p. 1. www.voa-
Islam.com/news/print/2010/06/147089/christofer-jadi-tersangka-




2010.60 Such active involvement of ethnic Chinese as evangelical leaders 
suggests a new trend in the Christian mission in the country which 
deserves an in-depth study in the future.61 
 
The Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (HKBP) Church and Batak 
Christians in Bekasi 
From the early twentieth century to the 1960s, the Bekasi regency was 
home to an overwhelmingly Muslim population.62 The rest of the 
population adhered to Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism 
and Confucianism. A tiny minority adhered to Aliran Kebatinan. In the 
early half of the twentieth century, the break-down of all believers 
totalling 2,457,585 persons, was as follows: Islam 2,145,447 (87.30 per 
cent); Protestantism 198,000 (8.05 per cent); Catholicism 73,224 (2.98 
per cent); Hinduism 73,224 (2.98 per cent), Buddhism 5,615 (0.23 per 
cent); Confucianism 201 (0.008 per cent); and the rest, mostly followers 
of Aliran Kebatinan, make up 8,816 (0.35 per cent).63 While this 
highlights the diversity of Bekasi’s population, it has to be noted that the 
demographic composition of religious believers was distributed 
disproportionally throughout 12 sub-districts. 
The villages Kampung Sawah and Pondok Melati, for instance, 
stood out for their Christian majorities and therefore were known as the 
‘Christian villages’ in the regency. Currently, Kampung Sawah and 
Pondok Melati are under the administration of the Pondok Melati sub-
district office. Recent statistics show that there are nearly 25,000 
Christians living in this administrative sub-district alongside 130,000 
Muslims and several hundred Hindus and Buddhists, among others. 
There are 23 Protestant and Catholic churches and 65 mosques in this 
‘Christian’ village.64 For decades, a culture of tolerance prevailed 
                                                          
60  ICG, ‘Indonesia: “Christianization” and Tolerance’, p. 10. 
61  Muslim activists living in Bekasi claimed to have observed a series of 
probably unrelated but highly offensive events against Muslims from May 
2008 onwards in Bekasi. These include an offensive blog, the Sculpture Saga, 
and a human cross formation in front of Bekasi’s Al-Barakah mosque. See 
ICG, ‘Indonesia: “Christianization” and Tolerance’, pp. 6-9. 
62  Badruzzman Busyairi, Rumah Ibadat di Kota Bekasi (Bekasi: Forum 
Kerukunan Umat Beragama [FKUB] Kota Bekasi, 2009), p. 21. 
63  Idem, p. 21. 
64  Idem, pp. 22 and 28. 
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enabling the Bekasi people to live in harmony irrespective of religious 
background. Christians and Muslims kept cordial relationships. This 
harmony endured well because, despite their religious differences, these 
people shared identities anchored in their ethnic bonds as most of them 
are of Betawi, Sundanese and Javanese origin, sharing the same 
languages and values. It was thus not surprising that until the 1960s 
Muslims and Christians enjoyed freedom in constructing houses of 
worship or in performing religious and cultural activities. Muslims 
respected the existence of Sundanese and Javanese churches, which they 
saw as tolerant and polite.65 The Christian population and institutions 
grew in an atmosphere of respect of their Muslim neighbours and it sent 
no messages of threat or intolerance.66 
The situation in Bekasi evolved in correspondence to rapid social 
change in the capital Jakarta. Since the 1970s, Soeharto had developed 
Jakarta and its surrounding areas as economic, trade and industrial 
centres. The Bekasi District has several sub-districts, one of which is also 
named Bekasi. Due to its economic link with Jakarta, the Bekasi Sub-
district grew rapidly. In April 1982, the Minister of Home Affairs 
upgraded it to a so-called kota administratif (administrative city). In 
several years’ time, the city saw a rapid growth in population and the 
development of infrastructure, transportation, and many educational 
and socio-religious institutions. In response to this growth, the Minister 
elevated Bekasi’s status of administrative city to that of a municipality. It 
has an area of 210,49 km2 and includes 12 sub-districts and 56 villages. 
The number of sub-districts had increased from an initial four in its 
infancy stage in the 1980s as a result of expansion (pemekaran) over the 
last three decades. The municipality is surrounded by Jakarta to the 
West, Bekasi District to the East, and Bogor District to the South. 
Having become the centre of economic development, Bekasi 
attracted economic migration from outside the municipality, especially 
from Java and Sumatra. Migration figures from 1995 to 2000 show that 
of all people arriving in West Java, those arriving in the Bekasi and 
Bogor districts from Java comprised 24.61 per cent in 1995 and 23.22 
                                                          
65  ‘Kasus HKBP, Warga Bekasi Justru Akrab dengan Gereja Jawa-Pasundan’, 
www.republika.co.id. Jumat, 17 September 2010. See also ‘Jangan Sudutkan 
Masyarakat Bekasi’, www.kompas.com, Kamis, 16 September 2010. Accessed 
16 September 2010. 
66  Interview, Koernia Atje Soejana, Bekasi, 11 May, 2010. 
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per cent in 2000, and 7.91 per cent and 9.42 per cent from Sumatra in 
the same years.67 The total migration into Bekasi in 1995 was 1,081,228 
persons or 35.03 per cent of the total migration in West Java.68 Probably 
due to the economic crisis this figure fell to 66,977 in 2000. This 
migration contributed to the municipality’s population surge. According 
to statistics, in 2000, the total population of Bekasi municipality was 
1,663,802 with a population density of 8,255 per square kilometre, 
which is higher than any other district and municipality across West 
Java except Bandung with 12,711 per square kilometre.69 This migration 
also contributed to the municipality’s population diversity; Bekasi is 
overwhelmingly inhabited by Betawi along with significant numbers of 
Sundanese and Javanese. In addition to these major ethnic groups, 
Bekasi has many migrants from north Sumatra, mostly comprising of 
Batak people from Tapanuli.70 
 
Table 571 
2000 Census Bekasi Population according to Ethnic Origin 
 
Bekasi Regency 




599,762 206,906 717,863 25,401 2,692 
Bekasi Municipality 




331,117 523,740 473,309 78,149 13,476 
 
                                                          
67  Profil Kependudukan Provinsi Jawa Barat Tahun 2000 (Jakarta: Badan Pusat 
Statistik, 2000), p. 39. 
68  Idem , p. 37. 
69  Idem, pp. 12 and 15. 
70  I failed to find accounts of the initial arrival of Bataks and Chinese into 
Bekasi. However, it is possible that the Bataks migrated to Bekasi through 
Batavia since the late 19th century for missionary reasons. In 1880, it was 
zendeling Nommensen who sent the first group of seven Batak youths from 
Selindung to Batavia to attend Seminari Depok, the oldest missionaries’ 
training centre across the archipelago. Before the suspension of the 
seminary in 1926, 67 persons had been sent to be trained at this Christian 
missionary school. Some of the Christian Bataks did not return home after 
they had been trained but preferred to stay in Batavia. 
71  See Profil Kependudukan Provinsi Jawa Barat Tahun 2000 (Jakarta: Badan 
Pusat Statistik, 2000). 
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In their new settlements, the Bataks would seek churches or 
congregations where they could meet other Bataks: 
 
Many observers note the great enthusiasm the Bataks have to 
build churches in their new settlements inspired by their desire to 
replicate their place of origin, their culture and their life and the 
circumstances in their villages. It is therefore no surprise that after a 
short while one can see the presence of HKBP congregations and 
churches everywhere.72 
 
HKBP churches existed across West Java and Jakarta. In these 
regions (including Banten), the HKBP conducted services in various 
places.73 During the 1930s-1950s, the HKBP provided services in 
Kernolong (where the first HKBP church was built in 1931-32), Tanjung 
Priok, Menteng Taman Suropati 2 (Adhuc Stat Building), Petojo Tanah 
Abang II, Jalan Sindoro South Jakarta, and Pademangan.74 It is worth 
noting that from the 1960s to the 1980s the number of HKBP members 
kept increasing. The growth in number of HKBP churches and adherents 
was determined by Batak migration into the area and mortality and 
birth rates. They did not settle in the expensive central Jakarta areas but 
rather in less affluent areas like peripheral Jabodetabek75 
neighbourhood mainly because of their low-income professions. Since 
ordinary Batak people are employed as low-income labourers such as 
drivers and conductors, construction labourers, roadside tire repair 
men, small-time traders and the like, they can only afford to live in the 
peripheral areas of Jakarta. This helped the spread of HKBP to these 
areas.76 
                                                          
72  Gomar Gultom (ed.), Keyakinan Dalam Percobaan: Studi Kasus Gereja HKBP 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Sopo Metmet, 1993), p. 37. 
73  This includes Menteng Central Jakarta, Sudirman Avenue, Slipi, Tanjung 
Priok, Tanah Tinggi, Ancol Podomoro, Kapuk, Kelapa Gading, Arabika Road 
West Jakarta, Pos Pengumben, Srengseng Road, Pademangan Barat, 
Sukapura, Pasar Minggu, Cijantung, Serang, Cengkareng, Tangerang, Merak, 
Duren Jaya Bekasi, Setia Mekar Bekasi, Cimahi, and Bandung. See Mika P.L. 
Tobing (et al.), Profile Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (HKBP) Distrik I Jakarta 
– 3 (Jakarta: HKBP Distrik XXI Jakarta-3, 2008), pp. 333-342. 
74  Tobing (et al.), Profile, pp. 333-342. 
75  Jabodetabek stands for Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Bekasi and Tangerang. 
76  Tim Bidang Sejarah, Sejarah Perkembangan HKBP Distrik VIII Jawa 
Kalimantan (Jakarta, 2006), p. 26. 
-234- 
 
According to Pieterson, a pastor serving in the so-called Taman 
Mini Resort, the Batak Christians are known to be devout individuals.77 
They maintain their religious practices even after having lived in 
majority Muslim regions for a long period of time.78 Since the early days 
of the arrival of Protestant Bataks into Jakarta and West Java, they 
would always seek out fellow Bataks with whom they could share their 
language and culture, 79 and they congregate for Sunday Church services 
wherever they went. The fact that the services were conducted in their 
shared Batak language contributed significantly to their attendance. The 
association between Batak identity and Christianity increased the 
demand for building churches which aided the expansion of Batak 
churches in Jakarta and West Java. 
However, building houses of worship is not easy. Government 
regulations stipulate many terms and conditions that have to be met in 
order to be able to build a house of worship.80 These requirements in 
many cases prove to be quite prohibitive, especially when it comes to 
obtaining the ‘approval’ of people living in the neighbourhood. Muslims 
are generally reluctant to allow Christians to build churches in their 
neighbourhood especially when there are few Christians. Failure to gain 
approval for the building of churches cause much frustration to 
immigrant Christians and leads to tension with local Muslims forcing 
them to carry out services at their private homes. Muslim activists 
accused Christians of sometimes having been able to procure the 
support for church construction projects by donations of money or other 
gifts. This tactic could backfire, however, in the event of an objection at 
any point afterwards, even when construction was already underway 
and pursuant to Joint Decrees No. 8 and 9/2006 or Joint decree 
No.1/1969. 
The cases of the HKBP church in Cinere Depok, GKI church in 
Bogor Yasmin residence, and Santa Maria Catholic Church in Purwakarta 
best exemplify how objections put forth even after construction had 
                                                          
77  Interview, pastor Pieterson, Jakarta, 10 March 2011. 
78  Idem. 
79  Idem. 
80  Peraturan Bersama Menteri Agama dan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor: 9 
Tahun 2006 dan Nomor: 8 Tahun 2006 tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas 
Kepala Daerah/Wakil Kepala Daerah Dalam Pemeliharaan Kerukunan Umat 
Beragama, Pemberdayaan Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, dan Pendirian 
Rumah Ibadat, articles no. 13-20. 
-235- 
 
begun could hold up the project or even nullify its authorisation. These 
cases have created a complex mix of legal and political problems as well 
as inter-religious tension and intolerance.81 In her study entitled 
‘Implementing the Regulation on Places of Worship in Indonesia’, 
Melissa Crouch portrays how court action taken by the church with 
regards to its permit for the construction of a place of worship has on 
occasion successfully challenged objections that were largely influenced 
by local politics. The Cinere HKBP’s church first attempt at court action, 
for example, was successful and the Bandung State Administrative Court 
ruled that the mayor of Depok‘s cancellation of the HKBP church permit 
could not be upheld.82 However, it did not help. Depok officials ignored 
the Bandung State Administrative Court’s decision to enforce the law 
and to ensure the construction of the church. 
A Christian leader I interviewed claimed to be committed to 
fulfilling all the legal requirements necessary but found it difficult to 
accept that objections raised by residents in the vicinity of the 
construction site might veto constructions, let alone those already 
underway.83 There is, however, in the spirit of the joint decree number 
1/1969, an emphasis on social order in matters pertaining to the 
propagation of religion and the construction of houses of worship. The 
mix of legal terms and conditions required in such efforts, on one hand, 
and the need to ensure order, on the other, have facilitated political 
intervention in the construction of houses of worship in particular and 
in the propagation of religion in general. 
 
A Case of Tension in Mustika Jaya 
Since the 1970s, the Mustika Jaya sub-district of East Bekasi has been 
inhabited largely by Protestant Bataks. Some of them live in Pondok 
Timur Indah (PTI). At one point in the 1990s, Samosir, a Christian Batak 
in the PTI estate, used his house for Sunday services. In the first few 
                                                          
81  Melissa Crouch of Melbourne University has written a very interesting study 
of this kind of legal cases in her ‘Implementing the Regulation on Places of 
Worship in Indonesia: New Problems, Local Politics and Court Action’, Asian 
Studies Review, December 2010, Vol. 34, pp. 403–419. See ‘Bogor Church 
congregation defies threats, authorities’, The Jakarta Post, Monday, 6 
September, 2010, p. 2. 
82  Crouch, ‘Implementing the Regulation’, pp. 403-404. 
83  Interview, pastor Esron Tampubolon, Jakarta, 25 March 2011. 
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years the use of his house for congregations drew no protests. Over time 
attendance increased forcing the Protestant Bataks in the mid-2000s to 
purchase another house next door owned by a Javanese Muslim. By that 
time, there was a real need for a place of worship and this need became 
more pressing as the local Batak population grew. Meanwhile, Bataks 
from Tapanuli, North Sumatra, kept arriving. The Sunday congregation 
continued to grow, and the Christian Bataks used the private residence 
to celebrate Christmas. 
A local Muslim leader, ustadz Sahid Tajuddin, expressed Muslims’ 
displeasure with this situation.84 He expressed his discontent over the 
fact that most attendants came from outside the village.85 Over time, he 
said, more HKBP Christians attended the Sunday services, during which 
a public road was closed in part to make more parking space for those 
attending. There were many vehicles coming from outside the village 
and this worsened traffic conditions and caused noise pollution. The 
local community felt that the visitors showed neither respect nor care 
for the neighbourhood. Over time the congregation grew even further, 
with new members arriving from various places across Bekasi and 
Karawang.86 Muslims began to seriously worry about this development, 
not really because the residence was being used for Sunday worship and 
Christmas services, but about the prospect of it being permanently used 
as a church in the neighbourhood. Interestingly, they feared that this 
would most likely alter the socio-religious and cultural character of their 
society87 whereas the actual use of the property as a ‘church’ was not 
seen as a problem. The fear of the establishment of a real church 
underpinned the Muslims’ reluctance to agree to the construction of a 
permanent one in their neighbourhood. Within this atmosphere, tension 
slowly mounted. 
Muslims began to protest by expressing their objections over 
simple administrative and technical issues, such as regarding the 
permission to conduct services and celebrations or over traffic 
congestion caused by the meetings.88 The private residence happened to 
                                                          
84  Interview, ustadz Sahid Tajuddin, Bekasi, 1 November 2010. 
85  Idem. 
86  Idem. 
87  Idem. 
88  The objection of the people can be seen in ‘Berkas Kasus Alih Fungsi Rumah 
Jl. Puyuh Raya No. 14. RT.01 RW.15 Kelurahan/Kecamatan Mustika Jaya dari 
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be at the side of the road, causing many commuters to complain about 
the heavy traffic and the inconvenience caused by the use of the house. 
In the meantime, Muslims saw this as a showcase of the Christian Batak 
faith.89 Muslim leaders in the village perceived it as an expression of 
arrogance. The issue soon escalated from the technical matter of the use 
of a private residence causing congestion on the public road into a 
religious and cultural problem. 
Local Muslims wanted to keep the village as it was and resented 
the arrival of the Bataks. In an effort to maintain the local status quo, the 
community mobilised and presented its complaints to the local village 
administration. On 15 January 2009, a leader of the administration unit 
at the local level (RW),90 Nyaman, mediated the tension.91 He invited the 
HKBP leaders to discuss the objections of the Muslims and to question 
the use of a private residence for mass religious services.92 Nyaman said 
that the HKBP had been using the house for 18 years without prior 
permission from the local village administration. Pastors Luspida 
Simanjuntak and Asian Lumbontaruan acknowledged this situation but 
wondered why the objections arose only recently.93 
While no appropriate solution was given to the objections, in 
December 2009 the HKBP held another Christmas service in the same 
place, which drew a large crowd. Protests repeated and Nyaman re-
invited the HKBP and local leaders to sit together to talk on 3 January 
2010. The HKBP apologised, promising to look for a new place for their 
services, and appealed to be given time for that. However, local leaders 
demanded the HKBP stick to a timeframe. Aware that this situation 
could escalate into unrest, on 16 January 2010, the PTI village head took 
over the handling of the problem and held a meeting. In addition to 
village officials, local leaders and HKBP leaders, the meeting was also 
attended by the Forum for Inter-Religious Harmony (Forum Kerukunan 
antar-Umat Beragama, FKUB). In this meeting potential solutions were 
                                                                                                                                        
Januari 2009-Juni 2010’ (Pemerintah Kota Bekasi, Kecamatan Mustika Jaya, 
Kelurahan Mustika Jaya. Rukun Warga (RW) 15., 2010)’. 
89  Interview, Suwito, Jakarta, 5 January 2011. 
90  Rukun Warga or RW is a small administration unit that operates under the 
village office and is tasked to manage the coordination of Rukun Tetangga 
(RT). 
91  See ‘Berkas Kasus Alih Fungsi Rumah Jl. Puyuh Raya’. 
92  Interview, Nyaman, by Muchtadlirin, Bekasi, 16 January 2011. 
93  Idem. 
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discussed with the HKBP leaders, with the FKUB proposing the Muslim 
community to allow the HKBP to temporarily conduct their Sunday 
services for a period of time to be agreed upon. The HKBP leader 
Luspida Simanjuntak argued that the HKBP had been there for 18 years 
and wondered why they should now have to go. She, however, pointed 
out that HKBP would do its best towards a workable compromise 
provided a new building or land could be found. 
Luspida claimed that since 2004 the HKBP sought to build a 
church on their own empty land one to two kilometres from Puyuh Raya 
road in Ciketing but the people there warned them not to do that in 
order not to cause problems.94 In this complicated situation, HKBP 
leaders sought understanding from the Muslims, who said they could 
not wait too long. In the end, they demanded the HKBP leave the house 
on the 31st of January 2010. The HKBP could not accept this ultimatum 
and continued to worship there because they felt that their religious 
freedom should always be protected by the state.95 
Meeting failure at village and district levels, the problem was then 
pushed up to the Bekasi municipal authority. On 2 February 2010, the 
Bekasi mayor held a meeting with all civil, police and military 
authorities under his jurisdiction. The meeting decided that the P2P 
office96 would issue an order to seal the house on 10 February as it 
violated its building function. The sealing was scheduled for 12 
February; however, it was postponed after a Member of Parliament from 
the PDI-P party intervened by making a call to the mayor.97 This call 
helped postpone the sealing for two weeks. However, due to Muslim 
pressure, the P2B office issued another order to close the house to any 
religious services on 25 February 2010. On the 1st of March, the house 
that was used as venue for Sunday and Christmas services of the HKBP 
congregation was officially sealed. 
The sealing of the house outraged HKBP members. Some female 
HKBP members came to the houses of Nyaman, the RW head, and 
Suwito, the Muslim’s spokesperson, who was also the imam of the local 
                                                          
94  Meeting notes written by Abd Jabbar named ‘Berkas Kasus Alih Fungsi 
Rumah’.  
95  Idem. 
96  P2B is Dinas Pengawasan dan Penertiban Bangunan (Office for Building 
Control and Order). 
97  Interview, Nyaman, by Muchtadlirin, Bekasi, 16 January 2011. 
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mosque, to express their anger. These Muslims sought police assistance 
as they felt they felt intimidated. The HKBP found the sealing 
unacceptable. They removed the cordon, accusing the government 
officials of being unfair. They maintained that the 1945 Constitution 
guaranteed their right to worship and continued to oppose the 
government decision. In the name of religious freedom they resumed 
their services in the house. On 20 March 2010, however, the municipal 
authority sealed the house again and warned the HKBP not to oppose 
the law. 
In the meantime, Muslim activists argued that articles of the 1945 
Constitution should provide practical guidelines on the implementation 
of Joint Decree Number 8/9 2006, which authorised the construction of 
all houses of worship at the district level and required that it be based 
on a real need. The joint decree requires proof of 90 members of the 
religious community seeking to construct a house of worship, with 
verified names and identity card numbers along with support from 60 
residents living in the neighbourhood.98 Due to the fact that the Mustika 
Jaya district is overwhelmingly Muslim, it seems unlikely that any 
Bataks seeking a church would be able to fulfil this requirement. The 
Decree also requires recommendations from the head of the office of the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs and the FKUB at the district level. 
In order to be fair to the Batak Christians, the Bekasi municipality 
promised to provide a location for them to perform their Sunday 
services. The HKBP, however, said that the government did not keep its 
word. Since then, the issue became so politically-charged that their 
search for other places for their Sunday services became very difficult. 
In July 2010, they moved their services to an empty plot of land about 
2.5 kilometres to Ciketing Asem, Mustika Jaya, East Bekasi. Although 
they claimed to have obtained the permission of the local authorities in 
this new location, their arrival was challenged by the people in the 
neighbourhood with the support of members of Muslim organisations 
from outside the village. Every Sunday morning they organised protests. 
For the Christians, the reason behind their objection was not really 
clear. What was stated was that they did not want the HKBP Christians 
to hold their Sunday services in their village, let alone build a church. 
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They considered the performance of Sunday services in their village an 
intrusive imposition. The general complaint was that the Sunday 
services would disturb those residing in the area.99 
However, the HKBP rejected these protests as they were 
convinced of their right to conduct services on their own land. Especially 
after their experience in their old location, this new challenge 
encouraged them to continue to defend their religious rights. The 
Bataks, especially those from North Tapanuli, are strongly attached to 
the Christian faith which has become enmeshed with their culture. They 
left home with their parents’ prayer that they would maintain their 
culture and keep faithful to their church.100 This religious element in the 
Batak culture lends great fervour in the defence of their religion. It 
seems that this commitment, at once cultural and religious, is what 
drove the HKBP congregation to keep performing their weekly Sunday 
services while ignoring the protest from all sides. 
This was an expression of resistance. The Batak Christians 
acknowledged the prohibition of using a private residence for public 
religious services. Nonetheless, they were unhappy with the 
government’s sealing of the house because they felt that they were 
impeded in performing their Sunday services and were denied their 
freedom of religion. They knew they had violated a government 
regulation, but also felt that the government was complicit in denying 
their fundamental human right to worship as guaranteed by Law No. 
39/1999 on Human Rights. Recognising their marginalised position and 
banking on the sympathies of various electronic and print media, they 
accentuated their discontent. Towards this end, they kept gathering at 
the sealed house every Sunday morning before walking the few 
kilometres to the empty plot of land in Ciketing where they performed 
their service. My respondents, whose house is next to the plot the Bataks 
use complained of the inconvenience they faced. One of them said: 
 
You know... upon the sealing of the house they used for Sunday 
services, the HKBP Christians kept coming to the place and used it as 
their meeting point. From there, they walked in lines to perform their 
Sunday service on an empty piece of land owned by a member of 
HKBP congregation. On their way to the land they kept walking in lines 
together, singing Christian songs in the Batak language at the top of 
                                                          
99  Interview, ustadz Sahid Tajuddin and Siti Hafsah, Bekasi, 1 November 2010. 
100 Interview, pastor Erson Tampubolon, Jakarta, 25 March 2011. 
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their voices, even louder than the Quranic recitation usually heard 
from the village mosque minaret. It sounds strange to us as 
Muslims.101 
 
Local Muslims were unhappy with what my respondent suggests 
is a ‘theatrical performance.’102 She pointed out that before the clash on 
12 September 2010 erupted the Bataks did this without fail every 
Sunday. She complained: “Their voices were loud and their language 
was strange to us.”103 She then compared the gospel choir on the 
Ciketing Street every Sunday morning with the Quranic recitation from 
the minaret and reiterated her discontent because the gospel choir 
drowned the Quranic recitation. Religious and ethnic identity were thus 
involved as the bases of tension, which in the end escalated into 
violence. 
The clash also indirectly resulted from the failure of the local 
authorities to step in timely to mediate the situation. Outside 
intervention on behalf of both groups also contributed to the clash. Local 
Muslims sought the help of their brethren outside the village.104 The 
Christians sought the political intervention from a PDI-P member of 
parliament.105 The former succeeded in applying more pressure on the 
HKBP members in the village, while the latter demanded that the Bekasi 
municipality, having gained office with the support of the party, act as 
fairly as possible. This situation, left unresolved, culminated in the 
small-scale attack on 12 September against the Batak Protestants of 
HKBP that left their pastors injured. Many Christian and Muslim leaders 
were shocked over the sudden eruption of this inter-religious tension in 
Bekasi. 
The Bekasi Islamic Community Congress (Kongres Umat Islam 
Bekasi, KUIB) accused the HKBP of violating the law as well as having 
transgressed local norms and cultures. The latter was demonstrated in 
their disrespect for the local people and their environment. It was said 
that the way in which they had obtained permission from the local 
people was illegitimate because the Muslims claimed the Batak 
                                                          
101  Interview, Siti Hafsah, Ciketing, Bekasi, 1 November 2010. 
102  Idem. 
103  Idem. 
104  Interview, Suwito, Jakarta, 5 January 2011. Also Interview with Nyaman, by 
Muchtadlirin, Bekasi, 16 January 2011. 
105  Interview, Suwito, Jakarta, 5 January 2011. 
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Christians had misused people’s identity cards.106 HKBP leader, Erson 
Tampubolon, rejected this accusation, claiming that they had obtained 
the consent from the local people without any tricks.107 
The conflict was actually there because the Muslims thought that 
the Protestant Bataks were trying to proselytise and the Muslim 
wrongly thought that the Batak Christians were intolerant.108 Muslim 
leaders in Mustika Jaya sub-district said that they have been living with 
the Javanese and Sundanese churches since the nineteenth century in 
tolerance and mutual respect. There never had been any 
misunderstanding or clash.109 They felt the tension with the Bataks was 
rooted in the cultural gap between Muslims mostly of Betawi, Sundanese 
and Javanese origins and the HKBP Christians of Batak origin. 
The introduction of Christianity in Mustika Jaya failed to garner 
the reception it enjoyed in Pondok Melati in the late nineteenth to early 
twentieth century. Aside from the fact that the Protestant Bataks did not 
use the same approach as deployed by missionaries in Pondok Melati, 
today’s context has also changed. What we see in this case is the refusal 
of the local community to accept the HKBP Christians in their 
neighbourhood. There were too many irreconcilable differences. 
 
Christianisation and its Opponents 
The Pentecostal and HKBP growth in Bekasi caused deep concern 
among Muslim activists leading them to oppose Christianisation and 
establish anti-apostasy organisations. They hoped to maintain their 
monopoly of the public sphere by taking anti-apostasy actions to put 
pressure on missionaries. However, it seems clear that the 
establishment of these organisations is symptomatic of Muslim anxieties 
about Christianisation. Interestingly, Muslim activists have been paying 
much attention to Christianisation in a situation of the deepening 
Islamisation across the region. A 2000 census indicated Muslims 
constitute the largest population in West Java (34,884,417 million/97.65 
                                                          
106  Jeje Zainuddin, ‘Solusi Konflik Ciketing’, Republika, 20 September 2010, p. 4; 
see also a report in the same edition on p. 5. See also ‘Klarifikasi FPI Bekasi 
Raya Atas Insiden HKBP’, www.fpi.or.id 16 September 2010. 
107  Interview, pastor Erson Tampubolon, Jakarta, 25 March 2011. 
108  Interview, ustadz Sahid Tajuddin, Bekasi, 1 November 2010. 
109  Idem. 
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per cent), where Islam is a thriving aspect of identity.110 Despite being 
lower than the annual Christian growth rate of over 4.5 per cent, the 
annual Muslim growth rate in this region (2.42 per cent) is higher than 
that nation-wide (1.86 per cent). In terms of numbers and percentage, 
the national Muslim population totals 177,528,772 or 88.22 per cent, 
which percentage is much lower than that of the total West Javanese 
Muslim population of around 97.65 per cent.111 
The Christian demand for new houses of worship increased in this 
context as an expression of growth, but Muslim activists saw the surge 
in church construction as an expression of evangelist Christianisation 
efforts instead of an honest need for houses of worship. The Muslims’ 
conviction that evangelism is a threat means that this issue is difficult to 
resolve. In countering the evangelist mission, Muslim activists 
established anti-apostasy organisations in places across West Java and 
Jakarta which staged strong protests against church construction. They 
also protested against conducting Sunday services in private residences. 
Counter-actions culminated in 2004 and 2005, causing continuous 
tension in Muslim-Christian relations. 
Muslims accused Christians of implementing an insidious 
Christianisation agenda, while Christians kept denouncing Muslims for 
the violence they perpetrated against them. Sustained mutual suspicion 
meant they were hyper-sensitive towards each other’s religious 
activities. The perceived threat of Christianisation has affected the 
Muslim community psychologically, inciting fear, anger and suspicion 
towards Christians. There was the potential that the Muslims would 
become paranoid. This might cause the danger that they would over-
generalise and consider all Christian denominations hostile and 
ambitious, while aggressive proselytisation was in fact mainly carried 
out by evangelicals. How irrationality turns into violence is well-
exemplified by the build-up of tension between the Muslims and the 
Christians of the HKBP denomination in Bekasi, which erupted into the 
attack on two HKBP pastors on 12 November 2010. The violence also 
                                                          
110  Aris Ananta, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, Leo Suryadinata (eds.), Indonesian 
Electoral Behaviours: A Statistical Perspective (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), p. 203. 




speaks to the latent tension between these two different faith 
communities. 
Muslim activists responded through the formation of a coalition of 
Dakwahists, Modernists and Islamists to challenge evangelical 
Christianisation. The ICG report mentioned above claims that Salafi 
jihadists seem to have become involved in this movement and warns 
that they may use the Christianisation issue as their “recruitment 
theme” for a new generation of jihadists.112 While this particular claim 
needs to be investigated, it is obvious that Christianisation represents a 
threat considered serious enough to induce Muslim leaders and activists 
to mobilise into a coalition cutting across diverse ideological 
persuasions. Most of the groups involved have no history of violence, but 
some have frequently been responsible for the sealing of churches 
across Jakarta and West Java. 
For many anti-apostasy activists, the ICG report’s claims came as 
no surprise because most facts presented in the report were already 
known. The ICG, long viewed with suspicion by Muslim activists, now 
acknowledged the reality of Christianisation. An Islamist website, Voice 
of Islam,113 which was a major source used in the report, used it to 
convey to its readers the message of the reality of Christianisation. On 
29 December 2010, it published a report entitled “These are cases of 
Christianisation behind the Bekasi Incident.”114 Quoting the ICG report, it 
maintained that one major reason for the disharmony between Muslims 
and Christians was the “aggressive evangelical Christian proselytisation 
in Muslim strongholds.”115 A coalition of Bekasi dakwah activists claimed 
the report as plain evidence of their complaints about Christianisation. 
Although the report did not invoke a collective response from 
mainstream Muslim organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah, it did draw the attention of intellectuals like Azyumardi 
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Azra who authored an article in the national daily, Republika, entitled 
“Christianisation and tolerance”116 criticising evangelist intolerance.117 
Arguing for respectful tolerance in spreading religion, Azra warned of 
the danger to inter-faith harmony posed by aggressive proselytising, the 
more so when deception or other illegitimate means are employed. He 
reiterated that to avoid tension and disharmony within society, the 
government had actually barred missionary activities from targeting 
those people who already embraced a recognised faith.118 Anti-
Christianisation activists subsequently tapped Azra’s critique as 
intellectually legitimising their protests. They made numerous copies 
and distributed them on the 6th of January 2011 to activists involved in 
the rally on the streets in front of the Bekasi Court.119 From Bandung, 
prominent Muslim leader K.H. Athian Ali praised Azra’s article for his 
critical comments about the intolerance of the evangelist approach.120 
In fact, the outpour of Muslim resentment toward Christians had 
been on-going since mid-2010. By that time Muslim groups established 
the Bekasi Islamic Congress and used every mosque in the city to create 
an anti-apostasy movement.121 The coalition of Muslim groups convened 
at the Al-Azhar mosque to address the so-called ‘Christianisation 
problem.’ One of the group’s leaders, Murhali Barda, head of the Bekasi 
chapter of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), who later allegedly 
assaulted the two church leaders in Ciketing, East Bekasi,122 proclaimed 
that all Muslims should “unite and be on guard because the Christians 
                                                          
116  Azyumardi Azra, ‘Kristenisasi dan Toleransi’ (Christianisation and 
Tolerance), Republika, 02 December, 2010. 
117  Idem. 
118  Idem. Azra was probably referring to Joint Decree of the Ministers of Home 
Affair and Minister of Religious Affairs No. 1/1969 dated 13 September 
1969 over the Implementation of the Government Officials’ Task in 
Guaranteeing Order and Smooth Operation of Development and Religious 
Worship amongst Believers. 
119  My own observation on-site in Bekasi, on the 6th of January 2011. The rally 
itself aimed to influence the outcome of the trial while showing support for 
those accused of incitement against the Protestant Bataks of Ciketing, East 
Bekasi. 
120  Interview, Hedi Muhammad, Bandung, 13 January 2011. 
121  http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/city/muslim-groups-talk-war-over-
christianization/382952, accessed 13 March 2010. 
122  ‘Two Church Leaders Assaulted’, The Jakarta Post, 1 September 2010. 
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are up to something.”123 An activist from the Forum for Ulama-Ummat of 
Indonesia (Forum Ulama-Ummat Indonesia, FUUI) in Bandung, Hedi 
Muhammad, characterised Christianisation as illegitimate missionary 
activity. He argued that the methods employed by the evangelicals have 
no basis in Christ’s teachings and he questioned whether 
Christianisation more accurately involved the commodification of 
religion.124 Some initiatives to proselytise Muslims obviously contradict 
Christianity itself, he said. Instead of deceptively baiting destitute 
Muslims with financial carrots in such un-Christian fashion, Hedi held up 
the personification of genuine compassion that was Mother Theresa. He 
felt that her sincere dedication to humanity earned her a place in 
heaven.125 
It was under these circumstances that the anti-apostasy activists 
organised their resistance. In May 2010, they held two religious rallies 
(tabligh akbar) that brought together a coalition of Muslim activists of 
various organisations from around Jakarta, Bekasi and Bandung. Unlike 
ordinary religious rallies that served as forums for addressing ritual, 
spiritual and social issues, the latter rallies addressed sensitive issues 
surrounding apostasy or pemurtadan.126 The first rally was held in South 
Bekasi on 8 May and was led by K.H. Athian Ali, the head of the FUUI in 
Bandung. The following day, another mass rally was held at the Barokah 
Mosque in downtown Bekasi. Represented at the meeting were Muslim 
organisations from all over Bekasi, including the Indonesian Islamic 
Propagation Council (DDII), Indonesian Islamic Scholars’ Council (MUI), 
Reformist Islamic Movement (GARIS), Islamic Defender Front (FPI), 
Muhammadiyah, PERSIS, Indonesian Islamic Youth Organisation (GPII), 
and many others. The meeting was hosted by the Bekasi Anti-apostasy 
Front (FAPB) which had put Christianisation on the agenda for 
discussion.127 
The gathering produced the Bekasi Muslims Declaration which 
included: (1) the rejection of the construction of churches that do not 
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124  Interview, Hedi Muhammad, Bandung, 13 January 2011. 
125  Idem. 
126  Interview, Abu Al-Iz, Bekasi, 2 November 2010. See also ICG, ‘Indonesia: 
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-247- 
 
meet genuine needs and follow legal procedures as this may cause 
disquiet among the people and lead to unrest; (2) the strong 
condemnation of any attempts by evangelist Christians to convert 
Muslims; (3) the expression that Muslims were offended by affronts 
towards Islam and its symbols; (4) the demand that local authorities and 
the police take action and sentence the perpetrators.128 The declaration 
conveys that Muslims were angry with the attempts to Christianisation. 
Their defensive mind-set is also evident in their much-heightened 
sensitivity towards criticism of their religious symbols in a situation 
where they are growing themselves through increased Islamisation. 
 
Increasing Assaults Targeting Churches 
Anti-apostasy actions involving the use of violence provoked tension 
between Christians and Muslims with socially-polarising potential. From 
1998 to 2010, numerous churches and other Christian properties across 
West Java were the targets of frequent attacks by Muslim mobs and 
many churches were forced to close. During this time, militant Muslim 
activists often protested the use for Sunday services of private 
properties such as shop-houses (ruko) or private residences. They also 
regularly mobilised to protest the construction of churches in a number 
of places, even where the government had issued construction permits. 
There was also an increase in the number of church construction 
disputes brought before the courts.129 Among these disputes are those 
involving the HKBP church in Depok and one Christian church in Taman 
Yasmin, Bogor. Church closures increasingly occurred across West Java 
with 45 instances reported in 2004-05.130 A Christian pastor, Chrisman 
Hutabarat, acknowledged that many of the churches that were forcibly 
closed indeed did not have construction permits (IMB). Most of the 
churches closed or destroyed, however, had been there for decades and 
had been constructed in the 1960s to the 1990s with the support of the 
residents in their surroundings. The Jakarta Post, for instance, stated 
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that from September 2004 to July 2007 there were more than 30 cases 
of churches being attacked or forcibly closed.131 This number would 
seem to be rather too low in view of other findings. What is significant 
here is the fact that the number does not seem to have reduced in the 
past few years. Moreover, anti-Christianisation activists have continued 
to pursue their agenda and to consolidate their position at the 
grassroots.132 Their concerns over the intensified proselytising actions 
appeared in the early days of post-1998 Indonesian democracy even 
though the establishment of formal anti-apostasy organisations is a 
more recent development that started in 2005. 
 
The Ministers’ Joint Decree Numbers 8 and 9/2006  
Due to increasing tension and intensified clashes between people of 
different faiths, the need for a solution to the problem became ever more 
urgent. Believers, however, could not see eye to eye about the causes of 
disharmony within their society. The tension revolved especially around 
the expansive presence and the construction of houses of worship, 
especially churches. Muslim activists accused Christians of having a 
Christianisation agenda focusing on Muslims while attacks on churches 
were becoming more frequent. In this context, various religious leaders 
opined that Joint Degree No. 1/1969 should be suspended while others 
said that it should be upheld or even revised. The former generally 
represents the voices of Christian leaders, while the latter, those of 
Muslim ones. 
A prominent pastor, Ismartono, noted that the forced church 
closings shared a common pattern. In his words: 
 
Muslim residents were mobilised to complain about the “unrest” 
caused by activities in the churches or in other Christian buildings. 
Then, Christians living near the churches were intimidated, he said. 
Finally, government officials declared the churches closed, based on 
the Joint Ministerial Decree No. 1 of 1969, and especially its article 4 
on the construction of worship houses.133 
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The Christians had been disappointed that the Ministerial Decree 
had even been issued in 1969. Now, with churches increasingly forced to 
close, Christian leaders felt compelled to demand a review of the Decree. 
On May 1999, members of the Communication Forum of Jakarta 
Christians (Forum Komunikasi Kristiani Jakarta, FKKJ) held a seminar 
discussing and reviewing the Decree. An adviser to the Justice minister, 
Cecilia F.G. Sunaryati, who was on the seminar panel, agreed with the 
idea to review the Decree in order to imbue it with the spirit of reform 
as well as to strengthen its legal basis.134 Sunaryati, a Catholic and 
former director of the national board for the development of laws at the 
Ministry of Law and Human Rights, pointed out that the need to review 
the Decree also stemmed from its failure to concur with the spirit of 
religious freedom which informed the 1945 Constitution.135 The forum 
was also concerned with the human rights perspectives regarding the 
Decree. The FKKJ chairman, Bonar Simangunsong, promised to continue 
studying the decree from both legal and human rights aspects and to 
submit his findings to the government. He argued that the Decree had 
been extensively misused to “deny Christians religious freedom by 
halting church construction.”136 
Under these circumstances the chairman of the Communion of 
Indonesian Churches (PGI), Andreas A. Yewangoe, put this controversial 
issue to the attention of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in their 
meeting on 23 August 2005.137 In response, the President asked the 
Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs to 
undertake an assessment of the existing legal foundations which 
regulate the socio-religious life of people of different faiths.138 The main 
question concerned the joint decree of the Minister of Home Affairs and 
the Minister of Religious Affairs No. 1/1969. The joint decree, passed in 
1969 by the New Order regime, stipulated the general guidelines for the 
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implementation of the tasks of the government apparatus in keeping 
order and the regulation of sustainable development and religious 
observance by believers.139 The decree contained regulations on 
religious propagation and the construction of houses of worship, 
inspired by the fact that the construction of houses of worship created 
much inter-religious tension.140 
The aim of joint decree no 1/1969 was to give full protection 
towards religious freedom while upholding social order. The regime 
guaranteed the freedom of religious observance but insisted that this be 
conditional on social order. After more than forty years, many view the 
joint decree as inadequate, because ambiguous, and having lost 
relevance to address specific practical aspects of religious life.141 This 
appraisal was made in September 2005 in a joint meeting of high-
ranking state officials including the Ministers of Home Affairs, Religious 
Affairs, Law and Human Rights and the Attorney-General. The officials 
concluded that various aspects of joint decree no 1/1969 were no longer 
relevant and needed to be revised.142 The weaknesses included, first, the 
ambiguous wording it contained, with many sentences amenable to 
multiple interpretations. Second, it lacked detailed provisions regarding 
the construction of houses of worship. These were the roots of more 
recent social discord. 
Upon the instruction of the President, the Minister of Religious 
Affairs, in cooperation with the Minister of Home Affairs, made drafts of 
joint decrees number 8 and 9 on the guidelines for local authorities in 
the maintenance of religious harmony, the empowerment of the Forum 
for Inter-religious Harmony (FKUB), and the construction of houses of 
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worship. The joint degree No 9 and 8 contains ten chapters and 31 
articles. The regulations about the construction of houses of worship are 
stipulated in articles 13-17 of chapter IV. Article 14 stipulates the 
procedures to obtain permission to build houses of worship. Article 14 
(1) says: “the construction of houses of worship must meet 
administrative and technical requirements.” The following point, article 
14 (2), states: 
 
In addition to the requirements referred to in article 14 (1), the 
construction of house of worship must meet specific requirements that 
include: (a) a list of names and identity card numbers of the house of 
worship’s users of at least 90 (ninety) persons authorised by local 
authorities, according to the boundaries referred to in article 13 (3); 
(b) local support of at least 60 (sixty) persons authorised by the 
headman/village head; (c) a written recommendation from the head of 
the Department of Religious Affairs at the district/city office, and (d) 
written recommendation from FKUB of district/city office. 
 
These requirements look conservative, weak and prone to incite 
conflict in society. It has proved difficult for believers who want to build 
a house of worship to meet these requirements especially those 
required by points (b) and (c). In many cases, it is not easy to get 
support from the local people of a different faith. Under this situation, or 
when there is an urgent demand to build a house of worship, local 
support of at least 60 (sixty) persons can become a matter of 
manipulation by conflicting parties; either local support is indeed 
manipulated or accused of being manipulated. Conflict and tension often 
occur after a house of worship has started construction and generally 
after accusations that local support had been manipulated. 
However, leaders of different religions do not seem to have an 
alternative to these conservative requirements and they approved the 
arrangement. Upon the completion of the draft by the two Ministers, 
religious leaders of various religions were invited to offer their insights 
and comments. After the decree had been discussed eleven times all 
parties involved in the discussion finally decided to agree to a final draft 
on 21 March 2006. Subsequently, the Ministers of Religious and Home 







In chapter three we have seen how the changing context, the regime’s 
politics and the state’s ideology exterminated the Communist party and 
its followers, which slowly undermined the significance of Aliran 
Kebatinan and provided the context for the increased insistence of the 
significance of religions. Christianity was among the official religions 
that benefited from the changing context and increasingly appeared to 
be a strong opponent against Islam. As the importance of the PKI and the 
Aliran Kebatinan had disappeared, Christianity’s significance increased 
and seemed to have replaced them in neutralising deepening 
Islamisation in the region. Christian leaders saw that the regime’s 
change provided the context to pave the way for Christianisation pari 
passu with Islamisation. 
As said in the beginning of this chapter, Christianity had been 
present in West Java, especially, since the nineteenth century and 
continued to gain ground in various parts of the region including 
Sukabumi, Cianjur, Bogor, and Bekasi. Thousands of Sundanese 
embraced Christianity at the end of the nineteenth century and more 
Sundanese chose Christianity in the 20th century. The conversion 
continued after independence and grew rapidly from the mid-1960s 
onward. Although Muslim Sundanese denounced their fellow Sundanese 
for converting to Christianity, their opposition to Christianisation did 
not seem to be very strong and therefore did not cause polarisation 
along the lines of strict-religious sentiments, or create conflict of identity 
between people of different faith. Recently, in the past few decades, 
Christianisation in the region, especially in Bekasi, had different 
consequences after society had changed due to economic development. 
As stated from the outset, since the 1970s, economic growth and 
industrial development in Bekasi as promoted by the New Order has 
changed society, especially after the influx over several decades of 
hundreds of thousands of migrants from Sumatra and other parts of the 
country. As said, among the migrants were Christians of Batak and 
Chinese origins who entered Bekasi along with their social institutions 
and cultural identity. Living among a majority Muslim population, the 
Chinese and Batak Christians secured their ethnic distinctiveness and 
religious identity through a Christian way of life, and by displaying their 
desire to promote Christian values among non-Christians. Leading 
experts on Christianity in Indonesia, Jan Sihar Aritonang and Karel 
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Steenbrink, observe a ‘spectacular growth’ of Christianity, especially of 
Pentecostals and Evangelicals.143 This Christianisation is done by new 
Christian actors under non-Sundanese leadership and this marked a 
new trend in the Christianisation of West Java. Some Christian elites 
took note of Muslims’ fears about the recent development of 
Christianity,144 as witnessed by Muslim activists’ creation of anti-
Christianisation organisations tasked to neutralise Christianity’s 
upsurge. Now, in this context, Muslim activists acted as the opponents 
who caused the tension between Bekasi Muslims and Batak Christians to 
emerge to the surface. 
This opposition trend is novel, especially in terms of organisation. 
The anti-Christianisation organisations now came to be organised under 
new banners including those of the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Jamaat 
Ansarut Tauhid (JAT), Gerakan Reformis Islam (GARIS), and Aliansi 
Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan (AGAP), et cetera, displacing old banners like 
those of Muhammadiyah, PERSIS, NU, and others. In terms of approach, 
these new anti-Christianisation organisations did not seem to be well-
organised nor endowed with the right direction and goal: they even 
tended to be violent. They were different from anti-Christianisation 
organisations in the early days of the New Order, which had a clear 
dakwah vision and had programs with access to proper intellectual 
resources. At that time, the Dakwahists struggled to win over the 
regime’s policies on the management of religion and dakwah. On the 
contrary, the most recent anti-Christianisation organisations do not 
seem to adopt a proper strategy in their demands for legislation in their 
favour. They are weak and reactionary. While the New Order politics on 
religion were losing relevance in the face of the Reform era, it is 
unfortunate that since the early days of the Reform era, after four 
regimes in power, no proper religious policy has been issued to cope 
with radicalism inspired by anti-Christianisation reactions caused by 
continued rivalry between Islam and Christianity, two world religions 
whose institutions keep developing and whose influence are deepening 
                                                          
143  Aritonang and Steenbrink, A History of Christianity in Indonesia, pp. 867-902. 
144  “There is a real fear that Christianity is on the march,” says Mike Hilliard, a 
Scottish minister who with his Indonesian wife runs an orphanage outside 
Jakarta that has been targeted by militant Muslims. Because of this fear, 
emotions are easily stirred up and mobs can form quickly. See Hannah 
Beech, ‘Christianity’s surge in Indonesia’. 
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in Indonesia. What is worth noting is that Christianity, which in the past 
failed to become deeply rooted in West Java, is now becoming more 












This study aims to show that in Sundanese society, since the 19th century 
there has always been an intimate negotiation between Islamisation and 
other faiths, especially Aliran Kebatinan and Christianity. This means 
that there has always been a coherent dialectics between cultural 
categories in society. This negotiation was caused either by social 
integration or by conflict as Islamisation had different impacts 
depending on its approach and objectives. Islamisation integrated and 
united society when it did not threaten or pretend to change the existing 
power balance of culture and politics but included valued native beliefs 
and adat into its practices. Contrarily, Islamisation threatened social 
integration when it harmed the integrated belief system and the culture 
society preserved. This is because in society there is always a 
fundamental link between culture and power.145  
The findings of this research show that in West-Javanese society, 
cultural and religious - both Islamic and Christian - changes are the 
results of social and political adjustments caused by shifting political 
contexts that together provided the imperative for these adjustments. 
There are at least three shifting contexts that became crucial in defining 
the direction of Islamisation and the extent of the changes to take place 
in society. The first was the pre-independence context in which Islamic 
institutions were inclined to be autonomous bodies and Muslims in most 
cases sought to compromise with the Dutch ruler. Second, in the post-
independence context, Soekarno guaranteed state neutrality towards all 
religions recognised by the state. As a rationalist, he called upon the 
Islamic umat and other believers to embrace a rational interpretation of 
                                                          
145  Ann Swidler, ‘Cultural Power and Social Movements’, in Hank Johnston 
and Bert Klandermans (eds.), Social Movements and Culture 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 31. 
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religious beliefs. Third, Soeharto’s authoritarian context provided 
Muslims with the setting for Dakwahism that led to the rise of Islamic 
culture and social institutions. Fourth, there is the Reformasi context 
during which regimes promoted democracy and an open society, but 
were contested by the radical Islamists and other groups who all had 
their own agenda and problems. Muslims, Christians and the Penghayat 
were given a new setting in which to push their religious agenda and to 
exist. In this democratic context, during which the more or less fair and 
liberal atmosphere was contested, rivalry among and negotiation 
between Islam and Christianity continued. It is also important, in this 
new setting, to bear in mind the dynamics of Aliran Kebatinan at the 
time. 
 
Islamisation and Unified Religious Systems 
Holding Balance between Islam and Adat 
As observed in Chapter One, Islam and Sunda have variously been 
imagined and interpreted as two distinct phenomena or as two sides of 
the same coin. The most-discussed interpretation is the claim that the 
Sundanese have always been more Islamic observant than the Javanese 
although objections to such claim have been raised. Missionary 
accounts, especially about the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries about 
Sundanese society seemed to justify such common vision.146 That 
Islamisation in the region from the sixteenth century onwards was 
successful was in part the result of Islam’s accommodative attitude 
towards native syncretism, whose followers believe in what Niels 
Mulder calls ‘the essential unity of all Existence’.147 In the native-
syncretic environment, Islamisation inclined to preserve adat, though 
not in its entirety. This attitude made it possible for the Sundanese to 
adapt Islam and to ‘blend’ its worldviews with their own typical 
religious practices and adat and other way around. Most important is 
that Islam had not in all cases, and also not in its entirety, been 
promoted to displace the adat that was largely rooted in Hindu-
Buddhist worldviews and mysticism.148 This Islamisation model 
obtained cultural and political legitimacy because the Sundanese ulama 
                                                          
146  Van den End, Sumber-Sumber Zending, p. 159.  
147  Mulder, ‘Aliran Kebatinan’, p. 105. 
148  Wessing, ‘A Princess from Sunda’, pp. 317-318. 
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and aristocrats, for instance Haji Hasan Moestapa and R.A.A. Moeharam 
Wiranatakoesoema, gave their supports to such a model. They even 
played important roles in maintaining the balance between Islam and 
adat. This came to be so through a long process of ‘intimate’ dialectics 
between Islam and adat that caused the easy permeation of Islam into 
West Java and the transformation of its society.149 
It was not uncommon that adat was harmoniously preserved in 
Islamic practices, which shaped the religious identity of the 
Sundanese.150 This adat-Islam setting provided the context for the 
protection of various native-syncretic beliefs. Even after world religions 
increasingly became central to the Sundanese, some syncretic creeds 
remained well preserved, for instance the belief in guriang, the 
Sundanese deity of prosperity, and honouring Nyai Roro Kidul, the 
Goddess Queen of the Southern Sea.151 The Sundanese custom of 
venerating the graves of saints remained to be honoured too.152 
The adat–Islam configuration has perhaps inspired some 
Sundanese leaders to juxtapose Islam-Sunda identities and to 
conceptualise them in the popular slogan “Islam teh Sunda, Sunda teh 
Islam,” which means ‘Islam is Sunda and Sunda is Islam’. Of course, this 
slogan does not necessarily mean to obscure the differences between 
the Sundanese and Islamic categories. Rather, this seems to be an 
affirmation of Islam–Sunda identity. Surprisingly this idea was 
conceptualised by Endang Saefuddin Anshari, none other than the leader 
of PERSIS, who was known to be highly critical of such blending. 
Although this notion was only first popularised in 1967, this view of 
Islam and adat had already become widespread among Sundanese 
Muslim leaders long before that time.153 I think such claim has been 
generally accepted for the reason that Sundanese society has never been 
polarised according to strict religious and adat-cultural lines. 
                                                          
149  A good example of the blend between Islamic precepts and existing practice 
may be found in ‘The Makam of Syaikh Abdulmuhyi’, in D.A. Rinkes, Nine 
Saints of Java, pp. 1-16. Also Wessing, ‘A Princess from Sunda’, pp. 317-318. 
Interview with the expert on Sundanese culture and arts, Hidayat Suryalaga, 
Bandung, 13 August 2009. 
150  Interview,  Hidayat Suryalaga, Bandung, 13 August 2009.  
151  Wessing, ’A Princess from Sunda’, pp. 317-318. 
152  Rinkes, Nine Saints of Java, p. 10. 
153  Interview,  Hidayat Suryalaga, Bandung, 13 August 2009. 
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Thus, the importance of adat as the element of Sundanese identity 
seemed also to be effective in case Sundanese converted to other 
religions than Islam which most Sundanese consider religiously 
unacceptable. However, conversion did not necessarily polarise the 
Sundanese. The Christian Sundanese community in Gununghalu, Cianjur, 
for instance, has embraced Christianity since the nineteenth century and 
has lived in harmony with their fellow Sundanese Muslims to this day. 
Radical Islamists recently appeared in town trying to disrupt this unity, 
but they failed because the Muslim majority refused to support them 
and, as a consequence, they lost their influence.  
 
Unified Religious System under Threat 
Purified Islamic Discourse and Social Disintegration  
As highlighted in Chapter Two, PERSIS had been critical towards adat. 
PERSIS leaders thought that adat contains animistic elements they 
considered un-Islamic and, therefore, must be removed as a means to 
carry on the complete conversion to Islam.154 PERSIS’s insistence on 
authenticity causes them to juxtapose Sundanese and Islam as two 
different identities, asserting that Hindu elements in Sundanese adat are 
harmful to Islam. PERSIS’s attitude is not surprising, however, given the 
Modernist tendency to devalue tradition’s significance155 by imposing 
‘pure’ religious practices. PERSIS’s stance provoked this kind of anti-
Islamic sentiment, which came up after the 1930s and climaxed in the 
1960s. The way PERSIS campaigned against Traditionalist practices, like 
what Geertz calls ‘unified slametan’,156 offended the Penghayat who 
propagated the anti-Islam sentiments among them. For instance, 
Madrais’ son, Tejabuana, an ADS leader, criticised PERSIS ardently and 
called upon them to respect any religious practice that was integrated in 
nativist traditions. He insisted that any religious practice that does not 
share nativist spiritual visions is illegitimate.157 This anti-adat tone is 
directed at the complex socio-political reality and the cultural plurality 
                                                          
154  Federspiel, Islam and Ideology, p. 150. 
155  Dale F. Eickelman, ‘Islam and the Languages of Modernity’, in Shahram 
Akbarzadeh (ed.), Islam and Globalization: Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 41. 
156  Geertz, ‘Ritual and Social Change’, p. 48. 
157  Interview, Pangeran Jatikusuma, Cigugur, Kuningan, 5 August 2009. 
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of Sundanese society. Its multicultural and syncretic composition meant 
that it is difficult to breathe in the straightjacket puritanical identity 
PERSIS sought. 158 
Kyai Madrais and Mei Kartawinata, two important opponents of 
Islam, condemned this anti-adat and confrontational vision of PERSIS’s 
religious discourses. That increased Islamisation causing the 
abandonment of other parts of the Sundanese creed caused social 
relationships to disintegrate as well as, perhaps, may be best 
exemplified by the example of Ciganjur, Kuningan where numerous 
Sundanese abandoned Islam and opted to convert to Christianity instead 
from 1964 onwards. However, the effect of these broken ties was not so 
great. This confirms that Sundanese society had not become polarised 
like Javanese society in Clifford Geertz’s well-known social 
categorization of priyayi, santri, and abangan. Or at least, as Steenbrink 
observed, the polarisation of Sundanese society was not as strict as that 
of Javanese society, which was polarised along social-religious and 
cultural lines.159 
 
Dramatic Shifting Contexts  
State Recognition of Islam and Soekarno’s Rational Interpretation 
of Religion  
In the 1945 Constitution, religions and beliefs were given all sorts of 
opportunities to grow and the Constitution guaranteed freedom of 
religion. Deeply inspired by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, Soekarno 
insisted that Indonesian Muslims should think and behave in modern 
                                                          
158  Kusnaka Adimihardja, ‘Pergumulan antara Kebudayaan Sunda dengan 
Islam’, in Cik Hasan Bisri (et al.), Pergumulan Islam dengan Kebudayaan 
Lokal di Tatar Sunda (Bandung: Kaki Langit, 2005), pp. 85-88. 
159  Steenbrink, ‘A Catholic Sadrach’; p. 288 and Ricklefs’ Islamisation and its 
Opponent in Java, p. 495. Ricklefs has also noticed that since 1830 to 
1930, Javanese society changed and polarised along religious and 
cultural lines. This polarisation continued after independence. During the 
early years after the revolution, for example, the santri-abangan conflict 
deepened. See Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java, p. 496. The 
impact of the aliran conflict spread widely after the Madiun affair in 
1948 and became what Hefner called “the basis for political organization 
in rural Java” as recounted in Chapter Two. See Hefner, ‘Islamizing Java?’, 




ways by embracing the fire (spirit) of Islam.160 He saw Islam as 
compatible to reason, so he thought that there was no contradiction 
between Islam and modernity.161 Soekarno had rational and modern 
views of Islam and he condemned Islamic backwardness, feudalism, 
mystical and irrational practices and superstitions, just like PERSIS, as 
revealed in his correspondence with A. Hassan from his place of exile in 
Ende, Flores. Having this understanding of Islam, Soekarno provided the 
setting for the development of Islamic institutions and cultures that 
promoted further Islamisation, both in urban and in rural areas.162 This 
was not only because of religious reasons but also to enable Indonesian 
culture to become more modern in other aspects as well. This caused 
Islamic institutions to flourish and created a gradual socio-religious 
transformation. In Bandung, Soekarno’s approval for the construction of 
the Salman Mosque at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) was 
crucial in intensifying campus dakwah and this increasingly Islamised 
ITB students, as observed in Chapter Four. 
 
Extermination of DI and Its Impacts 
From the political perspective, Soekarno’s dealing with the 
extremism committed by DI rebels left no message to Muslim Sundanese 
except to rationalise their political choice. The overwhelming majority of 
Sundanese Muslims refused to answer the call to join the DI guerrilla in 
the 1950s and the 1960s. Rather, they decided to escape the tense 
situation in Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, Garut, Ciamis and other parts in the 
                                                          
160  Soekarno admired liberal thinkers including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Halide 
Edib Hanoum and Amir Ali. Atatürk and Halide are the most quoted Muslim 
thinkers in Soekarno’s writings although Amir Ali was probably the most 
influential in his Islamic thinking. Lubis, Soekarno & Modernisme Islam, pp. 
142, 143, 286. 
161  Lubis, Soekarno & Modernisme Islam, pp. 142-43. 
162  After independence to 1966, Soekarno contributed to building Islamic 
education, both state and private Islamic universities, and initiated Islamic 
festivals celebrated officially by the state. Soekarno contributed to dakwah 
in secular campuses especially after he approved the establishment of the 
Salman Mosque just inside the grounds of the Bandung Institute of 
Technology (ITB) in 1964. As discussed in Chapter Four, Soekarno’s 
approval of the mosque, despite the ITB Rector’s disapproval, helped 
inspiring Dakwahism among the educated class of Muslim society. Under 
Soekarno, Muslims enjoyed state neutrality of religion from which dakwah 
and the Islamisation project continued. 
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region, and they fled to places in rural mountainous West Java, 
particularly Lembang, to liberate themselves from the insecurity 
inflicted by the rebellion. They also chose to go to Lembang for 
economic reasons because, as Horikoshi suggested, due to the rebellion, 
agricultural productivity had dropped and there were disruptions in 
commodity flows between regions caused by the deterioration of the 
transportation system.163 
As observed in Chapter Five, the majority of these people were 
Traditionalist Sundanese Muslims. They were trained in pesantrens 
across West Java and their socio-religious background enabled them to 
speak the same language as the people in Lembang and because they 
shared a similar cultural identity they encountered little difficulties to 
live in harmony with the people in their new place of residence. 
Endowed with this social and cultural capital they were able to approach 
the people in Lembang without being confrontational and they 
persuaded the people to embrace Islam through friendly and appealing 
ways.164 Because the people in Lembang were introduced to Islamic 
doctrine and practices, in the end the migration of the people from 
outside led to a gradual replacement of the established syncretic cultural 
basis in the area, as discussed in Chapter Five.  
The change created a new religious configuration in the area 
which was known as a Nationalist stronghold where Islamic identity had 
not been predominant. Interestingly, this process occurred without 
meeting strong opposition from Nationalist proponents which may 
indicate that the Nationalist Sundanese did not feel uncomfortable with 
the increased presence of Islam; or it might be fair to say that they did 
not think that these Muslim migrants were their opponents, because 
they upheld Sundanese identity while practicing Islam as a cultural 




                                                          
163  Horikoshi,  ‘The Dar ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1948-62)’, p. 77. 
164  Interview, K.H. Junaidi, Lembang, 03 September 2014. Van Bruinessen’s 
Kitab Kuning is an important work that gives us valuable information about 
the textbooks which are used as teaching materials and dakwah references 
especially in Traditionalist pesantrens. Van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, 
Pesantren dan Tarekat, pp. 142-176. 
-262- 
 
The Rise of the New Order and the Fall of the Penghayat 
The dramatic political change in the aftermath of the 30 September 
1965 coup attempt was crucial in the development of Islam in Indonesia. 
This change produced an unprecedented socio-cultural and political 
setting that increasingly shifted away from the social and cultural 
foundations of Soekarno’s political reign, which had been rather liberal 
in its outlook, towards Soeharto’s political reign in which religions were 
given a wider mandate. Consequently, this shift weakened the nativist 
syncretic creeds and favoured a much more intense Islamisation than 
ever before. Religious identity became increasingly stronger. In other 
words, political change caused religious change and the other way 
around, and these changes in their turn caused social change. This 
Islamisation transformed Sundanese society.165 It swept across West 
Java’s rural areas and weakened the Penghayat, the guardians of the 
native-syncretic creeds and caused them to become outsiders in this 
region. This socio-political change provided the context for the 
Islamisation of the Sundanese.  
 
Dakwahism and ‘Islamisation from Below’ 
The fall of the Penghayat paved the way for ‘Islamisation from below’ 
after Soeharto supported Muslims’ dakwah projects notwithstanding his 
opposition to political Islam. As said in Chapter Three, Soeharto, a 
devoted subscriber to Javanese values, was surprisingly accommodative 
towards Muslims’ cultural projects especially those the Modernists 
demanded. Moreover, he accepted the ideas of religious communities 
with respect to his development agenda, on issues such as family 
planning, education, economic empowerment and so on. Soeharto 
secured Muslims’ civil rights by accepting the Islamic inspired Marriage 
                                                          
165  In East and Central Java, Ricklefs observes that: “……..Soeharto’s New Order 
brought an aspiring totalitarianism to Indonesia and facilitated a much 
deeper Islamisation of Javanese society, a profound social change from 
Java’s past. Even while multiple scholars, journalists and politicians, both 
within Indonesia and outside, maintained the view that the Javanese 
constituted of a sort of impregnable abangan bastion against greater Islamic 
influence in Indonesian affairs – an idea resting largely on the still-
influential 1950s work of Clifford Geertz – Javanese society was moving 




Law no 1/1974. This law had slowly but constantly driven the 
Penghayat to convert to Islam. Some of them, however, converted by 
coercion or had embraced Islam for political reasons. Islamisation was 
in part the result of the politicisation of Islam among the grassroots. 
Marpu and his followers’ coercive conversion to Islam in 1976, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, is perhaps the best example of politically-
driven Islamisation in Sumedang West Java. This coercive conversion in 
part marked the fall of the Penghayat but strengthened the supremacy of 
Islam and Christianity in society. Soekarno’s fall was followed by 
tremendous socio-political transformation in which Muslims and their 
identity and institutions increasingly became more influential. This 
considerably factored in what Ricklefs calls ‘Islamisation from below’166 
or what Van Bruinessen called the ‘Conservative Turn’.167 The Dakwahist 
upsurge in both urban and rural West Java across campuses in the cities 
and across mosques in the villages proves that Islamisation was indeed 
deepening among the grassroots in Sundanese society. 
 
Christianity Turned into Islam’s Greatest Opponent 
As said in Chapter Three, the Soeharto regime’s politics on religions was 
translated into a favourable attitude towards Dakwahism and Christian 
missionaries aiming to neutralise Communist influence over society. 
Although ambivalent, theoretically the regime considered Islam and 
Christianity as important allies. Under these changing circumstances 
conflict patterns changed. Muslim Sundanese were happy with the 
pressure that had been put on the Penghayat across West Java, but their 
joy was tempered by the realisation that the Christian mission had 
turned into their greatest opponent, especially in the wake of the 
conversion of many thousands of Sundanese to Christianity. 
The promotion of religion, however, was not built on a solid vision 
of religious freedom and tolerance. The Christian leaders sought a 
liberal policy in spreading religion but, contrarily, Muslims demanded 
restrictions and favoured a conservative religious policy. Facing this 
dilemma, the regime resorted to a conservative stance and it saw social 
                                                          
166  Ricklefs, Islamisation and its opponents in Java, p. 162. 
167  Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), ‘Introduction: Contemporary Developments in 
Indonesian Islam and the “Conservative Turn” of the Early 21st century’, in 
Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the 
“Conservative Turn” (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013). 
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order and stability as its priority and without hesitation, the regime 
warned all parties not to provoke social and political instability. The 
Christian leaders, in particular, were upset by the regime’s insistence on 
a stable social and political order through downplaying the Christians’ 
right to exercise their religious freedom. 
Regardless of this development, and to the surprise of many 
observers, under this circumstance, Evangelical Protestantism has seen 
significant growth. The Christian leaders, especially the evangelicals, 
were now more passionate and courageous in their efforts to propagate 
Christianity. With increasing confidence the Christian leaders rose to 
prominence. With Chinese leaders playing an important role – as 
elaborated in Chapter Six, Muslims saw these developments as 
threatening and began to organise resistance to defend Islam. 
 
Educated Muslims Turned Dakwahists 
In the past Muslim leaders, particularly the Modernists, believed in 
politics as an effective means to defend Islam and their religious 
objectives. Now they could no longer trust this belief as it crumpled in 
front of their eyes. They even had mixed feelings of hope and anxiety 
whether the changing political environment under the New Order 
regime would provide the political changes they expected to ensure 
greater fairness for their religion and their umat. With these mixed 
feelings, they sought a solid foundation to enable them to defend their 
religious aims by turning Muslim students, youths and the educated 
class among Muslim society’s agenda towards dakwah.  
They hoped that with the students playing an important role, 
dakwah leadership and its vision would be transformed. With this 
mission in mind, the most prominent Dakwahist, Mohamed Natsir and 
student leaders such as Imaduddin Abdulrahim and his friends, turned 
their eyes to secular campuses to promote Islamisation. The Bandung 
Institute of Technology (ITB) became one of their most important 
targets. After some years, this dakwah project increasingly became the 
agenda of the educated class in Muslim society; and it no longer became 
an exclusive job routinely exercised by ulama or other traditional 
dakwah agents. With Muslim intellectuals in charge of the dakwah 
project, a significant change was promoted especially in the 
organisation, leadership and themes of dakwah. 
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However, it is worth noting that under the Salman movement, 
particularly during the 1970s to 1990s, no single ideology prevailed. 
Campus dakwah offered a diversity of Islamic discourses. With this new 
leadership and vision, dakwah had become attractive to a wide range of 
students and to society in general. Over time, this dakwah movement 
provided an Islamic nuance and an identity not only to Muslim 
intellectuals of the ITB, but also to other Muslims in the capital of West 
Java and surrounding areas. However, as no single ideology was 
promoted, the Salman movement was prone to ideological infiltration 
from Islamist like the Tarbiyah in the 1990s. This infiltration, however, 
did not succeed because of resistance from Salman elites. 
The dynamics of religious resurgence from below and of social 
changes are largely determined bythe regime’s political programme 
made to sustain the rulers and to control society. Despite being crucial, 
the regime and its ambition to control society has, to some extent, failed 
to engineer the social religious vision and way of life the regime 
expected. It seems clear that during this period the relationships 
between Islam, the AK and Christianity formed a unique, continually-
changing dialectic of contest, negotiation, victory, and defeat. 
 
The Reform: The Contest Continued 
Penghayat’s Reclaim of their Identity? 
Under the New Order’s closed political system, the regime ruled in 
authoritarian ways and it engineered the making of political dynamics in 
society, one of which caused religious change as exemplified by the 
decrease of the Aliran Kebatinan in Lembang. After politics became 
democratised and thus changed society to become more open and free, 
this changing political setting again brought about religious change that 
also caused social change. Thus, the political change under the 
authoritarian regime was a form of top-down social engineering; 
contrarily, in the Reform era, the change was inspired by people from 
the grassroots. The latter is exemplified by the Penghayat’s mounting 
claim that their belief in the Aliran Kebatinan is a true faith because the 
syncretic current is essentially the religion of the Sundanese ancestors. 
In recent times, the Aliran Kebatinan followers have sought to 
legitimise their presence by reclaiming their position in Sundanese 
history. This is an attempt to reconsolidate the superiority of their 
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Sundanese identity and that of the Aliran Kebatinan over other religions, 
particularly Islam, whose influence was deepening. Nativist or ethnic 
sentiments were important factors in Aliran Kebatinan’s search for 
identity consolidation. Islam’s use of the Arabic language and culture 
prevented it from being meaningful to some local people in the rural 
areas who found it easier to have meaningful relationships with the 
ethnic symbols already embedded in everyday rural life. The growing 
appreciation of local symbols thus reflects their resurgent identification 
with their cultural heritage. Aliran Kebatinan followers are worried 
about the dominance of the current Muslims’ legal, political and cultural 
presence in the life of the Sundanese as this will come at the expense of 
local traditions and symbols, thus jeopardizing their ties to their 
authentic historical identity. For this reason they are now struggling to 
revive. 
 
Christianisation and Ethno-Religious Sentiments 
Under the shifting political context from the 1960s, Christianity revived 
too and it flourished even more after the start of the Reform era 
pioneered especially by the Pentecostal churches. Indonesians of ethnic 
Chinese origins played a crucial role in this revival and thus provoked 
anti-Christian and anti-Chinese sentiments at the same time. Muslims’ 
fear of Christianisation as observed by Mujiburrahman168 was 
increasingly transformed into fear of Christian Chinese. Which motive 
was stronger, religion or ethnic, can not be decided. Muslims’ fear was 
evident, for instance, in the protests against the Mahanaim Foundation 
owned by IIn Tjipto, an Indonesian of ethnic Chinese origin, in Bekasi. 
This sentiment adds fuel to the existing tension between Islam and 
Christianity across West Java. The eruption of anti-Christianisation 
actions across West Java and the attack on HKBP leaders in Bekasi in 
2010 seems to have been inspired by the effect of the intersection of 
ethno-religious sentiments. 
 
Radical Islamist’s Dictating of the State  
Unlike the New Order regime which set and controlled politics and 
society, the following democratic regimes did not have strong policies 
on religions. Rather, the pervasive roles of religious organisations in 
                                                          
168  Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened. 
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politics saw them assume significant control and impose pressure on the 
state. Ricklefs observes that “in post-Soeharto years, it became less a 
case of the political regime setting the religious agenda than the reverse: 
religious dynamics shaping the political regime.”169 Muslim activists 
preferred building mass organisations to articulate their interests 
especially in launching their protests against Christianisation which 
have thus sustained the perpetual tension and competitive relations 
between Islam and Christianity. Christianity’s upsurge and the eruption 
of anti-Christianisation actions in the past two decades, from 1990s to 
the 2000s, was also exacerbated by the shift in pattern of contemporary 
conflicts, from aliran politics during the 1950s to the 1960s to religious-
ethno sentiment during the 1990s to 2000s during which Christianity 
became the greatest Islamic opponent. In the absence of strong policies 
on religions, tension and conflict between radical Islamists and 
evangelists will continue to erupt, thus West Javanese society will most 
likely be polarised according to religious, and maybe, ethnic sentiments 
unless the state embraces policies designed to maintain social harmony 



















                                                          











Negotiating Islamisation and Resistance: 
A Study of Religions, Politics and Social Change in West Java 
from the Early 20th Century to the Present 
 
De studie beoogt te laten zien hoe Islamizering plaatsvond en hoe het 
werd betwist en onderhandeld in West Java. De studie concentreert zich 
op drie belangrijke religieuze groepen: Islam, Aliran Kebatinan en 
christendom en beslaat de periode van de vroege twintigste eeuw tot 
heden met de nadruk op de periode na 1965. Aangezien de Soendanese 
samenleving bestaat uit verschillende groepen heb ik een aantal 
strategisch geselecteerde lokale case studies bij mijn studie betrokken. 
Ik heb verscheidene malen veldwerk verricht in West Java van juli 2008 
tot en met maart 2011 om een grote verscheidenheid aan mensen te 
interviewen die getuigen waren van of zelfs sleutelfiguren waren in het 
hele proces. Een grote hoeveelheid materiaal is gebruikt om the 
begrijpen hoe Islam werd omhelsd als een ideologie en hoe het werd 
gebruikt om nationalisme, christenheid en lokale gebruiken (adat) te 
betwisten. 
De studie vertrekt vanuit de werkhypothese dat er altijd een 
hechte dialectiek bestaat tussen culturele categorieën in de samenleving 
aan de ene kant en negotiatie tussen de staat en deze culturele 
categorieën aan de andere kant. De resultaten van deze studie laten zien 
dat in de West Javaanse samenleving, culturele en religieuze - zowel 
islamitische als christelijke – veranderingen het resultaat zijn van 
verschuivende politieke contexten die het imperatief geven aan sociale 
en politieke aanpassingen. De studie geeft een beeld van het belang van 
religieuze praktijken en hoe de adat, mystiek en mythen zorgvuldig 
werden gehandhaafd binnen deze praktijken en uiteindelijk leidden tot 
een specifieke Soendanese identiteit. Islam en Soenda zijn afwisselend 
gezien en geïnterpreteerd als twee zijden van dezelfde munt. De meest 
bediscussieerde interpretatie is de aanspraak dat de Soendanezen altijd 
meer nadrukkelijk de islamitische plichten naleven dan de Javanen 
alhoewel bezwaren tegen deze zienswijze zijn geuit. Missieverslagen, 
-270- 
 
speciaal die uit de achttiende en negentiende eeuw aangaande de 
Soendanese samenleving lijken deze algemeen aanvaarde aanspraak te 
bevestigen. De succesvolle islamisering in de regio vanaf de zestiende 
eeuw was gedeeltelijk het resultaat van de zich aanpassende houding 
van de islam tot inheems syncretisme. In de inheems-syncretische 
omgeving was islamisering geneigd om de adat te handhaven waarvan 
de volgelingen geloofden in wat Niels Mulder ‘the essential unity of all 
Existence’ heeft genoemd, zij het niet in zijn geheel. Deze trend maakte 
het de Soendanezen mogelijk om islam aan te passen en om de 
islamitische wereldbeschouwing te doen ‘samensmelten’ met haar eigen 
typische religieuze praktijken en adat en omgekeerd. Het belangrijkste 
is dat islam niet in alle gevallen, en ook niet in zijn geheel, werd 
gepromoot om de adat, die is geworteld in hindoe-boeddhistische 
wereldbeschouwingen en mystiek, te vervangen. Dit islamiseringsmodel 
verkreeg culturele en politieke legitimatie omdat de Soendanese ulama 
en de aristocratie hun steun verleenden aan dit model. Het was niet 
ongebruikelijk dat adat op harmonieuze wijze werd gehandhaafd in 
islamitische gebruiken die de religieuze identiteit uitmaakte van de 
Soendanezen. Deze adat-islam setting leidde tot de protectie van 
verscheidene inheems-religieuze overtuigingen. Het Soendanese 
gebruik om de graven van heiligen te vereren bleef gerespecteerd. De 
adat-islam configuratie heeft mogelijke sommige Soendanese leiders 
geïnspireerd om de islam-Soenda identiteiten tegenover elkaar te 
stellen in de populaire zegswijze “Islam teh Sunda, Sunda teh Islam”, 
hetgeen betekent ‘Islam is Soenda, Soenda is Islam’.  
De studie observeerde welke redenen een rol speelden in de 
opkomst van anti-islamitische sentimenten en analyseert hoe deze 
sentimenten religieuze visies kritisch bekeken. De studie ontdekte dat 
anti-islamitische sentimenten niet voortkwamen uit angst voor islam als 
een religie maar dat het veeleer de consequentie was van de oplegging 
van islam als ideologie en als totalitaire levenswijze. In deze traditie had 
adat niet langer een plaats en het werd derhalve van deze traditie 
uitgesloten. De wijze waarop PERSIS campagne voerde tegen de adat, 
bijvoorbeeld, beledigde de Penghayat die anti-islam sentimenten onder 
hen propageerde. Deze sociale setting leidde tot antagonisme jegens 
islam en met name in oppositie onder leiding van Aliran Kebatinan 
leiders. Kyai Madrais en Mei kartawinata, twee belangrijke islam 
opponenten, veroordeelden deze anti-adat en confronterende visies in 
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het religieuze discourse van sommige islamitische leiders. Zij stonden 
erop dat alle religieuze praktijken die niet de inheems-spirituele visies 
deelden illegitiem waren. De voortdurende islamisering leidde sinds 
1964 tot het verlaten van de Soendanese adat, zoals 
huwelijksgebruiken, en leidde tevens tot de desintegratie van sociale 
relaties waarvan wellicht Ciganjur, Kuningan het beste voorbeeld was 
waar grote aantallen Soendanezen zich afwendden van de islam en 
ervoor kozen om over te gaan tot het christendom. Dit bevestigt dat de 
Soendanese samenleving gepolariseerd was geraakt, net als de Javaanse 
samenleving, in Clifford Geertz’ categorisering van priyayi, santri, en 
abangan. In ieder geval, zoals Steenbrink observeerde, was de 
polarisering van de Soendanese samenleving niet zo strikt als die van de 
Javaanse samenleving die gepolariseerd was langs sociaal-religieuze en 
culturele lijnen. 
De Indonesische grondwet van 1945 geeft religie en 
geloofsovertuigingen alle ruimte om te groeien en het garandeert 
vrijheid van religie. Soekarno was sterk beïnvloedt door Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk en hij stond erop dat Indonesische moslims konden denken en 
zich gedragen als moderne mensen door het vuur (de geest) van de 
islam te omhelzen. Hij veroordeelde islamitische achterlijkheid, 
feudalisme, en mystieke en irrationele praktijken. Met dit begrip van 
islam zette Soekarno de setting voor de ontwikkeling van islamitische 
instituties en culturen die verdere islamisering bevorderden, zowel in 
stedelijke als in landelijke regio. Gezien vanuit het politieke perspectief 
liet Soekarno’s handelswijze tegen het extremisme van de DI 
opstandelingen geen andere boodschap toe aan de Soendanese moslims 
dan dat zij hun politieke keuze moesten rationaliseren. Het gevolg was 
dat de overgrote meerderheid van de Soendanezen weigerden gehoor te 
geven aan de oproep om de DI guerrilla in de jaren vijftig en zestig om 
zich aan te sluiten. Integendeel, zij kozen ervoor de geladen situatie in 
Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, Garut en Ciamis en andere regio te ontvluchten en 
zij namen de wijk naar de landelijke bergstreken van West Java, vooral 
Lembang om zich te vrijwaren van de onzekerheden van de rebellie en 
van de economische ontwrichting. Zoals Horikoshi heeft gesuggereerd, 
als gevolg van de rebellie was de agrarische productie sterk gedaald en 
er was ontwrichting in de toevoer van producten ten gevolge van de 
grote verstoring in het transport systeem. De meerderheid van deze 
mensen waren geschoold in traditionele pesantrens over geheel West 
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Java en door hun socio-culturele achtergrond spraken ze dezelfde taal 
als de bewoners van Lembang waardoor ze op een vriendelijke en 
aantrekkelijke manier de bevolking konden benaderen om hen de islam 
te doen omhelzen wat resulteerde in de geleidelijke vervanging van de 
gevestigde syncretische en culturele basis van de regio die bekend stond 
als een nationalistisch bolwerk. 
De dramatische politieke verandering die plaatsvond na de 30 
september 1965 couppoging was cruciaal in de ontwikkeling van de 
islam in Indonesië. De verandering veroorzaakte een socio-culturele en 
politieke setting die meer en meer verschoof van de sociale en culturele 
basis van Soekarno’s politieke regime naar die van Soeharto waar religie 
een groter mandaat verkreeg. Dit had tot gevolg dat de inheems 
syncretische geloofsovertuigingen verzwakten en op de hand kwam van 
meer intense islamisering dan ooit tevoren. Deze socio-culturele 
verandering vormde de context voor de opkomst van Dakwahisme en, 
dientengevolge, opende de weg tot een diepere islamisering van de 
Soendanezen van onder af, vooral toen Soeharto dakwah projecten 
begon te steunen ondanks zijn weerstand tegen politieke islam. 
Soeharto, die een fervent aanhanger was van Javaanse waarden, was 
verbazingwekkend toegeeflijk jegens islamitische culturele projecten, 
met name die van Modernisten. Meer nog, Soeharto waarborgde de 
burgerrechten van moslims door zijn islamitisch geïnspireerde 
Huwelijkswet nr. 1/1974. Langzaam maar zeker had deze wet de 
Penghayat ertoe gedreven zich tot de islam te bekeren. Sommigen van 
hen hadden zich onder dwang laten bekeren of gingen tot de islam over 
uit politieke overwegingen. De bekering van Marpu en zijn volgelingen 
in 1976 is misschien het beste voorbeeld van politiek-gedreven 
islamisering in Sumedang, West Java. Deze gedwongen bekering 
betekende voor een deel de ondergang van de Penghayat maar het 
versterkte de alleenheerschappij van de islam en het christendom in de 
samenleving. Onder deze geweldige sociaal-politieke transformatie 
werd de moslimse identiteit steeds meer van invloed. Dit is wat een 
belangrijke rol speelt in wat Ricklefs noemt de ‘Islamisation from below’, 
of wat Van Bruinessen de ‘Conservative turn’ noemde. The plotselinge 
geweldige opkomst van de Dakwaisten zowel in landelijke als in urbane 
regio in West Java over campussen in de steden en moskeeën in de 
dorpen bewijst dat de islamisering steeds dieper ging onder het gewone 
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volk en de Soendanese maatschappij steeds meer begon te 
transformeren. 
Onder deze veranderende omstandigheden veranderden conflict 
patronen. De christelijke zending had zich getransformeerd tot de 
grootste tegenstander van moslims. Christelijke leiders zochten naar een 
liberale gedragslijn in hun zending maar moslims eisten beperkingen en 
waren voor een conservatief religies beleid. Moslims zochten met 
gemengde gevoelens van hoop en zorg naar een solide basis om hen in 
staat te stellen hun religieuze doelen te verdedigen door moslimse 
studenten, jongeren en de geschoolde klassen tot dakwah te voeren. Ze 
verwachtten dat met studenten in prominente rollen dakwah 
leiderschap en dakwah visie getransformeerd zouden worden. Het was 
met deze missie in zijn achterhoofd dat Mohammad Natsir, de meest 
prominente dakwaist, en studentenleiders zoals Imaduddin Abdulrahim 
en vrienden hun ogen richten op de campussen om islamisering te 
promoten. Een van hun belangrijkste doelen was de campus van het 
Bandung Instituut voor Technologie (ITB) in Bandung. Na een aantal 
jaren werd dit dakwah project steeds meer de agenda van de geschoolde 
klassen in de moslimse samenleving en was het niet langer het 
exclusieve en routineuze werk van ulama of van andere traditionele 
dakwah figuren. Met moslimse intellectuelen verantwoordelijk voor het 
dakwah project had er een belangrijke verandering plaatsgevonden, met 
name in de organisatie, leiderschap en in dakwah themas. 
Nadat de politiek gedemocratiseerd was in de Reform Era, en de 
maatschappij dus meer open en vrij was geworden veroorzaakten deze 
veranderde politieke setting wederom religieuze vernieuwing die op 
haar beurt weer sociale veranderingen teweeg bracht. Was de politieke 
verandering onder het autoritaire regime een vorm van top-down 
sociale machinaties, nu was deze verandering geïnspireerd door de 
mensen van de grassroots zelf. Dit laatste kan worden geïllustreerd aan 
de hand van de steeds krachtiger wordende aanspraak van de 
Penghayat dat Aliran Kebatinan een echt geloof is omdat deze 
syncretistische stroming in feite de religie is van de Soendanese 
voorvaderen en door hier aan vast te houden probeerden zij hun 
identiteit terug te krijgen. De volgelingen van de Aliran Kebatinan 
probeerden hun aanwezigheid te legitimeren door hun positie in de 
Soendanese geschiedenis op te eisen. In hun zoektocht naar de 
bevestiging van hun identiteit waren voor de Aliran Kebatinan inheemse 
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of etnische sentimenten van groot belang. De groeiende waardering 
voor lokale symbolen reflecteerde dus hun herlevende identificatie met 
hun culturele erfenis. Aliran Kebatinan volgelingen waren bezorgd over 
de dominantie in het leven van de Soendanezen van de legale, politieke 
en culturele aanwezigheid van de moslims waarin Arabische symbolen 
een belangrijke rol speelden omdat dit ten nadeel zou zijn van lokale 
tradities en symbolen en dus hun banden met hun authentieke 
historische identiteit op het spel zouden zetten. 
Het christendom maakte ook een opbloei door en het bloeide na 
het begin van de Reform Era, vooral door Pinkstergemeenschappen. 
Vooral Indonesiërs van Chinese etnische afkomst speelden een cruciale 
rol in deze opleving en daarmee riepen ze tegelijkertijd antichristelijke 
en anti-Chinese sentimenten op. Zoals gezien door Mujiburrahman 
transformeerde de angst van de moslims voor kerstening in een angst 
voor christelijke Chinezen en de HKBP Batak Kerken. Moslimse 
activisten prefereerden massa organisaties te stichten om hun belangen 
te ventileren, voornamelijk in hun protesten tegen kerstening en 
daarmee zetten ze kracht bij aan de eeuwige spanningen en 
rivaliserende relaties tussen islam en christendom. De grote toename 
van het aantal christenen en de eruptie van antichristelijke acties in de 
negentiger jaren en in de eerste decade van de eenentwintigste eeuw 
werden verergerd door de wijzigende patronen van contemporaine 
geschillen van aliran politieke spanningen gedurende de jaren 50 en 60 
naar etnisch-religieuze sentimenten vanaf de negentiger jaren waarin 
christendom de grootste tegenstander van de islam werd. Het 
samenkomen van etnisch-religieuze sentimenten verergerde bestaande 
spanningen tussen islam en christendom over heel West Java. Het is nog 
niet besloten welk motief het sterkste was, religie of etniciteit. 
Ricklefs zag dat ‘in post-Soeharto years, it became less a case of 
the political regime setting the religious agenda than the revers: 
religious dynamics shaping the political regime” (Ricklefs, 2012). Anders 
dan de New Order die politiek en maatschappij onder controle had heeft 
het nieuwe democratische regime geen sterk politiek beleid ten aanzien 
van religies. Integendeel, de alomtegenwoordige rollen die religieuze 
organisaties in de politiek spelen maakt dat ze een belangrijk deel van 











 Anno Hegirae, in the Islamic era. 
ATB 
Akademi Theologia Bethel; Bethel Academy of Theology. 
BAKIN 
Badan Intelijen Negara; The State Intelligent Body. 
Bakor PAKEM 
Badan Koordinasi Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat; 
Coordinating Body for the Surveillance of Currents of Belief in 
Society. 
BAZ 
Badan Amil Zakat; Alms Collection Body. 
BAZNAS 
Badan Amil Zakat Nasional; National Alms Collection Body. 
BKKI 
Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia; All-Indonesia Kebatinan  
Congress Body. 
BKPMI 
Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Masjid Indonesia; Coordinating Body 
for Indonesian Mosque youth. 
BKLDK 
Badan Koordinasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus; Coordinating Body 
for Campus Islamic Propagation League. 
DGI 
Dewan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia; The Indonesian Church Council. 
DKM 
Dewan Kesejahteraan Masjid; Mosue Prosperity Council. 
FAPB 
Front anti-Pemurtadan Bekasi; Bekasi anti-Apostasy Front. 
FKKJ 
Forum Komunikasi Kristiani Jakarta; Jakarta Christian 
Communication Forum. 
FKUB 







Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus; Campus Islamic 
Propagation League Forum. 
FUUI 
Forum Ulama-Ummat Indonesia; The Forum for Ulama-Ummat 
of Indonesia. 
GARIS 
Gerakan Islam Reformis; Reformist Islamic Movement. 
Gema Pembebasan 
GEMA PEMBEBASAN 
Gerakan Mahasiswa Pembebasan; Student Movement for 
Liberation. 
HIS 
Hollandsch Inlandse School. 
HMI 
Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam; The Association of Muslim Tertiary 
Students. 
ICMI 
Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia; The Association of 
Indonesian Muslim intellectuals. 
IKIP 
Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan; The Institute for 
Teachers and Education Training. 
IMB 
Izin Mendirikan Bangunan; Construction Permits. 
KAMMI 
Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia; Indonesian Muslim 
Students Action Unit. 
KARISMA 
Keluarga Remaja Islam Salman; Salman Islamic Youth Family. 
KOPKAMTIB 
Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban; The 
Command for the Restoration of Security and Order. 
KUA 
Kantor Urusan Agama; Office of Religious Affairs. 
KUIB 




Lembaga Amil Zakat; Alms Collection Agent. 
LDK 




Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam; The Predication Body of 
Muslim Students. 
LIPIA 
Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab; The Institute of the 
Study of Islam and Arab. 
LMD 
 Latihan Mujahid Dakwah; Mujahid Dakwah Training.  
MAWI 
Majelis Agung Waligereja Indonesia; The Supreme Council of 
Indonesian Bishops. 
MIAI 
Majelis Islam A’la Indonesia or Consultative Council of 
Indonesian Muslims. 
MPR 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat; People’s Consultative 
Assembly. 
MUI 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia; Indonesian Islamic Scholars’ Council. 
Mulo 
Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs; Secondary School in Dutch 
Colonial Time. 
NDP-HMI 
Nilai-Nilai Dasar Perjuangan Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam; 
Fundamental Values of Struggle of the Islamic Student 
Association. 
PACKU 
Paguyuban Adat Cara Karuhun Urang; Adat Association for 
Ancestors’ Way of Life. 
PERMAI 
Persatuan Marhaen Indonesia; Indonesian Marhaen Associaton. 
PARMUSI 
Partai Muslimin Indonesia; Indonesian Muslims Party. 
PAS 
Pembinaan Anak-anak Salman; Nurturing Salman Children. 
PERSIS 
Persatuan Islam; Islamic Union. 
PERTI 
Persatuan Tarbiyah Indonesia; Indonesian Tarbiyah Association. 
PGI 
 Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia; The Indonesian  
Communion of Churches. 
PGPI 
Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja Pentakosta Indonesia; Associaton of 




Panitia Haji Indonesia; Indonesian Hajj Committee. 
PII 
Pelajar Islam Indonesia; Indonesian Muslim Students. 
PKI 
Partai Komunis Indonesia; Indonesian Communist Party. 
PPP 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; United Development Party. 
PRRI 
Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia. 
P2B 
Dinas Pengawasan dan Penertiban Bangunan; Office for Building 
Control and Order. 
SII 
Studi Islam Intensif; Intensive Islamic Study. 
RW 
Rukun Warga; A small administration unit that operates under 
the village office authority to coordinate the RT (Rukun 
Tetangga). 
RT 
Rukun Tetangga; Smallest unit of administration that operates 
under RW (Rukun Warga) in the village. 
TKI 
Tenaga Kerja Indonesia; Indonesian worker. 
YPM 











Nominal Muslims; the antonym of santris or practicing Muslims 
according to Clifford Geertz’s categorization of Javanese society. 
Agama Sunda 
Sunda Religion. 
Ahlu al-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah 
Muslims who follow the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad and the 
consensus of the Islamic community; long-hand term for the majority 
Sunni branch within Islam. 
Aliran Kebatinan/Aliran Kepercayaan 
Religious currents that promote the values and practices that 
originate from Javanese worldviews, postulating the essential unity 
of all existence, different from any world religion. 
Amil 
Person or organisation responsible for collecting and distributing 
Islamic zakat tithe. 
Al-Salaf al-Salih 
The pious ancestors; the first few generations of Muslims who are 
considered as having provided the exemplary model of proper 
Islamic thinking and behaviour. 
Asas Tunggal 
The Pancasila, the single ideological foundation all organisations in 
Indonesia had to adopt as stipulated by the Soeharto regime in 1984. 
Baduy 
Baduy is a popular designation for the land/area and people of 
Kanekes. 
Bina Masjid Kampus 
An integrated dakwah program consisting of mosques construction, 
Islamic predication and the training of Muslim students into 
Dakwahist. 
Bid’a 
Unlawful innovations in Islam. 
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A group of local churches centered in a district and directed by a 
church body. 
Da’i 
Person engaged in dakwah. 
Dakwah 
A combination of Islamic mission, propagation, predication; call to 
accept and improve one’s Islamic ways of life. 
Dedemit 
Spirits that harm people by entering their bodies, and who live in 
particular places such as cemeteries, big stones or trees. 
DI/TII 
Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia; a rebellious movement to 
create the Indonesian Islamic State which was against the central 
government. It came up in 1948 and was active across West Java, 




True and genuine mystical sciences, which Christian missionaries 
claimed could be derived from the Bible. 
Fiqh 
Islamic jurisprudence; interpretation of Islamic law. Also the generic 
term for the complete body of fiqh texts. 
Guriang 
The Sundanese deity of prosperity. 
Habib 
Beloved, a term of address exclusively used for the descendants of 
the Prophet Muhammad. 
Hadith 
Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and traditions. 
Hadith Qudsi 
God’s word which is not included in the Quran but which is preserved 
in The tradition of the Prophet. 
Haji 
A person who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Hajj 
The pilgrimage to Mecca; the last of the five pillars of Islam. 
 
Idul Fitri 
Islamic festival celebrated on the first of Syawwal (Islamic Lunar 




Independent religious judgement on legal and theological matters 
based on authoritative sources of Islam (Quran, Sunnah, Qiyas, Ijma’). 
Ikhwan 
Muslim Brothers, also short for Muslim Brotherhood. 
Ikhwan al-Muslimin 
An Islamist Muslim Brotherhood movement born in Egypt. It was 
established in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna.  
Jemaah 
Community of believers. 
Jihad 
Struggle; the term may be used for various forms of striving for 
religious objectives, including but not restristic to armed conflict 




Magical amulet for warding off evil and misfortune. 
Jurig 
Spirit that harms children. 
Ka’bah 
The rectangular building at the centre of the Great Mosque of Mecca, 





Javanese Spiritualism, usually seen to be opposed to orthodox Islamic 
norms and practices; literally inwardness. 
Keroncong 
Keroncong is a type of Indonesian musical ensemble that typically 
uses a violin, flute, guitar, ukulele, banjo, cello, and a string bass in 
addition to a female or male singer. 
Khittah 
The organizational and principle foundation guidelines, the initial 
mandate of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). 
Konstituante 
The state body established to formulate the permanent Constitution 
for the Republic of Indonesia to replace the provisional Constitution 
of 1950. 
Kyai 
Title for Islamic religious leaders or learned scholars in Java. 
Langgar/Musalla 
Muslim house of worship, generally small in size and used for daily 




A communist uprising in 1948 in the town of Madiun against the 
leaders of the newly-declared Indonesian Republic, Soekarno-Hatta. 
Madrasah 
Islamic school that not exclusively teaches on Islamic matter but 
includes the national curriculum. 
Magang 
Candidate for a post in the civil administration who volunteers to 
work in an office while awaiting appointment. 
Majlis Taklim 
A term popularly used to denote informal religious sessions or 
Islamic religious groups commonly organised especiallly by adult 
female Muslims. 
Manakiban 
Arabic manaqib. This word is semantically complex, yet in the 
meaning most relevant to current purposes it refers to both the 
“laudable traits of an individual and the text of an event in which 
those traits are illustrated.”171 
Mauludan 
Birthday celebration of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Nisfu Sha’ban  
A religious festival held in the mid of the month Sha’ban. Sha’ban is 
the 8th month in Islamic Lunar Year calendar. Muslims, largely the 
Traditionalists, believe that the Nisfu Sha’ban night is special because 
God promised forgiveness and rewards to those who celebrate it by 
observing some specific prayers. 
Pasewakan 
Penghayat’s house of worship and cultural activities. 
Penghayat 
The followers of Aliran Kebatinan or Aliran Kepercayaan. 
Penghulu 
Religious functionary who is responsible for administrating of 
marriages and other religious affairs. 
Pemekaran 
Literally means ‘proliferation’. The expansion of administrative levels 
of non-central government like the sub-district, district or provincial 
levels. 
Pesantren 
                                                          





Islamic boarding school led by a kyai as its central figure. Pesantren 
provide Islamic teachings and activities for santris (students) who 
board the school for certain period of time. 
Quran 
The holy scripture of Islam. 
Rajaban 
A religious festival held in the month of Rajab, the 7th month of the 
Islamic Lunar Year calendar. Muslims, especially the Traditionalists, 
believe that the month is sacred because the Prophet Muhammad 
used to pray to Allah to ask for blessing when he sighted the moon of 
Rajab. 
Ririwa 
A spirit that emanetes from a newly buried corpse as a result of 
improper treatment in the burial process. 
Rukun Islam 
The five pillars of Islam that consist of: (1) Shahadat: the confession 
of the faith; (2) Salat: performing ritual prayers in the proper way 
five times each day; (3) Zakat: paying an alms (or charity) tax to 
benefit the poor and the needy; (4) Saum: fasting during the month of 
Ramadan; (5) Hajj: Pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Ruwatan 
Ceremonies required in particular under specific social and personal 
circumstances to banish diseases and to eradicate pests, plants and 
so on, often using spells to protect people from disasters in their 
quest for protection or fortune from supernatural spirit. 
Salafi 
Muslims who seek to follow the example of the righteous ancestors of 
early Islam; the Salaf al-Salih; a position commonly associated with 
adherents of Wahhabism. 
Salat 




Giving valuable things such as money, clothes and foods to the needy. 
Sesajen 
Ritual offering usually consisting of flowers, foods, drinks (especially 
coffee), cigarettes and money. 
Slametan 
Ritual communal meal to observe major occasions such as birth, 
death, marriage etc. 
Sufi, Sufism 




Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret; official letter signed by Soekarno to 
Soeharto dated 11 March 1966 that authorised Soeharto to take over 
power which in consequence eliminated Soekarno from active 
politics. 
Tahlilan 
A Traditionalist devotional ceremony consisting of group repetitive 
chanting of the first part of the confession of faith, that there is no 
God but God (la ilaha illa Allah). 
Tarawih 
Prayers performed during the nights in the month of Ramadhan. 
Tarekat 
Sufi mystical order. 
Ulama 
Islamic religious leaders, learned Muslim scholars. Unlike in Arabic, 
in Indonesia ulama can be used as a singular noun. In Javanese 
society, these scholars are commonly called kyai; in West Java they 
are commonly called ajengan. 
Ummah/ummat 
The Islamic Community. 
Usroh 
Literally means nuclear family or cell. The concept of usroh was not 
exclusively used in campus dakwah circles and considered very 
effective for the formation of cadres under repressive New Order 
circumstances. The usroh model was officially used and widespread 
among NII (Islamic Indonesian State) followers in the early 1980s. 
Vihara 
Buddhist house of worship. 
Wahhabi 
Saudi-based religious movement that emerged in the late 18th 
century and was led by Muhammad ibn Abd Wahhab (1710-1787). 
The movement called for a return to a pristine Islam by purifying 
religious practices from superstitions and unlawful innovations 
(bid’a). 
Wayang 
Javanese shadow play using flat parchment puppets; also used for 
other forms of theatrical performances such as wayang wong (dance 
drama) and wayang topeng (masked dance performance). 
Zakat 







KEY ANALYTICAL TERMS172 
BASIC EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISTINCTIONS 
 
 
Traditionalism Acceptance of the four Sunni Schools of Law as 
valid guides to knowing Islam. 
 Traditionalism usually recognises that these legal 
traditions are subject to change and redefinition. It 
commonly involves tolerance towards locally 
derived cultural expressions, acceptance of 
mysticism, and a gradualist approach towards 
greater Islamisation. 
Traditionalist One who, or that which, adheres to Traditionalism. 
Modernism An approach to knowing Islam which denies that 
the four Sunni Schools of Law are authoritative 
guides and which relies fundamentally upon 
human reason in understanding Revelation. 
 This commonly involves a disregard for socio-
historical contexts but openness to modern 
learning as a way of enhancing the power of 
reason. It is principally opposed to what it sees as 
the medieval obscurantism of Traditionalism, may 
reject local cultural expressions and is at least 
suspicious of mysticism. 
Modernist One who, or that which, embraces Modernism. 
Revivalism An approach to knowing Islam which denies that 
the four Sunni Schools of Law are authoritative 
guides and which aspires to revive a pristine 
universal Islam as in the time of the Prophet and 
                                                          
172  This list of analytical terms and their definitions grew from discussions 
over several months by a research project team led by M.C. Ricklefs at the 
National University of Singapore (NUS) with my colleague R. Michael 
Feener and myself as active participants. 
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his Companions. Its epistemology rests on 
cognition of Revelation as found in the Quran and 
Hadith through Divine guidance. 
 Revivalism normally distrusts the application of 
human reason and denies that understandings of 
Revelation may legitimately change over time or 
that Islam may evolve in changing socio-historical 
contexts.It commonly rejects local cultural 
expressions and regards mysticism as a source of 
heresy. 
 
Revivalist One who, or that which, adheres to Revivalism. 
 
Social & political projects 
 
Islamism A project whose principal locus of activity is the 
state. It seeks a more perfect political order by 
establishing state institutions and/or controlling 
existing ones so as to impose deeper Islamisation, 
achieve greater justice, and safeguard the integrity 
of the Muslim community. 
 Islamism is most commonly associated with 
Modernist and Revivalist thought and sometimes 
(but not necessarily) validates the use of force to 
achieve its objectives. It usually seeks social 
conformity and, where it is tolerant of other faiths, 
normally expects them to accept a position 
subordinate to Islamic dominance. 
 
Islamist One who, or that which, embraces the Islamism. 
 
Dakwahism A project whose principal locus of activity is at the 
level of the society. It seeks a more perfect social 
order by actively propagating what it regards as a 
correct understanding of the faith, its moral 
standards and its ritual obligations. Dakwahism is 
found mainly among Traditionalists, Modernists 
and Revivalists. Traditionalist Dakwahism is 
normally consistent with tolerance towards locally 
derived cultural expressions, acceptance of 
mysticism, and a gradualist approach towards 
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greater Islamisation, and is usually said to rest 
upon the example of the Wali Sanga. Modernist and 
Revivalist styles are normally characterised by 
rejection of local practices and superstitions and 
insistence on the superiority of Islam over other 
religions. All styles may prioritise associated values 
such as the solidarity of the Islamic ummah and 
strict female modesty. 
 
Dakwahist One who, or that which, embraces Dakwahism. 
 
Liberalism A project whose principal locus of activity is the 
individual. It seeks greater individual freedom in 
religious and other matters, so long as no harm is 
done to the rights of others. Liberalism is found 
amongst Traditionalists, Historicalists and 
Modernists, but is rare among Revivalists. It is 
generally suspicious of the role of government in 
religious affairs and opposed to the use of force in 
any context. It commonly prioritises associated 
values such as social and gender equality, freedom 
of thought, interfaith harmony, social pluralism 
and economic progress. 
 




Islamisation a process of deepening commitment to standards 
of normative Islamic belief, practice and religious 
identity. Those standards are subject to 
contestation among groups and individuals. 
 Islamisation as an objective is associated with all of 
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